New Guidance on Counter-Insurgency

[Dayuhan]

I think if you can get an insurgent to give up or change sides, you should. Point being he is only likley to do that, once you have subjected him to some harm or threat.

This is not always the case. In the Philippines in the last years of the Marcos regime, the Communist New People's Army had roughly 40k armed members and was approaching strategic parity with a poorly led and demoralized AFP. In '86 Marcos fell, and his network of local governors, mayors and village captains, many of them in place for decades and responsible for a wide variety of abuses that served as recruiting tools for the NPA, were removed and replaced. NPA numbers dropped drastically, and by the mid 90s they were down to 6-8000. The hardcore ideologues stayed with the fight, but the followers abandoned it en masse - not because they were harmed or threatened, but because the regime they perceived as their enemy was no longer there, elections were happening, and there was potential for change within the existing political framework.

Only one case of course, but it illustrates the importance of understanding why the insurgent fights - not "the insurgency", as a whole, but the individual insurgent. The insurgency may be Communist, Islamist, Separatist, what have you, but it's often the case that many of the individual insurgents are fighting not because they are devoted to those goals but because of some more immediate and often more local grievance. Addressing those grievances may not eliminate the insurgency, but it can dramatically reduce the appeal of the insurgency to the populace, reducing recruitment and increasing defections.

[Rex Brynen]

Only one case of course, but it illustrates the importance of understanding why the insurgent fights - not "the insurgency", as a whole, but the individual insurgent. The insurgency may be Communist, Islamist, Separatist, what have you, but it's often the case that many of the individual insurgents are fighting not because they are devoted to those goals but because of some more immediate and often more local grievance. Addressing those grievances may not eliminate the insurgency, but it can dramatically reduce the appeal of the insurgency to the populace, reducing recruitment and increasing defections.

An excellent point. If you look at fluctuations in the strength of Hamas over the years, for example, it soon becomes clear that it has relatively little to do with IDF military activities. Rather, it grew during the first intifada (at a time when the IDF shifted from initial passive tolerance to active countermeasures--in a sense, IDF military action against it enhanced its "street cred"), waned sharply at the beginning of the Oslo process (when it fell to single digits in some polls as a consequence of optimism about the peace process), grew to over 40% by 2006 (because of a combination of collapse of the peace process and poor Fateh/PA governance), and has slowly slipped since then (largely because Hamas governance hasn't been much better, although here it could also be argued that IDF military action has had some effect).

[William F. Owen]

Addressing those grievances may not eliminate the insurgency, but it can dramatically reduce the appeal of the insurgency to the populace, reducing recruitment and increasing defections.

That is all true. It is certainly relevant to the early days of Ulster, but it in no way detracts from the efficacy using force to convince the armed opponent/insurgent that he can gain nothing by using violence to gain his political objective.

... and has slowly slipped since then (largely because Hamas governance hasn't been much better, although here it could also be argued that IDF military action has had some effect).

Combine that with the fact that Hezbollah's standing in the Southern Lebanon is dropping, and it may be filtering through into the Arab and Palestinian consciousness that violence against Israel cannot bring about their desired political objectives. I think the Tamils may be coming to the same conclusion.

[Rex Brynen]

Combine that with the fact that Hezbollah's standing in the Southern Lebanon is dropping

I'm not so certain--the Amal-Hizbullah bloc received an average of 88% of the vote in the Biqa and south Lebanon in the June elections.

[William F. Owen]

I'm not so certain--the Amal-Hizbullah bloc received an average of 88% of the vote in the Biqa and south Lebanon in the June elections.

...and the Southern Lebanon as a whole? My information is that while they are still the majority, support has dropped, to less than what it was. They certainly didn't do so well at the national level.

[Dayuhan]

That is all true. It is certainly relevant to the early days of Ulster, but it in no way detracts from the efficacy using force to convince the armed opponent/insurgent that he can gain nothing by using violence to gain his political objective.


Combine that with the fact that Hezbollah's standing in the Southern Lebanon is dropping, and it may be filtering through into the Arab and Palestinian consciousness that violence against Israel cannot bring about their desired political objectives. I think the Tamils may be coming to the same conclusion.

What if the political objective of the insurgent is reasonable, and they adopted violence in the first place because they were excluded from any peaceful means of resolution?

I'm not saying that violence has no place in fighting insurgency; that would be absurd. I'm saying that before we assume that the solution to insurgency is killing as many insurgents as possible, we might be well advised to try and identify the various motivations driving the actual fighters (not necessarily the leaders) and remove as many of those motivations as possible. Plenty of people who supported and fought for communist insurgencies wouldn't have known Karl from Groucho; they were fighting over local and often personal grievances with government, many of which were legitimate grievances. I suspect that the same may be true of many Islamist insurgencies. Identifying and addressing those grievances can be an effective way of isolating the ideological core of an insurgency from their active and passive support base.

What we may see as defending a government against insurgents may be locally perceived as an outsider taking sides in a local quarrel, not a role that anyone really wants to play. It pays to be very careful before deciding who the "good guys" and "bad guys" are.

In my part of the world, and I suspect elsewhere, Americans in particular have a reputation for being very easy to manipulate. One piece of advice I'd give anyone who is bringing resources (military, financial, whatever) into a chaotic situation is to be very, very wary of anyone who agrees with everything you say, tells you just what you want to hear, and wants to be your loyal ally. An alliance that falls in your lap without hard work on your part is more than likely an attempt to manipulate you and use the resources you have in pursuit of an objective that likely has nothing to do with yours.

[William F. Owen]

What if the political objective of the insurgent is reasonable, and they adopted violence in the first place because they were excluded from any peaceful means of resolution?

I do not know. What is reasonable? If they took up arms, then it suggests that their demands were unreasonable to the Government. Why were they excluded?
You only get fighting when one of the parties cannot be convinced that a peaceful achievement of their policy is either necessary or possible.

The purpose of fighting is to force peace. The conditions for that are many and varied, but my basic premise is that a primary objective in "COIN" should be to force the enemy to give up violent means/military methods of achieving their political goal.

[Dayuhan]

I do not know. What is reasonable? If they took up arms, then it suggests that their demands were unreasonable to the Government. Why were they excluded?
You only get fighting when one of the parties cannot be convinced that a peaceful achievement of their policy is either necessary or possible.

The purpose of fighting is to force peace. The conditions for that are many and varied, but my basic premise is that a primary objective in "COIN" should be to force the enemy to give up violent means/military methods of achieving their political goal.

This assumes that the governments we support are reasonable and responsive to their citizenry, which has not always been the case. I've seen people join insurgencies because their Governments were forcing them out of their homes to make way for dams, plantations, etc. When they tried to protest peacefully they were shot, by government soldiers - and this was a government that the US considered an ally. The people in question were not consulted, and had no opportunity to vote. In cases like this, do we need to force the insurgents to give up "violent means/military methods of achieving their political goal" or do we need to force the government to stop stepping on its people?

Here's a scenario, and I don't think it an unreasonable one:

Tribe A represents a majority of the population in a given jurisdiction. They get their people elected to key positions, and use Government resources in an effort to force tribe B, a traditional rival, off lands that have been in dispute. Insurgents, aware of the conflict, offer aid to tribe B.

As the leader of an outside force, you have tribe A, allied to the Government, and you have tribe B, allied to the insurgents. Do you necessarily want to take the side of tribe A, because you are nominally on the side of the Government and so are they? Or do you want to position yourself as a neutral broker and try to resolve the dispute that led tribe B to ally with the insurgents in the first place? Or do you simply see "insurgents" and "government" and not even look deeply enough to notice the original conflict?

[William F. Owen]

As the leader of an outside force, you have tribe A, allied to the Government, and you have tribe B, allied to the insurgents. Do you necessarily want to take the side of tribe A, because you are nominally on the side of the Government and so are they? Or do you want to position yourself as a neutral broker and try to resolve the dispute that led tribe B to ally with the insurgents in the first place? Or do you simply see "insurgents" and "government" and not even look deeply enough to notice the original conflict?

I assume you are asking me a soldier? I am an instrument of Policy. What Policy am I there to enforce? The source of the discontent may not be open to negotiation and/or subject to conditions of sovereignty that make my interference a bad thing.
It's not my problem to solve. Best I can do is report my impression through my chain of command. It's a problem for my Policy maker.

Now, I may want to "de-escalate" the situation and try and keep peace, but that depends on brokering a cease fire with the insurgents. Will both the indigenous and my own Government allow me to do that? Dunno!

My feeling is that this strikes to the heart of the issue here on SWC.
Soldiers are instruments of policy. Warfare is instrumental. There seems to be a constant desire here to effect Policy. Policy is Political. As a soldier your are absolutely limited to understanding the effects of your action on THE Policy. - not changing the Policy to better match your strategy.

[MikeF]

Excellent discussion probably one of the best that I have read in a long time. I'll highlight several points that jumped out at me.

In my part of the world, and I suspect elsewhere, Americans in particular have a reputation for being very easy to manipulate. One piece of advice I'd give anyone who is bringing resources (military, financial, whatever) into a chaotic situation is to be very, very wary of anyone who agrees with everything you say, tells you just what you want to hear, and wants to be your loyal ally. An alliance that falls in your lap without hard work on your part is more than likely an attempt to manipulate you and use the resources you have in pursuit of an objective that likely has nothing to do with yours.

Tribe A represents a majority of the population in a given jurisdiction. They get their people elected to key positions, and use Government resources in an effort to force tribe B, a traditional rival, off lands that have been in dispute. Insurgents, aware of the conflict, offer aid to tribe B.

This assumes that the governments we support are reasonable and responsive to their citizenry, which has not always been the case. I've seen people join insurgencies because their Governments were forcing them out of their homes to make way for dams, plantations, etc. When they tried to protest peacefully they were shot, by government soldiers - and this was a government that the US considered an ally. The people in question were not consulted, and had no opportunity to vote. In cases like this, do we need to force the insurgents to give up "violent means/military methods of achieving their political goal" or do we need to force the government to stop stepping on its people?

YES, YES, AND YES. Dayuhan's points echo the gap that I've observed between the theory of counter-insurgency and the practice. The environments that we currently work in are complex, fluid, and dynamic. The local populaces operate in a manner that can be both foreign and confusing to American soldiers. Ancient tribes follow different rules of governance and economics. Social norms, customs, and traditions often differ from what we would call normal. Acceptable levels of violence exceed what we would consider stable. It is different for us, but it is normal for them.

Entering into this "game" can be a dangerous endeavor particularly if you are naive to the rules. I've observed a direct correlation from those that take the non-kinetic version of pop-centric COIN to heart and those that are most succeptable to being used or manipulated by the tribal elder that smiles, speaks good english, and only wants to be a friend to the United States.

One of my favorite sheiks put it to me bluntly:

"Mike, only believe half of what I tell you, and if you cannot verify that information from two sources outside of my tribe or family, disregard it. This is Iraq. We have different rules."

As I continue to shape my own thoughts on COIN, I keep coming back to the same limitations- external military force can only be used to provide security. In other words, we can go into an area, become the biggest tribe, and use force and influence to minimize the levels of violence. We cannot install democracy, governance, etc...Those measures will take a concerted effort by the host nation and our state department, NGOs, etc...

One interesting study would be to see how the people voted in Afghanistan and the upcoming Iraq elections. My bet is that 99% of all votes followed the ethnic and tribal make-up of each area.

v/r

Mike

[slapout9]

One interesting study would be to see how the people voted in Afghanistan and the upcoming Iraq elections. My bet is that 99% of all votes followed the ethnic and tribal make-up of each area.

v/r

Mike

I would like to see a study like that myself,for the reason you point out.

[PhilR]

Entering into this "game" can be a dangerous endeavor particularly if you are naive to the rules. I've observed a direct correlation from those that take the non-kinetic version of pop-centric COIN to heart and those that are most succeptable to being used or manipulated by the tribal elder that smiles, speaks good english, and only wants to be a friend to the United States...

As I continue to shape my own thoughts on COIN, I keep coming back to the same limitations- external military force can only be used to provide security. In other words, we can go into an area, become the biggest tribe, and use force and influence to minimize the levels of violence. We cannot install democracy, governance, etc...Those measures will take a concerted effort by the host nation and our state department, NGOs, etc...

Completely agree. Going back to the ISAF Guidance, its continual reference to ISAF's responsibility to the people of Afghanistan, as a seperate issue from our responsability to support the Government of Afghanistan, is "entering into this game" in a very big way.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

[William F. Owen]

As I continue to shape my own thoughts on COIN, I keep coming back to the same limitations- external military force can only be used to provide security. In other words, we can go into an area, become the biggest tribe, and use force and influence to minimize the levels of violence.

If that is all conditional on making the Taliban fear you (and thus scared to harm the population), then I am all for it. Assuming it is, then how do you make the Taliban fear you?

[MikeF]

Completely agree. Going back to the ISAF Guidance, its continual reference to ISAF's responsibility to the people of Afghanistan, as a seperate issue from our responsability to support the Government of Afghanistan, is "entering into this game" in a very big way

I was going to make a point on this by adding up all the times the word WE was used in the current guidance. I lost count. In the long run, it is not so much about what WE do, but on what the Afghanis decide to do.

If that is all conditional on making the Taliban fear you (and thus scared to harm the population), then I am all for it. Assuming it is, then how do you make the Taliban fear you?

Simply put, Find, Fix, Finish, and Exploit.

Here's a start...

Pakistan Army: Taliban Camp Destroyed
Associated Press

Helicopter gunships destroyed a training camp for suicide bombers in northern Pakistan's troubled Swat Valley overnight, killing six Taliban militants, the army said Saturday.

Several more militants were wounded in the camp, located on a small island in the Swat River opposite the town of Charbagh, the army said. It said the operation followed reports on the camp by intelligence agents and local residents.

"The place was being used as a launching pad for preparing the suicide attackers," the army said in a statement, adding that those being trained were to bomb targets in Swat, including the valley's main city of Mingora.

About a week ago, two suicide attacks on consecutive days killed seven people in Swat.

"In the last weeks, the terrorists have been sending suicide bombers to cities in the valley. We have been working to find their source, and today we destroyed that source," Lt. Col. Akthar Abbas, the army spokesman in Swat, told The Associated Press.

Lt. Col. Abbas said another six militants were killed in two separate operations elsewhere in the Valley. In one operation, five Taliban fighters were killed, including a close aid to a high-ranking Taliban commander, Shah Doraan.

The officer said military operations were weakening the Taliban, and that many had chosen to turn themselves in rather than fight.

"With every day passing, the noose is being tightened around them, and that's why more and more of them are opting to surrender," Lt. Col. Abbas said.

v/r

Mike

[Fuchs]

I recall rumours about Soviet Spetznaz officers who allegedly stalked in the night and stabbed mujaheddin and their supporters. That apparently freaked out a lot of mujaheddin.

Another rumour is about the recent conflict; Lithuanian SF patrolling the countryside on motorcycles, hunting for Taleban.


Reinforced rumours may have be effective in creating fear.
That's how the French broke at Sedan in 1940, after all...rumours.

[Bob's World]

What Dave said!

(And I don't rough up CvC, only those who take him a bit too literally and universally. Everything must be read within the context of its time and culture. Sun Tzu was crafted over hundreds of years of experience I believe, so has a broader base of time; but both still colored by their cultures all the same)

And when I speak to populace focused approaches, it is not to say one does not go through the government; but often it is the government that must change the most for them to regain peace with their populace. So my focus is to help the Gov't get straight with its populace, or if they refuse either leave, or help the populace get a Gov't that will (depends on how big the interest is that brought us there); but to simply take the govt as they are and assist them in subduing their populace is simply to add our names to the target list.

Often we refuse to play hardball with governments because we fear the consequences. Often these fears are based in our addictions (energy being a big one); sometimes these fears our based in concerns with other states and what happens if we lose some support or right of access from the one we are engaging. Fear is healthy. It just isn't always rational.

[slapout9]

And when I speak to populace focused approaches, it is not to say one does not go through the government; but often it is the government that must change the most for them to regain peace with their populace. So my focus is to help the Gov't get straight with its populace, or if they refuse either leave, or help the populace get a Gov't that will (depends on how big the interest is that brought us there); but to simply take the govt as they are and assist them in subduing their populace is simply to add our names to the target list.

Bob, I know you are tired of hearing this COG thing come up, but you just explained what I have been trying to say but could not do it. The Government is the COG....the People are the Objective/Target. I think that is critical to understand because just protecting the people or killing them is not going to solve the problem. And your populace based theory is a winning theory and people should read it more carefully and stuff Ask yourself why do people form governments in the first place? Understanding that and why governments fail or succeed will show you how to win.

[Bob's World]

Bob, I know you are tired of hearing this COG thing come up, but you just explained what I have been trying to say but could not do it. The Government is the COG....the People are the Objective/Target. I think that is critical to understand because just protecting the people or killing them is not going to solve the problem. And your populace based theory is a winning theory and people should read it more carefully and stuff Ask yourself why do people form governments in the first place? Understanding that and why governments fail or succeed will show you how to win.

Slap, I understand what you mean when you say the Gov't is the COG, but I also understand that you are a "Wardenphile", and that fits. I would categorize the Gov't more as both a CR and CV; and the Populace as the COG. One does not necessarily try to defeat the COG, but in these internal conflicts more aptly one is out to win the support of the COG. Every populace must have a Govt of some sort, so therefore it is a CR. Failure of Govt is what gives rise to insurgency, so therefore this CR is also a CV and must be "targeted" to fix the points of poor governance.

Even in external conflicts where the COG is likely something that must be "defeated" I rarely think it is something that should be attacked directly. Derive the CRs that make it function in the way that makes it the COG in the first place; and then derive a subset of those CRs to the ones that are also susceptible to successful engagement, and call those CVs and make them the focus of your campaign.

[Fuchs]

I read CvC in original and my stomach cringes every time when I see such 'liberal' uses of the Schwerpunkt concept.

It's time to define a new term, the 'liberal' uses are really not connected with the original meaning any more - they're more like buzzwords.

[Bob's World]

I read CvC in original and my stomach cringes every time when I see such 'liberal' uses of the Schwerpunkt concept.

It's time to define a new term, the 'liberal' uses are really not connected with the original meaning any more - they're more like buzzwords.

He really didn't have much to say about COG. But then I sure never read the original, nor all of any translation.

To me this is a concept he tossed up for consideration, and all real value comes from how it has been applied and thought about by others.