IW and Stability Operations - in your own words - what is the difference?

[Ken White]

I've learned you that you do whatever you can to get a tactical advantage: especially when you're outgunned.

it's always a prob...

Re: juvenile: Other than Afghanistan, all our COIN missions are optional and retreat isn't the same as defeat. If success requires at least a decade, and we're not prepared to stay a decade than engaging means almost certain failure.

Afghanistan is optional, totally, as well. Iraq was not intended to be a COIN job; something changed in May 2003 and we turned from an imminent departure to staying. Thus far, I haven't been able to find out what that was. Could speculate but not here.

That decade bit is Kilcullen and Co. blather -- it's not written in stone, the length can vary depending on many parameters; Kenya only took a nominal seven years, 1952-59 but most of the the actual fighting was confined to 1954-57. Greece also took only three -- conversely, the Philippines took over 15 in total; ten is just an average. Nothing in war is ever certain and the unexpected is always right around the corner...

No, retreat is not the same as defeat -- yet, it can send a message that is better not sent. For example we retreated in front of ME attacks from 1979 until 2001, over 20 of them with the Tehran Embassy seizure and the several messes in Beirut simply encouraging them to keep at it. We weren't defeated but we were embarrassed and looked weak. To the ME, that is an open invitation to attack. They do not fight like we do and they do not think like we do -- they aren't wrong, just different.

Each successive turning of the other cheek only emboldens them. Carter, Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton all erred significantly in that regard -- you don't like where we are; they're the folks you really need to be upset with. They are the reason we're in the ME (Afghanistan is NOT in the ME), the current Admin is merely the reason the place in the ME is Iraq. I'd submit that if one has to be there in a combat mode, Iraq is easily the easiest and best place to be...

You have to tailor your tactics and your parameters to your enemy. You do not need to fight the way he fights but you have to know how he fights and you should be very careful not to send the wrong signals. We did that for almost 30 years and are paying the price for doing so. We could leave Iraq and do it fairly quickly. I'll flat guarantee you that if we do it too quickly we'll have to go back and it will be far worse.

[Presley Cannady]

Iraq was not intended to be a COIN job; something changed in May 2003 and we turned from an imminent departure to staying. Thus far, I haven't been able to find out what that was. Could speculate but not here.

Would certain resignation threats be part of that story?

[Ken White]

speculation...

[Global Scout]

Marc sort of mentioned it in one of his posts here, but words not only have meaning, they shape the way we perceive and explain the world. Imagine a doctor from the 16th century and a doctor from the 21st century explaining the life cycle of a disease. The doctor from the 16th century would not only be limited by available knowledge, but by his vocabulary. Not only do we have more knowledge, we have developed additional terms that explain certain phenomena that simply were inconceivable previously. More to the point, words shape the way we define problems (whether simple or complex), to include the nature of war and how we should respond to it.

After several false starts, under GEN Abrams the Army seemed to have finally relearned that war is not simply war, but that the nature of war varies greatly, as does the way we should wage it. If the book, “Army at Dawn” is considered credible, than at the start of WWII we had officers who didn’t see the value of armor, and sincerely believed they could defeat Rommel’s armor with horse Calvary. This further illustrates our reluctance to change, thus true leaders are those who have the ability to push past these self imposed cultural constraints that limit how and what we think (we’re more like Mao’s communist puppets than we want to admit).

Whether or not irregular warfare is old term in a new dress is not important, what is important is that our Army as a whole didn’t understand the underlying concepts of IW, so therefore resurfacing the term was critical in facilitating a needed cultural change within the Army to enable it to adapt to the type of war it is fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Terms can help facilitate a more accurate understanding of the problem, which is the first step to effectively solving any problem. Is the term IW needed? Definitely!

I’ll take a stab at further mudding the waters by attempting to explain away the apparent conflict between irregular warfare and stability operations.

In short irregular and conventional warfare are broad strategic approaches to solving a problem with armed force. In conventional warfare the objective is defeating the enemy’s fielding armed forces and/or forcing their leaders (usually state leaders) to capitulate by targeting their national infrastructure. In irregular warfare the objective is controlling (which means influencing) the populace. There is a gray area in the middle where there is some overlap, but if one attempts to control the populace with conventional warfare they will fail unless they identify the entire populace as hostile and target them for genocide or dislocation.

To further complicate the matter, unconventional warfare tactics such as guerrilla warfare and sabotage can be used to support conventional warfare. If the focus is on defeating fielding enemy forces or coercing/killing their leadership versus controlling the population, then it is still conventional warfare. An interesting note is that the first Special Forces qualification course was called the PSYWAR course for psychological warfare (or political warfare). At least at one time we understood the true nature of this type of warfare.

Moving on to stability operations, FM 3-0 states we do offensive, defensive, and stability operations in both conventional warfare and IW. This is overly simplistic, but it does clarify that stability operations are an operation, not a strategic approach in itself. It further states there must be a degree of peace (stable to unstable peace) before we can conduct stability operations, which may mean we need to first conduct offensive operations to clear an area, then defensive operations to provide security for the populace while concurrently conducting stability operations in the areas secured.

Stability operations can be conducted in numerous situations, including counterinsurgency operations, peace enforcement operations, humanitarian assistance operations, etc. The objective is to establish, or re-establish a safe and secure environment and facilitate “essential” services. The military’s role can range from providing logistics to security to actually providing the services as a stop gap measure.
Stability operations, if successful, create a window of opportunity for effective political intervention. They are not an end in themselves.

Since most of us are focused on COIN currently (a mission within the scope of IW), stability operations are a supporting operation to help establish conditions to effect government control of an area. As stated earlier there are two types of control, coercive and legitimate. If the situation warrants the government conducts defensive operations (coercive control of the populace), then they strive to achieve legitimate control as quickly as possible with stability operations and other political activities.