Assessing Al-Qaeda (merged thread)

[davidbfpo]

Leah Farrell's comment:

By my count AQ core has resurrected itself three times--each when it had less than 50 members.

Nothing like an Australian to ask painful questions. For those not familiar with Leah's background:http://allthingscounterterrorism.com/about/

On SWC we have looked a number of aspects about AQ, not its ability to resurrect itself.

My first thoughts are: a) it is the resilience of the message, b) 'small is beautiful' easy to finance, organise etc and c) will it work minus OBL?

[ianaj]

Even providing for a total kill of Al Qaeda, the organization is likely to reestablish itself given just a few years time. This is primarily due to the first of three points David made above.

Removing ourselves from a specific Islamic extremist group for a minute and taking a step back to look at the larger picture that is developing within the Muslim world, what we see is a religious revival, a reformation of what it means to be "Muslim". The change is not completely dissimilar to the protestant reformation in its scope or implication. A man wakes up in Cairo, he sees poverty all around him, he has a graduate degree but he drives a taxi, his political leaders are corrupt but there is naught to do about any of it. All of this is filtered through the stories he learned as a child of the Golden Age of Islam, the disparity is obvious.

At this point the man could choose to go several different routes in finding a solution to his problem - but a not wholly illogical route would be to state to himself "all of these man-made institutions have failed, it is time to get back to God, because he is infallible". Indeed, such a sentiment is one often shared among Christian conservatives here in the US.

While most on this path will seek to change their political situation through *relatively* peaceful means (Moorsi & Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) there are many who will see this revival as an opportunity to violently shrug off non-Islamic (Qutb's "jahili") rulers.

AQ's stated purpose is to reestablish the former Islamic Caliphate, but this is only a best case scenario, the realization that this is unachievable is hardly enough to end their campaign. As long as there are rulers in Muslim countries who do not appear to live or govern by Islamic standards, the recruitment pool for AQ will always replenish itself, it will always be capable of funding itself, and now that OBL has set the example, it needs no other charismatic leader to keep it going.

[Fuchs]

The Bolsheviks were down to about four members in exile afaik, but one of the four was their leader, nobody attempted to assassinate them and they later got decisive foreign assistance.

Today's AQ leaves on me the impression of being what its name says; a base. It may have some chieftains, and his certainly has enough indoctrinated supporters (just as the few dozen RAF terrorists had a supportive base of up to several thousand Germans) as well as some groups who think using the franchise is a good idea, but it appears to lack what makes a terror organisation so dangerous: The active, violent terrorists who are available for imagining, planning, preparing and executing terror attacks.

This may be related to the built-in defect of AQ; almost 0% of their terrorists return from a mission.
In the end, suicide attacks may have been too costly (and too much of a recruiting liability).

[jcustis]

ianaj makes excellent points David, and to this specific line:

My first thoughts are: a) it is the resilience of the message, b) 'small is beautiful' easy to finance, organise etc and c) will it work minus OBL?

I'd like to offer that once we (or we/Israel) attack Iran, the message will become resurgent. Amid the disarray that comes from trying to resolve the Iran situation, we won't be able to focus quite as clearly on AQ for a brief spell. I may not look like the AQ of 9/11 vintage, and it make lack the charismatic leader it had in OBL, but it absolutely has the ability to rise from the ashes (if it is actually there now).

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Davidbfpo

On SWC we have looked a number of aspects about AQ, not its ability to resurrect itself.

I disagree David, we have addressed this repeatedly directly and indirectly. A 50 man base is not a small base for a terrorist organization, especially one as creative and capable as AQ after a decade of co-evolving with the various counterterrorism tactics.

jcustis makes an important point

I'd like to offer that once we (or we/Israel) attack Iran, the message will become resurgent.

It doesn't have to be Iran, it can be a Western intervention in any Muslim land. The West will come with the narrative of liberation and AQ and their ilk with come with the narrative the West is oppressing Muslims and that will capture the imaginations of many Muslims who will swell their ranks as cannon fodder. Among that cannon fodder a few will prove to be elite and become prominent leaders in the movement themselves (within or outside the AQ Core). As several have pointed out over the years in SWJ and beyond AQ is a starfish organization.

In the longer run I think history will view AQ as the catalyst for the resurrgent Jihad, or in other words they restarted Jihad in the 21st Century using 21st Century technology to support their historical religious mandate (their narrative), and the Jihad evolved to the point where it can't be decisively defeated at this point. Pandora's box is open and we're not going to put the lid back on it by killing a few HVIs. If previous adminstrations acted decisively before 9/11 then maybe we could have delayed or prevented this global movement, but even that is questionable.

What we can and should do IMO is relentlessly pursue AQ and their followers with intelligence, law enforcement and special operations. It will be long fight, and we need to pursue it in a way that is sustainable and stop pursuing the mythical center of gravities that we incorrectly identified as Afghanistan and Iraq. We have an unsustainable strategy that hinges on the success of nation building and social reform. While we have the best intentions, or actions are seen as offensive to cultures who really don't want to be like us, and thus our actions create anti-bodies that continue to generate more terrorists. This needs to be a shadwo war period. A war/police effort that is sustainable and limits the propaganda value we provide to AQ, since propanda is a key part of what sustains their effort.

I would wager even if we killed the remaining 50 core members (imaginary number), the movement would be severely degraded, but it would still continue . So by all means we should kill the remaining 50, but not fall under the illusion we decisively defeated them. I think they were a base, but now they're an umbrella. Many other movements fall and will fall under their umbrella of ideology and methodology, and that will endure even if the base doesn't.

We need to strap in for a long fight, and simultaneously prepare to deal with other problems related to national security. For a free country we're very reluctant to change course even when we know we're going down the wrong path. I think that is a curse of democracy, in the case of national security it doesn't allow flexibility because strategies come with strong political undercurrents and politicians don't want to admit they were wrong and risk not getting re-elected.

[davidbfpo]

Bill,

Thanks for this. Posted by Davidbfpo:

On SWC we have looked a number of aspects about AQ, not its ability to resurrect itself.

Bill posted:

I disagree David, we have addressed this repeatedly directly and indirectly. A 50 man base is not a small base for a terrorist organization, especially one as creative and capable as AQ after a decade of co-evolving with the various counterterrorism tactics.

I looked around, in particular this arena and found nothing. Nor did my memory help. So if anyone can point to previous threads please help!

OK there is 'Confronting al-Qaeda (Afghanistan to the global level)':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9360 and maybe 'Why so few have joined al Qaeda's jihad':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=13957

[Bill Moore]

David,

There are posts scattered throughout various forums, so this forum is worthwhile to focus the conversation, some examples of past discussions include:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...61&postcount=4 A single post on issue and finance.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...esurgent+Qaeda Hoffman vs. Sageman: Myth of Grassroots Terrorism

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...feat+terrorism How Al-Queda may evolve, or end.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...light=starfish Groups: Bin Laden plans video on 9/11

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ght=Qaeda+Core The Islamist Terrorist Threat to Europe after bin Laden’s Death

[Dayuhan]

c) will it work minus OBL?

I'd submit that a dead charismatic leader is probably the most effective kind: he can be infinitely romanticized without the risk that he'll say or do something inconsistent with the image.

[Bill Moore]

I'd submit that a dead charismatic leader is probably the most effective kind

Moses, Jesus, Martin L. King, Nathan Hale, Che comes to mind among others. Mythology is very powerful.

Can't forget Eddie would go.

Now he's going to bundle them all into one!

David likes an orderly house, where I'm quite content with somewhat of a mess :-)

[Bob's World]

AQ was never so much about the man or the ideology, but rather about "the cause."

Little, other than the Arab Spring, has been designed to address the cause of AQ; or to help address the many diverse causes of the many diverse populaces that AQ is reliant upon to operationalize their vision or tactics. Instead we have worked in many ways to reinforce the causes and to validate the unifying message of AQ, while at the same time being overly focused on the group itself, and those groups that turn to them for support.

While people are being biblical, 50 is plenty for a dead martyr; look what Jesus did with 12...

[davidbfpo]

An article from an Arab paper, id'd via Twitter:http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/poli...ab-spring.html

It opens with:

The emergence of Ansar al-Sharia [Partisans of Islamic Law] in several Arab countries as democratic uprisings sweep across the Arab world represents a new phase of the Salafist-jihadist movement and its strategic goals.