You have assumed, but not demonstrated, that the use of PMCs was a failure. If you can "show me the meat", your contention might hold more weight.
You have assumed, but not demonstrated, that the use of PMCs was a failure. If you can "show me the meat", your contention might hold more weight.
Begin by providing examples ("meaty" and "weighty" would be best) of PMC success stories in Iraq and Afghanistan. Again, read my lips, this site is not about winning a battle here and there - PMCs can kick in doors with the best of them - it is all about winning small wars. Think more operational and strategic rather than tactical - that might help.
Well it was a surprise to me to hear people say that the use of contractors was a failure-especially in Iraq. Yes we've all heard (and heard and heard) in the press about the isolated problems, i.e. 4 BW guys getting killed in Fallujah, etc. But to define the use of contractors to be a failure on the basis of these incidents is very curious from my perspective. Typically you don't hear about contractors' daily positive (and usual) accomplishments-supplies they delivered, people they've trained, etc. However, when something does go wrong it gets plastered all over the press and it makes the people back home think that everything is falling apart over there with respect to the contractors. And things do go wrong in a war zone-nobody totally eludes the fog of war. But to define contractors' efforts as a failure, on the basis of a relatively few highly publicized events, is a mistake from where I stand. Having said that, I joined this forum because of its good rep as a place to engage in intelligent discussion about issues that interest me; so enlighten me if you think I'm wrong about the contractors in the mideast-especially Iraq. I'm certainly not omniscient. BTW, I don't deny that work needs to be done in terms of oversight, etc. but that will come with time.
The highlighted bit above is a gross generalization. Your perspective on the existence of substance behind that statement would be appreciated.Originally Posted by cobot
Yes, you do need to say much more. The simple presence of contractors in numbers does not equate to operational success. If you are able, illuminate the specific positive impacts (beyond simple mission execution) that contractors have had in current COIN ops.Originally Posted by cobot
Hello, Pot calling Kettle, do you read me Kettle? You have assumed even more egregiously on your side of the equation.Originally Posted by cobot
In fact, Bill is the only one who mentioned "failure", and it was certainly not in the form of an assumption. He stated clearly that the contractors have largely failed (meaning they have created more harm than good) in Iraq and Afghanistan, while going on to positive reflections of PMC impacts in other arenas.
Again, you demand detail from others to support their point of view, but have provided absolutely no context to your own stated perceptions. Reread SWJED's post about your direction of thought.
Here, you are the one making a huge assumption. If you believe the members of this board - especially individuals like Bill Moore and SWJED - are less than enthusiastic about the overall impact of contractors on ops in Iraq due to a few media stories, you are sorely mistaken.Originally Posted by cobot
As for myself, I am pretty much in line with the others that have responded. Not just the guns for hire, but the loggie guys, drivers, mechanics, tech geeks and other contractors in theater are there simply because we don't have the bodies in uniform to execute every necessary supporting mission in the larger op. Having people that can ably (more or less) fill those roles is a good thing - in the short term. However, the use of contractors in several of those roles raises many troubling operational issues; i.e. from my perspective, the over-reliance on contractors in many intelligence roles is doing long-term damage to the MI field, from which it will take a tremendous effort to recover. This is a significant negative impact that ripples well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.
To paraphrase what SWJED already told you - take a breath, step back from the base-line issue and look at the big operational picture. Think before you discuss.
And don't assume that the members of this board develop their perspectives from media feeds. Even in the best of interpretations, that is insulting.
Wow-all I am getting is the common perspective that contractors have failed and the request that I prove otherwise. In spite of the fact that day after day, week after week and month after month, supplies are delivered, personnel are trained and security is provided. In short, in spite of the fact that contrators have largely succeeded, I'm being informed that they have failed. Again, a few highly publicized accounts of problems don't translate to a failure.
You don't hear about all the successes (which in terms of quantity absolutely dwarf the failures) precisely because they aren't high profile missions. "Low level" missions like delivery of supplies, training and security all are important parts of COIN. Without "simple mission execution" COIN ops would be greatly handicapped.If you are able, illuminate the specific positive impacts (beyond simple mission execution) that contractors have had in current COIN ops.
And again, my request is for some substantiation as to why he thinks the contractors' efforts could aptly be construed as "largely" a failure. Yes, there have been some sporatic problems but these haven't, to my knowledge, tainted the overall effort. If I'm missing something please enlighten me.In fact, Bill is the only one who mentioned "failure", and it was certainly not in the form of an assumption. He stated clearly that the contractors have largely failed (meaning they have created more harm than good) in Iraq and Afghanistan, while going on to positive reflections of PMC impacts in other arenas.
Hmmm, enlighten me again-where did I ever write this or even insinuate this?you are the one making a huge assumption. If you believe the members of this board - especially individuals like Bill Moore and SWJED - are less than enthusiastic about the overall impact of contractors on ops in Iraq due to a few media stories, you are sorely mistaken.
Now we're getting somewhere-this is the level of analysis I was looking for-thank you.As for myself, I am pretty much in line with the others that have responded. Not just the guns for hire, but the loggie guys, drivers, mechanics, tech geeks and other contractors in theater are there simply because we don't have the bodies in uniform to execute every necessary supporting mission in the larger op. Having people that can ably (more or less) fill those roles is a good thing - in the short term. However, the use of contractors in several of those roles raises many troubling operational issues; i.e. from my perspective, the over-reliance on contractors in many intelligence roles is doing long-term damage to the MI field, from which it will take a tremendous effort to recover. This is a significant negative impact that ripples well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.
Well if somebody has spent time there, they'd have seen the number of times things were done properly-the everyday mission successes which directly feed into the possibility of overall operational success. Again, if I'm missing something please enlighten me.And don't assume that the members of this board develop their perspectives from media feeds. Even in the best of interpretations, that is insulting.
I would have to add to this that using contractors for MI is not only damaging to the field itself, but is also damaging to the reputation of the US forces globally. Many people can understand why contractors would be hred for specific support services (e.g. driving, tech support, etc.), but for something as crucial as MI and interogations? Surely this is sending a message that the administration wishes to bypass all intenational conventions surrounding prisoners - regardless of the "truth" of such a message.
Marc
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
There are many problems with the use of PMC's in COIN. The first thing to consider is their motivation. They are a for profit company. Therefore, what is their motivation to see a solution? That being said soem things to be said. The PMC's are not the resurrection of Hoare and No 5 Commando in the Congo or Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone. The one attempt at contractor direct involvement, MPRI running basic training at Kirkush for the new Iraqi Army did not work. If the mission needs to change, even slightly, that involves a new contract. Therefore the PMC's lack flexibility. The PMC's do good at fixed sight security, but at a certain point you have to have the locals do this, once again we are back to making money. The use of PMC's to escort convoy's works, but they really aren't integrated into military C2. This leads to them being very heavy-handed on the local population, hence a liability in COIN. Finally, the over reliance of PMC's for technological and labor support leads to an overall eroding of a military's capabilities. The PMC's provide a valuable resource for security, but there is no transition plan for them, and due to them being outside the military there are C2 issues and "butter-fly effect" issues that manifest into large problems. So in very limited roles, PMCs are great, but they are not what was and has been done in Africa in the mercenary tales of lore. Many of the PMC folks are great guys with impressive skills and resumes, but they are not the answer in any way shape or mean to COIN, and at worst, contribute to the problem.
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