The argument to partition Iraq

[JD]

The argument to partition Iraq seems superficially attractive given there are discernable ethnic and religious divisions that seem to correspond roughly to geographical areas. Violence against minorities is most prevalent where that minority is sufficiently large or powerful to pose a threat - Rwanda being a horrific example, Fiji being less so. By dividing Iraq into states based on the primary divisions is there a possibility of easing tensions and working towards a sustainable peace not only in Iraq but the broader region?

Pakistan was formed on the basis of creating a nation state for those of similar religion. The process was not pretty, but neither is the current situation in Iraq and all previous efforts to restor peace appear to be in vain.

I pose these questions not becasue I have a firm opinion but becase I am seeking input from those that actually do know about this.

JD

[aktarian]

The problem with partition are several:
-neighbors will quickly move in to establish influence and these new states will be de-facto vassals (think Syria-Lebanon prior to 2005)
-depending on drawing of borders 2 will be landlocked which translates into dependance on neighbors for imports and exports (see above)
-the problem of borders (how and where they are drawn) will be long memory and fuel for tensions (think Kashmir)

[Stu-6]

I would argue that while any partitioning Iraq would be messy and bloody but so is the current situation. Some form of ethnic partitioning is probably the only way to bring any form of stability to the region, short of restoring a ruthless dictatorship. I think the real choice is not between a untied or a divided Iraq, but rather between a terrible ending and a never ending terror.

[aktarian]

I would argue that while any partitioning Iraq would be messy and bloody but so is the current situation. Some form of ethnic partitioning is probably the only way to bring any form of stability to the region, short of restoring a ruthless dictatorship. I think the real choice is not between a untied or a divided Iraq, but rather between a terrible ending and a never ending terror.

But would partition create stability? as I said before, sunni and Kurdish parts would be landlocked. How would they export oil and import stuff? By making agreement with either shi'ia parts or some neighbour. which would leave them at their long term mercy. so when shi'ias would want to squeeze sunnis all they would have to do would be impose embargo on them. Nothing gets out, nothing gets in. Then what? Either sunnis give in to their demands or go to war. First one creates resentment that is likely to lead to war, second one is war. None of which brings stability.

[Rob Thornton]

You'd be surprised how many Kurds understand how much they need a unified Iraq (say at least over the next 20 years) in order to continue to move ahead. They understand regional politics and regional fears better then we do.

Coalition folks will often point to the "map" of Kurdistan you can buy in Dohok or Irbil which includes parts of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. People will often tell you how there are more Kurds in Iran and Turkey then in Iraq, and how that indicates a kind of “manifest destiny”. I think we are coloring that perception some with our own cultural proclivity and historical ref. – we are impatient so the rest of the world must be as well.

The Kurds are not in a rush to failure. I believe they are prudently trying to improve their position from a domestic point of view by arguing for Kirkuk, or buy consolidating some of the gains they have made over the last 5 years and some of the political compromises they have arranged to improve both Kurdish internal and "other" external relationships. Since the people they are primarily engaged with range from Arabs, to Turks to Persians, I'd say they are pretty open minded about what provides them leverage - they are businessmen in that sense. Even with Iran occasionally shelling into Sulimaniya, and the fighting on the Turkish / Iraqi border - they still trade and enter into agreements with those states and their citizens.

They understand that eventually we will leave and they will still have to live in the neighborhood. I think its useful as well to consider the strange relationship between Pakistan and India - one where they were able to exchange fire in the Kashmir Valley, but one where at the same time the President of Pakistan could fly to Delhi to observe a crikett match (read some of Eric Margolis' War at the Top of the World)

Perhaps the best way I heard of describing Kurdistan in its current form is to compare it with Texas - while abroad if you ask a Texan where he is from does he reply - "I'm American", or "I'm from Texas"?

That was one of the things I had a hard time rationalizing being both a foreigner and a transient - What would I do if I were Iraqi (or an Iraqi Kurd)and trying to consider the future?

I believe any discussion around partition or political longevity of Iraq as a state, the various peoples, nations (as an Identity) first needs to be taken from the perspective of is its survivability; and that I'd argue is in large part a matter of indigenous perception and will. It matters less if we think its a good idea, our perceptions are colored by a bias to find a solution we're comfortable with.

You can argue that we are the bill payer and therefore have earned at least an equal vote. While that is true (outside of the Iraqis), the question is what are we trying to purchase, and how much are we willing to pay. While a long drawn out political maturation is messy and costly, it may in the end keep us from having to pay more by further regional intervention down the road, or keep us from waking up the next day and finding out we bought a lemon.

[Stu-6]

But would partition create stability? as I said before, sunni and Kurdish parts would be landlocked. How would they export oil and import stuff? By making agreement with either shi'ia parts or some neighbour. which would leave them at their long term mercy. so when shi'ias would want to squeeze sunnis all they would have to do would be impose embargo on them. Nothing gets out, nothing gets in. Then what? Either sunnis give in to their demands or go to war. First one creates resentment that is likely to lead to war, second one is war. None of which brings stability.

Legit point, but there are other landlocked states out there, it can be done. Solutions can be found perhaps through Jordan or Syria. I guess in my opinion in comes down to the fact that the current situation is definitely unstable, a partition is possibly unstable.

[Jedburgh]

The Brookings Institution, Jun 07: The Case for Soft Partition in Iraq

The time may be approaching when the only hope for a more stable Iraq is a soft partition of the country. Soft partition would involve the Iraqis, with the assistance of the international community, dividing their country into three main regions. Each would assume primary responsibility for its own security and governance, as Iraqi Kurdistan already does. Creating such a structure could prove difficult and risky. However, when measured against the alternatives—continuing to police an ethno-sectarian war, or withdrawing and allowing the conflict to escalate—the risks of soft partition appear more acceptable. Indeed, soft partition in many ways simply responds to current realities on the ground, particularly since the February 2006 bombing of the Samarra mosque, a major Shi’i shrine, dramatically escalated intersectarian violence. If the U.S. troop surge, and the related effort to broker political accommodation through the existing coalition government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki fail, soft partition may be the only means of avoiding an intensification of the civil war and growing threat of a regional conflagration. While most would regret the loss of a multi-ethnic, diverse Iraq, the country has become so violent and so divided along ethno-sectarian lines that such a goal may no longer be achievable....

[Tacitus]

Gentlemen,
Just from what I read in the news, it seems that there is already alot of ethnic cleansing going on in Iraq. There won't be any need for a formal or informal partition of the country if that continues. It will be partitioned through people voting with their feet, not from some agreement on a piece of paper.

It is beyond my forecasting ability to predict how this phenomenon will affect regional or internal security. But the current effort in Iraq is inexorably leading to this, whether intended or not.

I don't see the Maliki government being able to appeal to all the groups/sects/tribes. Does anybody have confidence in it, either here in Iraq? It just seems to me that the Alawi government had more of a secular vibe to it, with leaders taking a more national perspective.

Our political leaders might eventually be tempted to overthrow the Maliki government, thinking it just won't happen with him in charge. JFK felt that way about Diem, and nothing that followed seemed any better in Vietnam, which was already divided in two.

[SteveMetz]

The argument to partition Iraq seems superficially attractive given there are discernable ethnic and religious divisions that seem to correspond roughly to geographical areas. Violence against minorities is most prevalent where that minority is sufficiently large or powerful to pose a threat - Rwanda being a horrific example, Fiji being less so. By dividing Iraq into states based on the primary divisions is there a possibility of easing tensions and working towards a sustainable peace not only in Iraq but the broader region?

Pakistan was formed on the basis of creating a nation state for those of similar religion. The process was not pretty, but neither is the current situation in Iraq and all previous efforts to restor peace appear to be in vain.

I pose these questions not becasue I have a firm opinion but becase I am seeking input from those that actually do know about this.

JD

My position for years has been that partition is probably necessary, but it can't be imposed. As Ralph Peters points out, a large portion of the world's violence today is the direct result of British boundary-drawing. We don't want to assume that role.

[Mark O'Neill]

My position for years has been that partition is probably necessary, but it can't be imposed.

Steve,

Partition is a nice idea from 'our' point of view perhaps, improbable is my guesstimate from my (albeit very limited) understanding of Iraqi society and nationalism, and 'never going to happen' from an assessment of the real poltik of the region. Does anyone seriously think that Turkey and Saudi Arabia are going to idly sit by and let such a thing further destabilise their interests?

I think the whole idea is as much of a wet dream for people looking for a way out of Iraq as the necon ambitions for Iraq in 02/03.

Cheers

Mark

[SteveMetz]

Steve,

Partition is a nice idea from 'our' point of view perhaps, improbable is my guesstimate from my (albeit very limited) understanding of Iraqi society and nationalism, and 'never going to happen' from an assessment of the real poltik of the region. Does anyone seriously think that Turkey and Saudi Arabia are going to idly sit by and let such a thing further destabilise their interests?

I think the whole idea is as much of a wet dream for people looking for a way out of Iraq as the necon ambitions for Iraq in 02/03.

Cheers

Mark

One of the great ironies of the Iraq conflict is that nations like Syria and Saudi Arabia which have a direct interest in the place hanging together and stabilizing haven't done squat to promote that end. Same thing with "old" Europe. The whole pile of them have decided that seeing the United States get its comeuppance is more important than stabilizing SWA. Just like us, they're going to be paying for their stupidity for decades.

[charter6]

Here's the reason partition can't work: There are no logical borders.

People look at the big chunk of Shiites in the south and Kurds in the north and figure that it makes sense to cut the country into three, but it doesn't quite work that way.

1. Baghdad: What the heck do you do about Baghdad? 2 million Shia in Sadr City alone, but if any sort of partition is going to work Baghdad has to be in Sunni-land.

2. Karbala and Najaf: Karbala especially is real far north, but both'd have to be incorporated into a Shia state -- no way Hakim or Sistani would accept losing the historical center of Shia Islam, or the tourism revenue from all the pilgrims.

3. Kirkuk: Neither Sunni Arab nor Kurd are going to accept a real partition without Kirkuk being in their zone. It's already a pain in the neck of an issue -- it'll only get worse if you start talking real partition.

4. Coast-lines: You're cutting of the Kurds and the Sunni from the sea. That leaves a Kurdistan at the mercy of Turkey and Iran for everything, and a Sunni-stan at the mercy of Syria. The only route for oil out of Iraq that doesn't pass down to the Gulf is overland through Turkey. Turkey probably wouldn't allow an independent Kurdistan to use their pipeline, and that's assuming Ankara doesn't just invade. They'd want to make sure that the Kurds didn't grow powerful enough to destabilize Dyarbikir.

5. Ethnic minorities: However you draw the map, you have significant ethnic minorities in each area. People also forget to talk about groups like the Turkomen. If we split off a Sunni-stan, suddenly they're a big chunk of the population of that new state; or at least a much higher percentage than they are in Iraq right now. The ethnic tension isn't going to disappear, it's just going to be devolved down to lower levels of minorities.

[SteveMetz]

Here's the reason partition can't work: There are no logical borders.

People look at the big chunk of Shiites in the south and Kurds in the north and figure that it makes sense to cut the country into three, but it doesn't quite work that way.

1. Baghdad: What the heck do you do about Baghdad? 2 million Shia in Sadr City alone, but if any sort of partition is going to work Baghdad has to be in Sunni-land.

2. Karbala and Najaf: Karbala especially is real far north, but both'd have to be incorporated into a Shia state -- no way Hakim or Sistani would accept losing the historical center of Shia Islam, or the tourism revenue from all the pilgrims.

3. Kirkuk: Neither Sunni Arab nor Kurd are going to accept a real partition without Kirkuk being in their zone. It's already a pain in the neck of an issue -- it'll only get worse if you start talking real partition.

4. Coast-lines: You're cutting of the Kurds and the Sunni from the sea. That leaves a Kurdistan at the mercy of Turkey and Iran for everything, and a Sunni-stan at the mercy of Syria. The only route for oil out of Iraq that doesn't pass down to the Gulf is overland through Turkey. Turkey probably wouldn't allow an independent Kurdistan to use their pipeline, and that's assuming Ankara doesn't just invade. They'd want to make sure that the Kurds didn't grow powerful enough to destabilize Dyarbikir.

5. Ethnic minorities: However you draw the map, you have significant ethnic minorities in each area. People also forget to talk about groups like the Turkomen. If we split off a Sunni-stan, suddenly they're a big chunk of the population of that new state; or at least a much higher percentage than they are in Iraq right now. The ethnic tension isn't going to disappear, it's just going to be devolved down to lower levels of minorities.

Baghdad is currently self partitioning. Perhaps it could be an independent free city under international administration. Mosul is actually more of a problem than Kirkuk. If there was a program to share oil revenues, who actually administers Kirkuk becomes fairly unimportant. I think they US would have to retain a major presence in Kurdistan, particularly along its borders. Other pipelines could be built. Iraq's access to the sea is pretty limited anyway. This really struck me while standing on the docks at Um Qasr in 2003.

[Tom Odom]

Baghdad is currently self partitioning. Perhaps it could be an independent free city under international administration. Mosul is actually more of a problem than Kirkuk. If there was a program to share oil revenues, who actually administers Kirkuk becomes fairly unimportant. I think they US would have to retain a major presence in Kurdistan, particularly along its borders. Other pipelines could be built. Iraq's access to the sea is pretty limited anyway. This really struck me while standing on the docks at Um Qasr in 2003.

I see Steve as closest to the mark with the point that Baghdad has self-partioned. That was our assessment on 1990: that a fragmented Iraq was the most likely outcome of any march on Baghdad. I feared as much in 2003 and said so. Now I would say to you is that it matters not what we as Western outsiders want to happen. What does matter is what the "Iraqis" want to happen. In the circumstances of today, inaction on their part is action, meaning that a neutral stance toward survival of the state is not really neutral. It is pro-fragmentation. I also see culture playing a strong role in that regard; Arab and Muslim cultures are fatalistic in accepting what happens as fate. The tendency to talk about about as it happens versus actively influence what does happen is strong. None of this in any case implies a nice, neat solution--which is where I see the proponents of partition going astray. It has not been pretty so far and it is not likely to get in prettier in the near to mid-term.

Best

Tom

[SteveMetz]

I see Steve as closest to the mark with the point that Baghdad has self-partioned. That was our assessment on 1990: that a fragmented Iraq was the most likely outcome of any march on Baghdad. I feared as much in 2003 and said so. Now I would say to you is that it matters not what we as Western outsiders want to happen. What does matter is what the "Iraqis" want to happen. In the circumstances of today, inaction on their part is action, meaning that a neutral stance toward survival of the state is not really neutral. It is pro-fragmentation. I also see culture playing a strong role in that regard; Arab and Muslim cultures are fatalistic in accepting what happens as fate. The tendency to talk about about as it happens versus actively influence what does happen is strong. None of this in any case implies a nice, neat solution--which is where I see the proponents of partition going astray. It has not been pretty so far and it is not likely to get in prettier in the near to mid-term.

Best

Tom

I think we need to get on board and support the idea of reestablishing the "caliphate." But we need to tell the militants that it will not be the Abbasid one, but the more historically terminous one: the Ottoman caliphate. Then let them chew on that.

[Jedburgh]

Foreign Service Journal, Mar 08: After the Surge: Toward an 18-State Federation

....We should not perpetuate the fiction that there are military, regional or economic solutions to a problem that is fundamentally one of internal Iraqi political structure and identification. Nor should we assume that an Iraq consisting of a Shiite-dominated core with a semi-independent Kurdistan and a marginalized Sunnistan will eventually be stable. The current political program for Iraq is to attempt to garner concessions from the Shiite government on behalf of Sunnis. The very nature of this process perpetuates and hardens the ethnic divisions that are at the heart of the dysfunction in the Iraqi state.

The only viable prospect for a unified and stable Iraq at present is to change the political framework so that the basic organizing principle is 18-state federalism. Thisironically, is where Amb. Bremer was headed with his caucus system in the fall of 2003, before the plan was aborted. It is not clear whether it would have worked then, but it is doubtful that anything else will work now. The structure of the Iraqi state must change fundamentally in order to break up ethnicity as the country’s core organizing concept......