"Standards of Excellence"

[bumperplate]

I think Pete's last comment is probably at the 99% solution. I know my biggest struggle is that I keep seeking to be honest in my assessments and messages. I've grown tired of reading OERs and seeing briefings that are gross exaggerations if not lies.

I do what I can in front of my Soldiers to portray the confidence, but more than confidence, I think passion carries a larger effect. When your troops see that you're passionate about the mission and about taking care of them, that carries a lot of weight. Passion is much more durable than mere confidence.

In the end analysis, I have come to the conclusion that I will never make it to the top shelf ranks in the Army. I am not a self-promoter and cannot keep my mouth shut when I see crap going on. It will probably cut my career short but so be it. All else that we do pales in comparison to combat and that's my focus - training for and leading in combat.

I do wonder though, it seems like the people with the best handle on military/combat leadership are those on this and similar sites, while those with the real power in the military just don't pay attention. I'm not totally ignorant to the time demands our senior leaders have. And I don't think I'd have a problem if they just took over the garrison and admin stuff and then let the real combat leaders take over once they're wheels up and leaving CONUS.

[Fuchs]

Don Vandergriff and others wrote a lot about that problem and possible solutions.

[Tyree]

And so did Doug Macgregor. They are both now on the outside looking in. Both were men of great talent. Both had something vital to say. But both proved once again it is not what you say, the validity of your message, but how you say it and to whom.

[Ulenspiegel]

What would be the problem to implement an officer training/education program as it existed in the German Reichswehr 1920-1932?

IMHO a good reading in respect to different leadership and different approaches to officer candidates selection is Jörg Muth's book "Command Culture" published in June 2011, it is the book version of the author's dissertation.

[JMA]

What would be the problem to implement an officer training/education program as it existed in the German Reichswehr 1920-1932?

IMHO a good reading in respect to different leadership and different approaches to officer candidates selection is Jörg Muth's book "Command Culture" published in June 2011, it is the book version of the author's dissertation.

Muth's book at £25 is expensive to buy but should be very educational.

In the meantime here is a US document from 1942 on the broader subject of German Army training.

German Military Training

Given the economic condition of Germany after Versailles and the restrictions on the military the methods used to build that war machine should indeed be studied as there must be lessons for other nations in there somewhere.

[Fuchs]

I'd rather look at the Foreign Military Studies series of documents than those wartime intelligence briefs, which were ridden with mistakes.

For example, Hitler did not solve the problem how to create an officer corps for a 300 division force; even counting Luftwaffe divisions, there were only about half that many, and army officers were always short in supply.
A 300 division force with a (normal) divisional slice of 50k personnel would have been a force of 15 million men; it would have required French- or Soviet-style mobilization to come even close!

Another example is the SA, which became quite irrelevant in 1934 and was certainly not the kind of important organisation in 39/40 as described in that 1942 document.

[JMA]

I'd rather look at the Foreign Military Studies series of documents than those wartime intelligence briefs, which were ridden with mistakes.

For example, Hitler did not solve the problem how to create an officer corps for a 300 division force; even counting Luftwaffe divisions, there were only about half that many, and army officers were always short in supply.
A 300 division force with a (normal) divisional slice of 50k personnel would have been a force of 15 million men; it would have required French- or Soviet-style mobilization to come even close!

Another example is the SA, which became quite irrelevant in 1934 and was certainly not the kind of important organisation in 39/40 as described in that 1942 document.

I did reply to this before but I think it got lost during the recent 'server issues' so I will repeat it.

Any of this 'Foreign Military Studies' stuff available online?

In the absence of available/cheap/in English alternatives the document I posted the link for is a good place to start looking at this particular subject.

[ganulv]

Given the economic condition of Germany after Versailles and the restrictions on the military the methods used to build that war machine should indeed be studied as there must be lessons for other nations in there somewhere.

Have you seen Triumph of the Will? I watched it for the first time recently. My mouth might literally have hung open during the initial footage featuring units from the National Work Service.

[Ulenspiegel]

A very good dissertation on the structure, selection, training and expansion of the German officer corps is:

Autor: Richhardt, Dirk
Titel: Auswahl und Ausbildung junger Offiziere 1930-1945
Titel (eng): Selection and trainig of young officers 1930-1945
Erscheinungsjahr: 2002
Fachbereich: Fachbereich Geschichte und Kulturwissenschaften, Philipps-Universität Marburg
Institut: Geschichte und Kulturwissenschaften
Format: Portable Document Format (PDF 2.2M)
URL: http://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/diss/z2005/0100/
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-z2005-01003
DDC-Sachgruppe: 943 Geschichte Deutschlands

This publication (only in German) gives a lot of hard numbers and describes in detail the dramatic chages of the officer training after 1941 due to the high losses at the ostfront. The combination with Muth's "Command Culture" and parts of Crevelt's "Fighting Power" gives a quite complete picture for the Greman side.

[bumperplate]

I sat through an IPR today where people talked about the CG going ballistic about "dog & pony" show type of stuff. Then I come home, read this thread and I have to just laugh.

The system is not going to change. It is what it is.

I wonder if there are any units that don't get distracted by the superfluous, garrison, limp-wristed crap.

[JMA]

Have you seen Triumph of the Will? I watched it for the first time recently. My mouth might literally have hung open during the initial footage featuring units from the National Work Service.

I did reply to this before but I think it got lost during the recent 'server issues' so I will repeat it.

I tend to avoid the political aspects of Germany of that era and focus upon selected aspects of military interest to me. The main one is how after Versailles they put in motion the rebuilding of their military under severe economic and other constraints. There are lessons to be learned there.

[Fuchs]

The FMS series is available online somewhere), but not for free.

The cheapest way to read one specific FMS study (IIRC 54) that I found was to travel to a distant German archive and read it there, followed by ordering photocopies for 80 bucks.

[ganulv]

I've grown tired of reading OERs and seeing briefings that are gross exaggerations if not lies. […] I am not a self-promoter and cannot keep my mouth shut when I see crap going on. It will probably cut my career short but so be it.

A friend told me that her grandfather (a career state legislator) once said to her that an important part of being an effective politician was never loosing a grip on the difference between what he told everyone he was convinced was the truth and what he himself was convinced was the truth. I don't know how many people in positions of power think like that. I kind of suspect that a great many of them don't even rise to that level morally, but maybe I am just being cynical.

[Pete]

I am not a self-promoter and cannot keep my mouth shut when I see crap going on. It will probably cut my career short but so be it.

After the Mexican War U.S. Grant had a big Report of Survey against him when he had been the Quartermaster Officer of his regiment when it was in the Midwest during an extremely severe winter. The regiment was spread out all across the land in detachments, companies and battalions. Grant did all he could to keep them fed, with firewood and forage. When spring came Grant had to face the Report of Survey, and afterwards he had to go about a year without pay to pay it off.

When he was the senior officer of a group sent to California around 1850 the people were hit with a cholera epidemic when they crossed Panama. Men and women, officers and enlisted, children too were shi**ing themselves to death. Grant said it was the worst thing he saw during his military service, war or peace. When Grant got the group to San Francisco he get no credit from his regiment or the Army for his leadership during the affair.

After Grant got the old heave-ho from the Army his wife left him and moved back in with her father. Everyone thought U.S. Grant was an alcholohic loser.

Perceptions changed after he captured Vicksburg. In 1864 Lincoln decided he needed a real soldier in command of the Army of the Potomac, not a showboat, a prancer and dancer, or someone who would juggle the books to cover up a supply discrepancy on the property book. Grant's tactics were crude and bloody in '64-'65 but he got the job done. He was never a showboat and he was wearing a mud-splattered private's tunic when Lee surrendered to him.

[bumperplate]

I wonder if our Army/Society/Current operational environment would ever allow for a repeat of Grant's story as told above. I suspect it could not happen. We are too worried about metrics with regard to leadership, rather than mission results.

[Steve Blair]

After Grant got the old heave-ho from the Army his wife left him and moved back in with her father. Everyone thought U.S. Grant was an alcholohic loser.

Perceptions changed after he captured Vicksburg. In 1864 Lincoln decided he needed a real soldier in command of the Army of the Potomac, not a showboat, a prancer and dancer, or someone who would juggle the books to cover up a supply discrepancy on the property book. Grant's tactics were crude and bloody in '64-'65 but he got the job done. He was never a showboat and he was wearing a mud-splattered private's tunic when Lee surrendered to him.

Grant's wife didn't leave him. She'd periodically lived with her family, as was quite common during this time. And Grant's star began to rise with Lincoln during the Donelson period, with more motion coming in the aftermath of Shiloh. But that's just the historian talking. Carry on...

To address bumperplate's comment, Grant was in many ways an exception even during his day. Many officers in the pre-Civil War army would look very familiar to us today. Drones and careerists were just as common then in terms of the overall force (remember that we're talking about an army that didn't often clear 20,000 total strength and was often under 15,000). For every Civil War success we remember, there were at least 5 duds from the Regular ranks.

[Pete]

... Grant was in many ways an exception even during his day. Many officers in the pre-Civil War army would look very familiar to us today. Drones and careerists ...

What was exceptional about Grant was that he made it to the top and won the war nobody else could. The problem with this precedent from history is that America won't put a guy like him in charge until it's 5 or 10 minutes until Midnight and the end of the world as we know it is impending. As Churchill said, America can always be relied upon to do the right thing after it has exhausted all of the other alternatives.

[Steve Blair]

What was exceptional about Grant was that he made it to the top and won the war nobody else could. The problem with this precedent from history is that America won't put a guy like him in charge until it's 5 or 10 minutes until Midnight and the end of the world as we know it is impending. As Churchill said, America can always be relied upon to do the right thing after it has exhausted all of the other alternatives.

It's the nature of the system, Pete, and I think you'll find that the US is not alone in this respect. We just talk about our failings more than most other nations do.