Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success

[Ken White]

Especially by moi...

I was still speaking about the backfills in the snippet your cut, some of whom are ready and it's a win-win and some of whom aren't ready and then the platoon is worse for the departure.

I addressed that reality with my first bullet. All platoons go in cycles, they get really good folks and are well trained then they have bad weeks or months due to our total Army totally screwed up personnel system.

That first bullet mentioned the fact that competence is not totally experience derived and is not time dependent -- yet the SYSTEM says those are the criteria...

I did mention that Shalikasvili et.al. were exceptions and they are. I realized you were addressing the NCO backfill. I applied those Links to counter your earlier point that the intellectual capacity might not be present as well as to make the point that they and others not as exceptional, just good average Officers, left units, generally in far worse conditions for the units and the Army than we are now experiencing -- and the units survived...

That intellectual capacity it is available but we will have to change the way we do business. Backfill is always available and my first bullet above also made that point -- we do okay when we fill and operate at less than design optimum -- but it takes an 'emergency' to allow (deliberately chosen word) us to do so. That, too, argues for changes...

[Shek]

I applied those Links to counter your earlier point that the intellectual capacity might not be present

Once again I think you're misapplying what I said. There's certainly plenty of talented, intelligent, and intellectual OCS officers out there - some of them are even my friends

I was speaking to using an OCS only model as per Wilf's allusion to the IDF, Germany, and Sweden. In increasing the percentage of OCS commissioned officers from 15% to 45% of all officers, we have increased the number of below CAT II commissioned officers.

As a result, the share of OCS-IS candidates with a U.S. Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score below Category II has increased from 15 percent in 1997 to 35 percent in 2007 (see Figure 5). This is significant because the AFQT score is used to determine basic qualification for enlistment, and to help predict future academic and occupational success in the Armed Forces.

If we were to increase OCS accessions even further, then you'd expect that the increase would have to dig deeper. If we screened harder and encouraged more OCS amongst the enlisted and NCO, then we could be more selective and I'm sure you could reverse this trend to some degree, but at the cost of your NCO corps. The authors make this exact point.

6. NCOs are sergeants. Similar to those found increasingly in professional armies, the U.S. Army’s NCO Corps consists of seasoned enlisted soldiers with increasing levels of rank, responsibility and authority. While subordinate to commissioned officers and not commissioned themselves, they are invaluable to the leadership of troop formations. Their direct leadership of
soldiers and their focus upon building and sustaining individual proficiencies allows commissioned officers to focus upon collective training, as well as the organizational and strategic levels of leadership. Importantly, NCOs are critical not just to the development of soldiers but to the development of junior officers as well, with whom they team in the effective leadership of
formations. Any improvements to an army’s officer corps gained at the expense of its NCO corps will likely have a deleterious effect upon that army.

[Ken White]

Once again I think you're misapplying what I said. There's certainly plenty of talented, intelligent, and intellectual OCS officers out there - some of them are even my friends

I didn't misapply in the last case, though my attempt at finesse was fairly clumsy. In this case, I'm not sure I'm misapplying you -- or the authors of the paper -- but

I was speaking to using an OCS only model as per Wilf's allusion to the IDF, Germany, and Sweden. In increasing the percentage of OCS commissioned officers from 15% to 45% of all officers, we have increased the number of below CAT II commissioned officers.

this statement could lead one to believe that intellectual capability is being questioned. With regard to that specific question, do recall that the AFQT categories generally show nominal learning capacity. They are NOT precise indicators. The issue, though, is really how much intellectual capacity is needed at what level.

I have no question that a number of really bright Officers with advanced degrees in many disciplines are needed in the Army. I also am firmly convinced that the probable number of those is the 20-25% of all Officers range and that such capability (and the degrees) are not required for most. The system that specifies that everyone must have a fair shot is at fault because it forces the Army to act as though all Officers will attend the War College and serve in positions determining national policy and / or strategies in a variety of fields of Army interest.

Patently absurd because all Officers do not have a prayer of doing that. My contention is that the Army cannot make a determination of an Officers potential until he's a fairly senior Captain (or has at least five years of service. Not to worry, that won't happen...

However, we are spending vast amounts of money producing people that are effectively over qualified for what they do most of the time in most assignment. They know this (as you and Scmedlap say) and so do all the civilian job headhunters.

...The authors make this exact point.

Yes they do and I've heard that tale for years. It is no more accurate now, I believe, than it was all the time I served or was a DAC. This statement which you highlighted is particularly misleading:

"Importantly, NCOs are critical not just to the development of soldiers but to the development of junior officers as well, with whom they team in the effective leadership of formations. Any improvements to an army’s officer corps gained at the expense of its NCO corps will likely have a deleterious effect upon that army."

Specious. While true to an extent it is as hyperbolic as my linking to John Vesey -- who did not get sent to get a degree until he was a 41 year old LTC --There are two glaring problems with it.

First, If SFC Pfugabosky goes off to OCS or gets a direct commission, SSG Heebly will become the PSG -- and he could just as likely be a far better NCO than was the guy he replaced. So the mentoring up process ALWAYS continues. As I also mentioned earlier, it has been my observation that all the NCOs that go to OCS are not the best and the brightest; some are, some are not.

Secondly -- it is a sad indictment of our very flawed initial entry training. If we better trained new officers, there would not be a presumed need for the NCO up-mentor effort.

As an aside, I'd say in my observation over the years that about half the new LTs didn't need it anyway and some who did (and some who did not) had pathetic people who should not have been NCOs much less PSGs. Can't learn much from that kind...

I think that Schmedlap hit the nail on the head with his comments about the reality of the Army experience for many, and those who were excited about the Army are often turned off. In terms of my comments about masking, this is also a product of the way the Army has defined itself - command is everything, and staff is the penance you pay for the opportunity. If this is the culture your propagate, when you have those who are told that you must pass a gate (ACOMs in command) and then the reward is taken away (the knowledge that you remain competitive for battalion command) through masking, then we shouldn't be surprised when people get upset and lose faith when the rules of the game are changed.

I agree that Schmedlap has very valid points and that turn-off is BIG problem -- and that is the Army's fault and part of it is the designed and desired over strength in Officers as compared to the number of EM. If you have more people than you can productively employ, those not so employed will get bored and get in trouble -- or they will leave. I'm totally unsure why the Army cannot figure that out -- or perhaps they have but don't care, as long as funds are adequate, Congressionally dictated stuff will get done...

I think we need to change the definition of a successful career such that command isn't the only thing celebrated, which I think is the same thing you're getting at...

Not really. It will not happen but I strongly believe that fewer officers overall; a command track and a staff track would provide far greater capability. It won't happen because Congress will insist on 'fairness' -- foolishly, it is not attainable; people differ in their desires and capabilities and both those factors impact which officers do what and how well they do those things. Plus, Congress does NOT want an Army that is too good; fear of the standing Army is deeply embedded in their little psyches.

However what can and should happen is that the Army should pursue all sources of commissioning equally -- and treat all sources the same up through MAJ or perhaps even LTC; it should reduce Officer strength to get to a figure less than 10% of enlisted strength. Lacking separate Cmd and Staff tracks, I'd agree that command should be removed as a defining qualification. It would, however, be helpful if the Army would acknowledge 'that everyone a generalist' is a bad idea. Everyone simply cannot do everything well. The square pegs in round holes bit.

However, I'm not sure how you mean exactly between competitiveness and competence.

Competence is simply the book definition of the word. Competence in not IMO the goal of the promotion system, competitiveness is. You don't really have to do a great job (in most units, most of the time -- there are a few -- very few -- exceptions), you just have to have more Attaboys than your peers and you have to have done all the right things to remain competitive. You also must not have outshone your peers too badly -- or hacked them off -- because then they will insure, some how, some way, you are not seen as competitive.

As I said earlier, time and experience are not guarantors of good performance or capability, much less competence -- nor is education for most Army things. Nor is having all the blocks checked whereby one is graded on what one has done (or not done) and only rarely on how well one has done that thing. Yet those are the criteria for promotion. Not a test, not demonstrated competence. Certainly not tactical competence. All generally speaking, there are a few -- very few -- exceptions, probably more now than ten years ago but still not enough.

Eden said it well above:

"For instance, if he hasn't been to the branch Advanced Course, he can't be a company commander no matter how talented. As another example, a superb captain, a peerless leader of men, with advanced degrees in Arabic and two tours under his belt in Iraq, could not be made commander of a PRT in, say, Iraq, because that is a liuetenant colonel's slot."

[82redleg]

I don't think that we need to create "more" of anything in the officer corps- the officer corps is just too big as it is.

We have too many staff positions, and not enough command positions for traditional commissioned officers (yes, I know WOs are commissioned at CW2)- to me, these officers exist to command, or be 2ICs (ready to step in to command). If they aren't doing that, they shouldn't be there.

My solution, and I haven't worked out exactly how to do this, is with SNCOs, WOs or LDOs (I haven't worked out exactly the rank and pay yet). This will cut down on the number of commissioned officers sitting on staffs waiting for command.

For example, a BN staff should consist of only 2 CPTs- the operations officer and the logistics officer (who is a logistician). The personnel officer, intel officer, commo officer and motor officer would be better filled with SNCOs or WOs, anyway. The multitude of 1LTs/CPTs that fill up S3 shops would also be better filled with SNCOs or WOs (does it really take a CPT to be the night battle captain in a BN TOC?- I think a strong SSG is a better choice). This would severly cut the competition to be a CO CDR, allowing us to assess the strongest LTs for promotion, and then let the stronger CPTs command longer. For instance, in a BCT there are at least 9 FA CPTs waiting on staff for the 3 BC jobs. MI is even worse (I think its 8 staff CPTs for 1 CDR). SIG is as bad, and AG and CHEM don't even have a command, unless they are selected to take an HHC.

Someone mentioned a BN that was 60% strength on officers, that functioned just fine. I'm sure it did. 2 of every 3 PLTs should be led by SNCOs (or WOs, or heck, make them LDOs and pay them LT pay if that is more). Only 1 PL / CO, plus the XO is bucking for CO CMD. Only 1 staff CPT (the ops guy) waiting on CMD. Only 1 MAJ / BN (the 2IC- I think he should be called Deputy CDR, not XO). So, a BN has only 3 officers (plus a logistician) in the HQ, plus 3 officers per CO (HHC, with specialty PLTs, may have more, with both PLTS led by officers), but that still leaves a 4 line CO BN (most maneuver BNs these days) with 18 officers, plus a logistics officer- a far cry from the 45 or so authorized now.

Same thing can be done at the BCT level. The army recognizes 6 WFFs, which information and leadership tie together to create combat power. The BCT CDR should be a BG (the name implies it), with a COL Deputy. The CoS (or XO) is a LTC, and those three should take care of the leadership element of combat power. 7 MAJs should represent each of the WFFs, plus the integrating function of information. All other specialties, which perform a single function, only rate a CPT. If you can't plan and supervise the execution of your specialty as a CPT, you shouldn't have made CPT. So, one "Sustainment" MAJ integrates the sustainment WFF, with CPTs/WOs/SNCOs that work personnel, trans, supply/services, maint, medical, etc. A "Protection" MAJ integrates the CPTs that supervise ADA, MP, EN, etc. Again, this results in drastic cuts, an allows LTs and CPTs to remain PLs and CO CDRs much longer. Why does the BCT CHOPs need to be a MAJ who is waiting for the jobs that "really count"? Why can't the OPNS SGM perform the duties of CHOPS- he definitely has the experience, and probably more "wasta".