Son Tay raid: stop or go? Vietnam

[JMA]

What you say is true. What you and I apparently cannot say at this time is whether or not that move was known -- satellites and UAVs are better and more prolific now but they then existed... -- and the 'Raid' allowed to proceed for other reasons. Not saying that was the case, just that whether it was or not is not known to us.

You may assume that it was an intel failure. Could well be, even likely correct. However, having worked in the belly of the beast for a day or two, I've learned to reserve judgement. Folks in the ME and Asia are not the only ones who can makes thing to be not always what they seem...

Ken,

Son Tay can most certainly be listed as a raid that failed (to achieve its objective) because of poor intel or the incompetent use of the available intel.

Much has been written about the Son Tay raid the conduct of which by the men on the ground was nearly flawless.

Having been involved in some raid activity myself it is the waiting that gets to you. You want to get it done and over with. Son Tay had a specific weather/moon phase window of opportunity which limited possible action to a few days in each month. They wanted to go in October but were scheduled for November. The prospect of another delay was not what the commanders (and probably the troops) wanted.

Here is the problem: From here

Operation Kingpin, the final phase of the rescue of the POWs at Son Tay, was approved on November 18. The following day Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, the new chairman of the JCS, received information that the POWs had definitely been moved to Dong Hoi. Unfortunately, the planners nixed the idea of moving on Dong Hoi. They felt that the raiders had rehearsed for months for a raid on Son Tay and that shifting camps at the last minute might prove to be disastrous.

Sums it up pretty neatly doesn't it?

What should Moorer have done? Ask any officer cadet and he will tell you that you cancel the Son Tay operation and plan a new one for Dong Hoi.

In fact lets take this further... go ask your grandson or any random kid of say 15 year old and ask him the following:

You have been rehearsing for months to attack a POW camp and free American prisoners there. You find out two days before the raid is to take place that the prisoners had been moved to a new camp. What would you do?

a) Attack the empty camp anyway.
b) Cancel the operation and prepare a new plan to free the POWs from the new camp.

Now one must surely wonder how this guy made it to CJCS?????????????

When imbecilic decisions like this are made at the top of the military it just opens the door for politicians to demand and get oversight of military operations to the micro management levels.

Then of course the spin doctors got hold of it and turned a flawlessly executed yet failed operation into an act of heroism (which it was at operational level) instead of a case stud in the failure of command decision making at the most senior level of the US military (which it most certainly was).

This was a strategic raid and the commanders were able to draw from the best available and have plenty of time to prepare which makes it different from raids conducted on the fly by units engaged on a battlefield.

Simmons was of the best (as once again proven by the Ross Perot funded Iran raid) but if you have an accurate 'weapon' and you don't know how to aim it then failed raids like Son Tay happen. Thank heaven there were no KIA or serious casualties.