New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Often it takes frustrated people with no real material wants but a need for a "mission" in life. Once they find that "mission" they become the hardest ones to deal with, because you can't really fill their needs.

Mr. Blair,
coincidence makes that I am attempting to refine a behavioral approach of terrorism of my own and I find your assumptions attractive.

My comment would be pages long if I attempted to express myself as clearly as I would like about that. But let’s say that it all bears upon a frustration/action relationship; when inhibition does not take precedence over action as it happens in a majority of cases.

Most among us who are interested in that problem tackle it in wondering first why people become terrorists because we, who are not terrorist and unlikely to yield to similar behavior, are emotionally inclined to ask this question thus way.

My point is that since it proved to be fruitless until then, might it not be more enlightening to turn the question upside down?
That is, given that so many people are exposed to the presumed generating conditions for terrorism, or “root causes,” the triggering factors and catalysts--both for religious and political mobilization--that may lead to engagement in violent activity, why is it that so few people actually become terrorists?

When violent death within a relatively short lap of time is the likely outcome of action, then it is logical that inhibition will take precedence over action because survival (as drive originating in our Reptilian Brain) is theoretically much more powerful than unfulfilled endeavor or expectations in life. This seems explaining why terrorists are not more numerous.

Therefore, if unfulfilled expectations are the cause of the initial frustration before a person become a terrorist--and I believe as you do that they are in many cases—then they are unlikely to be the cause any longer once this same person is indeed become a terrorist. A change powerful enough to take precedence over the “rules” of the Reptilian Brain happened between these two events, if ever the solution lies here. But how might we “technically,” if I may say so, envisage it?

Regards,

[SteveMetz]

Mr. Blair,
coincidence makes that I am attempting to refine a behavioral approach of terrorism of my own and I find your assumptions attractive.

My comment would be pages long if I attempted to express myself as clearly as I would like about that. But let’s say that it all bears upon a frustration/action relationship; when inhibition does not take precedence over action as it happens in a majority of cases.

Most among us who are interested in that problem tackle it in wondering first why people become terrorists because we, who are not terrorist and unlikely to yield to similar behavior, are emotionally inclined to ask this question thus way.

My point is that since it proved to be fruitless until then, might it not be more enlightening to turn the question upside down?
That is, given that so many people are exposed to the presumed generating conditions for terrorism, or “root causes,” the triggering factors and catalysts--both for religious and political mobilization--that may lead to engagement in violent activity, why is it that so few people actually become terrorists?

When violent death within a relatively short lap of time is the likely outcome of action, then it is logical that inhibition will take precedence over action because survival (as drive originating in our Reptilian Brain) is theoretically much more powerful than unfulfilled endeavor or expectations in life. This seems explaining why terrorists are not more numerous.

Therefore, if unfulfilled expectations are the cause of the initial frustration before a person become a terrorist--and I believe as you do that they are in many cases—then they are unlikely to be the cause any longer once this same person is indeed become a terrorist. A change powerful enough to take precedence over the “rules” of the Reptilian Brain happened between these two events, if ever the solution lies here. But how might we “technically,” if I may say so, envisage it?

Regards,

Have you read Marc Sageman's book on this issue?

[Steve Blair]

Therefore, if unfulfilled expectations are the cause of the initial frustration before a person become a terrorist--and I believe as you do that they are in many cases—then they are unlikely to be the cause any longer once this same person is indeed become a terrorist. A change powerful enough to take precedence over the “rules” of the Reptilian Brain happened between these two events, if ever the solution lies here. But how might we “technically,” if I may say so, envisage it?

Regards,

Mr. Poirier,

My personal opinion is that it takes two or three defining events to push a person into the terrorist spiral. One is, as I mentioned, the unfulfilled expectations. Another is a strong sense of personal betrayal by "the system" (this was seen in many of the RAF members, especially among the Baader-Meinhof "First Generation"). A third defining event is the need for revenge. This last need becomes more common as the terrorist cycle of violence increases (i.e., after the first generation of most groups is either killed or put in prison). The second generation then has the motive of either seeking vengeance or freedom for their comrades who have been "taken by the system." I also feel that once a group become driven primarily by the third motive they become almost beyond reach when it comes to negotiations.

I also make a distinction between insurgents and terrorists. This has more do to with what I see as differences in their motives and objectives. I don't feel that a pure terrorist group can make the switch to an insurgency, but it is very possible (and even common) for insurgents to slide into terrorist groups.

It is an interesting problem, and one that has distinct repercussions for COIN activities.

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Mr. Poirier,

My personal opinion is that it takes two or three defining events to push a person into the terrorist spiral. One is, as I mentioned, the unfulfilled expectations. Another is a strong sense of personal betrayal by "the system" (this was seen in many of the RAF members, especially among the Baader-Meinhof "First Generation"). A third defining event is the need for revenge. This last need becomes more common as the terrorist cycle of violence increases (i.e., after the first generation of most groups is either killed or put in prison). The second generation then has the motive of either seeking vengeance or freedom for their comrades who have been "taken by the system." I also feel that once a group become driven primarily by the third motive they become almost beyond reach when it comes to negotiations.

I also make a distinction between insurgents and terrorists. This has more do to with what I see as differences in their motives and objectives. I don't feel that a pure terrorist group can make the switch to an insurgency, but it is very possible (and even common) for insurgents to slide into terrorist groups.

It is an interesting problem, and one that has distinct repercussions for COIN activities.

Mr Blair,
I express my point and my questions in my last answer to Mr. Steve Metz, actually. Also, your last statement fits my personal assumptions when you say “I don't feel that a pure terrorist group can make the switch to an insurgency, but it is very possible (and even common) for insurgents to slide into terrorist groups.” For, they are likely, indeed, to find the network channel while they fight with other insurgents somewhere in the world, whereas they are much less so to do so before.

It is less a matter of personal will than a matter of opportunity, I conclude. Would you agree with me on that last detail?

All this brings us back to my initial question: how can they be targeted and channeled and converted to the utmost forms of violence while living in peaceful areas or, if you prefer, much outside places where open insurgency exist? Are al-Qaeda talent spotters that numerous in Europe or in other countries where there is no open conflicts?

Once more I agree with you about the rest you wrote. Now I seize this opportunity you just provide me in order to ask another question which does not really calls for an answer but, instead, for further reflection.

Of which origin was the assistance and help the RAF and affiliated cells and individuals enjoyed? Did they act entirely by themselves, in perfect autonomy?

[Steve Blair]

With the terrorist groups, I don't think they need spotters as much as they do general organizers. In this they have learned from the anti-globalization groups that network loosely via the Internet and then operate in an almost autonomous manner until they are called together for a large protest or action. One of the dangers for law enforcement of a cellular organization is that they can reproduce through networks of "fellow travelers" and affiliates over a wide area.

With the B-M Gang/RAF, they began networking with other terrorist groups through PLO training camps if memory serves. Over time they began working with the IRA (providing safehouses in Europe in exchange for bomb-making training, for example) and other groups. Soon enough you would see "actions" mounted on the Continent by the RAF showing solidarity with the IRA. The RAF's organization model was cell-based, but I also believe they exercised a certain level of central planning.

This model has changed, based I believe on the success others have seen the various environmental, anti-globalization, and radical animal rights groups achieve with a "central goal-decentralized planning and execution" model. By this I mean that there is one "vision" for the movement as a whole (say stopping whaling in a particular area). Once that vision goes out, the smaller cells (which may never communicate and in fact have different sub-goals from the main vision) will stage their own protests or actions in that area in support of the main vision. This way you get centralized action (which may not always be what the organizers hoped for) based on a decentralized planning model that is very difficult to trace back to those who provided the basic message.

Hopefully that made at least some sense and answered part of your question. This is something I'm starting to bash together so it's still a work in progress.

[Merv Benson]

Steve,

Doesn't this organizational structure lend itself to being infiltrated by law enforcement or intelligence organizations? If so, why hasn't it been done more often?

[Steve Blair]

I don't think the loose ones do, because they are centered more around small cells of "fellow travelers." And even if they can be infiltrated, you only take down one small part of a very large, loose whole. By that I mean you can't infiltrate or track up to the next link in the chain because there often isn't one, at least in the conventional sense. In the old model you could take out one cell and then trace its comms back to another cell or a higher link. With the "vision-directed" networks you often don't have a higher link...just a pointer to a web site or blind mailing list that serves to send out general thoughts and comments.

I think this might be what we're seeing with the various terror cells in the US and UK (especially the UK). They are small, self-contained units that are "fellow travelers" with AQ in the sense that they have attached themselves to the same goals but are not necessarily part of a larger plan or game plan. We're conditioned to taking down one cell, and then following the trail of crumbs to another cell. With this model...there are no crumbs to follow.

This is where I see the internet having the biggest impact. It allows the rapid distribution of audio and visual messages...motivation tapes for the masses, if you will. Fellow travelers can access huge amounts of target information, operational data, and even training materials without ever having to link back to the main group or receive a single order from them.

[Rifleman]

I also make a distinction between insurgents and terrorists. This has more do to with what I see as differences in their motives and objectives. I don't feel that a pure terrorist group can make the switch to an insurgency, but it is very possible (and even common) for insurgents to slide into terrorist groups.

That's an interesting point. It reminds me of Civil War guerrillas. Some groups started out as guerrillas dedicated to a cause and later became terrorists.

[SteveMetz]

That's an interesting point. It reminds me of Civil War guerrillas. Some groups started out as guerrillas dedicated to a cause and later became terrorists.

In my own writing, I stress that insurgency is a strategy and terrorism is a tactic or method. From this perspective, I don't think it's worth killing too many gray cells (of which I don't have many to spare, and have elected to kill those that I do have with single malt scotch rather than word games) trying to decide whether a given group or given individual is an insurgent or a terrorist. Almost all insurgent movements use terrorism as a tactic. Some groups which do not utilize a strategy of insurgency also use terrorism as a tactic.

[Mark O'Neill]

In my own writing, I stress that insurgency is a strategy and terrorism is a tactic or method. From this perspective, I don't think it's worth killing too many gray cells (of which I don't have many to spare, and have elected to kill those that I do with single malt scotch) trying to decide whether a given group or given individual is an insurgent or a terrorist. Almost all insurgent movements use terrorism as a tactic. Some groups which do not utilize a strategy of insurgency also use terrorism as a tactic.

To quote my old Mozambican oppo " I full agree, you are deadly right".

In my research reading I am heartly sick of all of the lame definitions of both insurgency and terrorism that abound - some of them are pathologically stupid.

I actually think Tom Mockaitis' treatment of this debate up front on his recent book, The New Terrorism is spot on.

[SteveMetz]

To quote my old Mozambican oppo " I full agree, you are deadly right".

In my research reading I am heartly sick of all of the lame definitions of both insurgency and terrorism that abound - some of them are pathologically stupid.

I actually think Tom Mockaitis' treatment of this debate up front on his recent book, The New Terrorism is spot on.

Speaking of Mozambique, I remember when I was a fresh-out-of-grad-school, young professor eagerly awaiting the first time I'd see myself cited somewhere. At the time, I was writing on security in Southern Africa. I picked up a new book on that topic at my university's library, skimmed the endnotes and there it was! A citatition that said, "For instance, see Steven Metz....." So then I went to the text itself to see what the citation referenced. The text said (and I quote), "Many American academics have been duped by Mozambican misinformation." And *I* was the best example they could think of.

I was still happy--better to be a cited dupe than an unduped unknown.

[Bill Moore]

In general I concur that insurgency is a strategy and that terrorism is a tactic, but as I think most of us agree our current lexicon and structural models describing insurgency and terrorism are entirely inadequate to accurately express what we're experiencing.

Although not new, I think the extent of using terrorism as a personal or group expression is much greater than it has been previously. I read an interesting study recently that explored some of the psychological and sociological factors that influence individuals to consider joining terrorist organizations, or simply conducting a terrorist attack without joining a terrorist group (and I'm confident that many of the same factors apply to why individuals join gangs, insurgencies, etc., with the exception of the economic status. I "think" most foot soldiers in gangs and insurgencies are from the lower economic class).

The greatest factor seemed to be identity. The majority of recruits into Muslim extremist groups were in their young 20's to 30's, lower to upper middle class, educated, and experienced a recent life change such as the loss of a loved one. This recent change served to alter their perception of the world fundamentally, so now they begin a new search for meaning. These searchers were easily identified in Mosques, Madrassas's, etc., and they would be befriended and gradually led down the path of becoming a devote Muslim to Extremist. Of course this happens in Christian organizations also, we have all seen the lost kids who have all the sudden seen the light, and are easily manipulated by their new mentors.

I can't help but think that terrorism for "many" of these individual terrorists is simply a form of expression of being dissatisfied and/or frustrated with the world. Perhaps this pushes many attacks into the criminally insane areana, but these criminals are frequently mobilized and given direction by savvy strategists in this case, so their criminal act ends up serving a larger strategy. Now that we're in the information age, jihadists (and other groups) can use the internet to radicalize lost souls globally, thus you have emergent lone wolfs and terrorist cells world wide that are home grown, and no longer a part of the Afghan/USSR war alumni.

The psychological factors that make people vulnerable to this type of manipulation is increasing at an alarming rate due to social and psychological disruption due to globalization, the Iraq war, etc. Globalism is upsetting social norms (isn't this the underlying reason that Al Qaeda exists? They want to free their holy lands from these emergent norms that are not in step with their views of how a muslim should live), which sets many people on a new path searching for meaning (we had drugs and free sex in the 60s during our social upheaval, the Muslims have jihad). Proliferating violence equals more casualties, which in turn equals more potential recruits. The world wide web and sattelite TV reaches out to a global audience, part of which consists of potentially frustrated individuals who are looking for a way to express themselves. The media has allowed terrorist attacks to become a new norm for the angry man to express himself, and to a lesser extent the angry woman. The frequency of the attacks has lessened the moral reluctance to engage in such an act, as indicated by a recent of poll of American Muslims where several thought terrorist attacks were an acceptable act. In other words, it is gaining momentum, much like rap music did in the recent past as a means of expression world wide (I'm attempting to show a parallel of where a paticular behavior initially considered undesirable by those in the fold, starts gaining acceptance by those outside the fold, and before you know it young kids from Lebanon, Peru, and Japan are into rap, ugly clothes, wearing pants that don't cover the crack in their butt, etc. as the means for their generation to express themselves, what is especially interesting is national/nationalism norms are becoming less important).

Obviously my arguments are not well thought out or intellectually supported at this point, but I wanted to throw them out to the council in rough form as food for thought. I think if we continue to wage this conflict as a war, rather than a social/cultural issue, we'll continue to feed the beast and create a problem set that will become unsolvable.

[Mark O'Neill]

Speaking of Mozambique, I remember when I was a fresh-out-of-grad-school, young professor eagerly awaiting the first time I'd see myself cited somewhere. At the time, I was writing on security in Southern Africa. I picked up a new book on that topic at my university's library, skimmed the endnotes and there it was! A citatition that said, "For instance, see Steven Metz....." So then I went to the text itself to see what the citation referenced. The text said (and I quote), "Many American academics have been duped by Mozambican misinformation." And *I* was the best example they could think of.

I was still happy--better to be a cited dupe than an unduped unknown.

Ouch!

That is gold - the original "well, there is good news, and there is bad news..."

Rob, regarding your point about introducing the term "jihad". I think that is problematic as it deliberately introduces a qualifier regarding terrorism / insurgency that reduces the universality of any subsequent definition or theory. Not all insurgent / terrorist Muslims in the world are fighting for what we might associate as a 'jihadist' cause. And, as we all know, not all terrorists or insurgents are Muslim. We have to be very careful about defining these terms (insurgency and terrorism) merely in terms of extreme Islamist behaviour just because that is what appears most problematic at the moment.

The 'West' made a similar error during the Cold War when we associated many nationalist or liberation movements with communism and the Soviet Bloc, rather than seeing their true nature. This in turn prolonged many conflicts, perhaps pointlessly.

My observation would be that the threat from radical Islam appears to have the same effect on rational strategic decision making that the 'threat' of communism had in a previous era. That is not to say that a threat does not exist, just that the nature and extent of it are often greatly mis-appreciated or exaggerated.

I, for one, am still trying to work out the reasoning behind the rhetoric that AQ is trying to, or will, 'destroy our way of life'. Seriously, how can a group of stateless individuals, half of whom are allegedly hiding in a cave somewhere on the Pakistan / Afghanistan border 'destroy' functioning liberal democracies such as ours, no matter how many bombs etc are let off?

The only answer I can even begin to see makings sense would be through our own disproportionate reaction to this perceived threat they offer. That is, our government's reactions through legislation, controls and actions that are enacted to counter the 'threat' actually could end up changing the way of life and liberties that our societies have now.

In effect, such an outcome could be interpreted, at least at one level, of 'destroying' our way of life - and we would have done it to ourselves. Now suppose that was AQ's intent all along? By reacting to the symptoms and manifestations of Islamic terrorism, rather than the recognising the true nature of the threat, are we in fact being suckered in by an abstract ' rope a dope' scheme?

Now that would be a 'premium' indirect strategy that both Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart would have approved of....

Meanwhile, back at the ranch, we cannot even agree on definitions of the 'threat'.