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Thread: Airpower Jumping Off In Syria

  1. #21
    Council Member CrowBat's Avatar
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    Indeed. The US-led coalition flew some 48 air strikes over Syria yesterday early in the morning, primarily targeting the JAN in Der'a, Hama, Hasakah and Idlib. While supposedly hitting the Khorasan (AQ's 'A-team' sent to Syria), at least according to this report, hits on various JAN bases provoked fierce protests and even threats from that group, the leader of which responded with threats against other insurgent groups and declaration that this is a 'war on Islam'.

    From what I get to hear from them, many of insurgents say that Khorasan never existed and that targets hit yesterday were almost exclusively different JAN HQs. There is plenty of anger between them because of such attacks. They have weakened the JAN so much that this enabled the regime to advance in several places: no surprise here, then JAN and insurgent units are intermixed in plenty of frontlines. Weakening the JAN is creating holes in these.

    Furthermore, the Daesh was left entirely unmolested while assaulting and capturing FSyA-held Bir Sana and Mahmudli, north of Tabqa: with this, it is now in control of entire Raqqa Province...

    More by accident than by design I guess, some air strikes have hit (Daesh-held) Tel Abyad yesterday, targeting 'warehouses' - and makeshift refineries again. About a dozen of civilians were reportedly killed: I am yet to find anything about any Daesh idiot getting killed (too).

    Now, there are Twitter reports that air strikes have forced the Daesh to withdraw from the outskirts of Kobane (they were that close to the town, meanwhile), but also: YPG and FSyA defenders keep on demanding attacks on Daesh tanks and artillery, which means these were not hit.

    The 'strategy' here is outright amazing: if the US air continues in this fashion, in few weeks there will be no insurgents left to join its 'anti-Daesh' army because they'll be either overrun by the regime or the Daesh - or undergoing training in Jordan and Saudi Arabia...
    Last edited by CrowBat; 09-29-2014 at 08:02 AM.

  2. #22
    Council Member CrowBat's Avatar
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    According to following report, here's the key figure behind target selection in this campaign:
    Meet The 'Invisible General' Leading The War On ISIS
    A man who was once described as an "invisible general" who holds master's degrees in both education and business management is in charge of the military operations against the jihadist group Islamic State and the Al Qaeda franchise Khorasan in Syria and Iraq.

    A Department of Defense spokesperson confirmed to Business Insider in an email Tuesday that General Lloyd J. Austin III was the "combatant commander" of the operations in both...
    If he goes on like this, I guess that Austin might soon need some help from Superman, Ironman, Captain America - and few Mars People too...

  3. #23
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by CrowBat View Post
    Well, not only you avoided answering any of my questions, but what can be read on the link you posted has imposed a number of further questions.


    CrowBat,
    Sorry it took so long to respond to you. So before I forget, here is the sound file (MP3 file)that I should have posted along with the Power Point Presentation that Colonel Warden gave to the Aussie Air Force. Hear is the link below. Really good stuff make sureyou listen.

    https://app.box.com/s/c4tpycyduzecumv6oinm


    As for the rest. You seem to ask and then answer your own questions so I am not sure how to respond some times but I will do better. I will put up a separate post and try and answer your questions point by point.

  4. #24
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by CrowBat View Post
    According to following report, here's the key figure behind target selection in this campaign:
    Meet The 'Invisible General' Leading The War On ISIS


    If he goes on like this, I guess that Austin might soon need some help from Superman, Ironman, Captain America - and few Mars People too...
    OMG he went to Auburn not Alabama......that's it we are done.
    I sure Nick Saban will help him if he calls

  5. #25
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by CrowBat View Post
    Well, not only you avoided answering any of my questions, but what can be read on the link you posted has imposed a number of further questions. Including:

    - Warden clearly says, '[war is] a means to end an objective, that 'all war activity should be conceived and executed to realize only those objectives achievable by force.

    What objectives are 'achievable by force' - especially so when deployed air power is blasting empty buildings, for example?
    None that I know of except as I explained earlier.

    Or, newest 'appearance' and then one that should be of major concern for anybody interested: this campaign is missing the Daesh, it's missing the JAN and it missed the Ahrar ash-Sham (which meanwhile dispersed). On the contrary, it has meanwhile killed more Syrian civilians than extremists. According to reports like this report (in Arabic), at least 43 Syrian civilians were killed yesterday alone - and this while the US-led air power was blasting empty buildings and makeshift refineries.

    Keep in mind: it is precisely because of concerns it could end hitting Iraqi civilians that the IRIAF (Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force) has ceased its attacks on Daesh in Iraq, something like 20 days ago. Namely, the Daesh dispersed after being hit by the IRIAF some 20 times, through August and in early September, leaving the IRIAF - which is actually a US-trained air force, still very much following even USAF's doctrine - 'without clear targets' (I'm citing 1st-hand source here).

    So, now I'm curious to hear: what kind of objective are planners of this campaign trying to achieve through such action?
    I don't have an answer for that as I am wondering the same thing.

    - He's 'writing' about 'change in enemy beliefs', and 'prevent an enemy from doing something'. What part of Daesh's beliefs do you think have these air strikes changed so far?
    No he isn't! And that is important you cannot change somebodies beliefs with force, but you can use force to physically stop them from doing something. Listen to audio file I posted, he talks about that very subject.

    And in what fashion was Daesh prevented from 'doing something' (for example: from continuing its assault on Kobane pocket)?
    They weren't as far as I can tell.

    - He's writing about 'exit strategy'.

    Who has defined the US exit strategy for this campaign, and what is that looking like?
    That is a very good question and I would like to know the answer myself along with alot of other Congressman

    - Finally, Warden is writing about factor time: how long is this campaign going to last? Indeed, he's writing about 'time value of action' (page 13), and is stressing 'highly compressed, highly parallel' action.

    On the contrary, this campaign is developing in particularly slow fashion, with more planes arriving in very gradual fashion and thus the intensity of operations developing only gradually. Or would you say that this campaign developed precisely along Warden's theories?
    You get a gold star! Time is one of the most critical elements of Strategy and we don't have one that I know of. And NO! we are not following Warden's theory at all.

    Whatever is the answer: that means that the enemy is left with more time to repair and reconstitute, to prepare a counter-offensive, to acquire allies (the latter process already began: in the light of all possible reports about high numbers of killed Syrian civilians, more than 200 defections from the JAN to the Daesh have been recorded in the last few days, and more than 50% of defectors are Syrians)... Indeed, if this campaign goes on like this, the Daesh is going to get time to 'employ novel weapons', and the 'world opinion' is likely to 'shift' too (especially in the light of heavy suffering of Syrian civilians).

    The US has entered this war with its own public weary from 14 years of anti-terror war that is actually still going on - and was thus never won. How long do you expect the domestic support to last this time?
    Again your are correct IMO. WE started with a simple and pretty good idea. Use American Airpower to support a local Arab Army.......but we don't have the Army part figured out yet. So we (USA) are trying to execute 1/2 a plan. And it is going to take 3 or more years to do it and nobody has given any costs estimates (at least that I know of). So we are not following any kind of true Strategy at least that I can tell. We do not have a clear "Future Picture" We do not have a peace Plan. We have 1/2 a War plan and we are just using the Air force to react to the enemy.

    No a good way to run an Airline

    Did I answer your questions this time? If you have anymore just ask.
    Last edited by slapout9; 09-29-2014 at 08:58 PM. Reason: stuff

  6. #26
    Council Member CrowBat's Avatar
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    At least you tried, Slap.

    I believe it's obvious even to crows on my roof, that the actual overall objective of the US military action in Iraq and Syria is 'maintaining status quo'. And that's the essence of the problem on hand.

    Obama seems to be hell or bent on proving himself a 'true US president'. So much so, he's blindly insisting on keeping everything in the Middle East the way it was (before he was elected, for example): the GCC should keep their oppressive dictatorships and Assadists should remain in control of Syria; the artificial Franco-British creation of Iraq should remain intact; Kurds shouldn't get their state, and Iran should be kept out of at least Iraq (plus not go nuclear).... With other words: all the reasons and major sources of extremism should remain in place, but extremism should be 'bombed into stone age'...?

    The next problem any theoretician of air power should have with this operation is that Obama is - in typical US-fashion - insistent on ripping things out of their context too. Namely, the stated goal of this 'USA & Friends Co KG Ltd GesmbH SA' operation should be the 'destruction of the Daesh'. Therefore, the military aspect of this enterprise should be run entirely unrelated to all the other things that are going on in Syria, and especially about zillion of all imaginable interests (but those of the US)?

    Frankly: while I can very well imagine... no, sorry: while I know very well indeed, that there are plenty of idiots in the DC thinking this is a good idea...

    ...is there anybody around this forum seriously thinking this is going to work?

    But hey: that's the 'starting point' of this military operation.

    Little wonder then, the first results of its military part have resulted in a qualified mess. Trying to keep things really short, the way this campaign is waged - a creepily slow start, pin-prick attacks against few targets strewn all over Syria, etc., etc.... to me this seems somebody there has a giant problem because his/her checklist is not applicable for this situation: elements necessary for the force to work the way it was designed, equipped and trained are not in place; 'Ring 1' type of targets are out of reach because... was it the intel that lacks the info or whatever other reason? ... so, somebody there has got to improvise and decided to start with 'Ring 2' type of targets - because they are the most obvious...?

    But wait, it's getting better: the few attacks on the Daesh are publicised the most. However, when I count them, attacks on the JAN are (or were, so far) more numerous. Not to talk about those on the Ahrar: this group has already decided to scatter and dive into anonymity....

    Fantastic: attack the wrong party, a 'lil bit, so the others know they are in danger and have time to go hiding...

    ... sigh...

    Sorry mate, but I think I'll stop asking you for anything here: I really don't know whether I should cry or laugh at this tragicomedy...

    The only thing I'm sure is that I'll not learn anything about methods of applying modern-day air power from this example: only all possible ways about how NOT to do it (which, as so often, is bringing me back to that Churchill's, 'you can always depend on Americans to do the right thing, after exhausting all the alternatives').

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    Air power failed even quicker than I anticipated. IS is laughing us, reportedly al Nusra made overtures to IS, the Syrian populace is furious with the US for not attacking Assad, and a key Kurdish area is getting ready to be over run, which will be a human tragedy and a major psychological victory for IS. It demonstrates that Warden and his few disciples didn't understand the true nature of war. It has never conformed to system theories. It is like we're back in Vietnam with McNamara's wiz kids. Another sad episode in our history because we fail to learn from history.

  8. #28
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Default Warden Won His War

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Air power failed even quicker than I anticipated. IS is laughing us, reportedly al Nusra made overtures to IS, the Syrian populace is furious with the US for not attacking Assad, and a key Kurdish area is getting ready to be over run, which will be a human tragedy and a major psychological victory for IS. It demonstrates that Warden and his few disciples didn't understand the true nature of war. It has never conformed to system theories. It is like we're back in Vietnam with McNamara's wiz kids. Another sad episode in our history because we fail to learn from history.
    Bill,
    It isn't Warden's plan he has been retired for years. It is General Dempsey's plan and he is Army the last time I checked. But like l say Warden won his war. Maybe if we start listening to winners and how they do things the situation would be different.

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    Enjoy your interpretation of history, I'm not wasting anymore time with Warden's theory, which has been proven not to work. Fortunately your arguments aren't gaining traction with anyone, but I'm sure the jihadists are getting a good laugh at them. Even if Warden's approach could work against some weak kneed states, it would still be inappropriate for this type of war. Air power is not "the" strategy, it is a valuable weapon system that is currently be misused for theater. You can afford to believe in myths, I can't. People don't conform to simplistic system theories, they never have. We were left scratching our asses before in Vietnam when we assumed they were a system and we could prick here and there and then the "system" would fold to our will. Furthermore, if you think the CJCS does targeting, then you know little about how the military works.

    I'm not blaming the pilots, they're tacticians doing what they're told to do, and they're doing it well.

    One rule in strategy is to divide the adversary, or to sever his alliances. As a former CIA analysis wrote we should either attack ISIL or al-Nusra, not both because we'll risk driving them together. We're all surprised by this news I'm sure.

    http://www.jewishpress.com/news/brea...ia/2014/09/29/

    The Al Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra (Al Nusra Front) terror group in Syria is reconciling with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

    The two groups have been at odds for most of the past year. However, last week’s U.S.-led air strikes in northern and eastern Syria have prompted Jabhat al-Nusra to renew its ties with ISIS, declaring the strikes a “war on Islam” in an audio statement released this past weekend
    .


    http://http://www.presstv.ir/detail/...led-coalition/

    Did you forget your numbers of injured and killed in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia? Did you forget the horror of September 11? Did you also forget the US navy ship Cole (attacked by bombers in Yemen) and the threatening of your interests in the region,” he said.

    “I am asking the Western people if you have forgotten how much you have paid and are still paying from your money for your reckless wars, which will result in a great economic crisis?” Golani said.
    This should be no surprise to anyone, and this is one reason they wanted us to attack, especially with airpower, because it is ineffective yet provides theater that they use to show we're waging war on Islam. The more videos we share with the media, the more recruiting material we give them. I guess for now the most important audience is the American people because of the mid-term election, then after that maybe we'll actually focus on what is important to reduce the threat instead of increasing it.
    Last edited by Bill Moore; 09-30-2014 at 04:11 AM.

  10. #30
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Enjoy your interpretation of history, I'm not wasting anymore time with Warden's theory, which has been pr oven not to work.
    Well let me be the the first to say thank you for sharing that with me but I had figured that out long ago.
    Fortunately your arguments aren't gaining traction with anyone, but I'm sure the jihadists are getting a good laugh at them. Even if Warden's approach could work against some weak kneed states, it would still be inappropriate for this type of war. Air power is not "the" strategy, it is a valuable weapon system that is currently be misused for theater.
    If you would ever take the time to read you would find out that this campaign is being run in the exact way it should NOT be run according to Warden. CrowBat did an excellent job of seeing and understanding that. Why can't you?
    You can afford to believe in myths, I can't.
    No I cant afford it and neither can the nation. To much time, money and people have been ruined and wasted on a process that is not working.
    People don't conform to simplistic system theories, they never have. We were left scratching our asses before in Vietnam when we assumed they were a system and we could prick here and there and then the "system" would fold to our will
    Never said they did and certainly Warden never said that.
    Furthermore, if you think the CJCS does targeting, then you know little about how the military works.
    I don't believe that and have never said I did. What I do believe is what General Dempsey has said the plan is : We are going to use Air power to support a local Arab Army which may take between 1 and 3 years. So don't blame Warden for a plan he had nothing to do with.

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    First off Slap I read Warden's book, and reread sections from it rather recently and find it to be even more inaccurate and misleading in the way he represents war, and prioritizes targets using the five rings. What worked in Desert Storm was targeting the 5th ring, his ground forces, and everything else accomplished little beyond imposing costs. Imposing costs is not the same is compelling someone to quit, and difference isn't slight.

    No I cant afford it and neither can the nation. To much time, money and people have been ruined and wasted on a process that is not working.
    We're all frustrated, but attempting to replace our CT and COIN strategies, which admittedly have failed miserably with a 5 rings strategy will simply result in more frustration because we're ignoring the basics of war. I'm not sure how you switch from a few posts back describing how this bombing campaign is exactly line with Warden's 5 rings strategy, and then when you realize it is not only failing, but making things worse, then claim it isn't Warden's strategy and the Army planned it? Are you attempting to make rational arguments, or are you blindly defending a model? Only you can answer that.

    Never said they did and certainly Warden never said that.
    Many times you have written it is all about the system. I admit Warden correctly identified the limits of viewing the adversary as a system in his book, but I haven't seen that from you in your posts. Design thinkers use system theory also, but most know it is flawed, and as long as you realize it is one approach to gain some understanding, but not complete understanding it is a viable "tool," but when it is taken to the level that it was in EBO, that A+B=C we are setting ourselves up for failure.

    What I do believe is what General Dempsey has said the plan is : We are going to use Air power to support a local Arab Army which may take between 1 and 3 years. So don't blame Warden for a plan he had nothing to do with.
    You wrote:

    It is General Dempsey's plan and he is Army the last time I checked.
    It is time to move past the debate on Warden's five rings, it isn't the answer to our challenges. There may be parts of it that are relevant that can be incorporated, but anytime we try to impose a template on a complex problem without understanding the strategic context, and worse not knowing what we're trying to accomplish, we will have started down the road to nowhere.

  12. #32
    Council Member AmericanPride's Avatar
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    Slapout,

    The problem with systems approaches, including Warden, is that systems are incredibly resilient and once untethered from their known foundations (i.e. assumptions), respond (and escalate) in unpredictable ways. Systems usually are not destroyed outright but instead adapt to changing circumstances. And even when systems appear to be destroyed, they manifest or express themselves in surprising forms. This necessarily results in repeated reciprocal escalatory actions that quickly test (or break) the parameters of the political object defining the conflict.

    We (the U.S.) should be considering how to bring the conflict to a close (read: the exit strategy) rather than embarking on open-ended campaigns with limited results and unpredictable end-states. The U.S. counter-terrorism strategy is very effective at killing terrorists (and those in their immediate vicinity) but not so much in reducing the long-term threat of terrorism. This is the percent increase from 2006 to 2012 in terrorist attacks per country from Global Terrorism Database:

    Afghanistan: 420.21% (282 to 1,467)
    Iraq: 71.80% (837 to 1,438)
    Syria: 17,500% (1 to 176)
    Yemen: 6,140% (5 to 307)

    How will exclusive use of air power reverse this trend?
    Last edited by AmericanPride; 10-01-2014 at 03:05 AM.
    When I am weaker than you, I ask you for freedom because that is according to your principles; when I am stronger than you, I take away your freedom because that is according to my principles. - Louis Veuillot

  13. #33
    Council Member CrowBat's Avatar
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    Slap,
    before you encounter yet heavier flak: could it be you were slightly too enthusiastic and have expected a Warden-like campaign, but this turned to be an amateurish air show?

    *************

    After an 'all out effort' (cough, cough!) of 48 strikes against targets in Syria, two days ago, the AFP is reporting the CENTCOM to have flown 'record-breaking' 22 strike sorties - that is: against targets in Iraq and Syria, yesterday. Eleven of these against targets in Syria.

    Either it's so that the Saudis are running out of princes, and Emiratis out of female F-16 pilots, or the screw-up is even intensified...

    While everybody is happy about these air strikes (haha!) supposedly hitting the Daesh around Kobane, reporters in situ - no matter if US freelancers or those from the Austrian state-owned ORF - report no attacks on the Daesh in that area. Nearest they saw any of 'allied' aircraft was about 15-20 kilometres outside that town....

    Sure, the YPG and the FSyA have meanwhile managed to push the Daesh some 7km away from Kobane in the south, but in the west the idiots are driving a wedge into the town and are now back to only 2km away from it.

    But, don't worry: Turkey is now massing troops on its side of the border and announcing these would be 'at the highest state of alert'. Yeah, Turkey is now going to save Kobane - because it's 'logical' that an Islamist government in Istambul is going to rush to the aid of the Syrian-wing of the PKK - which the YPG is, de-facto - fight extremist Islamists in Syria... Makes sense, doesn't it - especially if one takes things out of context and ignores politics and religion...

    And while the Turkish parliament is about to decide whether to go or not to go to war with the Daesh, later today, they're demanding help from the NATO too. Hey, the small Turkish military can't really go facing 20.000 idiots in north-eastern Syria... plus, its security has tollerated so many of them inside Turkey the last few years... well, who knows where are all of them now and what they are about...?

    And while all of this babbling is in such a high esteem, thanks to extensive use of chlorine gas (see: 'chemical weapons') and air support in form of US air strikes agianst the JAN (see: now you know why the USAF deployed F-22s to attack the 'Daesh in Syria'; what other aircrat should the US otherwise send into the SAM-congested airspace over Damascus to hit...erm... the JAN?), the regime has re-taken the entire town of Adra, as can be seen on the two maps below. This operation was a giant success - especially air strikes: the JAN de-facto melted there and has only two intact battalions left in the area...

    Another reason not to worry is: Gen Allen is about to meet leaders of Syrian opposition in Jordan, the next week, at least according to the WP.

    Let me guess what are these talks going to look like:

    Allan: Hello, my name is John. I'm here to unite you and lead you into a war against Islamofascists.

    Insurgent leaders: Welcome! Welcome Sir! Islamu' Aydikum for coming here and your fantastic idea. Would you like to have a cup of chay?

    Allan: Well, thank you: but, I came here to talk business...

    Insurgent leaders: We too. Call us again when you stop providing air support for the regime and ignoring the Daesh.
    Attached Images Attached Images
    Last edited by CrowBat; 10-01-2014 at 08:13 AM.

  14. #34
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Default Have You been Talking To Warden?

    Quote Originally Posted by AmericanPride View Post
    Slapout,

    The problem with systems approaches, including Warden, is that systems are incredibly resilient and once untethered from their known foundations (i.e. assumptions), respond (and escalate) in unpredictable ways. Systems usually are not destroyed outright but instead adapt to changing circumstances. And even when systems appear to be destroyed, they manifest or express themselves in surprising forms. This necessarily results in repeated reciprocal escalatory actions that quickly test (or break) the parameters of the political object defining the conflict.

    We (the U.S.) should be considering how to bring the conflict to a close (read: the exit strategy) rather than embarking on open-ended campaigns with limited results and unpredictable end-states. The U.S. counter-terrorism strategy is very effective at killing terrorists (and those in their immediate vicinity) but not so much in reducing the long-term threat of terrorism. This is the percent increase from 2006 to 2012 in terrorist attacks per country from Global Terrorism Database:

    Afghanistan: 420.21% (282 to 1,467)
    Iraq: 71.80% (837 to 1,438)
    Syria: 17,500% (1 to 176)
    Yemen: 6,140% (5 to 307)

    How will exclusive use of air power reverse this trend?

    AP,
    I had to do a double take to see who this was at first. Warden calls this the Hysteresis effect, which means...... well exactly what you said and he consistently pounds that point home when he talks about the whole system of war planning.
    As for the answer to your question of course it can. The Rhodesian Fire Force is an excellent example. People of confuse Air power with an Airplane or Air Force which is understandable but it is not the same.

    Here is a good example of the Army Air power!
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjBSJV0yHA8

  15. #35
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Talking I Am Airborne... Flak Don't Hurt

    Quote Originally Posted by CrowBat View Post
    Slap,
    before you encounter yet heavier flak: could it be you were slightly too enthusiastic and have expected a Warden-like campaign, but this turned to be an amateurish air show?
    The short answer is yes. When I started this thread you will notice it has very short comments, I didn't mean for it to turn into a Warden debate but thats OK, comments take many turns here. I only have access to open sources so I was just commenting on daily events. But when I began to see patterns and when I found out there are know JTACS on the ground it was time to re-fuel and re-arm cause this is going to take a while. I really like reading your posts.

  16. #36
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    First off Slap I read Warden's book, and reread sections from it rather recently and find it to be even more inaccurate and misleading in the way he represents war, and prioritizes targets using the five rings. What worked in Desert Storm was targeting the 5th ring, his ground forces, and everything else accomplished little beyond imposing costs. Imposing costs is not the same is compelling someone to quit, and difference isn't slight.
    Which book did your read. The Air Campaign or Winning In Fast Time? Cause I think you are confusing some things.



    We're all frustrated, but attempting to replace our CT and COIN strategies, which admittedly have failed miserably with a 5 rings strategy will simply result in more frustration because we're ignoring the basics of war. I'm not sure how you switch from a few posts back describing how this bombing campaign is exactly line with Warden's 5 rings strategy, and then when you realize it is not only failing, but making things worse, then claim it isn't Warden's strategy and the Army planned it? Are you attempting to make rational arguments, or are you blindly defending a model? Only you can answer that.
    That's right and I will answer it. I did not start the thread as a Warden thread(If you notice I always put his name in the title if I want to do that) it was simply to comment on Airpower in Syria. Which I thought would generally follow his guidelines but when I began to see through open sources which is all I have (sorta) I saw things are very different. This happened around post 6 or 7 when I said we need to do Hash Tag Bombing!

    I am short on time but will respond to the rest later.

  17. #37
    Council Member AmericanPride's Avatar
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    Slap,

    I think the point of divergence is determinng whether this strategy is good policy or good politics. I think it's good politics but bad policy - and not because airpower does not have a legitimate role in warfare, but that airpower in this circumstance will be insufficient for the high bar the U.S. has set for its political goals. And for this reason, the U.S. has once again fallen into a commitment trap: because of the bad policy, it will become good politics to increase U.S. commitment when it's apparent the policy is not working.

    So I think this is less about airpower's legitimacy and more about policy selection and decision-making. And when we combine this approach with our theoretical understandings of resistence movements, interstate conflict, it becomes quickly evident that there are very few 'good' policies available to the U.S.
    When I am weaker than you, I ask you for freedom because that is according to your principles; when I am stronger than you, I take away your freedom because that is according to my principles. - Louis Veuillot

  18. #38
    Council Member CrowBat's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    The short answer is yes. When I started this thread you will notice it has very short comments, I didn't mean for it to turn into a Warden debate but thats OK, comments take many turns here. I only have access to open sources so I was just commenting on daily events. But when I began to see patterns and when I found out there are know JTACS on the ground it was time to re-fuel and re-arm cause this is going to take a while. I really like reading your posts.
    OK, since you like reading my posts, here something I consider a good example for 'how to do it'.

    In your answer to AP, you mentioned Rhodesians. I find it estranging that it seems everybody, literally all the serious students of 'small wars' and 'modern air power at war' got struck with the RhAF in the 1970s. Even more so because the ascendant from that air force provided a 1st class example for much more serious 'expeditionary deployment' in relatively recent times.

    Early August 1998: Zimbabwean Defence Forces were put on alert for deployment to the DR Congo. Nobody expected a 'war': task was to control the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from there.

    That is: unless certain General Kabarebe (RPA) - better known as big friend of various 1 or 2-star generals at AFRICOM, a great COIN adviser, 'innovative thinker', even 'revolutionary military mind' (cough!) within the ranks of quite US Army scholars - came to the idea to launch a de-facto 'airborne' invasion of Kinshasa: he led one of RPA's SF-units over the border into Goma (eastern DRC), commandeered at least four, perhaps five airliners are the local airfield, then stuffed these full with his troops (Rwandans), few Ugandan units etc. and then flew all of that to Kitona AB, in western DRC, on the Atlantic coast.

    Once there, Kabarebe's force swiftly overpowered the Congolese guards of about 15,000 ex-Mobutu troops held in 're-education camp' and then this mob rushed in direction of Kinshasa, 300+ kilometres away.

    With Kaberebe's force approaching Kinshasa, Zims were left without the choice: in order to save Kabila's gov, their ally, they used even civilian C-47s (yup, old transports from WWII) to rush about 800 paras, two of their SAS squads, and then four each of Hawks, FB.337s, AB.412s, and several Alouettes of their Air Force (Air Force of Zimbabwe, AFZ) to N'Djili IAP.

    That's about 1,900 kilometres as the crow flies from Harare to Kinshasa.

    Again, this is a very, very short version (full story can be read here) so let me just summarize that a combo of SAS ambushes followed by AFZ strikes has slowed down Kabarebe's advance so much that he reached south-western outskirts of Kinshasa only on 27 August, by when the Zim para battalion has already established a defence perimeter and was reinforced by a squad of Cascavel armoured cars. Early on that morning, Kabarebe then attempted to overrun the Zims at N'Djili with help of a ploy, but that attempt failed. That is: it failed partially. Rwandans, Ugandans, and 'mutineers' found themselves in possession of the southern half of the runway, the Zims in control of the northern part.

    The point was (and remains): N'Djili has a runway some 5,000+ metres long. So, the Zims used their half of the runway to fly strikes against enemy entrenched - literally - 'at the other side of the runway'. But foremost: Zim commanders didn't guess about what to do, didn't hesitate nor waste their time with philosophic recourses about strategy and tactics, about target selection or how to hit 'Ring 1, Ring 2....' etc style targets somewhere in Rwanda, 1,500 kilometres away. They hit the enemy that was clearly in front of them: well, that with 'clearly' was relative, then the mass of Kabarebe's force was concentrated on the eastern side of N'Djili slum.

    Anyway, the Zims flew so intensively for the next few days, that the engines of their aircraft and helicopters were turned on in the morning and off only late in the evening; even cooks and caterers were trained in preparing bombs and hauling them to planes...

    After losing all the heavy weaponry the Congolese mutineers brought with them (including several Type-62 and Type-59 tanks, plus plenty of ZPUs and all of Ugandan artillery), and after enjoying being at the receiving end of this onslaught for some four days, the Rwandans began falling back, and then the Zim paras - supported by Cascavel armoured cars - launched their counterattack. The battle was over about a week after it started, with remnants of Kabarebe's forces fleeing in chaos through the jungle and over the border to northern Angola - from where they were evacuated by Viktor Bout's transports at Christmas 1998 (actually, Kabarebe has left not only all the Congolese but a significant bunch of Ugandans behind; Zim and then Angolans have spent two months mopping up all of these).

    While Kabarebe's force suffered several thousands of casualties (KIA and WIA combined, though of course most of these were Congolese that fought on this side), Zims lost some 20 KIA; while most of involved AFZ's planes and helicopters were hit by ground fire not only once, none was shot down. And despite pitched and days-long fighting through kilometres-deep slums of N'Djili, 'collateral' damage was minimal - so much so, the locals were more than happy to greet Zims as liberators (highest number of reported casualties stopped at about 300 civilians - and this despite Hawks levelling several of local churches: these were used by Rwandans with predilection because of their strong construction...BTW, if you ask Rwandans, this battle 'never happened'; they were 'forced to withdraw' because of Angola's entry into the war).

    And all of this without any use of sat intel, with no ELINT and minimal SIGINT, next to no HUMINT (most of it was useless, anyway), no LGBs, no GPS-guided PGMs, no stealth planes, no APCs or MBTs developed for 20+ years and at the price of several billions - and none of all other sorts of high-tech wizardry used by the US military.

    Now, I can understand that such 'obscure' battles remain unknown in the general public, or that the US military would never come to the idea to do something like the Zims have done and rush a relatively small force into a completely isolated place encircled by 10-fold more numerous enemy, 1,900 kilometres from nearest US base. (And, to make sure: I do not 'demand' anything of that sort). I admit having my problems with understanding that such battles remain unknown within circles of specialists: after all, it would be their job to find out about them, and 'learn lessons'.

    But, what I cannot understand the least is that the US military - whether in total or CENTCOM only - can't even do its work in regards of something it should be capable of 'doing in sleep': namely, organizing and running an aerial campaign against the Daesh in Syria.

    By side all the problems related with political strategy that is mindlessly nonsensical: but the sheer fact the military can't cope with the task is, ladies and gentlemen, simply a shame.
    Last edited by CrowBat; 10-01-2014 at 10:11 PM.

  19. #39
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Bill,
    here is the rest of the response to your post.



    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post

    Many times you have written it is all about the system. I admit Warden correctly identified the limits of viewing the adversary as a system in his book, but I haven't seen that from you in your posts. Design thinkers use system theory also, but most know it is flawed, and as long as you realize it is one approach to gain some understanding, but not complete understanding it is a viable "tool," but when it is taken to the level that it was in EBO, that A+B=C we are setting ourselves up for failure.
    EBO is gone as it should be and I said that when it happened, complexity with no benefit. However it is all about the System and I will always stand by that just a scientific fact. But the problem usually is you have to be able to accurately identify what is inside the system, which as you point out is constantly changing because it is a living system. You like the ASCOPE model anPeopled so do I for that matter, but they are all the same thing. People equipment,weapons,information,locations and finally actions against something or somebody. The SALUTE spot report model would work well with dynamic as opposed to deliberate targeting if that makes more sense to you. There is a poster here named "evwebber" or something like that but his avatar is aircraft carrier and his tag line is "All models are wrong. Some are useful. when he first posted I made a big deal about what a great line that was because it is very true.



    It is time to move past the debate on Warden's five rings, it isn't the answer to our challenges. There may be parts of it that are relevant that can be incorporated, but anytime we try to impose a template on a complex problem without understanding the strategic context, and worse not knowing what we're trying to accomplish, we will have started down the road to nowhere.
    Again I think your are missing something. there is always an a larger External System(Strategic Context if you will) and then a smaller internal/organizational system in focus(often the enemy system). So IMO the answer is not to move on but review of the entire process.

  20. #40
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by AmericanPride View Post
    Slap,

    I think the point of divergence is determinng whether this strategy is good policy or good politics. I think it's good politics but bad policy - and not because airpower does not have a legitimate role in warfare, but that airpower in this circumstance will be insufficient for the high bar the U.S. has set for its political goals. And for this reason, the U.S. has once again fallen into a commitment trap: because of the bad policy, it will become good politics to increase U.S. commitment when it's apparent the policy is not working.

    So I think this is less about airpower's legitimacy and more about policy selection and decision-making. And when we combine this approach with our theoretical understandings of resistence movements, interstate conflict, it becomes quickly evident that there are very few 'good' policies available to the U.S.
    I don't think we are diverging at all. The more I find out the more I think you are correct.

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