Rules of Engagement for Conscience and Sense

[jcustis]

I think, most importantly, ROE must "make sense" at the grunt level, and changes must be "sold" to the troops.

During one of our daily ROE changes, I actually looked at one of the cards. The fact that they ROE was changing, and it was done casually, and through an e-mail, led to the Troops proclaiming that the ROE was "all ####ed up." and they therefore felt justified in ignoring it.

A checklist-style ROE is not the answer, imho. We had a guy waste some kids stealing trash, and he was completely ROE-compliant. We also had a female E-5 who sat there and endured a mortar barrage from some insurgents that she could see and could've engaged, but was prevented from doing so by the "ROE of the day" as well as direction from the TOC.

I would prefer a Horatio Hornblower "Strategic Corporal" to an ROE, but lacking that, a leadership chain that puts some serious effort into communicated the "why" aspect of ROE.

120mm, I have to ask what will probably a painful question. These ROE changes, did they occur in Iraq? On the Marine side of things, the ROE never changed, although there were "clarifications" that arose during Fallujah v.2.0. In fact, I think that besides a shift in verbage that there were no forces declared hostile (e.g. military or paramilitary), I remember the ROE to be the same in 2004 as what we used to cross the border in 2003.

Your absolutely right, that's total nonsense to let guidance that should be as clearly cut as possible, degrade to set of something at the level of confusing special orders.

[120mm]

120mm, I have to ask what will probably a painful question. These ROE changes, did they occur in Iraq? On the Marine side of things, the ROE never changed, although there were "clarifications" that arose during Fallujah v.2.0. In fact, I think that besides a shift in verbage that there were no forces declared hostile (e.g. military or paramilitary), I remember the ROE to be the same in 2004 as what we used to cross the border in 2003.

Your absolutely right, that's total nonsense to let guidance that should be as clearly cut as possible, degrade to set of something at the level of confusing special orders.

The E-5 in question was a COSCOM soldier attached to V Corps Rear Headquarters. The ROE changed daily for us, mostly little changes, which I am sure never percolated down "to the troops" due to incessant and finicky nature of the changes.

Both of those incidents happened in the space of a week, and were partially the result of a well-publicized video of some "farmers" fired up by some 4ID Apaches, as well as complaints by the local sheik that we were killing too many farmers, who happened to be working at night.

A significant number of those farmers were carrying AKs and RPGs, as well as mortar rounds, verified by BDA photos, but for some reason we couldn't engage anyone from the towers anymore, without direct permission from the Corps Rear TOC.

The net result was tower soldiers not reporting engagements, several of which were actually against unarmed farmers. Training and trusting soldiers to execute the ROE is also an issue, here.

[jcustis]

Roger...I thought it would be those little things.

[120mm]

I think the most important thing to bring out of this is for commanders to train and trust their soldiers. The current checklist system of ROE is a crutch; we should be able to produce a soldier that will know when and how to engage an enemy so as to not assist the insurgency.

Walking over the ground, later, it was obvious that not only would the E-5 been justified in engaging the mortar crew, she would've damaged the insurgency in doing so. On the other side, the E-4 who killed the kids was absolutely in the wrong, though it was determined he was in compliance with the ROE. (They were penetrating the perimeter to steal trash)

Unfortunately, in a top-down "directed" system, you get Yugos. It is a "hard sell" in the current environment to get commanders to accept risk in order accomplish "soft" missions and to actually trust the enlisted man/woman. If our soldiers have to spend 8 hours a year training on "grill safety", how can we expect them to function in a COIN environment?

As an aside, to really p.o. the reading audience, the E-5 who took the mortaring was reprimanded for being "sharp" with the O-4 "Battle Major" who denied her requests to engage the mortar team.

[Stan]

Thanks 120 ! I had a feeling this was coming.

I now, more than ever, thank whomever for having refined officers such as LTC Odom (with his wit and wisdom) at my side when things got difficult and arduous decision making was the last thing I needed to hear.

Tom, like most of my professional officers used his common sense in such scenarios and took an ass chewing later. He would still laugh and I often had to wonder if this was doing his career any favors. I already had 20 plus in, so there were no longer academics involved, just saving the skin on my behind.

Unfortunately, in a top-down "directed" system, you get Yugos. It is a "hard sell" in the current environment to get commanders to accept risk in order accomplish "soft" missions and to actually trust the enlisted man/woman. If our soldiers have to spend 8 hours a year training on "grill safety", how can we expect them to function in a COIN environment?

As an aside, to really p.o. the reading audience, the E-5 who took the mortaring was reprimanded for being "sharp" with the O-4 "Battle Major" who denied her requests to engage the mortar team.
8 Hours Ago 02:40 PM