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Thread: COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

  1. #221
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    1. I meant if not for the smells-like-AQ dimension of the conflict, we could have disengaged or downgraded our involvement long ago. We've gotten where we are because the administration has to seem "tough on terrorists."
    Agree the with the tough-guy rhetoric, but I think the insurgency had quickened and become so obviously a military challenge by 2004 that withdrawal would have been mooted regardless of an election or not.

    2. There's lots that could have been done:

    --Turkey could have played initially, allowing a more rapid stabilization of the Sunni Triangle by the 4th
    --Europe, India, etc could have seen peacekeeping troops when there still was peace to be kept
    --The Gulf States could have provided reconstruction assistance
    --The whole world, but especially the EU, could have helped with strategic communications
    That the 4th ID could have snuffed the insurgency is pretty implausible. 12,000 additional troopers would not have made much of a difference given the capital itself was not secured despite the flood of coalition troops there, much less the countryside or arms depots. They would have been 12,000 additional troops mostly concerned with securing themselves while surrounded by policy confusion as the national infrastructure was looted and burned.

    No Indian or EU troops would have been committed without some degree of operational control. This was anathema to the Administration.

    Likewise "strategic communications" - how would this have stopped the growth of the insurgency? The primary dynamics of this were domestic Iraqi concerns, not international in scope.

    The amount of reconstruction assistance was not material to success or failure. Additional Gulf money would not have helped given the way money was being blown or stolen in 2003-2004 --- it would have disappeared in much the same way.

    3. By the time of the election, we were committed to massive involvement. I'm suggesting that if not for the election, it would have been easier to have begun disengagement earlier. Or, conversely, to have sustained U.S. political control until the Iraqis were truly able to manage it. I believe we had two viable options: throw the keys to Chalabi in the summer of 2003 and beat feet; or run the place for a decade. By splitting the difference, we got the worst of both.
    Again, I feel that the insurgency had ballooned to the point in 2004 that withdrawal would have been withdrawal under fire - politically impossible for any President. Throwing Chalabi the keys was recognized quite early as not even close to viable. He would have been dead or co-opted very shortly thereafter with no indigenous base of support. Sustained U.S. political control under the CPA was attempted by Bremer with his caucus plan, where elections would have been held with only CPA-approved candidates. This was mooted by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani - to go against him at that time risked bringing the religious Shi'i against the occupation.

    Steve, you are much closer to Beltway types - was El Salvador really bandied about as a reason why we could succeed in Iraq? I don't recall reading any real comparisons in the op-ed or thinktank literature at the time, except for some somewhat specious "voting under fire" comparisons with the Iraqi elections in 2005.
    Last edited by tequila; 10-08-2007 at 03:23 PM.

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    Let me weigh in on this part, not with any fundamental difference, but perhaps a slightly different weighting:

    This was, of course, code for the Palestinian conflict which, as much as any single issue, motivated Islamic militants and their supporters. But the Bush administration faced an absolute Gordian knot in Palestine. Resolution seemed to require compromise by both the Palestinians and Israel. But compromise on the part of Israel would be a concession to terrorism and send the terrible message that it worked.
    I think it has to be remembered that the Bush Administration came to office regarding the Palestinian issue as tar-baby of the Clinton Administration, an issue that was impossible to solve and more (political) trouble that it was worth. To this should be added the view that Arafat (until his death) was no possible partner, and that Barak had been too generous (a view held by some senior Administration officials). Finally, PM Sharon had a clear view of a rather different approach--that of managing the conflict and consolidating Israel's strategic position, rather than seeking a resolution.

    The net result was that, even post-9/11, the issue wasn't seriously addressed. When it was--in Bush's June 2002 Rose Garden speech--it was to (inappropriately) place all of the focus on the need for Palestinian leadership and "reform," not the core political issues. The Roadmap was only ever produced and released by the Quartet due to British pressure, with the Brits seeing it as important that the West be seen to be doing something on the Palestinian issue while they were intervening in Iraq (and even then, it was a mish-mash of poorly designed interim steps, bound to fail from the outset). It was also largely derailed by Gaza disengagement, and subsequent events.

    As for your conclusion, I absolutely agree:

    Unable to resolve these shortcomings in its policy, the administration responded with sophistry.
    Last edited by Rex Brynen; 10-08-2007 at 06:47 PM.

  3. #223
    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    Agree the with the tough-guy rhetoric, but I think the insurgency had quickened and become so obviously a military challenge by 2004 that withdrawal would have been mooted regardless of an election or not.



    That the 4th ID could have snuffed the insurgency is pretty implausible. 12,000 additional troopers would not have made much of a difference given the capital itself was not secured despite the flood of coalition troops there, much less the countryside or arms depots. They would have been 12,000 additional troops mostly concerned with securing themselves while surrounded by policy confusion as the national infrastructure was looted and burned.

    No Indian or EU troops would have been committed without some degree of operational control. This was anathema to the Administration.

    Likewise "strategic communications" - how would this have stopped the growth of the insurgency? The primary dynamics of this were domestic Iraqi concerns, not international in scope.

    The amount of reconstruction assistance was not material to success or failure. Additional Gulf money would not have helped given the way money was being blown or stolen in 2003-2004 --- it would have disappeared in much the same way.



    Again, I feel that the insurgency had ballooned to the point in 2004 that withdrawal would have been withdrawal under fire - politically impossible for any President. Throwing Chalabi the keys was recognized quite early as not even close to viable. He would have been dead or co-opted very shortly thereafter with no indigenous base of support. Sustained U.S. political control under the CPA was attempted by Bremer with his caucus plan, where elections would have been held with only CPA-approved candidates. This was mooted by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani - to go against him at that time risked bringing the religious Shi'i against the occupation.

    Steve, you are much closer to Beltway types - was El Salvador really bandied about as a reason why we could succeed in Iraq? I don't recall reading any real comparisons in the op-ed or thinktank literature at the time, except for some somewhat specious "voting under fire" comparisons with the Iraqi elections in 2005.
    I was being metaphorical with the "throw the keys to Chalabi." I simply meant cobbling together some sort of Iraqi government and leaving. Sure it would have fallen apart. But Hussein would be gone and we wouldn't have been involved.

    And I meant a serious period of U.S. rule and tutelage. Thing is, that would have required several hundred thousand troops. We were in mortal fear of the "Shia uprising" because we wouldn't have been able to deal with it with 120K troops. In other words, it wasn't that would couldn't have dealt with it, but that we weren't willing to pay the price to deal with it.

    And I didn't mean that the El Salvador precedent was direct (although there were a few people contending that we needed to use the same method). I just meant that the success of El Salvador muted the impact of Vietnam. That caused us to not consider whether Iraq is more like Vietnam than it is like El Salvador.

    And while a huge amount of reconstruction assistance was stolen, some got to where it needed to go. Even if 90% of the additional was stolen, there still would have been more getting to where it needed to go than there was.

    On the strategic communications, I was thinking of two things:

    --the refusal of Islamic governments to help delegitmize the insurgency contributed to the flow of money and foreign volunteers
    --the opposition to the American role by many nations helped the insurgents believe that we would leave sooner rather than later, and thus all they had to do was wait us out.

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    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    I really think it was a complex combination of conditions that got us where we are in Iraq, and that they're unlikely to be replicated:
    I look at it from a human nature point of view. People who think they're doing God's work will always attempt to overpower their opponents. A good spin doctor can sell anything: especially to his base, at least for a while and it doesn't take long to start a war.

    I really think everyone in the administration believed they would kick Saddam's ass in a couple of weeks and there would be parades in the streets just like the Gulf War. (So no one would ever ask about WMD etc.)

    Every war in history has happened because one side, and often both sides, believed they'd quickly kick the other's ass. It'll happen again. The more successful our military is, the less attention people will pay attention to why it was successful and the more they will forget about why we failed: especially if the Raptor is involved in future victory. The "technology changes everything" paradigm will rule again.

    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    The problem is that it deals almost exclusively with an outside power undertaking insurgency in a strange culture. My own belief is that the current administration , for some reason, forgot that's a very bad idea.
    Wouldn't it make sense to reinforce that it's a bad idea? It seems to me like a good time for a Powell doctrine Version 2.0: especially since many here seem to know exactly what they didn't like about version 1.0.
    Last edited by Rank amateur; 10-09-2007 at 11:42 PM.

  5. #225
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Not really, most of us liked it.

    Some of us just knew it wouldn't work. Moore's law applies to 'Doctrine' nowadays.

    Still, there's merit in your suggestion. What would be your ideal Powell Doctrine Version 2.0?

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    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Some of us just knew it wouldn't work. Moore's law applies to 'Doctrine' nowadays.

    Still, there's merit in your suggestion. What would be your ideal Powell Doctrine Version 2.0?
    I know you didn't address that to me, but have you read Skip Bacevich's books? I'm more and more falling into that school which is sort of neo-Powellite.

  7. #227
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    I know you didn't address that to me, but have you read Skip Bacevich's books? I'm more and more falling into that school which is sort of neo-Powellite.
    While I disagree on details, most of the disagreement is little more than a slew of minor quibbles. I agree with the thrust.

    I have seriously believed we were on the wrong strategic approach for well over 40 years -- and every time I thought we'd done the dumbest thing in the world, we pulled another one...

    The which has also led us into some not too smart equipment buys which in turn pushed the strategy which then caused not too smart equipment buys which led to...

    Friend of mine went to the War College back in the early 80s. After he completed, he mentioned to me that the theory there was that we needed a base lodgment in the ME, the only place we did not have one at the time. He and I had a lot of great arguments over the desirability of that and my objections thereto.

    I disagree with Bacevich on Iraq but only due to the fact that, right or wrong, we're there. I wouldn't have done it that way but it wasn't my call; we're there and unlike Bacevich I'm pretty sure it'll work out okay. Not great by a long shot -- but okay. There is no win in any COIN op in this age but an acceptable outcome can be achieved.

  8. #228
    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    I remember that well. Rumsfeld held a limited showing of the film in the Pentagon and as I recall invited the press to sit in, which struck me as really bizarre given the FLN wins.

    I put out two history lessons on the Alerian War, one of which highlighted the paradox of Trinquier's methods succeeding tactically and failing strategically, which the film The Battle of Algiers offered as its central message.

    Tom
    Funny that--actually your use of bizarre is probably even more appropriate.

    I used to show this film to my college sophomores as part of a Just War block of instruction. They got the point quite well. Prior to showing this movie, most of them thought that the good guys can do whatever they want in war because their cause justifies it. Afterwards, they came to see that the desired end does not authorize just any old means of attaining it.

  9. #229
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    I was being metaphorical with the "throw the keys to Chalabi." I simply meant cobbling together some sort of Iraqi government and leaving. Sure it would have fallen apart. But Hussein would be gone and we wouldn't have been involved.
    Isn't this a bit utopian? Do you think that politically the Bush Admin could have simply stood by and watched resurgent Ba'athists or Iranian proxies overthrow our puppet government?

    And I meant a serious period of U.S. rule and tutelage. Thing is, that would have required several hundred thousand troops. We were in mortal fear of the "Shia uprising" because we wouldn't have been able to deal with it with 120K troops. In other words, it wasn't that would couldn't have dealt with it, but that we weren't willing to pay the price to deal with it.
    I agree with you here. A more massive footprint would have helped enormously here.

    And while a huge amount of reconstruction assistance was stolen, some got to where it needed to go. Even if 90% of the additional was stolen, there still would have been more getting to where it needed to go than there was.
    Enough to make a real difference?

    On the strategic communications, I was thinking of two things:

    --the refusal of Islamic governments to help delegitmize the insurgency contributed to the flow of money and foreign volunteers
    --the opposition to the American role by many nations helped the insurgents believe that we would leave sooner rather than later, and thus all they had to do was wait us out.
    Do you think that "Islamic" governments (are you thinking Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, etc.) can really delegitimize anyone, especially given their own unpopularity amongst Islamic radicals (those most susceptible to assist or fund Iraqi insurgents)? Witness the rapid 180-degree turn that most of these governments had to pull in the recent Lebanon War, where most of the Arab governments backed Israel against Hizbullah but had to reconsider once they realized just how unpopular such a move was.

    As for the latter, I think this is impossible to assess given how poorly we understand insurgent motivation, especially in the 2003-2005 timeframe. I do not believe that this meme had any traction as far as insurgent propaganda during that period.

  10. #230
    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Default Counterinsurgency Panel


  11. #231
    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
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    Default Nice Job Dr's Crane and Metz

    Interesting Q&A on COIN doctrine, emerging concepts and "the debate". Linked from SWJ here.

  12. #232
    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Default Thanks for making the content available

    As good as any COIN "state of the union" summary I've seen/heard to date. I'm using it to help my boss prep for a conference. Steve, I think your point in the wrap-up regarding knowing your partners was the most important perspective of the session. Sometimes the pol. correctness bug keeps us from speaking plainly.
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    I appreciate the point that Steve made about the potential of the American Army becoming so focused on Coin that we end up in the next fight or operation trying to "re-fight" the last war; and the last war being the one we are fighting now in Iraq.

    I disagreed with Con's binary explanation of the theoretical premise to Coin operations as being either "enemy centric" or "population centric." He then built on this point by talking about a conference he went to a while back where there were a bunch of western European thinkers on the subject and they said something like well we just cant do, or go back to, the "enemy centric" approach because post-modern civilizations cant operate that way. The problem with FM 3-24 is that its only theoretical construct is the "population centric" approach and this theoretical construct has actually and in practice become a immutable principle that can not be challenged. I continuously read statements like: "In any Coin operation the people are always the center of gravity." Why, I ask, does it always have to be that way? Why couldn’t our Coin manual have embraced multiple theoretical constructs that don’t just limit us to one? The reason why this is critical is because by operationalizing the principle, or law, that in any Coin fight the people are the center of gravity the following derivative principle then applies; the people must be protected. Once we have these two rules dominating our thinking it in effect determines our strategic, operational and tactical approach to any irregular fight that presents itself to us. In short we have become dogmatic and our answer on the ground then means to commit large number of troops, establish cops, etc. in order to “protect the people.” This may be the correct course of action in certain cases, but not always. This was one of the main points that MG Dunlap was making in his article that the SWJ ran a few weeks ago.

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    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Gian,
    Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post
    I continuously read statements like: "In any Coin operation the people are always the center of gravity." Why, I ask, does it always have to be that way? Why couldn’t our Coin manual have embraced multiple theoretical constructs that don’t just limit us to one? The reason why this is critical is because by operationalizing the principle, or law, that in any Coin fight the people are the center of gravity the following derivative principle then applies; the people must be protected. Once we have these two rules dominating our thinking it in effect determines our strategic, operational and tactical approach to any irregular fight that presents itself to us. In short we have become dogmatic and our answer on the ground then means to commit large number of troops, establish cops, etc. in order to “protect the people.”
    (Emphasis Added)

    I am not convinced that by making the population the center of gravity we must infer that the people must be protected. Instead, I think making the population the center of gravity entails respecting the wishes and desires of the population. I suspect that there are principles or courses of action other than protection that we might derive from making the population the center of gravity. It might also be the case that there is a list of things that the population wants with differing levels of intensity for each. It might well be the case, for instance, that the people want protection much less than they want something else --like jobs, a working sewer system, or a consistently available power grid.

  15. #235
    Council Member TROUFION's Avatar
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    Default The people in COIN

    The question to ask is: why are the people the focus for COIN Ops?

    The people are the focus because they provide (in Maoist lingo) the ocean for the insugent to swim in. Protecting the people from the insurgents is not necessarily the only way to achieve the end state of stability. Basically you want to seperate the insurgents from the general population. You want to remove the people as a source of intel, sustenance, and support. There are many ways to achieve this and they do not all require protecting the people.

  16. #236
    Council Member CR6's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post
    I continuously read statements like: "In any Coin operation the people are always the center of gravity." Why, I ask, does it always have to be that way? Why couldn’t our Coin manual have embraced multiple theoretical constructs that don’t just limit us to one? The reason why this is critical is because by operationalizing the principle, or law, that in any Coin fight the people are the center of gravity the following derivative principle then applies; the people must be protected.
    I think that's a huge point Sir. CGSC stressed treating each operation as unique, being mindful that just because the enemy's (and your own) CoG was one thing the last time, doesn't mean that it hasn't changed. Additionally, isolated instances may arise in which it is possible for more than one CoG to exist (although the school recomended isolating the CoG to one thing as often as possible). The population as CoG model does focus thinking in one specific direction before mission analysis even occurs, which in turn limits thinking creatively about problems. To me this indicates a lack of continuity between 3-0 and 3-24.
    "Law cannot limit what physics makes possible." Humanitarian Apsects of Airpower (papers of Frederick L. Anderson, Hoover Institution, Stanford University)

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    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Default People in COIN

    Gian, my brother, I know its difficult to generate much discussion without throwing a little fuel on the fire, but you extrapolate the "dictum" a little too far...

    I continuously read statements like: "In any Coin operation the people are always the center of gravity." Why, I ask, does it always have to be that way? Why couldn’t our Coin manual have embraced multiple theoretical constructs that don’t just limit us to one? The reason why this is critical is because by operationalizing the principle, or law, that in any Coin fight the people are the center of gravity the following derivative principle then applies; the people must be protected.

    It is more accurate to say that the people must be separated from the influence of the insurgent. That can take many forms and are not limited (quite the opposite in fact) by placing the people as a COIN COG. COIN operations at their core are (should be) designed to defeat an insurgent's efforts to sway the people's opinion that their vision is the preferred option to reforming the current sitting government. It is the people's trust and confidence, and maybe that is what is missing in the current version, that must be earned, swayed, etc

    I acknowledge your concern that a default setting may develop that trust & confidence equals secure the people (probably justified), but I think you sell CDRs and their slaves (planners) a tad short.

    I do think we can (and have in the case of Iraq) do much worse than establishing a relatively secure environment while simultaneously building HN capability & capacity to provide individuals with an acceptable degree of security and freedom from the capricious (sic) application of violence. Without doing so there is no chance to earn trust & confidence.

    Now Mr Crane's comment about the conference and people always being the center regardless of the spectrum. That is probably either language translation barriers or a lack of precision. We live in an era in which we have to keep in mind the IO content of all operations, but that is a far cry from People as the COG of all operations. If neither of the above applies, then that is just drivelling, I don't think he was espousing that as his position, but if it was then the previous statement applies.

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    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Default Please excuse my inability to form a coherent sentence today

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    Quote Originally Posted by Hacksaw View Post
    Gian, my brother, I know its difficult to generate much discussion without throwing a little fuel on the fire, but you extrapolate the "dictum" a little too far...

    I continuously read statements like: "In any Coin operation the people are always the center of gravity." Why, I ask, does it always have to be that way? Why couldn’t our Coin manual have embraced multiple theoretical constructs that don’t just limit us to one? The reason why this is critical is because by operationalizing the principle, or law, that in any Coin fight the people are the center of gravity the following derivative principle then applies; the people must be protected.

    It is more accurate to say that the people must be separated from the influence of the insurgent. That can take many forms and are not limited (quite the opposite in fact) by placing the people as a COIN COG. COIN operations at their core are (should be) designed to defeat an insurgent's efforts to sway the people's opinion that their vision is the preferred option to reforming the current sitting government. It is the people's trust and confidence, and maybe that is what is missing in the current version, that must be earned, swayed, etc

    I acknowledge your concern that a default setting may develop that trust & confidence equals secure the people (probably justified), but I think you sell CDRs and their slaves (planners) a tad short.

    I do think we can (and have in the case of Iraq) do much worse than establishing a relatively secure environment while simultaneously building HN capability & capacity to provide individuals with an acceptable degree of security and freedom from the capricious (sic) application of violence. Without doing so there is no chance to earn trust & confidence.

    Now Mr Crane's comment about the conference and people always being the center regardless of the spectrum. That is probably either language translation barriers or a lack of precision. We live in an era in which we have to keep in mind the IO content of all operations, but that is a far cry from People as the COG of all operations. If neither of the above applies, then that is just drivelling, I don't think he was espousing that as his position, but if it was then the previous statement applies.

    Live Well and Row
    Good to hear from you Hack, old friend:

    I am not making these arguments just for the sake of doing so, or as you state to throw "fuel on the fire." I do make these arguments not to be argumentative but because I believe them to be true and to get at a serious problem in our army today.

    Here is an example of theory turned to principle, then turned in practice to immutable law:

    FM 3-24 states:
    The protection, welfare, and support of the people are vital to success [in Coin].
    To think that FM 3-24 is not exclusively premised on the "population centric" theory of Counterinsurgency operations is not to understand FM 3-24 in scope and purpose. In short FM 3-24 reads like Galula and not Callwell.

    In the current issue of Military Review there is an essay by a former Brigade Commander in Afghanistan on his outfit's experience there in 2006 practicing FM 3-24 by the book. The article is articulate and important for its insights from a former brigade commander practicing Coin in Afghanistan. However, at the beginning of the essay this brigade commander notes that

    the population is the center of gravity in ANY insurgency. [caps mine]
    Lastly, before I left command i participated in a senior command "warfighter" training exercise that was based on a contemporary Iraq scenario. A few days into the exercise the senior commander changed the purpose statement on all unit missions from the highest level of command down to the lowest to read as purpose:

    protect the people
    So we can talk about flexibility and adaptability but those qualities by and large in our army are constrained by a FM 3-24 box that we have put ourselves into. Consider the fact that newspaper reports have it that AEI is putting together a "Surge 2" plan for Afghanistan. I speculate that it will be premised on an increase in troop strength, the method of clear, hold, build, and has as its center of gravity the "people" and the imperative to "protect them."

    always good to be in touch with you; just like old times.

    gian

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Very interesting thread here. According to the Slapout Based Warfare theory the COG is the GROUND. The ground connects and links and provides life and support to everything and everybody. Whoever can seize and control terrain that has the most political value (life support) is going to win in the long run.

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