The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)

[Fabius Maximus]

There has been some outstanding thoughts presented here, no doubt why the number of hits is so high.

Thanks to all of you who have posted on this thread (or will do so in the future). The worst aspect of writing about 4GW is the fog -- the difficulty of seeing different theories and facts in their proper relationship to each other. With your help I'm a little clearer on Kilcullen's work, and where it stands in the 4GW debates.

Here are a few speculations, closing my participation here. These need more thought. I don't know if they are useful or interesting to you all, but they're free!

To reiterate (again) a key point: the debate is not about utility for a company commander. Whatever works, however it works, great. As cliff notes, or checklist, or source of ideas, or whatever.

1. I consider Kilcullen’s work a valuable contribution in the debate about how we can win 4gw's. That this is his intent is clear from his other works, which we should logically have reviewed in chronological order (but which would have been dry going).

The debate has more urgency, of course, for those of us who believe we're losing in Iraq and Afghanistan.

2. Kilcullen has more in common than I saw at first with both “standard” tactical doctrine and 4GW views. Perhaps he can be seen as a bridge between them. Note similarity between some of his views and those of Lind in FMFM-1A and Greg Wicox’s "Information Arrow."

3. Perhaps the major insight – which I totally missed – is that Kilcullen’s recommendations might work best for the side playing strategic defense (for example, having the home court advantage). That’s important, since, as we all know, defense is the inherently stronger mode of war (On War, book one, chapter one). And some (including me) believe that this is exceptionally true for 4GW)

Easy to see this when reading Kilcullen’s 28 articles from the perspective of an Iraq or Afgh insurgent. Works quite well. Better, I think, than for an American in Iraq – let alone in Afghanistan.

That should not surprise. We’re both fighting a 4GW, and there is a long history of enemies both contributing to development of a tactical doctrine (e.g., the development of infiltration tactics into Blitzkrieg by the Germans and the Brits). Stratfor has also seen this, as in their mention of Iraq as a “Jihadist war college.”

Again, thanks for sharing your insights and experience on this thread. Best wishes to you all for a great 2007.

[RTK]

Again, thanks for sharing your insights and experience on this thread. Best wishes to you all for a great 2007.

Before you leave to your own devices, I'd like some response to the questions you were asked above. Additionally, what are your credentials and research methods to be able to intelligently write 20 articles over 40 months on Iraq?

I guess after 2 years in theater and an hour and a half responding to your question I expect I'm owed at least that much.

[RTK]

Before you leave to your own devices, I'd like some response to the questions you were asked above. Additionally, what are your credentials and research methods to be able to intelligently write 20 articles over 40 months on Iraq?

I guess after 2 years in theater and an hour and a half responding to your question I expect I'm owed at least that much.

Based upon the personal message responses I've received over the last hour, don't expect answers to your questions. We were rode hard and put away wet. As for credentials, don't hold your breath; he won't even address that much.

expect to see your musing in a future blog with his name on it, proclaiming all thought to be his own.

Quite the professional....

[SWCAdmin]

A spirited and heated thread. I have no visibility of what is going on in the PMs, just that there are many of those, too.

Points are strongly felt and generally professionally presented on both sides, despite the passion behind them. At risk of violating my content-agnostic personna when logged in under this identity, I have to say that I tend to support those who prop up Kilcullen. Nevertheless, I am also concerned that we are on the brink of some FM bashing. I, for one, appreciate his voice even as I disagree with it. I know the answer to cold fusion and world hunger is not on d-n-i net. It still makes me think. Plus everyone is all lathered up and writing good stuff here in reply.

My two cents -- the debate is welcome (even if one-sided), our charter is that contrarian viewpoints are welcome (even if unpopular), the tone has been largely civil, rock on. Happy god damn new year.

There's nothing that will replace a lifetime of PME. But it needs some cliff notes to get it rolling out of the mental cobwebs at the tip of the spear. Praise be to both. Kilcullen's 28 to me is sort of like the model T of COIN theory. Not perfect, available only in black, but darn good and reaching folks that weren't served before.

[Bill Moore]

Thank you for bringing us back into our charter where all voices welcome and needed in this council. I shouldn't have to remind anyone that we as a nation, or we as the West, or we as the collective against the Al Qaeda Network or AQN like threat have yet found and implemented an effective strategy to defeat this global movement (yes we hurt it, but that is far from defeating it). Fabius provides a voice contrary to many, and maybe in the end contrary is right. All the respect due to those currently in the fight (and it is a hell of a lot), winning battles (physical and perception) in your AO is critically important, and Kilcullen TTP should help, but it still won't win the conflict at the strategic level. We need to hear the ground truth from the Co Cdrs and NCOs out there now, but we also need to hear ideas from the stratosphere on grand strategy, then find ways to mesh them.

Great debate, still the best forum for professionals I have found on the net. I wish you all the best for a successful and happy New Years!