Bob, sometimes Wilf is right. There are situations where that may be the best option.Originally Posted by Bob's World
Yes.
No.
Bob, sometimes Wilf is right. There are situations where that may be the best option.
David Agrees!
Just of interest...I recently attended a book signing for David Kilcullen. At the beginning of his comments to the attendees (SWJ/Quantico sponsored event 60 - 80 folks were there) he stated the FM needs to be re-written and is out of date (he also stated that it was out of date from day one because things are always changing and we are always learning). He also stated that yes part of counter insurgency is killing bad guys...that didn't come across in the FM because everyone was thinking the military already knew how to do that.
I used to have great respect for Dave, back in the day, but I think he's wrong these days, unless I am not understanding what I keep reading.
a.) FM3-24 was not out of date. It was wrong and bad.
b.) We keep learning? Sorry, what crushes a rebellion hasn't really changed. What has changed is the constraints place by policy.
NOW, - I admit, my ideas have changed. I have learnt. I have publicly viewable record of my though in the 3,000+ posts here, BUT my ideas now all conform to what got taught back in the old days and was written down a long time ago. The problem with the COIN-fusion is that is simply ignored history to pursue either the avant-garde or reputations.
....yet clearly that was the source of the problem because they weren't killing the right people and only the right people.He also stated that yes part of counter insurgency is killing bad guys...that didn't come across in the FM because everyone was thinking the military already knew how to do that.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Well, in 7 months of COIN I did three things:
1. Employed Basic Infantry Doctrine;
2. Tried, as much as possible, to know my backyard; and
3. Respected/Observed Afghan culture.
To me, nothing here requires a new manual. If I'm missing anything, please enlighten me.
Well, that is sort of implied. If I send a poorly trained person to do something, I'm probably not going to get the results I want.
Agreed - anyone can be defeated, we just aren't willing to acknowledge or accept much of that threshold these days (Jim Storr said that in a conversation we had). I think today's junk-COIN is an effort by the military to find something around that. Unfortunately, in my opinion, it's just farting around with no real solution (because you aren't approaching that threshold).
I'm told by the smart guys that no matter how good the tactics are if the strategy is bad then the whole exercise is pointless. How did your efforts measure against this?
Updating 3-24
Interesting comment posted by DavidPB4 on 23 November 2011 at SW Journal on COIN is Dead: US Army must Put Strategy over Tactics.I just returned the questionnaire inviting outside comments on the revision of FM 3-24. I thought the writing committee's decision to open the process to a wider range of civilians deserved a response. I look forward to learning the results and also the findings of Colonel Gentile's current study of counterinsurgency and generalship.
Electrical copies of JP 3-24 and FM 3-24 each dated 5 Oct 2009 seem to be the prime publicly available references on American COIN doctrine. Until now I had assumed that those and other manuals were revised on a frequent basis to incorporate feedback from current operations and then securely distributed to military users. However, the above quote and the content of this thread suggest that update of doctrine and re-issue of manuals is ad-hoc and infrequent.
The work done by armed forces benefits from having an agreed current goal and plan of action usually guided by general instructions on what is to be done, and to some extent how it is to be done. Even when that general instruction or doctrine is erroneously referred to as COIN it must assuredly provide some mix of useful and less useful - or even uselessly out-of-area/context - guidance.
All problem-solving doctrine needs to be adaptive and to some extent it may also be anticipatory. To continue stuck at some time in the past can delay improvement and achievement. Medieval monks were comforted by the belief that what they dealt with was immutable and omnipotent. They laboriously completed, copied and distributed manuscripts in a leisurely manner. They also used colour to illuminate manuscripts and support superstition.
In this modern era it is possible to revise and widely distribute soft-copy doctrine in relatively quick time. Also colour can be readily used to highlight changes in text and to assist understanding and assimilation by showing both the ‘prior’ and ‘revised’ versions.
If the above comments are valid then it is past time to improve feedback and reissue of doctrine that is in heavy current use. That is feedback from any unit, signed off by and forwarded by the commander of that unit. It should be practicable for central staff with recent field experience to evaluate all such feedback and to revise, gain approval and re-issue doctrine on a regular and fairly frequent basis, say at four or six monthly intervals.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 12-01-2011 at 11:35 AM. Reason: Citation in quotes
Slap,
No worries, Wilf on warfare is typically spot on. It's when he applies warfare to COIN where he starts to drift off track. Our reasonable (or unreasonable, as its really up to others to assess that status) minds will differ, but it is such public differing that makes SWJ such a handy tool.
The killing of certain insurgents absolutely needs to be a strong, well resourced, supporting effort of any COIN campaign. Main effort must be the repair of governance and re-earning the support of the populace through change, not charity.
As to the FID force (that intervening role we find ourselves in), I would strongly advise staying out of the insurgent killing business altogether, and to keep our focus on guiding governmental reform and mediating the popular voice into that process (or staying out of the mess altogether unless national interests truly demand our presence).
AQ and non-state UW organizations like them that seek to employ such insurgent organizations and populaces to conduct their acts of terror for them are another matter altogether, and for them we should show now mercy or respite, wherever they might hide. (Just don't listen to the Intel guys who paint everyone they talk to with their same stink, as that throws us right back into killing nationalist insurgents 9 times out of 10).
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
We really gotta come with a better name....sounds like a girls softball team
Thank you, but I think you overstate your case..
The population will support who ever has POWER, by having the monopoly on armed violence. ONCE that is done, then the political fixing can start.The killing of certain insurgents absolutely needs to be a strong, well resourced, supporting effort of any COIN campaign. Main effort must be the repair of governance and re-earning the support of the populace through change, not charity.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
It wouldn't, though.
History does not bear this out
Time and again it is the "power" of a populace seeking liberty from tyranny that over comes the power of even the strongest and most effective of governments.Thank you, but I think you overstate your case..
The population will support who ever has POWER, by having the monopoly on armed violence. ONCE that is done, then the political fixing can start.
As to the trite catch-phrase of "monopoly on armed violence," I gladly toss it to the same bone pile where so many half-right phrases commonly associated with the efforts of intervening powers to suppress such popular uprisings duly belong.
The American populace was guaranteed freedoms of speech, the press and assembly so that movements such as the Civil Rights, and now the Tea Party, could not be deemed treason or insurgency by the sitting government; and were guaranteed the possession of our arms to ensure that they never grew too bold in their possession of some concept of "monopoly" on armed violence. It is the lack of such monopoly that leads to (ultimately) the stability of good governance. It is the presence of such monopoly that leads to the stability born of oppression.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Not true. Cambodia in the 70's, Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany, Saddam's Iraq, A'stan under the Taliban, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, North Korea etc etc etc.
This "power from the people" is not a reality in the real world, unless they do a lot of killing to get it, and unless they are prepared to keep killing, they can loose it.
Then you don't understand it. It means "Man on the ground with a gun." It's not presented as a "system of Government". It is a means by which control - for both good and bad - is gained and maintained for the Government to function.As to the trite catch-phrase of "monopoly on armed violence," I gladly toss it to the same bone pile where so many half-right phrases commonly associated with the efforts of intervening powers to suppress such popular uprisings duly belong.
All sounds good, till you look at Somalia, the Congo, Sierra Leone, parts of Colombia, Thailand etc etc etc. It's the competition for the monopoly that creates the problem and it is frankly ridiculous to suggest the US citizens owning guns gives them the capacity to defend themselves against their government. Never seems to work and never has.It is the lack of such monopoly that leads to (ultimately) the stability of good governance. It is the presence of such monopoly that leads to the stability born of oppression.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
You misstate the problem
It is not that I fail to understand, rather that I refuse to agree with your understanding. I merely point out that reasonable minds can differ, and that the model you profess while often applied, is not, IMO, one that can produce enduring, positive, effects.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
or said another way, as posted on Doctrine Man's (I am a fan) Facebook
http://www.facebook.com/#!/photo.php...&id=1275108793
or this:
http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fb...&id=1082681298
Last edited by Bob's World; 11-19-2010 at 03:52 PM.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Exactly... and that is why western or civilised countries can't "win" counterinsurgencies or suppress rebellions.
Take Zimbabwe for example. Mugabe, that darling of western liberals (in the US sense of the word) faced a rebellion of sorts in Matabeleland through the actions of a number of armed dissidents.
Didn't take him long to suppress that rebellion and not a word of protest heard from the West or anywhere.
Mugabe saw the dissidents as fish swimming in the water (of the general population). Kind of hard to find the dissidents if the population won't report them (through support or fear) so leave the fish and focus on the "water".
IF you "poison" the water so that the "fish" can't survive in it then you win... yes?
Yes.
Conservative estimates were that Mugabe's (North Korean trained) 5th Brigade killed 30,000 men, women and children until the Matabele population reached tipping point. The Matabele were crushed.
That's the way you do it... and you don't have to fix the political thing because even today if the people of Matabeleland hear of soldiers in the area wearing red berets the whole nation has a collective bowl movement. All you need to say if they become problematic again is "do you some some more of the same"?
Then (in a tamer example) we see Sri Lanka first securing support from China (that great nation with supposedly thousands of years of civilisation but still no human rights conscience) then they too apply a little "poison" to the water in which the (Tamil Tiger) fish were swimming. The rest is history.
That's how you put down rebellions and win counterinsurgency wars... brute force.
Now which western country would dare employ such an approach? So that is why in most cases one has to give away the farm to "win" the war. Always a Pyrrhic victory to be sure.
Last edited by JMA; 11-19-2010 at 11:15 PM.
Whoah there Mudhara!You're about 50% right, but....
Western or civilised countries can suppress rebellions IF they recognise the limit of the military instrument, to using armed force against armed force, and the employment of criminal convictions to those sustaining it.
The political problem may continue, BUT you use violence (military AND Police) to ensure it remains a political problem that the rebels will not seek to resolve by force. The ONLY thing armed force does is stop the other guy (rebels) using armed force. That is the key thing FM3-24 doesn't get.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Wilf:
Today's KGS Nightwatch does a pretty good job of summing up the new changes:
Return to Air Power, Tanks and a higher war tempo as the way to break the stalemate, and actually impact the Taliban by returning US "invincibility," at the expense of "hearts and minds."
I suspect that the above, if accurate, speaks strongly against the mixed concept of nice guys gently extricating evil from an otherwise happy and democratic Lake Wobegon.A fourth consequence is that the coalition might begin to start making its own luck. Diligent prosecution of the fight in a more warlike fashion is more likely to shorten the conflict than the mixture of fighting with development projects to win hearts and minds. Under the pressure from no withdrawal date and increased losses, the Taliban inside Afghanistan might be more receptive to negotiations.
If the changes are implemented consistently, and are not just piecemeal, spot fixes, they should improve security conditions. However, they also are likely to produce significant negative consequences in property damage, civilian and militant casualties and bad press, all consistent with a war. On the other hand, the stalemate will continue if the most important change is a longer conflict.
Reality. People in war zones must respect those in power---the goal is to protect yourself/family. Period.
Security is much more important than obscure western concepts, which might be great to think about once security and minimal life-safety/food security is in place.
Steve
Its all about timing isn't it.Whoah there Mudhara!
Western or civilised countries can suppress rebellions IF they recognise the limit of the military instrument, to using armed force against armed force, and the employment of criminal convictions to those sustaining it.
The political problem may continue, BUT you use violence (military AND Police) to ensure it remains a political problem that the rebels will not seek to resolve by force. The ONLY thing armed force does is stop the other guy (rebels) using armed force. That is the key thing FM3-24 doesn't get.
By the time the army gets involved its too late already as the shooting has already begun. And to stop the shooting you either have to pull a Mugabe on the population or give away the farm.
Well the UK effectively suppressed the rebellions in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and even South Arabia, without measures that - at the time - drew large scale international criticism.
The success of the Rhodesian Armed Forces was that the transition to majority Government took place, under a negotiated peace, and not by force of arms as intended.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The Comparisons Don't Work
The problem with these cases is that you are trying to compare how regimes behave in their own backyards with how the US or any other western nation can behave in a foreign country. The lessons of what Mugabe was able to get away with are not tenable for American armed forces in Afghanistan, for example. Perhaps the conclusion you want to make is that it is very difficult for a foreign power to deal successfully with insurgencies and rebellions because they cannot, in the end, utilize the sort of force necessary to defeat them. In this case, the example would be the Japanese in China during WWII and their infamous "Three Alls" campaign -- which made the Rape of Nanking seem like a loving embrace. Despite every form of brutality applied against the Chinese population they continued to contest the Japanese occupation of their country, bleeding the IJA white and softening up the enemy to the best advantage of the Allies in the war as a whole. At the end of the day, the historical record significantly favors the foreign army that is intelligent and as benign as possible in its treatment of the locals.
And for what it's worth, whatever reprieve Mugabe has gained for his regime, the brutality he has visited upon segments of his country will be repaid at some point. Unfortunately, it will likely result in even greater chaos and brutality for that country, to nobody's benefit.
Finally, I do not agree with your conclusion that the concessions that must be made by a foreign power in order to win are pyrrhic. Again, I look to WWII, and the tremendously effective post-hostilities COIN campaign that was conducted in Germany/Western Europe and Japan. We did end up giving our opponents in the war just about everything they had sought to obtain through force, and it was a smashing success to the ultimate policy aims of the war.
Jill
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