Rifle squad composition

[Richard W]

Kiwigrunt:

Thank you for your kind reply.

If memory serves the British put eight battalion size formations into the Falklands (1 Welch Guards, 1 Scots Guards, 1/7 Gurkha, 2, Para, 3 Para, and 40, 42 and 45 RM Commando). I would describe the Welch and Scots Guards as dismounted mechanized infantry. I would also describe the remaining six formations as light infantry. Every Rifle Section in each battalion was authorized one GPMG.

It is interesting that to the best of my knowledge the two dismounted battalions neither tried to increase their number of GPMGs nor did they recommend post action that the number be increased.

The three Army light battalions both tried to double the number of GPMG's and recommended that the number be permanently doubled post action.

The three Royal Marine light battalions both tried to bring a GPMG and a Bren Gun for each section and recommended two guns per section post action.

In other words the guys who knew all about carrying heavy things were the most enthusiastic for the additional weight of another GPMG and 800 rounds of 7.62 x 51 link (about 56 pounds without the packaging).

The SAS were engaged in an action early on to cover the beach landing site. The target was a group of Argentine soldiers overlooking the landing beaches. They were called the "Fanning Hill Mob" by the SAS. If memory serves the SAS alloted 24 men to attack the Fanning Hill Mob. Twelve of the 24 carried a GPMG for the task.

See the books by Hastings, Frost and Vaux for more on this subject.

Regards

Richard W

[120mm]

120mm:

You also posted in part: "Have you ever worn PVS-7Bs or better at night??? Or tried to lead a platoon without radios???"

I reply: No. Am I missing something here? Are they worn during the day for some reason - zero a weapon?

I think I've failed to communicate, here. When I said PVS-7Bs or better, I meant PVS-7B or "a better version of NODs." (Didn't mean to apply that wearing them at night was "better", so sorry about that.)

You do have a point about squad composition, but as others have said before me, how important a point is it? Back when I was much younger, we had large squads that didn't work, and small squads that did.

On belt-feds at the squad level: The main problem I see, as a former M60 gunner, is the feeding method, itself is problemmatic when you want someone to be mobile. The bag/box and links were constantly getting fouled, or torn off, or you just couldn't move quick enough to keep up with the rest of the squad.

I've seen some home-brewed versions of the RPK that looked promising, (cut down barrel and different stock) with the hard ammo case; and there are versions of the SAW ammo box that are better than others.

But at the squad level, you have a definite trade-off, when it comes to the automatic rifle/squad machinegun.

On the M203: I've never been a fan of this design. The method of loading is anti-intuitive and cumbersome. The new H&K underbarrel launcher appears to be lightyears ahead of it, esp. in it's ability to be detached and used as a pistol. (as well as the pivot to load)

I once had the opportunity to burn up 300 HE and 800 paint rounds that were going "out of date" and am impressed with the round's basic capabilities once you get some practice, and "think out of the box" with it....

[William F. Owen]

Kiwigrunt:

Scots Guards: The only comment on machine guns regards the ".50 MG were very effective against enemy sangars...they were very good for our morale,,,Their weight and weight of ammunition severely reduced the options for their use when solely manpacked".

2 Para: Under the heading "Minor Tactics": The Battalion was fortunate that it acquired sufficient GPMGs for two per section. Consequently fire and maneuver at section level was between two gun groups, which proved far more satisfactory that between a gun group and a rifle group". (Note this passage was underlined by the writer.) Further: The GPMG, on the other hand, more than proved its worth both in the light and sustained fire role". More under "Recommendations": "A rifle section should be established for two GPMGs". Finally 2 Para reports that its ammunition scale for the GPMG was "800 rds per gun". Ouch!

The .50 is man packable but at great cost. 1 can of 105 rounds weights >30lbs. The gun and tripod need 3-5 men to man pack it, and once assembled it's not really an act of war to manoeuvre. A Barrett light .50 will produce the same round for round terminal effect for far less weight.

I know, talk to, and correspond with some of the Company Commanders and officers from 2 Para that fought at Goose Green, so I can add something to this.

a.) There is some debate as to where the idea for 2 x GPMG came from. One source suggests Sydney Jary talked to Lt Col Jones.

b.) The organisation of UK fireteams comes from the 1980 PAM45 laying out the 2 x 4 man teams in the mechanised section operating from the FV-432. One team carried the GPMG and one carried the 84mm MAW.

c.) The after action report may be dishonest to the degree that there is not way anyone can say 2 fireteam of GPMG worked better than one, because there is simply no comparative data. The UKs employment of the Rifle Group and Gun Group was taught and done wrong from the word go (1942/43) so I remain to be convinced. -

d. ) Te 2 x GPMG statement was also used to support the creation of 2 x Fireteams each with a 5.56mm L-86 LSW. This was put into place with no testing. Experiments conducted in 1995 showed that Platoon and section organisation was not well understood, and the Platoon was far more effective in the attack if organised and trained differently.

[William F. Owen]

In other words the guys who knew all about carrying heavy things were the most enthusiastic for the additional weight of another GPMG and 800 rounds of 7.62 x 51 link (about 56 pounds without the packaging).

Major Dale Colette MC, (OC A Coy - 3 Para) made the categoric statement that it was the GPMG than won firefights and that the SLR was just for self defence. I put it to members of 2 Para, (and hypothesised in my RUSI Article) that they might have focussed on having no SLRs and just SMGs, to carry to more ammo and to have a lighter hand held automatic weapon for exploitation. The reply came back - "not sure about that."

...but! The number of GPMGs in the platoon or section is missing the point. These days you have far better communications and sensors. That makes a massive difference. The problem area for modern dismounted operations is not weapons

...and why is having 2 GPMG so good when only 22 men out of an available >80 took part in the final "assault" on Darwin Hill?

It was MILAN missiles that forced the surrender of the Boca House position and M72 LAW than was actually used by the CSM and Corporal Abols to break into the Darwin Hill position.

[William F. Owen]

I've seen some texts on your platoon designs, but I had several times the impression that
- it's either a simple 2-section platoon
or
- you assume that the platoon is the smallest element and teams/sections are not really capable of temporarily pursuing independent missions

Fuchs mate,

Yes it could be 2 x 15 man sections (section of 3 x 5 fireteams), or 3 x 10 man sections,(section of 2 x 5 man fireteams) or 6 x 5 man fire-teams, or 5 x 6 man fireteams.

I do not make this assumption. It depends on the mission / task, the number of men available. If you send out a 4 man OP party, then you have to have at least another 4 men to protect them and at least a 10-15 man QRF. Experience from Basra suggests that QRFs may even have to be Sub-unit size, unless you want to see your the bodies of the 4 man OP team hung from a bridge.

I am not really worried about Anti-armour operations. We're pretty good at that. It's the complex environment that posses the challenge.

[William F. Owen]

Foot mobility: Some years ago I had the opportunity, privilege really, to do a job with the French Army on the ground. The leadership consisted entirely of veterans of the Colonial Parachute Battalions and Regiments and 2REP. 3BEP and even the dreaded 1REP. Their idea of foot mobility was for an entire Battalion, to include the commander and his staff, "to disappear" in the back country for 3-5 days without backpacks or resupply.

I've no doubt they could walk around for 3-5 days in the Bundu, but so what? If they bumped into some serious opposition, with access to caches, how would they have re-supplied ammo, and evacuated casualties?

If the answer is helicopters then they fail the test for un-supported dismounted operations, which seems to be the "not needed" holy grail of infantry operations. The Chindits were pretty good and needed an entire air force to support them. A OPS-35 SOG Recon Team, needed as many as 10-14 Helicopters and aircraft, to get an 8-12 man team in and out of the AO.

3 Days of supply, including water, rations and batteries is about +/- 25lbs under most conditions. I guess you could halve that if you can effectively forage water, and these days, that has become very easy compared to the past.

[Norfolk]

It is interesting to note that there appears to be a consensus through a number of battalions in favour of fireteams with a gimpy each. Not quite in line with Karcher's (or Melody? I get confused) suggestion of one gun per squad.

No, it certainly isn't quite in line with what Melody found, but Karcher would seem to agree. I suppose that we can all lay blame for this debate on some now-forgotten German panzergrenadier who first decided to take the MG from his Gruppe's SPW as he dismounted, figuring that if one MG per Gruppe was good, then two must be better. And while we're at it, we can lay further blame on individuals in the US Army who latched on to this and perpetuated it. So, whether two MGs per Squad/Section is a reflection of a genuine tactical requirement, or more a case of the Infantryman's predilection for "acquiring" as many MGs and other pieces of shiny kit as come into hand's grasp, the formal studies would suggest the latter. Commando Forces and Special Forces may require GPMGs in 4-man Fire Teams/Patrols, given their isolation and relative lack of external support, but regular Infantry usually not.

But...,back to the Infantry's poaching of every automatic that they can lay their hands on. The Infantry naturally reorganize themselves around whatever automatics they have, with a rough handful or half-dozen men grouping themselves around each automatic, and typically they carry an UGL in their midst as well. An AT weapon of some sort usually finds its way into their midst, typically for use against targets of the fixed, immobile persuasion. The Falklands War is the classic example of infantry dispensing with doctrine that said each enemy MG should be the object of a Platoon attack; the lads quickly chucked this rubbish and proceeded to take out MGs with every AT weapon they could lay their hands on. Pretty soon many of them were on to clearing ordinary trenches with Carl G's and LAWs instead of rifles and grenades.

The reality is that from war to war, Infantry more or less consistently organize themselves into basic fighting groups of about a half-dozen men (in turn breaking themselves down into teams of 2s or 3s), each group with an automatic weapon, a grenade launcher, and an AT weapon of some sort. And whether you're starting with a German Platoon of four 10-man Sections each with a GPMG, a US Army or Commonwealth Army Platoon of three 8-9 man Squads/Sections each with a pair of LMGs, or a USMC Platoon of three 13-man Squads each with 3 LMGs, or whatever, you still usually end up with these roughly half-dozen man groups.

The main difference between these different Platoons is how many of these groups do you tend to end up with. The Germans usually had 3 or 4, the US Army and the Commonwealth usually 3, and the USMC usually 3. As to Wilf's Platoon, it would probably find itself whittled down from five or six 5-6 man teams (2 of them GPMG teams) to three or four 4-6 man groups, two of them with a GPMG; it's probably more efficient than the other Platoons, and simpler to fight, but isn't much more resistant to battle losses given its modest size to begin with. The other English-speaking Squads/Section would find themselves like the late WWII-German Groups, overarmed and undermanned; good for defence, but lousy for offence. Wilf's Platoon might avoid or at least mitigate that, provided that it dispensed with LMGs in the non-GPMG teams. This would fit with Melody's point that not more than a third of infantry strength should be absorbed by automatic weapons; implicitly, grenade launchers would likewise have to be factored into this 1/3rd fire support:2/3rds assault force ratio, as, like ARs/MGs, they don't handle nearly as well as rifles/carbines in CQB.

[Ken White]

For obvious safety reasons I've refrained from trying to see a dark ignition tracer shot from the far business end.
I wonder whether the late ignition (10-50m away from muzzle) helps to keep at least the exact position difficult to spot as it is supposed to do (besides reduction of barrel wear).

It helps a great deal but is not perfect in that sense, a bright green or red line is still fairly easy to spot and work a back bearing as long as one is not too far off axis.

And if it's still too compromising (likely, as most post-WW2 tracer cartridges were of the dark ignition type afaik), how about using incendiary cartridges? Incendiary provides a more visible impact afaik (I never shot with INC - environment and no real training requirement anyway).

That works well with the .50cal/12.7mm, using either incendiary or API. It worked less well with the old .30-06 (7.62x63mm; the incendiary charge in the blue tip M1 cartridge was too small) and, to my knowledge, there is no incendiary for the 7.62x51mm or the 5.56x45mm.

Larger problem in any event is getting tracers to the troops to use, some people strip them out of MG belts but tracers are frequently hard to come by.

[Rifleman]

How nice! I go away for a couple of weeks and return to find all these new posts to read!

A couple of thoughts:

After the American five - man fire team went the way of the dinosaur something interesting happened. The Army authorized every Rifle Squad not one but two belt fed machine guns. One for each fire team.

I was there for that one. We thought we were pretty hot at the time, too!

For reasons I cannot understand the American Rifle Squad continued to soldier on through WWII, Korea and Vietnam without a belt fed machine gun. (I understand that some specialist units had one or more machine guns assigned to each rifle squad.) Apparently it was not until Gulf War I that most American Rifle Squads received their light machine guns.

But when they received the light machine guns the American Squads, for the first time in their history, suddenly had serious fire power at their disposal.

Yes, officially you're correct but let's make a distinction between what was official doctrine and what often happened in the field in Vietnam.

I've mentioned this a couple of times before (sorry to sound like a broken record): the rifle squad of that era didn't include the M60 at squad level but many Vietnam Vets remember employing the M60 at squad level as standard operating procedure anyway.

The usual Army squad in Vietnam wasn't 11 men in two fire teams (even if that was what the book called for). It seems to have been about six to eight soldiers with one M60, one M79, and a handful of riflemen with M16s.

So the "squad" itself was often, defacto, a large fire team and not a squad as we think of one: very similar to the German WWII squad, Paul Melody's proposed squad, and the fire teams in Wilf's proposed platoon.

[William F. Owen]

@ And whether you're starting with a German Platoon of four 10-man Sections each with a GPMG, a US Army or Commonwealth Army Platoon of three 8-9 man Squads/Sections each with a pair of LMGs, or a USMC Platoon of three 13-man Squads each with 3 LMGs, or whatever, you still usually end up with these roughly half-dozen man groups.

@ As to Wilf's Platoon, it would probably find itself whittled down from five or six 5-6 man teams (2 of them GPMG teams) to three or four 4-6 man groups, two of them with a GPMG; it's probably more efficient than the other Platoons, and simpler to fight, but isn't much more resistant to battle losses given its modest size to begin with.

@ Wilf's Platoon might avoid or at least mitigate that, provided that it dispensed with LMGs in the non-GPMG teams.

Platoons are not games of absolute numbers. Numbers is not that important compared to Leader ratios, cost, training and primary equipment's. For example, a Company of 4 x 24 man platoons is far more expensive than 3 x 32 man platoons.

A Fully manned 1918 Commonwealth Platoon was 27-28, dependant on whether it was commanded by an Officer or NCO. (1 extra was the Officers Batman!- Soldier Servant).

I picked 30 men, as being able to be transported across current scales of commonly used vehicles, and to offer the greatest range of flexible groupings for smallest number of leaders (1 less corporal and L/Cpl per platoon) within generally accepted spans of command. I am looking at principles of organisation, not TOEs. The 30-man platoon is just an example of that thinking.

40-Man platoons have all problems associated with being 25% larger, and probably 50% more expensive. This would reduce the number of platoons and companies held in a battle group for a given number of men. Cost may be mitigated by needing less officers, NCO's and primary equipment, but I suggest a 40 man platoon needs at least 2 more NCOs to maintain effective spans of command.

The discussion on Platoon Organisation never starts from the real world perspective that the Manning level of a Battle Group is X or Y. - (that being said someone has just asked me to start looking at just that!)

Yes, a 30-man platoon may drop to 24 or even 4, but that can't govern principles of organisation. Principles are what commanders are trained in. The T of E (like that shown) is just a budget pot.

"You x men, and NCOs, plus Y equipment. Now get the job done."

The where my thinking currently stands there are no 5.56mm LMGs!

30 Man Platoon Outline

Manning
1 Officer, 1 Sergeant, 2 Corporals, 2 Lance Corporals, 24 other ranks

Weapons.
30 x Individual Weapons/Carbines (5.56mm)
6 x 40mm UGL kits, or 40mm launchers
2 x GPMG (7.62mm)
2 x Long Range Rifles (8.6mm)
1 x 60mm Mortar Hand Held
2 x MAW, - Alcotan / Panzerfaust / 84mm
M72 type LAW and M200 type Rifle grenade issued as required.

3 x ATGM Posts held for Anti-armour mission

Communications
30 x PRR
6 x PRC-148 or 710 type multi-band hand held.
1 x HF Manpack
6 x Commanders GPS sets (PLGR) and PDAs

Night Vision
30 x NVG and IR Weapons pointer
4 x Weapons mounted Long Range Night Sight
4 x Thermal Weapons sight
6 x Light Weight Laser Range Finder

Organisations – organised by mission, transport and operational requirement.
2 x Multiples
Each multiple is 3 x 5 man teams. Each multiple Commanded by the Platoon
Commander, and the Platoon Sergeant.
3 x Sections
3 Sections of 2 x 5 man teams, or each section as 3,3,4 groups.
5 x Sections of 6 men
6 Sections of 5 men.

Transport (as dismounts)
5 x 6 man APC
4 x 8 man APC (2 spare seats)
3 x 10 man APC
10 x M/WMIK crews (2 Sections of 5 vehicles)

[Fuchs]

That's simply not enough machine guns.
1 machine gun in 15 men - that's nto enough at all.
It might function in deliberate attack due to reinforcements, but it's not enough to hold terrain against infantry. It's also not enough to set up a machine gun on every truck if they're being moved in 2 ton trucks.
I'd at least declare six rifles to automatic rifles with bipod, increased magazine capacity and heavier barrel for short-time suppressive fire.

The snipers are apparently permanently attached instead of being attached according to circumstances. Their training won't be optimal with so little contact with other/senior snipers. If one sniper becomes a casualty, a replacement sniper may arrive, but it takes days or weeks to become a good team - a time during which the platoon either has no sniper team or the snipers are at unnecessary risk.
The use of sniper teams being detached from a battalion sniper platoon would allow a more flexible sniper strength (0-3 teams à 2), time to recover, time to build teams in the platoon, ability to concentrate snipers at hot spots, ability to replace a lost or reduced sniper team immediately with an intact team, plenty contact with other snipers for training and still all the time one intact sniper team at the platoon to help train sharpshooters and infantry in general in fieldcraft and marksmanship.

I do also wonder about the choice of a 60mm mortar. 51mm FLY-K has a unique low signature (Georgia offers a 60mm copy, though) and enough range for infantry platoon applications. I prefer this tool.

Well, and again; doesn't look like enough well-trained NCOs to me. Maybe I simply don't know enough about UK corporals, though.

[William F. Owen]

@ That's simply not enough machine guns.

@ The snipers are apparently permanently attached instead of being attached according to circumstances. Their training won't be optimal with so little contact with other/senior snipers.

@ I do also wonder about the choice of a 60mm mortar. 51mm FLY-K has a unique low signature (Georgia offers a 60mm copy, though) and enough range for infantry platoon applications. I prefer this tool.

@ Well, and again; doesn't look like enough well-trained NCOs to me. Maybe I simply don't know enough about UK corporals, though.

@ US Platoons only have 2 x M240B. You can give every 5 man team a GPMG if you want. Carried loads will climb by some 35% or more and there will be no measurable increase in capability, for mobility, communications or observation. - so why do it? You can add SAWs and also reduce all you other capabilities at the expense of merely adding automatic fire. The focus is on projected HE and enhanced suppression - which works better than just MG suppression.

@ It doesn't matter where the sniper training comes from. You can detach 5 men to the Regimental Sniper Wing. - and they are not Snipers. They are long range riflemen. I did not say Sniper Rifles.

@ A RO 51mm would be the optimal but it's not made anymore. 60mm offers commonality with other 60mm ammo natures, and costs very little. FLY-K is very expensive, and not proven, plus it adds a unique ammo nature to platoon.

@ You have one NCO or officer for every 5 men. 20% of the manpower is leaders.

I am not saying this is perfect or the last word. Its a starting point to provoke discussion on the issue, so if you want to change the number of men from 30, to 40 and add another 6 Machine Guns, then OK. If you can do that for less load and lower overall costs, then let me know.

[Fuchs]

U.S. platoons have several SAWs as well, I'm missing an equivalent in your description. The firepower is too small without anything in between GPMG and AR.

Long-range rifleman are a waste. Make them snipers, sniper training is cheap as they're on active duty anyways.

A 20+ % leader ratio is very useful for force growth/mobilization. It enables the force to quickly double or even triple its size.
Small unit leader survivability is often lower than common infantryman survivability. The percentage of leaders would drop quickly in a high intensity conflict anyway.
Plus: You'll find out about a lot of unsuitable leaders once a conflict goes hot.

[William F. Owen]

@ U.S. platoons have several SAWs as well, I'm missing an equivalent in your description. The firepower is too small without anything in between GPMG and AR.

@ Long-range rifleman are a waste. Make them snipers, sniper training is cheap as they're on active duty anyways.

@ What do you mean firepower? It's a meaningless term. Every man has an automatic weapon, so you cannot physically increase the number of automatic weapons.

@ Says who? A Long range rifleman is the trained operator of the long range rifle. About 2 days of instruction and range time.

Fuchs, if you know better and have the data, then show me.

[Fuchs]

@ What do you mean firepower? It's a meaningless term. Every man has an automatic weapon, so you cannot physically increase the number of automatic weapons.

@ Says who? A Long range rifleman is the trained operator of the long range rifle. About 2 days of instruction and range time.

Fuchs, if you know better and have the data, then show me.

Wilf,
so why don't you delete the last two GPMGs? 2 GPMG are no more automatic weapons than 2 assault rifles are. You used a meaningless argument.

Firepower is the weapons effect that intimidates, destroys, wounds, kills and occasionally even ignites.
I have probably for the very first time found someone who argues that an assault rifle has as much firepower as a GPMG.
The usual point of view is that controllability, ammunition capacity before reload and ability to fire more shots in a fire fight (without a glowing barrel, molten handguard or cook-offs) constitute superior firepower against all but the smallest (and at the same time slow) targets. This point of view has strong and obvious merits.

I remember your argument about accuracy replacing volume of fire for suppression. That works fine - unless you don't know where exactly (really exactly - like accurate to one metre) the enemy is. In that case you need to spray a bit - that requires volume of fire. You'll also need volume of fire to tear through some cover like sand bags or walls and to drive enemies away from behind such imperfect cover - you won't be able to do that with LSW or 5.56 assault rifle shots.


About the "Long range rifleman"; who is this? Is this someone who has joined the Army three months ago?
Even conscript armies have enough time for a six-week sniper course to add fieldcraft, sniper tactics, counter-sniper tactics and FO skills to the repertoire for marginal costs. They just need to want it.
I don't think that you can have any data that rejects this because this isn't about data at all.
A two-day course won't even suffice to learn to read the wind. It's enough to have two cold days during this instruction = they won't be able to learn much about mirage. Two very windy days = they won't learn much about reading slight bushes movement. Two days is enough to learn how to use their weapon, their scope and a LRF tool, that's nothing in comparison to what these two could learn in just a couple more weeks (it would help a lot even if they were no talented snipers) and certainly not enough to exploit the potential of a .338LapMag rifle simply because it's about more than holding the weapon steady and read the distance from an electronic tool.

A single rifle type like 8.6mm (.338LapMag) is just a compromise. Such a weapon won't be able to shoot a powerful subsonic bullet to fool acoustic-based sniper detection systems (which all seem to depend on the sonic boom of the bullet) and to achieve minimum signature overall like VSSK does.
A .338 will also not be able to match the armour penetration effect of a .50 or to achieve its range. Both could be even better with 9x90, but as long as that's just in prototype stage I'd recommend a .50 for really long-range shooting and for the ability to penetrate BMD/BTR and recce vehicles with SLAP.
That's why I prefer to offer the platoon snipers the choice between three different weapons. Conventional sniper rifle, AT rifle and suppressed subsonic heavy bullet rifle.

I don't want to piss you off; but these are components of your layout that don't seem to be anywhere near-optimal to me. And that's what you claimed; to have an idea how a platoon could be optimised.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,
so why don't you delete the last two GPMGs? 2 GPMG are no more automatic weapons than 2 assault rifles are. You used a meaningless argument.

Sven, the GPMGs are 7.62mm x 51. The Carbines are 5.56mm. As you know 7.62mm is greatly more capable, in terms of target perforation and comparative terminal effect at a given range. 5.56mm for a SAW with the same barrel length as a Carbine, has no increase in performance, and even with a longer barrel on the SAW the performance increase is negligible.

remember your argument about accuracy replacing volume of fire for suppression. That works fine - unless you don't know where exactly (really exactly - like accurate to one metre) the enemy is. In that case you need to spray a bit - that requires volume of fire.

...but you can spray with a carbine just as well as you can spray with a SAW.

You'll also need volume of fire to tear through some cover like sand bags or walls and to drive enemies away from behind such imperfect cover - you won't be able to do that with LSW or 5.56 assault rifle shots.

Which is why I suggest 2 x 7.62mm GPMG and 2 x 8.6mm LRR

Even conscript armies have enough time for a six-week sniper course to add fieldcraft, sniper tactics, counter-sniper tactics and FO skills to the repertoire for marginal costs. They just need to want it.

If you were training unit snipers, I'd agree, and BTW, I don't think it needs to take six-weeks.

Two days is enough to learn how to use their weapon, their scope and a LRF tool,

Correct! and as LRR operators that's all I want from their training. If they can hit a 1 x 0.5m target out to 1,000m, 60-70% of the time, I'm happy.
They also need to be able to use the Thermal Image site, but that can only engage out to 600m, so not a great training challenge as 8.6mm has a pretty flat trajectory out to 600m.

it's about more than holding the weapon steady and read the distance from an electronic tool.

It is, but not much. These guys as good shots, not snipers. They can use Mil-dot reticle or a Hold over type reticle to judge distance and engage. Or use an LRF, or BOMARS type system. Wind, light, shooting up and down, all comes with practice and that's built into the Platoon training program.

A .338 will also not be able to match the armour penetration effect of a .50 or to achieve its range.

8.6mm is, lighter, cheaper and more accurate out to 1,000m (RMCS testing 1996) and requires less training.

That's why I prefer to offer the platoon snipers the choice between three different weapons. Conventional sniper rifle, AT rifle and suppressed subsonic heavy bullet rifle.

So, you increase expense/cost, training and complexity across three weapons systems? You also loose a lot of internal stowage space inside your APCs or supporting vehicles

I don't want to piss you off; but these are components of your layout that don't seem to be anywhere near-optimal to me. And that's what you claimed; to have an idea how a platoon could be optimised.

I don't want to be pissed off, but I do want to be challenged. I present these and other ideas to rooms full of British Infantry Officers and NCOs, so I understand the arguments.

This is why I posted my suggestions here. The folks on this board are mostly smart and experienced so it's a privilege to get the feedback.

[William F. Owen]

If memory serves the SAS alloted 24 men to attack the Fanning Hill Mob. Twelve of the 24 carried a GPMG for the task.

Sorry, missed this.

A friend of mine was on the Fanning Head raid, and planned it. Couple of things.

1. There were 16 GPMG, a 51mm Mortar, A Naval Gunfire FO party (NGFO 1?) and a hand held thermal imager.

2. The Raid was planned to "bluff" an Argentine Heavy Weapons Company into surrendering by making them believe they were under attack by at least two companies. If they did no surrender the plan was to use Naval Gunfire to do the damage.

3. The troops concerned were so overloaded that one of the helicopters used, could not actually lift off at the first attempt.

So all in all, I submit that this is not a particularly useful example for the matter under discussion.

[Fuchs]

Wilf, I bet you know a universal trend in infantry during war since early 20th century.
They drop some of the non-weapons and non-ammo equipment to lighten up and pick up additional heavy weapons to increase their firepower.

The peacetime design of small units should attempt to give the best basis for tailoring to specific circumstances in wartime. A platoon TO that is weak on machine guns will in my opinion be changed very much once the conflict goes hot.
I'm pretty sure that the infantrymen who use your organization won't accept your argument that additional machine guns are no improvement.
They might end up with four to six GPMGs.

Think about it; the opposing force might have three machine guns and easily pin down your two machine guns. Your platoon would be effectively reduced to about 20-24 assault rifles and some GLs (which are very difficult to use with accuracy when the user is already pinned down).

Possible reasons (just one necessary) why your GPMG firepower might be temporarily reduced to a single GPMG for the entire platoon: the machine gunner
is KIA,
is WIA,
panicked,
is being pinned down,
is clearing a stoppage,
changing position,
lost LOS due to smoke/dust,
is in wrong position,
misunderstood the situation and shoots to wrong direction,
is reloading/changing barrel,
his machine gun was damaged by a hit,
has expended his munition too quickly and is separated from ammo bearers.

Or think about a L-ambush at a road. You'd only have a single machine gun for the flank and one for the front. Remember the difficulty to turn the machine gun beyond its about 60° cone without losing several seconds due to repositioning.

5.56mm for a SAW with the same barrel length as a Carbine, has no increase in performance

The external and terminal ballistics performance is not very different, but the internal ballistics allow for a much higher sustained RoF.
The psychological effect is almost the same effect as of a GPMG, it's much better able to suppress (more than just one or two opponents as possibly with accurate single shots) and to hit moving targets than a assault rifle/carbine.
I believe that this is too obvious to discuss it much.

[William F. Owen]

I bet you know a universal trend in infantry during war since early 20th century.
They drop some of the non-weapons and non-ammo equipment to lighten up and pick up additional heavy weapons to increase their firepower.

I am unaware of this trend. AARs I know of from Vietnam talk about the need for more night vision and radios. None I have seen mention the need for more weapons. Same was true from the Falklands, with the exception of wanting a light mortar and an M-203.

I'm pretty sure that the infantrymen who use your organization won't accept your argument that additional machine guns are no improvement.
They might end up with four to six GPMGs.

I don't understand the focus on Machine Guns. MG suppression is less effective than Projected HE, which is what kills and what works. 2 Para doubled the number of GPMGs in a platoon to 6! Yet it was the use of projected HE that reduced the enemy positions.

Again, you can give every man a GPMG if you want. You will loose something in return.

If you want 6 GPMG then fine. You can only scale each gun with 600 rounds. (You can't allocate more if you only want to hold only 1 x 7.62mm 4-BIT pallet at BG HQ) Now it is possible to have another pallet, held at BG HQ but each man in the Platoon is now carrying 2.7-3kg of ammo more, so they have to give something up. Your 100% re-supply weight is now more than 3 times greater than it was, and can't be carried by two men, (97kg versus 27kg).

Cost has now gone up to a huge degree, with the need for more TI sighting units, weapons kits, and training ammunition. A large amount of internal stowage space, both in guns, ammo, kits and TI sights, is also gone, so some other capabilities have probably been lost.

As you can see, like the number of 30 men, I didn't pull the figure of 2 GPMGs out of thin air.

Think about it; the opposing force might have three machine guns and easily pin down your two machine guns. Your platoon would be effectively reduced to about 20-24 assault rifles and some GLs (which are very difficult to use with accuracy when the user is already pinned down).

I don't see how this is a valid argument. It assumes fire fights are based on linear equations. What if the snipers killed the enemy MGs? What about my mortars, LAWs and MAWs, or even ATGMs??

Possible reasons (just one necessary) why your GPMG firepower might be temporarily reduced to a single GPMG for the entire platoon: the machine gunner etc etc

That's why each gun is crewed by a 5-6 man team.

Or think about a L-ambush at a road. You'd only have a single machine gun for the flank and one for the front. Remember the difficulty to turn the machine gun beyond its about 60° cone without losing several seconds due to repositioning.

I'll have the same problem in a triangular harbour. Why would I let one possible "ambush" pattern, or harbour design define my scale of weapons?

The external and terminal ballistics performance is not very different, but the internal ballistics allow for a much higher sustained RoF.
The psychological effect is almost the same effect as of a GPMG, it's much better able to suppress (more than just one or two opponents as possibly with accurate single shots) and to hit moving targets than a assault rifle/carbine.

Suppression has nothing to do with a high ROF. 30 rpm cyclic suppresses jus as well as 800 rpm cyclic. However I don't see a great variation in cyclic rate between most 5.56mm carbine and SAWs. (750-850 rpm approx)

I bet that at 200m, you would not be able to tell the difference between a 3-5 or even 10 round bursts fired from a 5.56mm Carbine and a 5.56mm LMG and if someone was suppressing the window you were using, you wouldn't care.

You are right about moving targets. The best cyclic rate for hitting a running man is about 1,200 rpm (20 rounds a second) and is why the MG-42 had such a high rate of fire.

[Fuchs]

I know about Vietnam LRRP teams and GI squads which added GPMGs (GPMGs not being part of the official TO&E of squads) and I remember lots of examples from WW2 and Korea that clearly showed an increase in heavy weapons in the infantry. There should be no doubt that WW1 infantry added lots of machine guns between 1914 and 1918.
The quantity of machine guns and the calibre of mortars tend to rise in wartime.

I don't understand the focus on Machine Guns. MG suppression is less effective than Projected HE, which is what kills and what works. 2 Para doubled the number of GPMGs in a platoon to 6! Yet it was the use of projected HE that reduced the enemy positions.

Meanwhile, the enemy was suppressed and didn't kill much due to the intense machine gun fire?
Would projected HE work as well against enemies who fight smarter and change positions after spending half a magazine? Would HE projection have helped as much against rear slope defenses? I bet that ATGMs and light tanks are not useful against rear slope defensive positions.

I don't see how this is a valid argument. It assumes fire fights are based on linear equations. What if the snipers killed the enemy MGs? What about my mortars, LAWs and MAWs, or even ATGMs??

I won't write pages to cover every aspect in detail when I want to raise a single point.
All the mentioned support weapons can be used by both sides, if you claim that these kill a superior number of enemy machine guns then I claim that the opponent's support weapons have killed your two machine gun positions plus some others. Seriously, this is not helpful.
Less machine guns = less volume of fire = less effect (both psychological and physical).

That's why each gun is crewed by a 5-6 man team.

Which is only a partial and unreliable fix for the mentioned problems.

I'll have the same problem in a triangular harbour. Why would I let one possible "ambush" pattern, or harbour design define my scale of weapons?

You don't need to. But lots of standard positions don't work fine with only 2 machine guns. And every such example casts doubts about whether 2 GPMGs only is "optimal".

Suppression has nothing to do with a high ROF. 30 rpm cyclic suppresses jus as well as 800 rpm cyclic. However I don't see a great variation in cyclic rate between most 5.56mm carbine and SAWs. (750-850 rpm approx)

I bet that at 200m, you would not be able to tell the difference between a 3-5 or even 10 round bursts fired from a 5.56mm Carbine and a 5.56mm LMG and if someone was suppressing the window you were using, you wouldn't care.

I didn't write about cyclic, but about sustained RoF. Btw, There's no such thing like "30 rpm cyclic" and troops should avoid to use windows if possible.

You have an underlying assumption that the enemy's positions are well-known.
That coins your suppression argument of few+aimed = volume+sprayed.
I think this is optimistic. I never really saw well-camouflaged conscript riflemen at 100m distance.

Modern weapons have easily 300-400m effective range, machine guns even much more on tripod. HE projection out to 300m is too inaccurate, aiming is difficult and requires significant exposure. Quit the same goes for accurate single shots to long range - the hit chance isn't high unless the rifleman exposes himself for a while. He might even be unable to hit the machine gunner if the latter uses a good tripod and telescope combination to fire from behind cover.

Your platoon would be limited to two GPMGs as only weapons with reliable firepower in a forest. 5.56mm is easily deflected and stopped, explosive munitions detonate directly after safety distance and the lack of clear vision requires some spraying. A WW2 platoon would be clearly superior in a dense forest.

It's important to gain fire superiority (relieve the own troops from being pinned down and pin the others down) even if you're not the one who initiated the firefight.
This highlights whether the weapons are the right ones to turn the tide. A UBGL and a long range rifle are only effective with careful aiming, and that's not really possible while you're being pinned down.
Assault rifles can do something (but unless properly coordinated) they won't turn the tide against an opponent who already has fire superiority. Even if they did, their firepower would dwindle quickly afterwards due to reload activity.
The impressive, intimidating firepower of machineguns is what turns the tide most easily. Their belt length or magazine capacity also suffices to keep fire superiority for more than few seconds.
But you need some redundancy, or you won't have enough machine guns for the job.
5.56 machine guns can turn the tide just like GPMGs because the ability to penetrate cover isn't required to pin the enemy down. It can even be counter-productive as you want them to take cover.
The disadvantage of 5.56 machine guns to 7.62 machine guns is not in suppression, but in killing through cover and at long ranges.

I doubt that your 2 GPMGs can turn a firefight, I doubt that the UGLs and heavy rifles would help much to turn a firefight and the assault rifles - well, assault rifles are standard. The enemy will have lots as well.

I understand your ammunition and weapons weight concerns. I never liked to carry a GPMG myself. But to take away firepower in all missions is not the solution, especially no solution that deserves to be associated with being "optimal".
That's why I advocate a flexible platoon that partially reorganizes and re-equips to suit a mission.
Deliberate defense = 6 GPMG.
Patrol = much less GPMGs.
Offense = some machine guns, but most important external support.
Recce = no machine guns, sub squad size.

I believe that such a flexible TO&E is a much better answer than to have an all-round TO&E that is still quite heavy for some tasks and much too weak on machine guns for other tasks.

The ultimate test would need to be actual combat against even-sized opponents, as lots of psychological and Murphy's law components play into this. Exercises won't help to test the effect in a firefight.