Quote Originally Posted by Eden View Post
I have no problem using MRAP-class vehicles to 'transport' soldiers to their AOs (say on the first day of their tour), or for moving beans and bullets, or as specialized engineer vehicles. But the MRAP is exactly the wrong way to approach the IED threat. The right way is through intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments that don't require constant commuting. The MRAP is the same sort of response to a threat that has our soldiers chasing insurgents while weighed down with 100 pounds of gear and body armor. Moreover, MRAPs isolate soldiers from the population and the environment and this extends the war - meaning more casualties in the long run.

I'm sorry, but a brutal fact of war that we sometimes forget is that preservation of our soldier's lives is not the primary objective. Our senior leaders rarely talk about that, and the MRAP is an example of taking the easy way out rather than laying out the often harsh facts of life.
There are a couple of assumptions in this argument. The first is that "intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments" and MRAPs are mutually exclusive. While TTPs are important, why can't they be married with force protection for a greater effect?

The second assumption is that MRAP isolates Soldiers from the environment. MRAP is an inanimate object. MRAPs don't formulate missions, orders, TTPs, or SOPs. That would be the responsibility of commanders and leaders. While I see your point that MRAPs provide an opportunity for Soldiers to avoid engaging with the local populace, staying on the FOB does the same thing. It is a leadership issue, not a force protection issue.

Another issue I have with this comment is the comparison to 100 lbs worth of body armor. Certainly, there is a tipping point where too much force protection inhibits mission accomplishment. Excessive equipment weight would seem to be one of them. On the other hand, suggesting that no force protection is warranted simply because too much may inhibit mission accomplishment seems wrong.

Lastly, I'd be careful about that last argument. While casualties are a part of war, the idea that we shouldn't do anything to mitigate risk is nonsense. Soldiers are combat power. If you lose combat power, you lose your ability to accomplish the mission. Therefore, you must preserve your combat power.

This isn't an emotional appeal for the lives of young men. It is a time-tested tenet of tactics and strategy.