FOB Keating attack repulsed

[MikeF]

Mike,

You and I had very similar experiences in Iraq. I had a patrol base in a very bad area attacked VBIED which wounded four only 48h after establishing it. We established a second (structure was unsat after the bomb) nearby and carried forward. Two months later sector was secure - zero attacks. So my initial reaction was the same as yours. I would normally agree but my studies have led me to conclude that these are very different contexts.

I've been reading about and talking to lots of guys stationed in this area - here's the difference:

1) Locals are Afghan equivilants of hillbillies who don't like *any* foreigners. These are not urbane, (comparitively) civilized Iraqis of Diyala.

2) We don't posess enough force to be credible. It would take many more troops to even begin to impose our will on the population. The police were obviously unable to stand up for themselves and more importantly we couldn't protect them. Even if we did have the force, right now the pressing need is to turn the tide in places like Khost, Gardez, Herat, and Kandahar, where the Taliban is threatening once completely safe areas.

3) The only way to operate here is by CH-47 resuppy at night - because of the threat. Wedidn't face a (significantly) vulnerable supply line in Iraq, where a well planned enemy attack could negate your ability to CASEVAC and resuppy.

4) Taliban has freedom of movement and family ties in the population. This is home turf. Unlike Iraq, the insurgents aren't unpopular or bringing a foreign ideology. In Iraq the majority of people wanted return to "normal" - meaning security. The Afghans in this area just want us the hell out and to be left alone. Big difference.

5) The amount of force required to "fight it out" there is an opportunity cost. Even if we apply extra support and succeed - the population there isn't decisive to the overall campaign in any way - it doesn't influence or move any other group. Security in Nuristan won't likely have spillover effects anywhere else because of physical and logistical isolation from the rest of the country. It would be similar to expecting the security/perception of NYC to be changed based on how well you did COIN in West Virginia. No linkages to the center of Afghanistan. If the goal is to keep AQIZ attritted, there are better ways to do that than operating out of fixed, vulnerable outposts.

Given that the major cities are under heavy threat, the resources (in my opinion) dedicated to maintaining these outposts would be better applied in more strategically vital area than endless battle in an area with very little (if any) prospects of success.

I think the location/culture/context of this particular place and area make it different, from my current understanding. As always, I stand ready to be challenged.

Niel,

You maybe right. I'm suggesting holding it through the winter. Here's my thoughts (double-tapping from the front page). As far as resourcing goes, I'm sure we could muster 500 soldiers from the Green Beans, internet cafes, and gyms of the Big FOBs.

During the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge), then COL Bruce Clark arrived at St. Vith, a key junction for track and motorized units, to find an American Army confused, panicking, and some retreating. He took charge, assembling infantrymen, tankers, cooks, and mechanics, establishing a hasty defense, he held St. Vith for several days until Patton's 3rd Army showed up. His actions proved decisive in the overall battle.

I think his actions apply- here's why.

In one of the articles I read (Foust I think), shadow governments, training camps, and denied areas were suggested. Additionally, we know it's a gateway for fighters coming from Pakistan. (Nuristan could be more important than we think).

If we leave now, then we're likely to return to an area scorched by Taliban reprisals. In some areas, entire villages will be wiped out. The locals will never forgive us.

If we stay and reinforce for another two months, we achieve victory as we head into the winter months and large-scale offensives are minimized until spring. We can use that time to dismantle the local shadow gov't and training camps AND muster support from the locals.

Then, we can re-evaluate the situation and determine if the area requires more or less force. If we need to reposition, we can leave proclaiming the Taliban/AQ were too cowardly to fight.

v/r

Mike

[IntelTrooper]

If we leave now, then we're likely to return to an area scorched by Taliban reprisals. In some areas, entire villages will be wiped out. The locals will never forgive us.

I'm not sure about this. If there are genuinely friendly villages, we can probably reinforce areas where CF can cover them, but in eastern Nuristan I'm under the impression that those are few and far between.

After seeing the recent Frontline episode on Helmand (see Abu Muqawama's blog) I'm not sure that plunking down bases in the middle of villages/populated areas is such a good idea any more. The locals know that those places are mortar and RPG magnets, and move away from them. After all, would you want to raise your kids in a place where slightly off-course rockets could kill them in the middle of the night?

Also, as to Ken's comment, totally agree. If we're already resupplying via rotary wing, why not put the base in a tactically sound position?

[MikeF]

I'm not sure about this. If there are genuinely friendly villages, we can probably reinforce areas where CF can cover them, but in eastern Nuristan I'm under the impression that those are few and far between.

After seeing the recent Frontline episode on Helmand (see Abu Muqawama's blog) I'm not sure that plunking down bases in the middle of villages/populated areas is such a good idea any more. The locals know that those places are mortar and RPG magnets, and move away from them. After all, would you want to raise your kids in a place where slightly off-course rockets could kill them in the middle of the night?

Also, as to Ken's comment, totally agree. If we're already resupplying via rotary wing, why not put the base in a tactically sound position?

Good points IntelTrooper. Along with everyone else's. I don't know the situation in Nuristan, but I know my own experiences. What we did worked in Diyala. I made an ASSUMPTION that the same recourse could happen in Nuristan. I could definitely be wrong. That's why I appreciate the conversation here

On a side note, I'd be willing to get on a plane tonight and head out to hold Nuristan.

v/r

Mike

[Entropy]

Good points IntelTrooper. Along with everyone else's. I don't know the situation in Nuristan, but I know my own experiences. What we did worked in Diyala. I made an ASSUMPTION that the same recourse could happen in Nuristan. I could definitely be wrong. That's why I appreciate the conversation here

On a side note, I'd be willing to get on a plane tonight and head out to hold Nuristan.

v/r

Mike

I've been meaning to write a post about it, but one of the major differences between Iraq and Afghanistan is population diffusion. In general, the number of counterinsurgents needed increases the more diffuse a population is.

[Rank amateur]

I've been meaning to write a post about it, but one of the major differences between Iraq and Afghanistan is population diffusion. In general, the number of counterinsurgents needed increases the more diffuse a population is.

And terrain. And no history of effective central government. And a history of successfulyl resisting COIN efforts. And sanctuary in Pakistan.

[omarali50]

Good points IntelTrooper. Along with everyone else's. I don't know the situation in Nuristan, but I know my own experiences. What we did worked in Diyala. I made an ASSUMPTION that the same recourse could happen in Nuristan. I could definitely be wrong. That's why I appreciate the conversation here

On a side note, I'd be willing to get on a plane tonight and head out to hold Nuristan.

v/r

Mike

Thats exactly the thinking anyone would value in a cavalry officer, but taking a step back: are there alternatives in between pulling out and going all in? I ask because I get the impression that the place cannot be held easily and is not worth the intense effort it would take to hold it (even if the resources were available). But just pulling out may hand Gulbuddin too much of a victory. What (if anything) could be done while pulling out? Not necessarily in Nuristan, but even beyond (I am assuming Gulbuddin acid-thrower is not personally holed up in some village in Nuristan??)..

[IntelTrooper]

Good points IntelTrooper. Along with everyone else's. I don't know the situation in Nuristan, but I know my own experiences. What we did worked in Diyala. I made an ASSUMPTION that the same recourse could happen in Nuristan. I could definitely be wrong. That's why I appreciate the conversation here

You're a good man, sir.

[MikeF]

Entropy- thanks for the links and background.

You're a good man, sir.

IntelTrooper- no man is an island particularly in a small war. Any commander that does not recognize that is either stupid or caught up in his own ego. This thread reminds me of the "huddles" I had with my PLs, PSGs, and SLs a long time ago. Heated debates to find truth.

Ken said to Niel:

Mike's idea will work, so will yours. The most important thing is to realize that due to your item 2 (and my follow on comment to it) we are not going to turn this thing into achievement of the stated -- not necessarily the actual -- goals in Afghanistan. Thus, in the interim, we simply need to do what we are doing but get better at the Tactical side of things.

I think we just developed the best COA for our reaction to Nuristan. In the short term, reinforce as I suggested to prove a point and hold through the winter. Second, do a map recon and analysis as Ken suggested. Use METT-TC. Third, consider Niel's points- "Is this worth it?"

Niel's points should drive the operational actions and subsequent strategy in the spring.

On the backside of any US led COIN operation, we must consider the fall-out. This article had me thinking all weekend. Niel, your AO, so I'd appreciate your thoughts and feeback on the accuracy.

In Anbar, U.S.-Allied Tribal Chiefs Feel Deep Sense of Abandonment
Anthony Shadid
Washington Post

RAMADI, Iraq -- There was once a swagger to the scotch-swilling, insurgent-fighting Raed Sabah. He was known as Sheik Raed to his sycophants. Tribesmen who relied on his largess called him the same. So did his fighters, who joined the Americans and helped crush the insurgency in Anbar province.

Sabah still likes his scotch -- Johnnie Walker Black, with Red Bull on the rocks -- but these days, as the Americans withdraw from western Iraq, he has lost his swagger. His neighbors now deride him as an American stooge; they have nicknamed his alley "The Street of the Lackeys."

"The Americans left without even saying goodbye. Not one of them," Sabah said in his villa in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar, once the cradle of Iraq's insurgency. "Even when we called them, we got a message that the line had been disconnected."

Nowhere is the U.S. departure from Iraq more visible than in Anbar, where the 27 bases and outposts less than a year ago have dwindled to three today. Far less money is being spent. Since November, more than two-thirds of combat troops have departed. In their wake is a blend of cynicism and bitterness, frustration and fear among many of the tribal leaders who fought with the troops against the insurgents, a tableau of emotion that may color the American legacy in a region that has stood as the U.S. military's single greatest success in the war. Pragmatism, the Americans call their departure. Desertion, their erstwhile allies answer.

[MikeF]

Since Slap hasn't applied the appropriate music

Cookie Jar

v/r

Mike

[Infanteer]

Thus, other than continued pointless frittering away of troops in overrun outposts there are two basic options. Fewer outposts with massive backup forces a short helicopter ride away (with all the military and political problems and shortfalls that entails) or careful selection of choke points to interdict the movement of the opponent -- we and they can only do so much with given terrain -- and a whole lot of foot and light vehicle mobile hunting teams on our part.

After seeing the recent Frontline episode on Helmand (see Abu Muqawama's blog) I'm not sure that plunking down bases in the middle of villages/populated areas is such a good idea any more. The locals know that those places are mortar and RPG magnets, and move away from them. After all, would you want to raise your kids in a place where slightly off-course rockets could kill them in the middle of the night?

On the topic of FOBs/COPs/Platoon Houses, why does "troops with the locals" necessarily have to have some sort of tactical infrastructure. How about a good old laager? A fellow Platoon Commander said that an established Patrol Base would last about 72 hours before the local insurgents started to figure out what was up.

It seems plausible that moving around in a village area every 24-72 hours would offer a reasonable alternative to a COP while still maintaining a footprint in a geographic area.

[Ken White]

It seems plausible that moving around in a village area every 24-72 hours would offer a reasonable alternative to a COP while still maintaining a footprint in a geographic area.

Less than 24 will leave them unable to do a decent recon and it will also not allow your troops to get into a routine. Keeps the opponent off balance which is where we should always try to place him.

Battalion I was in during the fun and frolic in Viet Nam had several firm rules -- one was no more than 24 hours for anyone, anywhere. We never got attacked in a static position. Most of us routinely moved after 12 hours or so. Another was a quarter of strength on patrols during the day and on ambushes at night -- we never got surprised. Other than two meeting engagements and one major operation where we were supposed to be holding force at the open end of a Valley and were awaited and pounced upon by the entire 18B NVA Regiment who had pulled a neat head fake on the Intel folks, we initiated every contact while I was there -- including the one where Kelly's Platoon chased a Troop of Black Gibbons for about five kilometers before the Gibbons decided they were tired of playing and took to the trees...

It just is not that hard to do it right. It really isn't. This stuff is easy, hard physically to do it right but the brain side is easy...

[Cavguy]

From an article dated Sept 22: (emphasis mine)

At Combat Outpost Lowell, about 110 U.S. and Afghan troops regularly visit the village of Kamu, which is right outside the base and has approximately 70 men. But the troops aren't able to patrol any of the other villages in the area, some of which are less than two miles away, because the security in the area is too precarious and the terrain surrounding their base is too rugged.

U.S. and Afghan forces at Combat Outpost Keating, also in Nurestan, are even more constrained. The base is about one mile from the Taliban-controlled village of Kamdesh, but more than 100 U.S. and Afghan troops there haven't set foot in the village in more than three months. On rare occasions, the elders from the local shura, or council, will come and discuss reconstruction projects with troops at the outpost.

The troops there could be put to far better use in other regions, said George, who first developed plans to shut down the two outposts in December. "They are protecting themselves in those areas, and the bottom line is that is not enough," he said. "They don't get off the base enough because of what it takes to defend those places and the security situation up there."

And this:

It seems this is COP Keating, occupied by 3-61 Cavalry, part of TF Mountain Warrior. From surveying all the open sources, it seems the COP outside the village was overrun and set on fire prior to being re-taken, and is now mostly burnt to the ground. The overall fight lasted approx 18h. Close air support was liberally used to support the troops. I recommend ABC's website because they have a reporter in the AO and also some information I couldn't find elsewhere. Heartening story below:

http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=8754347

Exclusive: Wounded U.S. Soldiers Refused to Leave Taliban Fight
Afghan Attacks: Darkness, Smoke Forced Medevac Doctors to Work by Touch
By KAREN RUSSO

KAMDESH, Afghanistan Oct. 5, 2009—

ABC News' Karen Russo was the only reporter to get to the scene of this weekend's bloody firefight between U.S. troops and hundreds of Taliban insurgents when she went in on a MEDEVAC helicopter. Here is her report:

Flying into the besieged Afghan base

during a nighttime firefight this weekend was a harrowing mix of overwhelming noise, stomach dropping maneuvers and shadows hurrying through the gloom.

When the chopper lifted off moments later with three wounded soldiers, it left behind others who were wounded but refused to be MEDEVACED out of the combat zone so they could return to fight with their buddies.

Fighting raged at two remote U.S. outposts near the Pakistan border this weekend, that left eight U.S. soldiers dead and 24 wounded. The battle was fought from Friday night through Sunday as hundreds of Taliban insurgents and their allies tried to overrun the Americans.

During the fighting, the insurgents succeeded in breaching the outer defense of the base at times before being repelled with the help of attack helicopters, fighter jets and drones. It was the bloodiest battle in a year for U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

During the fight, the MEDEVAC team at a nearby base waited - with both patience and frustration. MEDEVAC teams are known for flying into some of the most deadly areas in the world
to rescue injured soldiers. MEDEVAC helicopters are unarmed so they often need supporting aircraft to protect them, and sometimes the cover of darkness is their only defense.

On Saturday night, the team finally received the go-ahead as the sun set. Within moments of receiving the call, we rushed to the helicopter and quickly sped to the outposts.

As we were flying into the attack space, the MEDEVAC team with one medic and a doctor were preparing for the oncoming patients, setting up IV's, pulling out medical equipment and making other last minute preparations.

Apache helicopter gunships escorted us as we neared the combat zone to ensure our safety as we hovered at 10,000 feet awaiting word to descend. When word came, we plummeted in a corkscrew manner, making the descent in a matter of seconds, landing in a valley at the bottom of steep mountains. It felt very vulnerable to attack.

One of the pilots said that even though he had night vision goggles and ordinarily he can see in that sort of situation, because the fighting was intense there was so much smoke it was actually fogged over and it was difficult for him to see. Fortunately he could make out the landing zone, but it was touch and go.

Doctors in MEDEVAC Chopper Work By Touch.

Once on the ground, I hopped out of the chopper, but could see little other than smoke wafting through the moonlight, likely from a fire that was burning much of the base. Then I could make out the shadows of soldiers as they carried the wounded towards the helicopter.

Any noise of the conflict was drowned out by the propellers of the helicopter. The area smelled of burned out pine trees something one solider described as "death and hell."

Three wounded soldiers, one U.S. and two Afghan, were carried down the steep incline and quickly placed on the helicopter.

Some of the injured refused to be MEDEVACED out of the combat zone and continued to fight despite their wounds, according to soldiers at the base. Soldiers told the MEDEVAC crew that troops were donating blood during the battle, so it could be transfused into wounded comrades.

Between the gloom of night and the smoke, it was too dark to see much and the roar of the chopper made it almost impossible to hear commands.

I was quickly sort of touched by a crew member to get on the flight. I hopped on and even before I was on, the medical team was already working on the wounded.

Doctors wore night vision goggles, but still found it difficult to see. One doctor said it was like working by touch.

We were on the ground for a little more than five minutes, but in the chaos of noise and darkness, it felt like it could have been anything from 30 seconds to 30 minutes.

Moments later, the chopper lifted into the air and flew to the nearest medical facility. Despite the heroism of the crew, one of the soldiers died after reaching the facility. It wasn't immediately announced whether the soldier who died was American or Afghan.

Copyright © 2009 ABC News Internet Ventures

[Bill Moore]

I just heard second hand a recent pre-command course addressed by a very senior NCO was informed that if the prospective Commanders went on a FOB and the troops were wearing their pouches and gear in other than a uniform fashion, that unit was not disciplined.

This type of stupidity is "still" much too common within our senior NCO and Officer ranks. While we have all types, I admire the senior NCOs who enforce standards that matter such as maintaining physical fitness, combat skills, and taking care of Soldiers (pay, mail, discipline [not moronic uniform regulations], advising the commander on the men's readiness/morale, etc.). There are plenty of good ones out there, don't let this idiot taint your impression of the NCO Corps. Although I agree, after 8 plus years in combat, you would have thought we would have purged these weaker links.

The troops there could be put to far better use in other regions, said George, who first developed plans to shut down the two outposts in December. "They are protecting themselves in those areas, and the bottom line is that is not enough," he said. "They don't get off the base enough because of what it takes to defend those places and the security situation up there."

Well said. I'm sure the critics will keep jumping out of the wood work over this fire fight, but it appears to me the leadership identified the problem and were in the process of fixing it. Unfortunately, it takes time to plan the logistics and the IO message to support closing the COP. While news articles can be misleading, it appears that the troops handled themselves well, and based on the amount of fire support that "apparently" was available, it doesn't sound like the rules of engagement argument has any legs (as though it ever did). It's combat and ugly stuff happens. If we repeat the same mistakes, then voice your discontent. Losing any Soldier is tragic, losing eight Soldiers in one fire fight is esceptionally painful, but we didn't lose the battle nor the war. Our men held the line, give them the credit they're due.

[Entropy]

Niel,
If we leave now, then we're likely to return to an area scorched by Taliban reprisals. In some areas, entire villages will be wiped out. The locals will never forgive us.

If we stay and reinforce for another two months, we achieve victory as we head into the winter months and large-scale offensives are minimized until spring. We can use that time to dismantle the local shadow gov't and training camps AND muster support from the locals.

First, here's some good background on Nuristan.

Mike, the locals have always been hostile to our presence and they are not worried about the local "Taliban" coming in and burning them out. We are not protecting the population from the Taliban since the population pretty much support most of the insurgent forces.

Secondly, there isn't much of a shadow government to dismantle. This area is controlled by local tribes and powerbrokers, not a Pashtun shadow-government.

Third is the terrain. As Neil indicated there isn't any infrastructure and the population is highly diffused. There are 24 major villages in Kamdesh district with a total population of only around 20k people (The entire province only has an estimated 100k population). Getting from one village to another requires walking (or helos) and can take all day and our forces are almost always ambushed when they leave the wire. We simply don't have the resources to keep an adequate force there and what we have there now is not remotely adequate for interdicting infiltration routes.

IMO, our presence there is counter-productive. Better to pull-out and attempt to rent some local powerbrokers to combat the infiltration, though that probably won't have a huge effect.

[Schmedlap]

As far as resourcing goes, I'm sure we could muster 500 soldiers from the Green Beans, internet cafes, and gyms of the Big FOBs.

Not gonna happen. I made that very same appeal, in person, to my battalion and brigade commanders as we were preparing to provide security for the referendum vote on the IZ constitution. I even recommended the specific FOBs and proposed a much lower number of bodies needed. That vote was regarded as having strategic significance and the answer was not just "no" - not even "hell no" - but just a blank look that said, "are you that naive?" Nuristan is operational-level economy-of-force in a country where the FOBs are less plentiful and there are probably only 29 flavors of Baskin Robbins. Don't expect anyone to cut back on the non-essentials in order to plus up the essentials. What do you think this is, a war? We've got people getting skinny and you want to take away their fat pills.

[MikeF]

Not gonna happen. I made that very same appeal, in person, to my battalion and brigade commanders as we were preparing to provide security for the referendum vote on the IZ constitution. I even recommended the specific FOBs and proposed a much lower number of bodies needed. That vote was regarded as having strategic significance and the answer was not just "no" - not even "hell no" - but just a blank look that said, "are you that naive?" Nuristan is operational-level economy-of-force in a country where the FOBs are less plentiful and there are probably only 29 flavors of Baskin Robbins. Don't expect anyone to cut back on the non-essentials in order to plus up the essentials. What do you think this is, a war? We've got people getting skinny and you want to take away their fat pills.

Sad but true.

Along with Ken's comments on the bureacracy and institution. Take a look at the 15,000 soldiers on LSAA- pimping out their shiny new HMMWVS and MRAPs. An hour or two from the fight, dwelling on college courses, the olympic sized swimming pool, open mike night, and the suf and turf night, we could have them reinforcing Nuristan in the larger fight.

Just my two cents for what it's worth.

Maybe I'm that naive...and, I haven't even seen Kabul or Khandarhar.

v/r

Mike

[MikeF]

The current situation is about 50 soldiers in a patrol base in gateway for AQ from Pakistan. Is that all the soldiers we can muster of an Army of 1.5 million and a population of 350 million?

50 men to bridge the gap?

I think not.

Still, I'd rather be with those 50 men than in LSAA, Monterey, or DC.

v/r

Mike

[J.C.]

It's been a while since my last post but, I recently returned from AF. We sent elements in and around the mountianous regions on the AF/PAK border to target fighter camps. It is very unforgiving terrian and even with resources was a challanging enviroment to fight in, however we did have some good effects from going in and clearing out targeted areas where we were.

I don't belive that the COPS in this area where or will produce the desired effect they were put in place for. DA agianst fighter camps and targeted strikes would produce greater effects. If I am catching the wind right closing these isolated outpost down and pushing those forces to more populated areas to conduct a COIN mission will pay greater dividens in the long run.

Along the mountianous regoins near the AF/PAK border we will not when hearts or minds, but we may with the greater application of force be able to cut some of the supply lines and flow of FF and destroy key training nodes in the region and provide some breathing room for forces on the ground.

[Ken White]

...pimping out their shiny new HMMWVS and MRAPs. An hour or two from the fight, dwelling on college courses, the olympic sized swimming pool, open mike night, and the suf and turf night, we could have them reinforcing Nuristan in the larger fight.

I just heard second hand a recent pre-command course addressed by a very senior NCO was informed that if the prospective Commanders went on a FOB and the troops were wearing their pouches and gear in other than a uniform fashion, that unit was not disciplined.

Silly me, outside of a tourniquet and battle dressings so everyone knew where to find those, I'd have told people to put stuff where it worked best for them. Want to keep your mags in an old Canteen pouch? Go for it...

We've been in a war for nine years and people in high places are saying things that stupid? I said earlier we've forgotten how to fight on foot. Maybe we've forgotten how to fight altogether...

Sad. Scary.

[MikeF]

I just heard second hand a recent pre-command course addressed by a very senior NCO was informed that if the prospective Commanders went on a FOB and the troops were wearing their pouches and gear in other than a uniform fashion, that unit was not disciplined.

Silly me, outside of a tourniquet and battle dressings so everyone knew where to find those, I'd have told people to put stuff where it worked best for them. Want to keep your mags in an old Canteen pouch? Go for it...

We've been in a war for nine years and people in high places are saying things that stupid? I said earlier we've forgotten how to fight on foot. Maybe we've forgotten how to fight altogether...

Sad. Scary.

15,000 soldiers at LSAA in 2005. Who knows what it is now?

And I didn't even start with the contractors...

50 men at that patrol base.

I don't see any even coming close to right.