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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by TAH View Post
    While "determine the enemy's intent" may have never been a stated mission, having and understanding of the full enemy situation: composition (what and possibly who-what unit or unit type) disposition (where-location(s)), capabiities (what he is able to do) AND intentions (he is likely planning on doing) is important for the commander to make correct decisions.
    Well I believe commanders should base decisions on what is actually known about the enemy and not what is suspected. One of our huge doctrinal faults is basing plans on predicted enemy courses of action, and not on actual observed enemy courses of action.
    Somebody has to go up and punch the guy in the nose in order to determine actual intent. By restricting ourselves to passive surveillance, we open ourselves up to deception by the other side.
    True reconnaissance is merely finding and observing the enemy. That does not leave you open to deception unless you are very stupid and the enemy knows you are watching. Fighting the enemy (nose punching) is an entirely different objective, which basically tells the enemy you've found him.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member TAH's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Well I believe commanders should base decisions on what is actually known about the enemy and not what is suspected. One of our huge doctrinal faults is basing plans on predicted enemy courses of action, and not on actual observed enemy courses of action.
    Amen Brother!
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 06-30-2010 at 08:55 PM. Reason: Fix quote

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    Council Member TAH's Avatar
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    True reconnaissance is merely finding and observing the enemy.
    A bit of semantics here too, I think.

    Some folks use the terms two reconnaissance and surveillance inter-changably. I do not.

    A basic functional distinction often proposed is that surveillance tends to be more passive, the watch and listen mode, while reconnaissance tends to be more active,

    A time and a place for both types of gathering intel.

    My real basic issue with the BCT Recon Sqdrns was that they are out of step with current tactical reality and lack the ability for "Fight for Information" that now appears the more likely need, at least in Major Combat Operations.

    COIN/Stability Ops is a whole other ballgame.

    An intersesting note to me is that a USMC Division has both a Recon Bn (with the sneak and peek types) and a LAV Bn for "Classic" CAV missions.

    TAH
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 06-30-2010 at 08:56 PM. Reason: Fix quote

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by TAH View Post
    A bit of semantics here too, I think.
    Words matter
    Some folks use the terms two reconnaissance and surveillance inter-changably. I do not.
    Nor do I.
    A basic functional distinction often proposed is that surveillance tends to be more passive, the watch and listen mode, while reconnaissance tends to be more active,
    IMO, its even more simple. Reconnaissance is seeking. Surveillance is watching. Both are normally done by the same folks.
    My real basic issue with the BCT Recon Sqdrns was that they are out of step with current tactical reality and lack the ability for "Fight for Information" that now appears the more likely need, at least in Major Combat Operations.
    I think the "fight for information" is less useful, than "seek to contact." Contact may just mean locating the enemy and not blundering into them 25m the wrong side of the ridge line.
    COIN/Stability Ops is a whole other ballgame.
    You still need to find the enemy. Different type of enemy, that's all.

    Good stuff TAH. You've clearly given this stuff some thought and that is always good regardless of my pedantry!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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