FOB Keating attack repulsed

[jmm99]

from Fuchs
I know only one definition of tooth/tail in the military realm.

Tooth are those who are meant to shoot at the enemy as a unit.
Tail are those who are only meant to shoot at the enemy in self-defence.

What is the source for your definition, other than Fuchs, On War ?

By your last sentence, long range recon folks would be tail.

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

By your last sentence, long range recon folks would be tail.

Or did, once upon a time.

I don't know where on the anatomy to place these guys who'll operate a drone and shoot Hellfires at the unholy... LINK.

[jmm99]

I know you did (many klicks downrange) - seem to recall some Whitean comment re: lurpie purpose in effect is to observe, not to make contact.

By Fuchs' definition, the remote drone operator is "tooth", as one of "those who are meant to shoot at the enemy as a unit".

I don't know where to fit them into the definitional game. But, I'm happy we have them, despite the fact that many lawyers througout the World punditize that kind of direct action is illegal.

Regards

Mike

[Schmedlap]

I know you did (many klicks downrange) - seem to recall some Whitean comment re: lurpie purpose in effect is to observe, not to make contact.

Reminds me of a funny story (well, I think it's funny). We had a LRS-D unit attached to us in 2005 for a few days. For our purposes, they were simply a handful of shooters who were available, of which we were always in short supply, given our outrageous mission set. They understood this well in advance - that they were provisional infantrymen for whom we would use for some surveillance type stuff if necessary, but most likely would be used in the role that we use other fire teams.

One day the LRS team was manning an OP (our OPs generally observed and reported, but often ambushed people who were emplacing IEDs or engaged in other tomfoolery). They PID'd some individuals whom we were looking to kill/capture. The nearest friendly element to them was 2 km away and the individuals spotted were about to drive away in a vehicle that looked like just about every other vehicle in the city. I had just returned to our patrol base and walked into the CP when my CO was instructing them to kill the individuals for fear that they would escape and blend into the populace.

Their response was classic LRS: "if we do that, our position will be compromised." *

My CO just stared at the radio for a few seconds, then all of us exchanged baffled glances at one another for a few more seconds before the CO repeated his order with more explicit guidance and some humorously more obscene justification for why his orders should be followed in light of their concerns.

* - Our QRF generally responded to a TIC at that distance in about 2 minutes - plenty of time for, as I recall, what was a six-man team; twice the size of most of our elements in sector

[Pete]

Perhaps a better way of distinguishing the tooth from the tail is to call them the combat arms and the support arms. The latter category is further subdivided into combat support branches and combat service support ones; I once knew the difference between the two but now it escapes me.

[Ken White]

and reconnaissance / surveillance action requires a different mindset and training.

As does SF FID / UW work and DA...

It really pays to use the right tool for the job. The US Army's fetish for 'general purpose (GP)' units and equipment inculcated by Leslie McNair is a really bad idea. The US army's fetish for GP personnel, one size, one rank fits all is a far worse idea.

Buying equipment and selecting people suited for for specific jobs and training them to do that job is not impossible, it isn't even difficult. We have just elected to not do that -- and it's become a habit.

That said, I suspect once the boss broke the surveill mindset all worked out okay...

[Pete]

In justice to McNair, though, it was probably easier to equip and train an Army of almost 100 divisions by cranking out standard trianglar infantry and armor divisions cookie-cutter style rather than having an eclectic assortment of TOEs and MTOEs, all with their various unique features.

[Ken White]

an things have changed. Made sense in WW II, today -- not so much but old habits die hard...

[JMA]

Are "EN route clearance companies" = e.g., our local 1431st Engineer Sapper Company, which was in Astan during 2009:

1421st /107th deployed to Afghanistan:



and U.P. troops coming home (Nov 2009) and 1431st Sapper Company Freedom Salute (Mar 2010).

Regards

Mike

PS: from Soldier, husband, dad return home:



So, more tooth than tail from the PHs.

So I assume then that they clear roads (routes) of IEDs?

[JMA]

Well, the US has somewhere between 70,000 and 100,000 troops in A-stan. We'll use 70,000, giving the ratio the benefit of the doubt.

According to http://www.understandingwar.org/file...OrbatMarch.pdf, this 70,000 yields 2 x SF BNs, 1 MSOB (all under the CJSOTF), 6 BCTs and 2 USMC RCTs (with 6 IN BNs). Assuming that everyone in a BCT is a shooter (they AREN"T), that's 6 x 3200 (19200) for the Army plus 6000 give or take for the USMC.

I can't speak for the tooth-to-tail of the USMC, but out of 3200 +/- in an Army BCT, about 1400 are in IN COs, CAV TRPs, FA BTRY and EN COs. That's a very imperfect # (it doesn't count the BN mortar and scout platoons, for instance). Those rough numbers also don't count helo crews or EN route clearance companies (for instance), but overall they give you a pretty good idea of the tooth-to-tail.

And the bottom line is?

Are those percentages accurate?

What I'm attempting to establish is whether the 70 : 30 ratio is correct or is a 7 : 1 ration more accurate.

[JMA]

Aviation units maintain and fly aircraft; Engineers build stuff; Artillery shoots guns and rockets, Medical units keep the 'died of wounds' rate down in single figures, a worldwide wartime first; Supply and maintenance units do those things; Signal units provide comms; Military Police provide law enforcement, security and do convoy escort, Intelligence Brigades provide intel and operate some UAVs / drones (other are owned by combat units but the folks operating them are support types, not riflemen), SF do both combat and support stuff; Transportation types move stuff and people.

Combat units have mechanics and cooks who are support types. The significant US fixed wing and helicopter presence, with aircraft from all services requires a lot of maintainers, armers and fuelers to support 24 hour operations. Not to mention control tower operators...

Don't forget that the armed forces of the US are providing people to assist in rebuilding Afghan infrastructure (LINK) -- and these guys: LINK. All sorts of stuff going on there. Those US numbers also include the Air Force (fihters, transports and helicopters plus crews and support folks) and the Navy (yes, a lot Navy types there; all the Marine Medical Corpsmen and Doctors are Navy, as are the Chaplains).

P.S

In addition to the big military support package, there are a host of civilian contractors also supporting the effort.

Modern warfare is expensive and expansive...

Hi Ken, thanks for the reply again.

This all started with your comment "It's the folks in the rear, about 70% of the deployed force, not the 30% that is actually performing active service."

I then (in error it seems) made the leap from converting "folks in the rear" to "support" staff.

Maybe too I was distracted by this quote from elsewhere from a certain Lt. Colonel Robert A. Lynn:

"The strength of one U.S. Army infantry brigade consists of two to four battalions with the strength typically ranging from between 1,500 to 3,500 personnel. It is usually commanded by a brigadier general or a colonel. A U.S. Army brigade with its assigned personnel and support units will vary with the mission and type of unit. A U.S. Marine expeditionary brigade consists of between 10,000 to 13,000 U.S. Marines. It is commanded by a brigadier general and consists of one infantry regiment and support units. Individual aviation squadrons are task organized to support the mission. In wars that the U.S. have been involved in since the end of World War II; the ratio of U.S. combat troops to combat service support and support have gone from 4 support soldiers to 1 infantryman to 7 support soldiers to 1 infantryman in Iraq and Afghanistan" http://tinyurl.com/yeabfz2

[JMA]

It's been 25 years since I was in the Army so my observations may be a bit out of date, but as I saw it the role of command sergeants major at battalion level and higher in the U.S. Army was rather nebulous. Their main duty description was to serve as the commander's chief advisor on matters relating to NCOs and other enlisted personnel; other than that his duties were pretty much as the commanding officer chose to define them. In addition to monitoring enlisted selections for leadership schools, promotions and disciplinary issues, as Ken pointed out they often focused on uniforms, haircuts, the barracks and the police (tidying up) of the unit's area. One thing they are certainly not are the hellfire-and-brimstone type of sergeant major the British Army is famous for. It also seemed to me that the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy turned them into homespun philosophers who go on and on about how "the young soldier" adapts to his new military environment. What is really needed is a better definition of their duties, responsibilities and authority, even if it infringes a bit on the traditional prerogatives of company/battery commanders and first sergeants. Perhaps Ken may have something to add because he knows a lot more about this subject than I do.

I accept that the "hellfire-and-brimstone type of sergeant major the British Army is famous for" ends at battalion level. After that it is probably a few "quiet" postings to allow them to see out their time until retirement.

[JMA]

JMA- everything from the necessary but mundane (fuel handlers, mechanics, etc) to inteligence analysts, to watchstanders/RTOs in command posts, to planners, to civil-military coordination, to finance/personnel/mail clerks, to running the garrisons (thats what the bigger FOBs are) to you-name-it.

Some of it has to be done in theater, some could be done stateside. Some of it could be curtailed (I've yet to see a finance unit that keeps the hours of an infantry unit), but are necessary if overmanned. Some is just plain superfluous.

What percentage of the numbers are superfluous then?

[JMA]

If I may break this conversation down into separate parts.

The problem is that politicians do not want to do that sort of thing in peacetime -- the Mothers of the Troops get all upset at a 1 or 2% killed loss in realistic training. As I said elsewhere, make no mistake, the US is at peace and has been since 1945. In the war that ended then, a near existential thing as was your war existential for you, we did the same thing, formed units ad hoc and charged them with producing results. Commanders who did not produce were fired and quickly. The rules change quickly and harshly. Can't do that in peacetime; tradition and protecting the institution get in the way -- and the politics of it all are not helpful.

The Selous Scouts and their roles and missions have been discussed here and a search should show the threads. However, the US is highly unlikely to use those techniques, successful as they are, for a variety of reasons. So we'll bumble along in Afghanistan, realize a medium level of success and depart. That's okay, no one ever really wins an insurgency, the best that can be obtained is an acceptable outcome. That's what we wanted going in and we'll get it on the way out.

The first is the formation of irregular units to wage the war in the manner it is needed. It is easy to blame the politicians at every turn when it may well be more a case that the 'traditional' units and formations will not want control over the war to slip from their fingers. (I'm not sure what the death rate during training has to do with this though). Yes I understand to change the role of existing units would be well nigh impossible that is why I am drifting towards the idea of the formation of new 'special' units which can be disbanded as fast as they have been formed if the direction of the war changes or the political situation home and in Afghanistan demands. Remember that if there is to be a political solution in Afghanistan it will depend on the internal politics of Afghanistan and not what happens in Washington.

I use the Selous Scouts as merely an example how necessary the departure from 'traditional' thinking and behaviour probably is for any form of success in Afghanistan - both military and political. The creation of such units I believe will have the necessary shock effect on the existing troops in Afghanistan.

The formation of the Selous Scouts stripped out most of the best senior NCOs out of the RLI and they drew their African soldiers from the RAR (Rhodesian African Rifles) it hurt these units and there some initial complaint. It was the SAS who felt the most threatened (see the book "The Special Air Service - Rhodesia - the men speak" ISBN 978-0-9814321-2-0) as they also lost men to the Scouts (this is not my opinion, read the book).

So when the SAS were tasked with additional work and complained they were too busy with other tasks or that they were understaffed they were told "OK then we'll give the task to the Scouts". The SAS had to come to terms with the fact that few other than themselves gave a damn what the unit had done in Aden or Malaya. The SAS spoke of 'opposition' (as it were only this tiny unit that mattered). A classic was as told by then Maj Brian Robinson OC SAS in his own words in the book that when on occasion he was placed under operational command of the RLI and Lt Col Dave Parker was in the process of tasking him, he kept replying "That's really not an SAS job, sir." This led to the final word from Lt Col Parker "Brian, I don't know what is or isn't a SAS job but why don't you take you Squadron and f**k off back to Salisbury". Wake up call!

Now the inter service rivalry and the lack of cooperation among the US forces is similar but on a massive scale it appears.

I'm not sure it is ethical for force commanders to "bumble along" while taking causalities. They really appear to need to do some serious soul searching.

[jmm99]

from JMA
So I assume then that they clear roads (routes) of IEDs?

Yes. A video and Powerpoint linked here re: 1431 Sappers in Astan.

That unit goes back to WWI (107th Engineers), reorganized recently to reflect combat engineering specialization and to allow deployment by individual companies (from May 2008 Bull Sheet):

Reorganization of the 107th Engineer Battalion

Over the last few years the Army has been going through a “transformation” and fighting the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT). The MI Army National Guard and the 107th Engineer Battalion have been affected by this initiative.

In the Engineer branch there are no longer any “organic battalions.” An organic battalion was an organization where there was an HHC and lettered line companies. In time of war the whole battalion was to mobilize as a whole, like the WW II days. Those of you who have followed the battalion’s activities in the last few years know that there have been half dozen partial mobilizations of the battalion’s personnel to support the GWOT.

Now the battalion is no longer an organic battalion. Each company is a separate mobilization entity with a number designation and can/will be called to active duty individually by company. This reorganization of the battalion and deactivation of other UP units is detailed in the table below.

HSC, 107th Engineer Battalion will be the peacetime command and control headquarters for all the UP units.

Old Name - New Name - Location

HHC - Headquarter & Support Co (HSC) - Ishpeming. This is the Bn HQ, “S” sections, and most of the other HHC sections.

New unit - Field Support Co (FSC) - Ishpeming. This company is basically the maintenance and transportation sections.

Co A - 1431st Engr Co (Sapper) - Calumet & Det 1, Co A Det 1, 1431st En Co - Baraga

Co B - 1432nd Engr Co (Horizontal const) - Iron River & Det 1, Co B Det 1, 1432nd - Kingsford

Co C - 1430th Engr Co (Vertical const) - Gladstone & New unit Det 1, 1430th - Marquette

1437th - same name and mission [* JMM: 1437th Multi-Role Bridge Company] - Sault Ste. Marie

So, combat engineers can be the tip of the spear or very much rear echelon builders - depends on the speciality and mission.

Regards

Mike

[Fuchs]

What is the source for your definition, other than Fuchs, On War ?

By your last sentence, long range recon folks would be tail.

I knew these terms for way too long to remember the source.

And yes, LRS is tail. They provide a service (recce info) that's more similar to a service provided by image interpreters on a different continent (recce info) than the similarity between infantry and armour jobs.

You may not be pleased by this idea, but that seems to be due to a prejudice against the tail.

Effective and lean parts of the tail are just as good as combat troops. the excesses of the tail are the problem (combat troops personnel excesses are no problem because casualties and other reasons delete them quickly).

[jmm99]

for or against teeth or tails. The concept of supported and supporting seems more useful as a generalization; and then focus on whether the unit is necessary, desirable or why is it there at all. All of this tooth and tail stuff is context sensitive - so, putting precise definitions and numbers to it suggests (to me) that teeth will be chasing tails.

Regards

Mike

[Cavguy]

So I assume then that they clear roads (routes) of IEDs?

Yep. Do a great job of it too.

[Cavguy]

I knew these terms for way too long to remember the source.

And yes, LRS is tail. They provide a service (recce info) that's more similar to a service provided by image interpreters on a different continent (recce info) than the similarity between infantry and armour jobs.

Having been a recce scout, there is no similarity between a forward recon element that does fight for info when necessary and image interpreters on a different continent. Surprised you would make such an analogy.

[Fuchs]

Having been a recce scout, there is no similarity between a forward recon element that does fight for info when necessary and image interpreters on a different continent. Surprised you would make such an analogy.

I wrote explicitly about the service they provide to combat troops; recce info.

There's no similarity of the job between a tank driver and an infantryman either; that tells nothing about whether they're in the same group (tooth or tail) or not.