Force Structure for Small Wars

[Cavguy]

I see a few observations here -

First, just because we didn't do well in the past doesn't mean we won't do the same in the future. I don't buy his argument that we will abandon COIN following Iraq/Afghanistan - we don't have the Cold War to run back to. Not that there isn't a risk, but it's unlikely.

Second, I don't get his last recommendation about moving the COIN mission to the Reserve Components.

COIN is by default a long (years long) process. How can the reserve component handle the long deployments implicit in his recommendation? Secondly, there is zero evidence to suggest RC units are better at COIN - I can attest to some experience that they were in many ways worse at COIN. (Plenty of stones to be thrown all around though)

A better argument was put to me today by COL Mansoor - make the guard/reserve the HIC force and keep the active force for COIN in the immediate term. Since we face no imminent HIC threat, ARNG formations should act as our strategic HIC reserve while the active force handles Iraq/Afghanistan in the coming years. Would be more in line with the likelihood of employment and better suited to current strengths.

I'm not sure I like either argument though.

[Ken White]

...
A better argument was put to me today by COL Mansoor - make the guard/reserve the HIC force and keep the active force for COIN in the immediate term. Since we face no imminent HIC threat, ARNG formations should act as our strategic HIC reserve while the active force handles Iraq/Afghanistan in the coming years. Would be more in line with the likelihood of employment and better suited to current strengths.

I'm not sure I like either argument though.

emotional arguments for not doing things -- no matter how logical...

I've long (over 30 years) said that a 500K Army should have four Corps (+); each of about eight big 4-5K man Bdes (NO Divisions). One Heavy Corps (that concentrates on training itself plus the two to four more in the ArNG AND the USAR [The ArNG with all the cbt units was a political deal that should be scrubbed, it harms national flexibility and doesn't really do the Guard that big a favor]), two Infantry Corps and one Light Infantry Corps (+ six Parachute Bdes; Eur, Pac and CONUS. Inefficient but strategic entry reach provided no other way at this time). Yes, there is a difference between Infantry and light Infantry -- and the light can include Airmobile even if I don't agree with the concept. If we just have to have a Medium Corps, then scratch the light (and the Airmobile). Only makes sense to tailor the active force for what it must do and put to be needed strength in the RC; we'll likely have more than adequate time to change the structure if the hybrid war period of insability settles down in ten or twenty years.

So give COL Mansoor an Attaboy from me.

Oh, and I agreed with the rest of your comment, too...

P.S

The plus in my idea is five active and five RC ACRs...

[Ski]

Numerous interesting comments and thoughts here"

1. RC should not be focused on COIN specifically and neither should the Army. The COIN mission is one measure in decades, not years. While recruting and retention for the ARNG is still high and growing, multiple tours guarantee the slow degradation of the force (something the AC is living with right now).

2. Most importantly, stop creating and changing force structure. It's my biggest pet peeve. Being in the military is hard enough, and creating new organizations just adds to the complexity of the job. Just deploy off the MTOE, attach some medium/heavy truck companies, or create fleets of MRAP's/HMWVV's in theater to fall in on (we've done that already). Commanders and personnel should not have to worry about inactivating and activating when they are back in CONUS or home station. The wars are hard enough - stop adding unneeded complexity into the situation. Like Ken said - wait until a lull, and then change it if needs to be changed.

3. As Field Marshall Nigel Bagnell stated, "over the centuries identifying a nation's future strategic priorities has proved to be a very imprecise art, and as a result peacetime force structures have seldom proved relevant when put to the test of war."

4. The cultural differences between the AC and RC MUST be overcome and at the Major and below level, I truly believe this is the case. The old men and dinosaurs with institutional biases and grudges must pass into oblivion in order to reach the full potential of the entire Army.

5. Shifting combat structure from the USAR to the ARNG to the USAR continues to focus on the wrong problem. Just keep the structure stabilized for a while. Using combat structure out of any reserve component has significant political pressure and risks.

6. The ARNG will never get the HIC mission or the bulk of the heavy forces because the Army uses tank miles to formulate it's OPTEMPO budget. Too much money comes into the AC from this account for them to give it up outright. I think the concept has a lot of merit - I'd use III Corps as the HIC operational reserve, create an ARNG Heavy Corps (2 Divisions+ of HBCT's left) for a strategtic reserve, and use the ARNG IBCT's as an operational force to be used in the Middle East for COIN/SECFOR missions. But again, follow the money...HQDA will never let the bulk of Heavy Forces move into the RC...

Just a few thoughts from an admittedly addled mind...

[Ken White]

Numerous interesting comments and thoughts here"

1. RC should not be focused on COIN specifically and neither should the Army. The COIN mission is one measure in decades, not years...

Agree with the first part. not so much with the second. Is that historical length of time due to the types of insurgencies and / or the way they were 'fought?' I don't think that decades are required.

2. Most importantly, stop creating and changing force structure. It's my biggest pet peeve...Like Ken said - wait until a lull, and then change it if needs to be changed.

True. I watched one unit in the TN ArNG go from a Tank Co to a Chemical Co to a Truck Co -- in the space of four years. While I understand we hired all these civilian 'Force Developers' and they have to do something for job justification, we've gotten ridiculous. Any force structure change ought to be locked in five year increments; miss a window and wait five more years -- with only rare exceptions. That said, I think we need not wait for a lull -- because the system will never allow one to avoid change...

3. As Field Marshall Nigel Bagnell stated, "over the centuries identifying a nation's future strategic priorities has proved to be a very imprecise art, and as a result peacetime force structures have seldom proved relevant when put to the test of war."

Also true -- and that's why it makes sense to put the heavy stuff in the RC.

4. The cultural differences between the AC and RC MUST be overcome and at the Major and below level...

True, prob is on both sides of the fence, just as it is with conventional vs. SOF.

5. Shifting combat structure from the USAR to the ARNG to the USAR continues to focus on the wrong problem. Just keep the structure stabilized for a while. Using combat structure out of any reserve component has significant political pressure and risks.

True but in many circumstances, use of the USAR is better for several reasons than is using the Guard.

6. The ARNG will never get the HIC mission or the bulk of the heavy forces because the Army uses tank miles to formulate it's OPTEMPO budget.

True on the OPTEMPO today but wasn't true in the past and need not be the way it's done. On the possibility of such a shift you may be correct but I submit the reaction is far more emotional than logical.

... Too much money comes into the AC from this account for them to give it up outright...

That, too is by design -- and designs can be changed.

...HQDA will never let the bulk of Heavy Forces move into the RC...

Possibly true. A question for Congress to ask is "Why not?" --and they should demand a logical answer that does NOT rely on todays arcane and foolish budget and allotment processes.

Just a few thoughts from an admittedly addled mind...

My mind is more addled than yours, so there!

[Ski]

Cavguy - the ARNG only has 7 HBCT's left, so the allocation for deployments are limited when looking at the current requirements versus future requirements. Of course, the ARNG could grow back to the 34 BCT's it had three years ago.

Ken

Now you are getting into the true ugliness of it all. Reforming the budgetting "system" and the allocation process will take nothing less than Congressional input, oversight and the capability to crack skulls when required.

Don't understand why you are focusing on the USAR so much - they have zero combat arms capability at present minus a single IN BN and single ATK AV BN. Would take a long time to reconstitute these units from cadre status...2-4 years is my guess. I always hear why using the USAR is better, but never the reasons why - please educate...

As an ARNG armor officer, I would love to see additional growth in HBCT's in the Guard. I just don't expect this'll happen because of too many rice bowls being shattered

[ipopescu]

3. As Field Marshall Nigel Bagnell stated, "over the centuries identifying a nation's future strategic priorities has proved to be a very imprecise art, and as a result peacetime force structures have seldom proved relevant when put to the test of war."

I began reading this 2001 book on defense budgets and force structure, Holding the Line, edited by Cindy Williams (currently at MIT, formerly in a high-level position at the Congressional Budget Office.) It is a compilation of the conventional wisdom regarding defense planning for the 2000-2010 period as it was viewed at that time. It seems so incredibly dated, hard to believe it's merely a decade old: the main worry was that the coming 4 trillion budget surplus may mean defense spending would rise over the 2000 level of $300 billion that DoD anticipated for the next five years. The military was said to be worried that in addition to being able to sustain one conventional Major Theater War AND multiple "lesser contingencies" (stability and peacekeeping operations, you know, stuff that doesn't require much attention in terms of dedicated resources), it may not have enough available forces for a SECOND conventional Major Theater War. No talk whatsoever of CT or COIN or irregular warfare, although the contributors (civilian and military professionals alike) proclaim with certitude that they are offering the solutions to move the military form Cold War structure to what's required in the 21st century. The recommendations suggested further cuts in structure, on the grounds that we only really need to win one MTW and do lesser interventions (by which I take to mean everything that's not MTW), so the capabilities for a potential second war could be eliminated. And our "likely" adversaries are so weak that we would surely have some overmatch left anyway, given our technological supremacy.

Thinking about how people who are kind of doing studying and writing about this stuff for a living could be proven so "wrong" (if that's the right word) over such a short period of time, I was left with a renewed appreciation for humbleness and flexibility in all efforts to design the "necessary" forces for coming wars. I fully understand why Ski and Ken talk about too much "creating and changing force structure." Constant reform and adaptation are obviously needed as threats evolve and enemies change, but I'm almost coming to believe that there are some hidden virtues in the much-maligned bureaucratic resistance to changing the way the military works.

[Cavguy]

I began reading this 2001 book on defense budgets and force structure, Holding the Line, edited by Cindy Williams (currently at MIT, formerly in a high-level position at the Congressional Budget Office.) It is a compilation of the conventional wisdom regarding defense planning for the 2000-2010 period as it was viewed at that time.

She also wrote a series of op-eds in the 2000-2001 period that argued the military was overpaid in benefits.

The non-military security studies academics has a terrible track record of their theories panning out. Wolfowitz and Feith are but two examples on the other end of the spectrum.

The fact that the whole community (who gave birth to RAND) sprung up to wargame nuclear war should add suspicion.

Of course, I'm currently enrolled in a graduate security studies program!

[ipopescu]

The non-military security studies academics has a terrible track record of their theories panning out. Wolfowitz and Feith are but two examples on the other end of the spectrum.

The fact that the whole community (who gave birth to RAND) sprung up to wargame nuclear war should add suspicion.

Of course, I'm currently enrolled in a graduate security studies program!

Yeah, the current state of that academic field is rather deplorable. That's one reason why I'm preparing to enter it: weak competition.

On a more serious note, I currently see two general ways of arguing about planning for force structure.

1. You can start from the premise that there is an ends-means mismatch, and that we need to better match our goals with our resources . And on the one side you get the people who argue that foreign policy objectives should not include regime change + nation-building operations in anything but the most extraordinary circumstances. The "Iraq is an anomaly, and a disaster, and we won't do it again" school of foreign policy. This implies that we could, and should, lower our "ends" side of the equation to match our current means. And on the other hand the ones who envision large increases in defense spending and force structure to be able to deal with failed states by occupying and nation-building them. That's my caricature of what the underlying premises are for the Conventional vs. Irregular/Coin debate people are talking about.

2. Another way of looking at it is to believe, as, IMO, Frank Hoffman, Nate Freier and others who write about hybrid challenges do, that there is something intrinsic to the nature of future warfare (because of technology, globalization, US superiority in conv. warfare, etc.) which does not so much depend on the reasons why you went to war. Both state and non-state actors will use these hybrid tactics, mixing and matching modes of warfare to cause the greatest harm in that particular situation. Thus you won't have regular vs. irregular, but ever more innovative mixes of the two. Hezbollah is a prime example of this. Hence, you need flexible forces who can switch quickly from one to the other.

I think one way to look at this, in Clausewitzian terms, is a debate between people who are focusing more on the logic of war (1) and its grammar (2)

[Eden]

2. Another way of looking at it is to believe, as, IMO, Frank Hoffman, Nate Freier and others who write about hybrid challenges do, that there is something intrinsic to the nature of future warfare (because of technology, globalization, US superiority in conv. warfare, etc.) which does not so much depend on the reasons why you went to war. Both state and non-state actors will use these hybrid tactics, mixing and matching modes of warfare to cause the greatest harm in that particular situation. Thus you won't have regular vs. irregular, but ever more innovative mixes of the two. Hezbollah is a prime example of this. Hence, you need flexible forces who can switch quickly from one to the other.

I think one way to look at this, in Clausewitzian terms, is a debate between people who are focusing more on the logic of war (1) and its grammar (2)

I would caution those who believe the above statement that chosen 'modes of warfare' can not be entirely de-linked from the desired ends. Ends, in other words, sometimes dictate the means. Moreover, there are always non-military factors (culture, politics, economics, etc) which impact on an adversary's ability to 'mix and match' modes of warfare.

And referring to Clausewitz on this forum is like jumping into the lion's den with a pork chop around your neck.

[SteveMetz]

I began reading this 2001 book on defense budgets and force structure, Holding the Line, edited by Cindy Williams (currently at MIT, formerly in a high-level position at the Congressional Budget Office.) It is a compilation of the conventional wisdom regarding defense planning for the 2000-2010 period as it was viewed at that time. It seems so incredibly dated, hard to believe it's merely a decade old: the main worry was that the coming 4 trillion budget surplus may mean defense spending would rise over the 2000 level of $300 billion that DoD anticipated for the next five years. The military was said to be worried that in addition to being able to sustain one conventional Major Theater War AND multiple "lesser contingencies" (stability and peacekeeping operations, you know, stuff that doesn't require much attention in terms of dedicated resources), it may not have enough available forces for a SECOND conventional Major Theater War. No talk whatsoever of CT or COIN or irregular warfare, although the contributors (civilian and military professionals alike) proclaim with certitude that they are offering the solutions to move the military form Cold War structure to what's required in the 21st century. The recommendations suggested further cuts in structure, on the grounds that we only really need to win one MTW and do lesser interventions (by which I take to mean everything that's not MTW), so the capabilities for a potential second war could be eliminated. And our "likely" adversaries are so weak that we would surely have some overmatch left anyway, given our technological supremacy.

Thinking about how people who are kind of doing studying and writing about this stuff for a living could be proven so "wrong" (if that's the right word) over such a short period of time, I was left with a renewed appreciation for humbleness and flexibility in all efforts to design the "necessary" forces for coming wars. I fully understand why Ski and Ken talk about too much "creating and changing force structure." Constant reform and adaptation are obviously needed as threats evolve and enemies change, but I'm almost coming to believe that there are some hidden virtues in the much-maligned bureaucratic resistance to changing the way the military works.

I think there is general agreement that we have a means/ends mismatch in our current defense strategy. But there are always two solutions to such a mismatch: increase your means or diminish your ends. That's the shape the debate is taking now.

I thought the contours were pretty clear at the Heritage Foundation symposium earlier that week that SECDEF addressed on Tuesday morning. One school of thought (led by Heritage and AEI) is that we need a significant increase in the defense budget for about a decade to recapitalize. People like former Senator Jim Talent at Heritage advocate 4% of GDP. People like Toim Donnelly at AEI also support a significant force size increase.

The other argument (expressed very powerfully by Chris Preble of the Cato Institute at the Heritage symposium) is that we need to diminish our commitments. Chris contends that the bulk of our defense spending is actually defending other nations that could well afford to pay for their own security rather than defending Americans. The Stanley Foundation policy brief that Frank Hoffman and I did last year, while not as extreme as the Cato position, also argued that we need to be more circumspect in what we plan and budget for. Specifically, we took issue with the scenarios that are used to justify a force increase post-Iraq and Afghanistan such as the occupation and stabilization of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, or something similar. Frank and I were not sanguine about the threat from terrorist bases in distant lands or uncontrolled nuclear weapons. We just didn't think that long term occupation and attempted social and political re-engineering of flawed states is the most effective way to address these threats.

Basically, we could build a 5 million person force, and missions would emerge to occupy them. What we need to ask ourselves is whether, in this time of mounting economic, environmental, and social challenges, we really want to underwrite the security of other nations who spend much less than we do on their own defense (and I mean on a per capita basis, not in the aggregate).

[Andy Pavord]

I have been out of town so I am a little late to the party. I would like to respond to a couple of points made.

I do not adovocate transferring the COIN mission to the Guard. I suggested that the infantry brigades in the Guard should be transformed to specialize in COIN. I would also like to see a few COIN BCTs on the active force complemented by some Guard COIN BCTs. I am not sure how many. the exact number could be determined by a strategic analysis of the potential need.

My main argument is that COIN and its variants are a specialized form of warfare. The tactics and techniques required to excel in COIN can be best developed in units that specialize in COIN. I therefore believe that the Army should develop a force of COIN BCTs in both the active and the reserve components. However, because of the uncertain nature of the threats that we face I would keep this COIN force structure relatively small. It should be big enough to ensure that tactics and techniques can be developed and tested and yet not so big that it detracts from the regular BCTs. Many politicans are supporting the idea of expanding the army. I would propse that some of this expansion could be devoted to COIN BCTs.

COIN BCTs could serve as the spearhead of the initial phase of either a stabilization campaign (after the high intensity fighting has defeated enemy regular forces) or of a counterinsurgency campaign. They could be allocated to the most critical part of the theater while regular BCTs take on the less critical areas. As the campaign continues, Guard BCTs could be deployed to replace active units.

Break to new subject:

I do not think that we can transfer the HIC mission to the Guard. HIC requires the ability to synchronize very complex systems under very demanding conditions. This takes an incredible amount of practice through high level collective training. Much more practice than Guard units can achieve in the time alloted during a normal drill year. Guard units can get there after mobilization, but it takes time. The nation needs HIC forces that can respond rapidly. Desert Shield is the case in point. I think that the case can be made that Guard units were ready by Feb 1991, but does anybody believe that Guard heavy units could have been deployed by Spt/Oct 1990? Guard heavy units are really part of the nation's strategic reserve. And given the unpredictable state of the world I think that we need them.

Break to the budget situation:

Our nation is going to run a deficit of over $500 billion dollars this year. The international capital markets will simply refuse to continue to fund our debt at this level. We will be forced to reduce spending in the near future. It is unrealistic to expect that defense will escape the budget reductions that are coming. No matter who is elected President, we should expect the defense budget to decrease significantly in the next few years.

The real question is how we will reduce defense spending. The most obvious place to start is Iraq. Shutting down America's particpation in the Iraq war would save lots of money. I am willing to bet that is where the politicians of both parties will start.

But leaving Iraq, even with its huge savings, will not be enough. We are really broke. So the Congress and the President will cut into the existing defense budget. That is where it gets interesting. All the Presidential candidates have promised to increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps. They will be reluctant to go back on those promises. They want to support our troops. So I bet they will go after our weapons and strategic programs. I am not sure if there are enough funds there to pay for the Army and Marine expansion, so they will look for other ways to cut. It will be really interesting to see what they come up with.

The hard truth is that America really has come up against its financial limitations. In the very near term, the capital markets will no longer buy American debt in the quantities required to sustain our defense spending at the current level. And that should scare us all.

[Ken White]

as we now operate but I suggest an AC HIC Corps for that rapid response and at least two ArNG / USAR HIC Corps are quite feasible IF we change the way we train. You say:

"...Guard heavy units are really part of the nation's strategic reserve. And given the unpredictable state of the world I think that we need them."

I agree -- and we need more in the RC than we have while the AC will most likely need less for the foreseeable future.

You also mentioned a strategic analysis of need. Good idea. Whether such an analysis could transcend the politics of either COIN units (doubtful IMO) or more HIC in the RC than the AC (possible, barely) remains to be seen.

[Norfolk]

Andy Pavord wrote:

I do not adovocate transferring the COIN mission to the Guard. I suggested that the infantry brigades in the Guard should be transformed to specialize in COIN. I would also like to see a few COIN BCTs on the active force complemented by some Guard COIN BCTs. I am not sure how many. the exact number could be determined by a strategic analysis of the potential need.

My main argument is that COIN and its variants are a specialized form of warfare. The tactics and techniques required to excel in COIN can be best developed in units that specialize in COIN. I therefore believe that the Army should develop a force of COIN BCTs in both the active and the reserve components. However, because of the uncertain nature of the threats that we face I would keep this COIN force structure relatively small. It should be big enough to ensure that tactics and techniques can be developed and tested and yet not so big that it detracts from the regular BCTs. Many politicans are supporting the idea of expanding the army. I would propse that some of this expansion could be devoted to COIN BCTs.

COIN BCTs could serve as the spearhead of the initial phase of either a stabilization campaign (after the high intensity fighting has defeated enemy regular forces) or of a ounterinsurgency campaign. They could be allocated to the most critical part of the theater while regular BCTs take on the less critical areas. As the campaign continues, Guard BCTs could be deployed to replace active units.

What are termed COIN BCTS in your proposals are what are termed Gendarme units in many other countries; either paramilitary police forces (such as the MVD and the old KGB, various European Gendarmeries and Border Guard forces, et al.) who specialize in OOTW, or specialized military police forces (ie. the Carabinieri) who do likewise. In the context of the US Army, this would mean raising a force of several specialist Constabulary/MP Brigades. While there may be an operational niche for a few such formations (perhaps even on a scale of one per Army Corps), a separate and substantial force structure of several or many such BCTs would result in the corresponding loss of GPF forces for medium and HIC missions. As is, even those European powers with the longest and most comprehensive experience of OOTW (including COIN), particularly in the days of Empire, never maintained substantial specialized COIN-type formations within their military force structures. Even the separate paramilitary police forces tasked with the bulk of the day-to-day COIN-type tasks were dwarfed in size by the military establishments they cooperated with.

There seems to be a lingering myth that somehow OOTW in general and COIN in particular not only require quite different skills than MCO, but indeed are somehow more sophisticated and advanced forms of war or conflict than MCO. They are not; they are policing writ large, with a greater or lesser amount and degree of "war" intertwined. They require professional-level (not conscript-level) individual and small-unit leadership, discipline, presence of mind, and fighting skills, along with a mindset of heavily-armed policing instead of War - the majority of the time. The six-month infantry syllabus that Commonwealth Armies have adopted over the past generation is a reflection of the demands of both OOTW (including COIN, and in places as diverse as Sub-Saharan Africa, South-East Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East) and the demands of MCO, and again in places as divsere as Norway and Central Europe during the Cold War, to the hot wars in the Falklands and the Middle East.

I do not think that we can transfer the HIC mission to the Guard. HIC requires the ability to synchronize very complex systems under very demanding conditions. This takes an incredible amount of practice through high level collective training. Much more practice than Guard units can achieve in the time alloted during a normal drill year. Guard units can get there after mobilization, but it takes time. The nation needs HIC forces that can respond rapidly. Desert Shield is the case in point. I think that the case can be made that Guard units were ready by Feb 1991, but does anybody believe that Guard heavy units could have been deployed by Spt/Oct 1990? Guard heavy units are really part of the nation's strategic reserve. And given the unpredictable state of the world I think that we need them.

Rather agreed, although I would have to concede to Ken, Ski, and some other that MCOs performed by RC formations mobilized in 3-6 months would probably get the job done against most opponents; but not against those few opponents who might know what they're doing. As such, the minimum HIC force requirement should include a full-strength AC Heavy Corps, in addition to whatever RC Heavy Corps there may be. I don't see any realistic alternative to maintaining a large RC HIC-force; a Field Army -level force may well be necessary someday (as it was in 1991, and few expected that), and the AC is just not going to be large enough to accomodate much more than a quarter of that. MCO is the master-level of warfare; not to gall those who have to practice it, but COIN is the apprentice-level of war. By this logic, I suppose, minor conventional wars would make for the journeyman-level of war. Personally, I would be inclined to place ODS and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 into that category.

English-speaking Armies have done decently enough against opponents the likes of Argentina and Iraq in minor conventional wars, but we've had our heads handed to us on a number of occasions by those who had mastered MCO in major conventional wars, Germany in Europe and North Africa especially, though the Japanese handed us some pretty bitter defeats in Asia. To a more limited extent, China gave us a good whuppin' early on in Korea. Happily, we never actually had to take on the Russians in Europe.

As such, it could be argued that English-speaking Armies, the U.S. amongst them, are most comfortable at minor conventional wars against mediocre opponents whom we can out-manoeuvre, out-gun, out-supply, and out-tech. We run into serious trouble either when we're faced with a foe that we can't dispose of quickly - such as in COIN, where the nature of the conflict defies military resolution per se, or when we have to face opponents who have taken the pains to master major conventional warfare. The simple truth is, we're not the best, or even necessarily very good, at either. In time we become just good enough, and then forget soon after the emergency is over...

Raising specialized COIN forces would be unnecessary and counter-productive. Most COIN-related training is part and parcel of thorough initial-entry training, which in turn provides the basis upon which excellence in MCO is based upon (see Ken who's bin' der, dun dat). The remaining, more specialized training that COIN requires is largely something that must be an integral part of officer training and staff college education. Start with the basics, individual and small-unit skills, OOTW (including COIN), and work up through major-unit/formation-level OOTW and minor-unit MCO, and then finish off with major-unit and formation-level MCO training. That's how its done, and been done for over a generation in other English-speaking Armies (check with Wilf on this if you have doubts), and that's what the US has to do since the other English-speaking Armies can't do it the same anymore because of political weakness and indifference at home. No need to consider COIN to be an arcane art-form, with similarly arcane needs.

[ipopescu]

I think there is general agreement that we have a means/ends mismatch in our current defense strategy. But there are always two solutions to such a mismatch: increase your means or diminish your ends. That's the shape the debate is taking now.

The Stanley Foundation policy brief that Frank Hoffman and I did last year, while not as extreme as the Cato position, also argued that we need to be more circumspect in what we plan and budget for. Specifically, we took issue with the scenarios that are used to justify a force increase post-Iraq and Afghanistan such as the occupation and stabilization of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, or something similar. Frank and I were not sanguine about the threat from terrorist bases in distant lands or uncontrolled nuclear weapons. We just didn't think that long term occupation and attempted social and political re-engineering of flawed states is the most effective way to address these threats.

Basically, we could build a 5 million person force, and missions would emerge to occupy them. What we need to ask ourselves is whether, in this time of mounting economic, environmental, and social challenges, we really want to underwrite the security of other nations who spend much less than we do on their own defense (and I mean on a per capita basis, not in the aggregate).

Steve,

I remember reading last year the excellent brief you and Frank did on ground troops level where you two did some serious damage to the arguments made by Kagan&O'Hanlon in a similar Stanley Foundation paper. Your points were very well taken. It's fairly ridiculous to assume that 100k or 200k more troops would allow the US to successfully invade & perform a successful long-term nation-building mission in a place like Pakistan, Iran, or Saudi Arabia.

One point on which I have some doubts on is to what extent you can count on allied contribution to provide extra manpower for multilateral operations.
Frankly, outside the ones that were in Iraq, I don't really see any other NATO members or non-Nato allies being able to provide significant troops for any scenario that's not on their borders. It doesn't look to me like they have either the will or the capability to do so. I mean, if they can't even do more for a fairly clear cut "moral" case like in Afghanistan, I find it very unlikely to believe that they will do so in any scenario I can think of. Local allies, yes, Northern Allies proved very useful, but that situation seems rather unlikely to be easily replicable in other places; and they of course come with their share of problems such as unreliability, corruption, incompetence, etc. In short, I share your (and Frank's) skepticism regarding the suitability of dealing with failed states through regime change + nation-building, but if you do decide to do it, than I believe we shouldn't really count on much extra help by others - IMO "multilateralism" is sometimes an excuse for people who want to do those missions but don't want to pay for them.

Having said that, I nevertheless disagree rather strongly with the last point in your post regarding the disproportionate level of US investments in maintaing world peace and security. I don't actually think that's wrong, but it's just that it leads to a cure that in my opinion is worse than the disease. It's a great talking-point to argue that the US shouldn't "subsidize" other countries, but at the end of the day I don't think we are willing to, say, abandon Afghanistan just because we feel that the French or the Germans won't do their fair share. International Relations academics love to bitch about "the free rider" problem and about the US providing "public goods" when others ought to do more as well, but at the end of the day I think it's a much bigger problem if you don't take care of a security issue that affects you just because others are also reaping the benefits of your actions. Maybe I'm just having too pessimistic an opinion of Europeans, but having grew up in Europe, well, I have my reasons for it

Ionut

[William F. Owen]

the Army has fought the war on terror with conventional units adapted to counterinsurgency operations. For most units, the transition from conventional organization and tactics to the very different and challenging tasks of counterinsurgency was traumatic. The costs of poor organization for counterinsurgency, in terms of battlefield mistakes and the misallocation of resources, were substantial. To provide the optimal force for fighting insurgencies the Army should develop Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) that are specifically organized, equipped, and trained for the complex challenges of counterinsurgency operations...

Everything I can see, suggests that this is utterly correct. What is more, I see it as pretty simple to re-configure a COIN structured force to go kill armoured vehicles, either dismounted or in protected mobility, or even get them to employ stand-off fires against the appropriate target sets. This is not 1944, or even 68.

Simple as it is, (and I think it is) we will never do it.

[Cavguy]

Only makes sense to tailor the active force for what it must do and put to be needed strength in the RC; we'll likely have more than adequate time to change the structure if the hybrid war period of insability settles down in ten or twenty years.

So give COL Mansoor an Attaboy from me.

Will tell him.

I still havent stopped thinking about what right should look like.

The whole argument is somewhat academic at the moment anyway. The number of BCT's engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan isn't dropping significantly anytime soon, so there's no slack in the active force to pull any off the line for HIC.

Given that the RC is our "strategic reserve" (morphed into operational reserve today), perhaps we should be training and equipping a Corps of RC for any potential HIC threats.

As I said, still mulling it over.

[Ski]

ARFORGEN does not help the situation either. If you take X amount of units out of the cycle to create a HIC strat reserve, you then speed up the cycle for the remaining units.

[Cavguy]

ARFORGEN does not help the situation either. If you take X amount of units out of the cycle to create a HIC strat reserve, you then speed up the cycle for the remaining units.

Exactly my point. Well said. Discussion is mostly academic for the next 2-3 years at least, for reasons above and several others. The recently redeployed reserve units are the best option for constituting a HIC reserve.

[Ken White]

Exactly my point. Well said. Discussion is mostly academic for the next 2-3 years at least, for reasons above and several others. The recently redeployed reserve units are the best option for constituting a HIC reserve.

is unlikely; we've got aside from the obvious two theater problem a Roles and Missions review (and IMO this sub thread should be a big part of that discussion) and an upcoming QDR.

However, given the 18 month lag time in the Army's bureaucratic decision cycle (unless it's important to one of the Pachyderms), seems like the time to start discussing it is now...

My belief is that the Roles and Missions review and the QDR should provide the Army some guidance for the future and that the Army then needs to focus on, in order; the flawed personnel system, the flawed training system -- and then on the optimum, logical force structure; all the other stuff will flow from those three items.

There are those who will say I've got it backwards, the first two items I listed flow from the third. Don't think so. The current personnel system was designed to support a type Army (the pre 1940 model). It has had bandaids applied and a random tweak now and then but it is effectively totally obsolete and non responsive to the needs of the Army and the nation. It is in dire need of total redesign and that design needs to focus on providing effective personnel operations and support to what ever the Army of the day happens to look like...

Almost the same thing could be said of training; we have a pre 1940 system with grafts and patches. Most other Armies of any real use provide almost twice the training to new entrants that we do. Why is that? I have been embarrassed many times by US Officers and NCOs who didn't know as much as Brit, Canadian, German and Oz peons. Fix the training and the troops will cope with whatever force structure we throw at them.

ArNG and Reserve force structure needs less change; the Active force can endure change and fight a war at the same time. We did that in WW II, Korea, Viet Nam and we're doing it today. Doesn't make life easier but it can be handled. Be even easier with a functional Personnel system and better training.

[Norfolk]

My belief is that the Roles and Missions review and the QDR should provide the Army some guidance for the future and that the Army then needs to focus on, in order; the flawed personnel system, the flawed training system -- and then on the optimum, logical force structure; all the other stuff will flow from those three items.

There are those who will say I've got it backwards, the first two items I listed flow from the third. Don't think so. The current personnel system was designed to support a type Army (the pre 1940 model). It has had bandaids applied and a random tweak now and then but it is effectively totally obsolete and non responsive to the needs of the Army and the nation. It is in dire need of total redesign and that design needs to focus on providing effective personnel operations and support to what ever the Army of the day happens to look like...

Almost the same thing could be said of training; we have a pre 1940 system with grafts and patches. Most other Armies of any real use provide almost twice the training to new entrants that we do. Why is that? I have been embarrassed many times by US Officers and NCOs who didn't know as much as Brit, Canadian, German and Oz peons. Fix the training and the troops will cope with whatever force structure we throw at them.

ArNG and Reserve force structure needs less change; the Active force can endure change and fight a war at the same time. We did that in WW II, Korea, Viet Nam and we're doing it today. Doesn't make life easier but it can be handled. Be even easier with a functional Personnel system and better training.

Very much agreed on these points, and would be in no position to dispute them anyway. That said, if the HIC role was mostly transferred to the RC, just how long would it take to bring said Heavy forces up to snuff in MCO? Six months? That seems like just painting a big red bull's eye on said forces prior to dispatching them to the war zone. A year? If that were sufficient for a basic grounding in MCO, how could one ensure that the major war they were to be dispatched to would still be ongoing, or even if ongoing, still in a phase in which a major intervention would lead to victory? And, just to throw a monkey in the wrench (as this is most unlikely, but I'm drawing it to try to make a point), suppose an RC HIC force was pitted against a force of near-equal, equal, or even superior fighting quality?

The latter event, as I said, is most unlikely, but it is instructive to ponder the problems that Allied forces faced when fighting an enemy that was, for the most part, still its superior in quality, though in the midst of a precipitous decline in said quality, largely due to the sheer weight of losses suffered in operations in the East. Combined-arms MCO is the most unlikely form of warfare that will have to be faced during the foreseeable future, but it is by far the most difficult to prepare for and to master. It takes not months, not a few years, but several years at least to fully come to grips with, not just "passably", but with real proficiency. The RC manoeuvre brigades sent to ODS did not go into battle, and for good reason. Even with the six months' "grace" period that the Coalition was gifted with by the Iraqis, the RC combat brigades were not up to the job. Arguably, some of the AC units were not fully up to the job, either. Good thing the Iraqis were not up to the job at all.

I fear that there is a tendency in many quarters to overestimate the MCO proficiency of many "Top Tier" Armies, and to underestimate the difficulties of achieving real and thorough proficiency in those regards. It may be that HIC forces - especially Armoured Corps - are not required to make up as much of a proportion of the Active force structure as during the Cold War. One AC Heavy Corps may well be enough. But "Medium" Corps, composed in the main of regular (not Light) Infantry Formations may be more suitable to make up the bulk of the AC force structure, as they can perform in LIC and MIC with barely skipping a beat (if properly led and trained), won't break the procurement budget, and are best suited to most of the tasks that the Army is likely to face anyway. "Light" forces are probably best restricted to dedicated Parachute and Mountain formations, for the most part, and of course SF.

But all that force structure is predicated in the main upon holding to the highest levels of leadership and training. And not least, the substantial reduction of present overeseas committments. Three "Medium" Corps (along the lines of what Ken seems to be describing), a single Heavy Corps, and several Parachute and Mountain Formations (there seems little reason, other than training funds of course, for Parachute and Mountain units and formations to not be of the same quality as Ranger Battalions); Airmobile can be handled just fine by regular Infantry Formations, when the need to perform such operations arises.