Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[davidbfpo]

Just as interesting as Mossad is the team in Norway who watch jihadists, so Thomas Hegghammer's article evaluating ISIS is a good read:http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/07/t...ted-caliphate/

It ends with:

The bottom line is that business in the jihadi world will largely continue as usual after the declaration. Over time, the new caliphate will come to be seen as just another militant group, albeit a very presumptuous one. In the meantime, it is probably wise for Western governments to let the internal jihadi debate run its course. Premature military intervention will give the caliphate a jump start it does not deserve.

[Bill Moore]

Just as interesting as Mossad is the team in Norway who watch jihadists, so Thomas Hegghammer's article evaluating ISIS is a good read:http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/07/t...ted-caliphate/

It ends with:

After reading this I reviewed some other papers, and listened to a talk, by Dr. Hegghammer. The general theme of his message is his increasing uncertainty, so at best he is sharing some random thoughts on potential directions that ISIS (or IS) could evolve in. I think it is a bit of pipedream to believe, or hope, it will remain a localized terrorist or jihadi movement. The number of foreign fighters and stated ambitions indicate they have wider aspirations. The question is do they have the capability? His recommendation of not intervening at this time is based on a logic bias of not acting without better information, which is usually good advice, but in this situation I'm not so sure that caution is the best answer. On the other hand, if there was an opportunity to prevent or reduce this situation in the first place it is long past, so holding off on intervention, if required, may be the best answer. In either case (intervention or not), we can only speculate on the possible outcomes. We won't know the result of taking or not taking action until we watch the situation unfold, and then we still risk attribution error (e.g. our intervention or lack there of is what caused X to happen).

Dr. Hegghammer certainly doesn't dismiss the potential of high rates of terrorists returning home and staying active after their adventure in Syria and Iraq ends. There is certainly a history of it after AQ and other jihadists left Afghanistan. JI in Indonesia, ASG in the Philippines, and others throughout Africa and the Middle East. It would be a mistake to confuse the percentage of foreign fighters that remain active combatants when they return home with the risk they pose to their home countries. Even if a paltry 2% remained active, that is enough to form terrorist cells, train new recruits, and conduct sophisticated attacks. In the West, at least in the forseeable future, we don't have to worry about large scale mobilization of Muslims into the Jihad (like we see in Syria and Iraq), we have to worry about London bus bombings, the Madrid train bombing, hijacking and/or blowing up civilian aircraft, individuals conducting small scale acts of terrorism. Any of these events will result in a media frenzy and force a reaction by our governments that is disproportionate to the scale of attack we suffer.

So whether a low or high number seek to conduct attacks outside the current Caliphate (notional), ISIS will not remain focused on just Iraq and Syria, they'll focus on the broader the Middle East, which does threaten our interests, and some will have aspirations to target the West. Did al-Qaeda or Lebanese Hezbollah restrict their attacks to the local area of jihad? Absolutely not, so why would we expect ISIS with their large number of foreign fighters to do the same?

I do think throwing a large number of Western troops into the fray would backfire on us in many ways, but active support of the Iraqi Army to get them back in the fight, and possibly providing fire support and precision targeting is an option worth implementing sooner rather than later. I'm very much undecided at this point, and I'm of the belief we have a choice of bad and less bad options at this point.

[Bill Moore]

http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA...T-20130718.pdf

The Future of Anti-Western Jihadism

I have been doing academic research on al-Qaida since before 9/11, and never has the future of the jihadi movement seemed more unpredictable to my eyes than now. Still, for this testimony I have decided to look ahead and speculate about the long-term future of al-Qaida.

First, it is my assessment that we are past the peak of organized jihadi terrorism in the West. Al-Qaida Core is weak and most affiliates are not systematically targeting the US homeland.

My second and more pessimistic point is that the jihadi movement writ large is thriving and will be with us for another decade at least.

My third point, which is more of a guess, is that I expect a “second wave” of serious plots in the West some 4-6 years down the line.

[OUTLAW 09]

And the Sunni discourse begins now;

http://www.arabnews.com/news/597026

The core problem IS will have is that while they are Takfiri the Sunni Coalition to a large degree are Sunni secular--with say an influx of foreign fighters coming to the "caliphate" based on the "advertising by al Baghdadi and social media" --not so sure that will sit well with the Iraqi Sunni.

Remember a vast majority of AQI foreign fighters from 2005 thru to 2010 did not co-mingle with Iraqi's basically AQI did not allow the co-mingling---will be interesting to see how this works out-but am betting it is becoming a friction point in short fashion.

The US over the long haul would do well to truly understand the "moderate" Islamist as they will be around a lot longer than most anticipate in the ME and if one really looks at their stated goals, needs and wants they are a number of interesting mid and long term crossing points that both can talk about---but by defining all Islamists as enemies we defeat our own self interests in the region.

It is not the "moderate" Islamists that carried out the 9/11 strikes nor will they attack the US as they have been strictly focused on their own countries ie Syria and Iraq and have shown absolutely no interest in the US motherland.

[OUTLAW 09]

Jwing---

1. Looks like the IS/Sunni Coalition killed it's first ISF General (Commander 6th Division). Not surprised to see the 6th near Baghdad as it's Commander was always a hand picked Shia---it was originally designed to be near Mandali and responsible for Diyala Province.

A senior Iraqi general was killed today in fighting with islamists not far Baghdad. Major General Negm Abdullah Ali, commander of the army's sixth division, responsible for defending part of Baghdad, "met martyrdom on the battlefield as he was fighting ... terrorists", Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said in a statement.

Ali was killed "when mortar rounds fell" in the Ibrahim Bin Ali area, which is about 16 km northwest of Baghdad.

Government Security forces have been in a standoff with Sunni radicals in the area since the city of Fallujah that was taken earlier this year had fallen.

Insurgents led by a group called the Islamic State seized large areas in northern and western parts of the country last month and have threatened take the capital of Iraq soon.

http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_0...Iraqi-PM-4834/

2. The Shia militia are fighting now in Tikrit---but apparently not well as over 50 were killed yesterday in and or near the University that the ISF claimed several days ago they cleared and "owned".

JWing--it appears that one of the major reasons for the lack of ISF success is that they are in fact copying our style of warfare which we the US military have not really thought about going back in history and relooking how we fought in Iraq---and COIN has nothing to do with how one fights.

From about 2004 through and after the surge a large number of the BCTs were deploying with between 63 and 74% fully manned and maneuvered
using 114s some of the HBCTs still used their Bradley's, but those were venerable to EFP IED strikes so they shifted as well to 114s.

The most a 114 can carry is four plus the top gunner and if say a 114 patrol is made up of 4-6 vehicles and they engage into a firefight how many of those patrol members can actually dismount and engage on foot an insurgent force---not many so a firefight becomes more or less a gun truck fire fight until normally the insurgent breaks contact because he feared Apaches were coming.

If one really thinks about it ---it is the same concept in AFG but there one is using the MRAP instead of 114s. The fight is one of using stand off weapons not dismounted infantry.

Yesterday there was a video coming out of Baghdad showing fighting around Baqubah in the typical palm groove small villages---must have been say 6-8 114s in a line patrol working their way through a mud and water area and at the same time fighting insurgents---they have been hung up in to village for going on five days and still they are not making head way and yet via their press releases they are beating IS.

Sometimes it takes straight foot infantry without all the snick snack to clear and hold insurgent villages---not run in via 114s shooting everywhere, then pulling out, and later "claiming" you have driven out IS/Sunni Coalition.

So the question becomes has our training the ISF in our image helped or hurt the ISF now in the fight with the IS/Sunni Coalition?

[JWing]

Here's my latest interview "Analysis Of Ayatollah Sistani’s Fatwa To Defend Iraq Interview With Tel Aviv Univ’s Rachel Kantz Feder". I talked with Tel Aviv Univ's Rachel Feder about Ayatollah Sistani's Fatwa calling on Iraqis to defend the country's shrines and states which was immediately seen both within and without Iraq as a sectarian move to mobilize the country's Shiites against militant Sunnis.

[JWing]

Outlaw

Since the fighting started insurgents have been able to kill a generals before. June 22 a police general was assassinated in Baghdad. Also June 11 a general from the 4th Division was killed in combat in Awja, Salahaddin.

As for the fighting the Iraqis are hindered by a number of factors.

1) Most commanders are political appointees who have proven to be incompetent

2) The ISF were flooded with volunteers after Ayatollah Sistani issued a fatwa calling on Iraqis to defend the country. From reports these guys are getting anywhere from 3-7 days of training and then sent to the front. Some are just doing guard duty but others have been put into combat. These guys are obviously going to be a hindrance to combat effectiveness but strain an already bad supply system.

3) Iraqis can't shoot whether its regular ISF or the militias. I can't tell you how many videos I've seen of hip firing, putting guns around corners without looking or over a wall and blasting away a whole clip. I call this "going rambo". Again this is not only ineffective but wastes huge amounts of ammo on a poor logistics system.

4) The ISF can't hold any ground they take. ISF continues to go thorugh an area, clear it, and then leave allowing insurgents to move right back in. Ishaqi in Salahaddin for example has been cleared 2 times since fighting started. Yesterday there was fighting in Khalidiya, Anbar 2 days after the ISF claimed it had cleared it.

5) Disintegration. One report claims that up to half of the army's divisions are combat ineffective because of the loss of personnel & equipment from those first few days of fighting when the ISF collapsed across northern Iraq. Who knows how long that will take to rebuild all that.

6) Most importantly Baghdad has shown no strategy for who to counter the insurgents. Right now they're just trying to hold ground and kill their way out of the situation and doing a very poor job at that.

Overall I think the only way the government is going to be able to turn this situation around not only militarily but politically is if Baghdad finds Sunnis on the ground in local communities that it can ally with, and provide them with military and political support to fight insurgents otherwise the Sunnis areas will never be held and the larger complaints about Baghdad's discrimination against their community will never be overcome. That's not going to happen with Maliki and may not even happen if he's replaced. That's a major reason why I see this fighting going on for years.

[OUTLAW 09]

Here's my latest interview "Analysis Of Ayatollah Sistani’s Fatwa To Defend Iraq Interview With Tel Aviv Univ’s Rachel Kantz Feder". I talked with Tel Aviv Univ's Rachel Feder about Ayatollah Sistani's Fatwa calling on Iraqis to defend the country's shrines and states which was immediately seen both within and without Iraq as a sectarian move to mobilize the country's Shiites against militant Sunnis.

JWing---

1. this is a link to the German Der Spiegel German interview with the Sunni Sheikh al Hamdun (one of the major Sunni protest movement leaders and close ties to the IAI/al Duri) where he outright tells the current Iraqi government ---- a larger proportion of Kurds and Sunni's in the government and an three federation state under one flag with Baghdad as the capital ----if not the Sunni's will create their own government and state---a de facto split up of Iraq.

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/auslan...-a-979714.html

2. Appears the Voice of Russia article on the killing of the ISF General was a tad off---seems that he was killed by a sniper instead of a mortar attack which indicates to me that the fighting in the area of the General was going the way of the IS.