Mostly what he said
Maximinze platoons/companies, minimize HQs (numbers and size)Originally Posted by 82redleg
A unit of 16 Companies in 4 Bns of 4 companies (16 total) will most likely be more agile/effective then a unit of 6 Bns of 3 companies (18 total).
A briagde of 6 Bns of 4 companies (24 total) should out-perform the same number of companies spread across 8 Bns (3 companies each) in two Brigades.
Now this is strange.
I understand your assertion in the context of "blue 1x6 Bde moves east and two red 2x3 Bdes move west", as you've got unity of command advantage for blue in such a scenario.
Yet, modify this into a pincer scenario or let blue face some smarter red behaviour and you end up seeing an inferior blue unless it divides itself into dissimilarly behaving components. At that point, the advantage of blue is all but gone.
Now keep in mind the experience from WW2; namely that smaller formations are handy and practical, whereas large ones are clumsy until they fragment- and are very difficult to command when fragmented.
The practical experience seems to suggest that small is beautiful while theory cannot convince me that big is beautiful.
All about the bottom line
A disadvantage of the 2 brigades of 4 Bns of 3 companies is who/what Hqs coordinates the actions of both of the brigades. You will normally defalt to a DIV HQs.
So the Brigade of 6 has a single (probably overall smaller) HQs while the Brigades of 4 will have three (2 BDE & 1 DIV). More people to direct and conctrol the actions/activities of the same number of units.
The C2 capability of a WW2 division is less than what exists in a BN today. Simply put, a given staff today can exercise C2 across much larger footprint than their WW2 counterpart.
Current experience indicates that our current BCT staffs can supervise the operations of a much larger organization than they have organically.
That's no argument, for you can simply adjust the HQ to an optimal size, no matter what's the Bde TO&E.
The previous "less staffs" argument has its limits as well, for otherwise we could concentrate on one HQ for an entire army. Pointing out a factor that's pro larger Bdes alone doesn't make the case for a larger Bde, for there are many other reasons.
Among these other reasons are the advantages of smaller, more agile Bdes.
A large Bde can also be agile, of course - IF the really relevant level is the battalion level, IF battalion (battlegroups) are the real manoeuvring forces.
The HQ argument loses relevance in this case because the Bde/Div HQs could be really tiny then.
18 to 24 Companies
My comments were intended to be for a force of 18 to 24 companies.
Within that, you could have a Brigade as "small" as 4 Bns of 4 companies (OK only 16) or a division as "large" as 8 Bns of 3 companies each. A Bde Hqs and staff should be able to handle 16 or even 18 maneuver companies. Eight Bns would be too many for a single Bde to handle, six might be too many as well.
To me alot of its about how much HQs "overhead" do you want/need.
TAH
Except that to do the job of a BDE (or whatever level) HQs entails a certain amount of overhead- I've seen no convincing argument (I've requested Storr's book inter-library) for failing to maximize that capability. Without maximizing the capability, you end up with micromanagement.
When drawing comparisons from WW2, you have to remember 3 things:
1- (already mentioned) is the exponential increase in C2 capabilities since then
2- the relatively unlimited nature of the force structure. In WW2, we had lots of separate BDEs, regiments, groups, battalions, etc, that could do all the little tasks that tend to come up. Now, we don't. So we take it out of hide, from subordinate units. The problem comes when we make these subordinates so small that detaching a subordinate effectively emasculates them. My BCT detached a IN BN shortly before our own deployment to Iraq- long story. A BCT of only one IN BN left us scrambling for combat power- we eventually made up for it, and ended up with 4 battalions attached in theater (total of 9 BNs in the BCT), but we were in-effective without the plus up, and effectively only a rump BCT.
3- in WW2, we were an amateur army. Most of the BN CDRs and even many RGT commanders had very little time in service, and those that did have time in service had little experience with large units. Our BCT commanders today have much more and better preparation to command at that level than their WW2 counterparts, and the difference at BN level is even greater. Most WW2 company commanders were shake and bakes with only a couple of years service and almost no professional education. This lead to a need to micromanage, from DIV CG on down, which effectively decreased the size of units that can be controlled.
Last edited by 82redleg; 10-27-2010 at 11:28 PM.
Some agreement, some disagreement...
Very much agree, been in big strong Bdes and small weak Bdes -- the larger always worked better. Not least because they're less personality dependent and more error tolerant -- and IMO, less inclined to facilitate micromanagement. Size is an impediment to that trait; redundancy and strong capabilities render it unnecessary.Yep. Cautionary tale that -- ala TAH comment on the poor Cav performance early in WW II, inexperience causes people to attempt to 'economize' in all aspects. Doesn't work well, most warfare tends to be manpower intensive. In a given unit, I'd rather be understrength than overstrength (the latter allows, even encourages, slack habits at all levels) but I'd rather have too many units available than not enough, those not employed can always train. Hopefully we know that training is a constant, in combat and out...When drawing comparisons from WW2, you have to remember 3 things:
1-...2- ... A BCT of only one IN BN left us scrambling for combat power- we eventually made up for it, and ended up with 4 battalions attached in theater (total of 9 BNs in the BCT), but we were in-effective without the plus up, and effectively only a rump BCT.All true, however the counter to the first portion of number 3 is that the cream (generally ) rose to the top and slackers got summarily fired -- that does not happen today, therefor the increased education and training * are countered by the luck of the draw on competence and drive. Not to mention that IIRC, it's two years to CPT today???3- in WW2, we were an amateur army...Most WW2 company commanders were shake and bakes with only a couple of years service and almost no professional education. This lead to a need to micromanage, from DIV CG on down, which effectively decreased the size of units that can be controlled.
My experience with a slew of WW II Commanders in the immediate postwar era and in Korea was that they did NOT micromanage. That began to change in 1952 when the line stabilized in Korea and suddenly Regimental Commanders, GOs and worse, their Staffs, had little to do and being aggressive take-charge guys, learned to micromanage which essentially forced CPTs who knew better too do the same thing. That trend was severely exacerbated by Viet Nam when again the COLS and Generals really had little to do (as is often the case today...).
That trend migrated down to Bn level after 1969 when the third and fourth string LTCs got in country and found they had no CPTs and few senior NCOs but a bunch of 2LTs and SGTs (NCOC Grads, six months of service...) who would do anything you asked but who knew little and thus almost had to be micromanaged -- thus a generation of Generals learned to over micromanage everything. They made it a way of life...
I would also suggest while the the WW II guys may not have been as (book wise) tactically and technically competent as todays crop, those guys knew people. I sometimes wonder if that is not a lost skill in today's Army.
Thus, they knew what to watch out for and what to ignore. Given the spate of aberrant and senseless behavior by NCOs and Troops about which Commands seem to be clueless and the number of horror tales about uniformtiy, haircuts and such, that too seems a lost skill.
Today's reconnaissance
One cannot forget in today's technology driven warfare and over abundance of arm chair quarterbacks watching live feeds from the sky, of operations hundreds if not thousands of miles away; how many commanders will allow manned reconnaissance again? Knowing the military we will not increase the capabilities of manned reconnaissance, then we will end up in a jungle where unmanned reconnaissance cannot penetrate the canopy. Only then will someone wake and say "Hey we need to train reconnaissance elements." I know not necessarily the CAV's ideal terrain, but makes the point. Look at how commanders abuse unmanned reconnaissance currently, it will only get worse. Nothing worse than executing a target only to find out command put ISR on your target without your knowledge so the could see what was going on. The current operational environment has led to information overload and requirements than junior leaders have come to know as the norm and will expect it in the future. I miss the days of commo windows and short to the point SITREPS. Sorry, I digressed a bit from the subject at the end, but it needs to be taken into account. Especially, since all command has to do is look at the little blue dots on the screen and micro manage away. It will not matter the size of the element, one little blue dot wanders from where the commander thinks it should be and they will be calling that element direct wanting to know what is going on. Tactical patience has disappeared and become a lost art.
ODB
Exchange with an Iraqi soldier during FID:
Why did you not clear your corner?
Because we are on a base and it is secure.
Ken,That trend migrated down to Bn level after 1969 when the third and fourth string LTCs got in country and found they had no CPTs and few senior NCOs but a bunch of 2LTs and SGTs (NCOC Grads, six months of service...) who would do anything you asked but who knew little and thus almost had to be micromanaged -- thus a generation of Generals learned to over micromanage everything. They made it a way of life...
Never thought I'd say this, but the cycle is there and now I'm potentially part of the problem ...
Cav Squadron XO life is great, but different than when I last was in a troop unit - we could count on 3-5 Captain's Course graduates in the staff, now we're lucky to have one. For you non-army types, they teach staff work at the Captain's course, which makes having a good density of grads a multiplier. So I find myself having to explain/teach a lot of basic things (staff skills) to the motivated but untrained 1LTs that comprise a good deal of the staff. No crisis but certainly slows things down.
I can see where some might choose/be forced to micromanage IOT ensure success. Fortunately I have enough time to teach what I need before we deploy, and they're a sharp bunch. Makes the learning curve steeper though.
Now keep in mind the experience from WW2; namely that smaller formations are handy and practical, whereas large ones are clumsy until they fragment- and are very difficult to command when fragmented.
That was Storr's argument or justification for smaller divisions. I don't know if his book has been the subject of a thread on this site - if not, it should be because I am curious what you guys think after reading his well thought out arguments.
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"A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball,
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