Mechanization hurts COIN forces

[Tom Odom]

I will read it also. I have long thought there is a significant internal cultural difference between heavy and light forces when it comes to dealing with people and dealing with systems. Many heavy leaders are by their training and inclinations "systems" as in combat systems oriented. They think by nature of their training in map sheets not kilometers aand almost never in meters. Light leaders are prople oriented and all planning and think is human-centric and done one foot at a time. That makes many light leaders more adaptive (or accepting) of human-centric adaptations.

Now before RTK and CAVGuy shoot me, I used the term many and not most. It is always a question of leadership and some leaders are adaptive and some are not. But in a macro sense, I see this as a trend that has continued for some time. How it plays out in COIN is certainly debatable.

But I would also say that we do have to be careful in talking COIN in an urban environment versus a full-blown MOUT fight. No argument at all on the need for combined arms in MOUT; them that use combined arms win the Shugart-Gordon fight here (at least when we were doing them). That is however a different world than cordon and knock or TSE.

Best

Tom

[J Wolfsberger]

Tom,

No argument at all on the need for combined arms in MOUT; them that use combined arms win the Shugart-Gordon fight here (at least when we were doing them). That is however a different world than cordon and knock or TSE.

If I can amplify a bit on combined arms: I'll concede to the Air Force the potential utility of a 2000 lb. bomb in MOUT. In COIN, I not only can't see any utility, I think ANY use would be seriously counterproductive.

By the same token, an Abrams in COIN has a terrific psychological effect, one I'm sure is more profound than a Stryker/LAV. But I also believe, and I'll defer to RTK and CavGuy, that the Stryker/LAV has much greater COIN utility as transport and occasional base of fire for the dismounts. And it's the dismounts who will ultimately decide the outcome.

[Dennis]

I also haven't read this in depth yet, but my first response is is there really a difference between getting out of a brad/striker to getting out of an uparmored vehicle?

[goesh]

I see alot of humping grunts on tv from the safety of my living room

[Steve Blair]

I see alot of humping grunts on tv from the safety of my living room

Sure....but I think the points of interest (at least in terms of this study) are
a) What unit do they come from (mech or leg)?
b) How many of those grunts does the unit have to put on patrol?
c) Does that tie into success in COIN?

The questions raised are important for this conflict...and the one after it...and the one after that...

[Cavguy]

As indicated by my handle, I'm not impartial in this discussion.

I think most of the good points have been well said already, but will clarify some points:

1) 3ACR did not stable its horses. It did dismount a lot and patrol, but rarely out of sight from its vehicles for a number of security and C-IED reasons. It used them smarter. But absolutely the focus was population-centric. (source: 2 weeks in RIP/TOA with 3ACR with a company commander observing ops) It is partially true that the Dragoon concept largely won the Indian wars in the west from a tactical standpoint.

2) There are two issues here - the platform and the leader.

a) The ideal platform for COIN depends on the situation. Ramadi in mid-06 was ideal for tank/bradley ops due to its heavily kinetic nature, and you needed that armor and firepower to survive. Tal Afar in the same period was M1114/Stryker terrain where you wanted to avoid annoying the locals with a heavy footprint. In general, I'll agree that lighter vehicles able to protect a fair number of dismounts is ideal - as long as you have a few big guns to back you up.

Case study: April 2004 in Sadr City. A 1st CAV BN did not bring its tanks/bradleys because of the assumptions above - light was better. On April 4th a HMMWV patrol was attacked in central Sadr city, and cut off in a "Black Hawk Down" scenario. The 1st CAV unit was unable to get to the patrol due to a lack of Armor. In fact, a QRF launched in trucks suffered severe casualties. 2-37 AR (my BN) had to launch a tank company attack through Sadr city to rescue the patrol. The M1A1 was the only platform able to run the RPG gauntlet. They loaded the infantry on the backs of the tanks and shot their way out. I bet the Rangers/Delta in Mogadishu wished they had the same support inherent rather than begging from the Pakis and Bangledishis.

I'm certainly not saying Armor is the best platform for COIN, but you have to have it to get your nuts out of the fire.

Decision: Slight win for lighter forces. Every platform has its place and use though, the key is HOW you use it.

b) Leader mindset is a separate and highly subjective discussion in a "branchist" tone. Each branch has mentally agile and adaptive leaders.

That said, I can't resist plugging for Armor officers. A salient point was made by an SF LTC to me at the Carr Center conference. He pointed out that the majority of successes and best conventional COIN commanders from Iraq seemed to be Armor guys. He was asking me (an Armor guy in a COIN schoolhouse assignment) why that was. My best answer (I'm really not sure) was that most of the people he was citing (Chiarelli, MacMaster, Hickey, MacFarland, Mansoor, May, White, Tien) had Cavalry backgrounds. Cav is to Armor what Airborne is to Infantry (no flames from the airborne guys, thanks). Cav trains a decentralized, high initiative mindset that encourages innovative solutions with little higher guidance. Armor is more controlling and top down. That's my best explanation.

That said, I would say that all the branches have an equal number of leaders who get it and those who don't, and I've certainly seen more than one bonehead in Armor. I think generalizations about which branch and which profile (light/heavy) has a better mindset is nothing but speculation. You can make the argument that Tom has that the light guy is unencumbered by a maintenance tail and vehicle to attach himself to, but the Armor/Cav guy can argue that the light guy thinks in terms of short range objectives, and not an adaptable and rapid maneuverist approach. That's why the Army (until recently) sought to rotate infantry officers between light and mech and armor officers between armor and cav.... to balance the perspective.

Decision: Draw, based on individual leader personalities.

Now that I've stirred the pot ....

[Steve Blair]

I'm not exactly impartial either. I firmly believe you need a strong armor/cav force in place to serve as the sort of reaction/striking force you mention, CavGuy. Going back to Vietnam, there are too many examples of armor being able to shoot its way though just about any ambush to be ignored. The size of that force, of course, varies depending on the nature of the local threat, but you still need it.

At the end of the day, it really does come down to the leaders.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Shek,

Absolutely. The interesting policy question that stems from this is still the same million dollar question - how do you (and can you) develop an Army that can truly be full spectrum and not one that pays lip service to full spectrum operations while treating small wars as the lesser included case?

That is the one that concerns me.

We can't allow ourselves to believe we can make a rule (in a biological or physics sense) that our opponents will follow - or put another way, - that our enemies will abstain from casting a vote in the action, reaction, counter-action cycle. Even now our enemies (that would be them that are opposed to us due to their own interests or feel threatened by ours) are considering our trends, acquisitions, thoughts and actions and how to best prepare to defeat us with the means available to them. Unfortunately, the battlefield only seems to get more lethal because the technologies associated with it are prolific by being both increasingly cheaper and available. They will apply the full range of options available to them and they are keenly aware of our requirements to be better then them at everything we do in what is often their own neighborhood.

We face a myriad of counter-punchers in that regard. The best hope, and I believe our strength, is that we grow counter punchers at the unit and leader levels and provide them with the technologies in sufficient depth and quantities to adapt, innovate & prevail. However, as many have agreed, without the continued (and I'd argue increased) investment in the people (the leader and the led), the tech cannot be applied on the battlefield to good end (either the intended or adapted).

Best regards, Rob

[Jedburgh]

...Case study: April 2004 in Sadr City. A 1st CAV BN did not bring its tanks/bradleys because of the assumptions above - light was better. On April 4th a HMMWV patrol was attacked in central Sadr city, and cut off in a "Black Hawk Down" scenario. The 1st CAV unit was unable to get to the patrol due to a lack of Armor. In fact, a QRF launched in trucks suffered severe casualties. 2-37 AR (my BN) had to launch a tank company attack through Sadr city to rescue the patrol. The M1A1 was the only platform able to run the RPG gauntlet. They loaded the infantry on the backs of the tanks and shot their way out. I bet the Rangers/Delta in Mogadishu wished they had the same support inherent rather than begging from the Pakis and Bangladeshis....

Just to add some more depth to your excellent choice of a "case study", here's an article from the Nov-Dec '04 issue of Armor Magazine describing that fight:

Sadr City: The Pure Armor Assault in Urban Terrain

Baghdad, Kut, and An Najaf were scenes of concerted attacks by the Mahdi army throughout Iraq on 4 April 2004. On that afternoon, elements of the Mahdi army engaged multiple elements of 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment (2-5 CAV), 1st Cavalry Division, nearly simultaneously throughout Sadr City in northern Baghdad. Twenty soldiers from Comanche Red Platoon, 2-5 CAV, had become isolated in the northern central portion of Sadr City, and available vehicle assets prohibited the unit’s exfiltration. Soldiers from C Troop, 2d Battalion, 37th Armor (Crusaders), attached to the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), conducted a hasty attack into Sadr City to relieve the isolated infantry platoon....

[Cavguy]

Just to add some more depth to your excellent choice of a "case study", here's an article from the Nov-Dec '04 issue of Armor Magazine describing that fight:

Sadr City: The Pure Armor Assault in Urban Terrain

John Moore, the author, is a friend of mine. He is currently a Russian FAO stationed at the hardship post of the Marshall Center in Garmish, Germany. I was the BN S4 at the time.

He received the Silver Star for his action, along with one of his Platoon Leaders. A mechanic from his company filling in as a tank loader was killed in the early stages. Most everyone on the assault got (deserved) valor awards. My OIF 05-07 XO was one of his PL's and has two BSM/V's.

That issue of ARMOR also has the story of how 2-37 re-took Najaf from the Mehidi army during the Sadr Rebellion.

Great Plug!

[Shek]

That said, I can't resist plugging for Armor officers. A salient point was made by an SF LTC to me at the Carr Center conference. He pointed out that the majority of successes and best conventional COIN commanders from Iraq seemed to be Armor guys. He was asking me (an Armor guy in a COIN schoolhouse assignment) why that was. My best answer (I'm really not sure) was that most of the people he was citing (Chiarelli, MacMaster, Hickey, MacFarland, Mansoor, May, White, Tien) had Cavalry backgrounds. Cav is to Armor what Airborne is to Infantry (no flames from the airborne guys, thanks). Cav trains a decentralized, high initiative mindset that encourages innovative solutions with little higher guidance. Armor is more controlling and top down. That's my best explanation.

Cavguy,

Maybe because it's easier to read riding around versus humping a ruck

Seriously though, I think this is a great example of where the mechanization variable doesn't serve as a solid proxy for doctrinal approach/mindset. While having big toys, the goal on average for the cav is not to use them if possible, which is certainly a different mindset than an armored division designed and trained to take it to the enemy directly.

However, I'd suggest that this might not be the full story. Of the five names I recognize from your list, I see two masters degrees and two PhDs, all of them in the social sciences/humanities realm. The exception is COL McFarland, who did RIP/TOA directly from 3 ACR and thus, transitioned with a unit already successfully performing COIN. I'm not trying to detract from their successes, but I think you can attribute some of it to the learning curve that has occured across the Army as we've adapted to the war we need to fight. I'd be curious to find out what experiences (Bosnia? Kosovo? grad school? just general Cav experience) you'd attribute as being the foundation of success for Colonels May, White, and Tien. Thanks.

Shek

[Cavguy]

Cavguy,
I'd be curious to find out what experiences (Bosnia? Kosovo? grad school? just general Cav experience) you'd attribute as being the foundation of success for Colonels May, White, and Tien. Thanks.

Shek

I think the Cav mindset is one component. Part is education, both military and civilian. For example, COL MacFarland is not a PhD, but was a SAMS grad. LTC Tien was a Rhodes Scholar, White House Fellow, and now a Harvard Fellow. Mainly it's being open minded enough to assess each situation for what it is, and adjust the plan accordingly. Adaptive leadership styles and being placed in situations where authority was decentralized is a common theme. None of those mentioned was a micromanager, but each provided an extremely strong commander's intent. Each placed their subordinates in the positions where they could best use their talents and personality to influence success. Each was willing to adjust the plan when it wasn't working, but recognized the necessity of perseverence through rough times.

I would also say each is a scholar and a reader, and learns from studying.

I am beginning to think that there is a connection between humanities education and success in challenging, unscripted situations, if for no other reason than history provides a framework of principles applicable to those situations. I have no backup for that.

I am sure I missed a host of great leaders from downrange, those listed (except Chiarelli) I have personally met or served for and can discuss why I listed them as such.

It's a topic worth studying, I'm not sure you can point to a single answer. I would also say that the officers listed above are generally less "narrow minded" than many other commanders I have observed, tolerate (to a reasonable extent) both pushback and discussion, and don't have a need to be right all the time.

[Schmedlap]

This reminds me of a study that concluded that homes with more books in them tend to have children who are better readers. One should not conclude from that study that if you drop your entire paycheck at Barnes & Noble that your 6-year-old will be reading at the 12th grade level. It was not the presence of the books that made the kids better readers. The parents thought that reading was worthwhile and that good reading skills were important, so they owned lots of books. The children inherited the values of their parents. They thought that reading was enjoyable and important and put forth more effort to become better readers.

Likewise, there is a root cause to mechanization that correlates with a reluctance to do necessary dismounted work, but this does not imply a causal relationship. I would assert that militaries become more mechanized only after their country has modernized. An increase in modernization correlates with less tolerance for casualties in the so-called “middle wars” that include COIN. Less tolerance for casualties leads a military to reduce exposure to enemy actions by placing more armor between the Soldier and the enemy, as in Iraq, or to neglect the armor protection and then retreat in short order after fatalities hit double-digits, as in Mogadishu.

It’s not mechanization. It’s modernization.

[Ken White]

...
. . .
It’s not mechanization. It’s modernization.

In all the aspects you cited.

...That from the resident dinosaur...

[Norfolk]

In all the aspects you cited.

...That from the resident dinosaur...

Schmedlap is completely, utterly correct. Just as modernization drives mechanization, modernization drives imbecilization. Excellent post.

And I know this to be certified true because the wise old dinosaur sayeth it is so.

[tequila]

Of IEDS and MRAPs: Force Protection in Complex Irregular Operations - Andrew Krepinevich & Dakota L. Wood, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (77 pg PDF)

Interesting report that points out some of the drawbacks of the MRAP with respect to COIN operations and implicitly criticizes DoD's rush to embrace the vehicle (currently 8,800 vehicles on order in 16 different variants, cost of $8 billion over FY 2007-2008, with eventual plans to expand to 17,000+ MRAPs by 2009).

Criticisms include:

• Runs counter to COIN doctrine of establishing relationships with the population, which theoretically is tougher to do from the confines of an armored truck rather than on foot or in an less-imposing hummvee.
• Increased logistical requirements will require more convoys, increasing vulnerability and casualties. Increased weight of armor lessens "lightness" and expeditionary capability of the force vs. hummvees.
• Insurgents can more cheaply and easily increase their armor-piercing capabilities than the U.S. can up-armor its troops.
• Opportunity cost issue.

[Rob Thornton]

more safe to do so. The amount of battlespace assigned dictates that even the smallest patrol will have to transit large areas – they may be going somewhere to link up with ISF to do dismounted patrols, they may be responding to an incident, they may be delivering aid or logistics, they may doing anyone of the myriad of things they do everyday that require vehicular movement.

This means the enemy will employ IEDs (of all flavors) against our folks while they move to do those things. IEDs are a feature of the modern battlefield, but all IED are not EFPs – the technology required to produce and employ EFPs to good effect is more technical then those of regular IEDs – this is why every IED is not an EFP, and one of the reasons why Iran’s technical assistance is such an issue. However, big IEDs – big enough to kill from the shock effect of killing and wounding those inside an 1114/1151 is more common and real – think of a marble inside a beer can. Now imagine if that marble is hollow and has soft, spongy brain matter inside it. That is where we have so many MTBI (mild traumatic brain injuries) from. However, mild is a misnomer – some things will not manifest themselves for years, some are up front and center. MRAP’s design deflects some of that blast and lessons the chance of MTBI. I’ve had several friends killed from such big IEDs while riding in 1114s/1151s and others seriously injured by big IEDs – their trucks where picked up – their bodies pushed up inside the truck and slammed against the ceiling with incredible force – their necks broken, their bodies hurled from a turret, their skulls smashed inside their ACH (advanced combat helmets). Think of torpedo detonating under a ship.

I’ve also watched EOD survive massive IEDs because their MRAP type vehicles deflected most of the blast – you can only covertly employ so much explosive. Now which one combined with good tactics will mitigate the enemies weapons while allowing us the flexibility to go after the networks? I don’t like reliance on technology – but I do like having good tech to be there when I need it. It is one of our strong points that allows us to conduct our “away games”.

[Rob Thornton]

I don't know if we've just mitigated it through leadership and training, or its a question of adaptation over time, but I do know this. While there I saw three different BCTs rotate through Mosul. The 172nd SBCT out of AK was on the ground when I first got there - and after their RIP TOA with 3/2 SBCT from FLW they went South. 3/2 was on the ground just long enough to get things laid out (however this was much of that units 2nd time in Mosul) before they too were sent South. 3/2 was replaced with 4/1 CAV out of FT Hood. They were all good units, had quality leaders and good soldiers.

The two SBCTs had lots of soldiers in vehicles tailor made to move lots of Infantry quickly, with good protection for the conditions and enough firepower to overcome any enemy you'll find in most COIN conditions I think - there are about 170 soldiers in a SBCT Rifle Co, you get three of those in an SBCT BN, and a good size HHC as well - lots of snipers in the BN MTO&E and within the BDE you get lots of extras to provide lots of organic Combined Arms. You also get a lot of C4ISR and in addition to the three IN BNs you get a RSTA Sqdn, an EN CO, and a AT CO - so as Ken points out - the number of folks you can put on the ground is substantial. I promise even though Shek and I are products of the SBCTs - we're not biased (much) This provides lots of options for the CDR. Both of those SBCTs were well led and well employed both in Mosul, Baghdad and Baquba.

However, the unit that seemed to adjust the quickest to its surroundings and be able to move from lethal to non-lethal-to lethal, etc. (I could use kinetic/non-kinetic - but it just seems anti-septic to do so) was 4/1 CAV. I really wondered about that - so I started just asking the EMs, NCOs, LTs and CPTs about their experiences. For many, this was their 2nd and 3rd tours - many had been to different places and gone with different types of units. Many also discussed their MRE (Mission Readiness Exercise) at the CTC - all agreed the training had gotten to where within reason (talking resources) it reflected what they knew about the COIN environment, many had gone through the COIN Academy in Taji - and said that the training there was valuable, many had been involved with LPDs/OPDs/NCOPDs focused to COIN at Home Station, undergone special training with EMS, LE and other Civil organizations. They were well read. They were smart. These soldiers and leaders could run in Bradleys and Tanks on one day and work out of 1114s the next with no issues.

This is not to sell the two previous units short - just to point out that over time (not very long at all if we are looking at individuals, leaders and specific units) we have gotten much better at COIN regardless of the type of unit. Also that conditions change in an area - 1/25th SBCT had been in Mosul prior to the 172nd and had a different set of challenges, and I believe the situation got progressively better to where when 4/1 came in they had 1 x IN TF conducting CF ops (but partnered with a variety of folks to include ISF) and 1 x AR TF that had been given the mission to stand up an ISF cell and partner with what was then the IAG TTs at various levels (DIV through BN) to provide greater training capability with the ISF - so you have to consider the requirement to be flexible and take advantage of opportunities as they emerge.

As others have pointed out, its really about providing leadership at every level, and being able to employ the right tool or adapt it to the task at hand. I found few (if any) stereo-types in those three units, just leaders trying to the best they could (and their best was very, very good) as they understood the mission - as time has continued, our soldiers and leaders understand the mission and supporting tasks better and better -

I think at this point the light/heavy comparison is OBE except in the raw sense of MTO&E. If we're talking about the formations that provide the most flexibility in those terms - then I'd advocate more soldiers and more capabilities as it applies to good mobility (keep in mind while more and more people live in urbanized areas - some still live in remote, hard to get to places), adequate protection given the conditions of METT-TC, enhanced C4ISR - (everything from low level comms, to access to raw information and feeds), reasonable firepower that means in a COIN environment we are never the ones who show up to a gunfight with a knife, and the host of low density MOS that seem to be ever more critical and ever growing since DOD is the 800lb gorilla and the Inter-Agency just can't fill out fast enough. These types of units are going to be expensive because there are allot of people, and allot of capabilities and you have to provide them with the type of training that sets them up for success. This is not meant to translate directly into a SBCT - but you could come up with a hybrid given the amount of MRAP we are trying to acquire - the actual vehicle is just a platform that we have wired up with good computers and comms - the important piece is the soldier and leader.

Best Regards, Rob