Rifle squad composition

[jcustis]

First off, I offer this product which has been here with the SWJ for some time now. Its origin is with a former member of 2 Commando, Rhodesian Light Infantry, and is an excellent primer on minor team tactics that were employed by 4-man teams often fighting across dispersed areas.

Drake shooting

Now back to the thread.

The attitude of the commander of the moment -- and, unfortunately, his Boss as well -- will likely be the operating determinant. Good planning can lessen the impact of the small number on force survival.

Ken brings up a very salient point, especially when we start to talk about truf fights and such. Take for example this bit from a May, 2006 article in the Marine Times recounting actions of an experimental DO platoon:

"However, DeSantis did point out that his ability to operate in a more "distributed" manner was hampered by higher commanders in Afghanistan who were loath to separate units into groups smaller than a platoon after a four-man SEAL team was compromised last June.

[Throughout our deployment, we ran against our willingness to be employed in distributed operations like we wanted to, with the higher-level commanders being risk-averse,] DeSantis said."

Being risk-averse certainly runs counter to having any ability to seize the day and prosecute the fight well, but I catch myself wondering what truly defines such aversion.

I've worked within a TF COC/TOC, and while slaving away to meet HHQ information requirements, I came to the conclusion that if headquarters didn't have an established and reliable way to talk to us, they might not care much unless we were forceably displaced from our position. I lean back on my knowledge of the LRDG and SAS in N. Africa when making this statement, because those guys were definitely DO operators, and there are very few reports of the Brit high command becoming all too concerned when a patrol couldn't establish communications over its wireless set during a comm window.

Can force structure at the tactical level be associated with risk-averse mindsets, and can those mindsets in turn be associated with our appetite for real-time information about our forces; an appetite that becomes greater with every leap in C2 capability?

[Duke Togo]

jcustis

Fantastic article on cover shooting and good points on command and control issues with the increased modernization of our coms. Between watching a TIC on "kill TV" /ISR and the ability to have real time coms reach out higher and higher levels of command are able to second guess tactical level leaders.

Good stuff

Duke

[Norfolk]

First off, I offer this product which has been here with the SWJ for some time now. Its origin is with a former member of 2 Commando, Rhodesian Light Infantry, and is an excellent primer on minor team tactics that were employed by 4-man teams often fighting across dispersed areas.

Drake shooting

Now back to the thread.

Ken brings up a very salient point, especially when we start to talk about truf fights and such. Take for example this bit from a May, 2006 article in the Marine Times recounting actions of an experimental DO platoon:

"However, DeSantis did point out that his ability to operate in a more "distributed" manner was hampered by higher commanders in Afghanistan who were loath to separate units into groups smaller than a platoon after a four-man SEAL team was compromised last June.

[Throughout our deployment, we ran against our willingness to be employed in distributed operations like we wanted to, with the higher-level commanders being risk-averse,] DeSantis said."

Being risk-averse certainly runs counter to having any ability to seize the day and prosecute the fight well, but I catch myself wondering what truly defines such aversion.

I've worked within a TF COC/TOC, and while slaving away to meet HHQ information requirements, I came to the conclusion that if headquarters didn't have an established and reliable way to talk to us, they might not care much unless we were forceably displaced from our position. I lean back on my knowledge of the LRDG and SAS in N. Africa when making this statement, because those guys were definitely DO operators, and there are very few reports of the Brit high command becoming all too concerned when a patrol couldn't establish communications over its wireless set during a comm window.

Can force structure at the tactical level be associated with risk-averse mindsets, and can those mindsets in turn be associated with our appetite for real-time information about our forces; an appetite that becomes greater with every leap in C2 capability?

Outstanding piece on team TTP's, jcustis. The more I read of the lessons of the Bush War (and which you kindly provide for our edification), the more I am not only confirmed in my suspicions of some of our peacetime doctrine, but the clearer my mind becomes on what simply works, and what simply doesn't. And as Ken says, that's what counts.

I see the field-grade officers aren't exactly breaking down the door just yet to comment on cooperation with 4-man SF Teams in general, and the dynamics involved with a major or colonel having to deal with a SF NCOs in one-on-one terms.

What I have to say on this matter is this: when you put someone from a conventional unit or HQ who may well be unfamiliar with SF, their capabilities, and their "style", their will almost certainly be some friction, some misunderstanding. Provided both sides are reasonably accomodating an open-minded (ie., willing to learn), they can usually work that sort of thing out. A willingness to learn is a strong marker of someone who is passionate and conscientous about their profession, even when such learning runs counter to much of what one has already learned and experienced. Usually (but not always), the problem lies more with the regular than with SF. SF itself is typically composed of such learners - true professionals; in fact, it is that quality which is one of the most outstanding marks of what makes an SF soldier.

Perhaps above everything else, both the willingness and the ability to think critically, to learn and to seek to learn, on one's own intiative, and an unwillingness to accept unclear/unverified/untested/rote prescriptions or common assumptions are what set the SF soldier apart from most other soldiers. This independence of thought and mind - what I would say is the very basis for professionalism - is strictly necessary for SF, where there is little room for error, and few scapegoats available to toss to the wolves.

This, as we can all personally attest to, is not quite the case in regular units. We have all seen good men, professionals - dedicated to learning their profession in order to improve themselves and their units, and on their own initiative - either leave or be driven out of conventional units, by those whose "careers", and the accompanying demands of self-promotion, either distract them from or render them indifferent to, such learning (and therefore professionalism) and the independence of thought and mind that is required - even if they have nothing to do with SF. This then, is the person that the Senior NCO of a 4-man SF Team may be compelled to deal with.

Coupled with both continuing improvements in communications and the never-ending expansion of C4IR elements at practically every level - the USMC's proposed 8-man HQ for a new Rifle Platoon structure, in addition to a 4-man C2 Team in each proposed reduced 12-man Rifle Squad being an example, however imperfect, of these developments - makes the "careerist's" need for micro-managment (to "avoid" mistakes that might endanger the progression of his career) much more easily fulfilled, whilst at the same time greatly impeding the discretion left to, and required by, the "professional" to get the job done right.

I think that a 4-man Team, even an ordinary infantry fire team led by a competent junior NCO, should have no trouble most of the time doing whatever job it has to do, never mind an SF Team stacked with senior NCOs -provided that these people are professionals, and left to carry out their assigned tasks as they see fit. Thus, I see little real difficulty, given a short period of learning and adjustment, for regular officers at unit-level and SF NCOs leading 4-man teams to work together, provided that they are all professionals. If they are professionals, they will work things out soon enough.

But if the regular unit-level officer is a careerist, the only thing the SF NCO Team Leader can do is to try to avoid contact as much as possible, and given the extensive C2 suite that even a 4-man team may find itself carrying, obviously this may prove practically impossible. Little good is likely to come of such a situation. Given the Army's present Officer Retention issues, and especially the incentives being offered to stay ("corporate" bonuses and the like), it doesn't require terribly impressive mental powers to imagine just what sort of officer the Army is most likely to retain.

[Rifleman]

For those of us who just can't get enough of this thread (or who just suffer from insomnia) :

The concern over the infantry squad's effectiveness has focused on its size. A review of the historical data suggests that the squad's organization is the critical facet in the effectiveness of an infantry squad. As a result, the author suggests the current squad can be made more effective if its organization is changed to reflect the lessons of three wars and decades of peacetime testing. Specifically, the squad should not be organized around fire teams, nor around more than one light machinegun and grenade launcher. Concurrently, the squad should be used as either a base of fire or maneuver element; the squad should not be expected to fire and maneuver simultaneously.

Link: http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=...fier=ADA225438

And yet another one:

This study analyzes the organization of the US Army infantry rifle squad since the end of World War II, focusing on the attempt to gain and then maintain the capability of fire and maneuver at the squad level. Since the end of World War II, the US Army has conducted or commissioned at least nine studies, aimed at determining the optimum organization of the infantry rifle squad. Common trends affect all recent attempts at transforming the US Army and become evident when studying the evolution of the squad, but the goal must remain developing a combat effective unit. Combat effectiveness is determined by applying the evaluative criteria of control, sustainability, flexibility, and lethality. By applying these four criteria to analyze various squad organizations, one can determine the strengths and weaknesses inherent to these organizations, thereby recommending the most combat effective rifle squad organization. The US Army's current focus on strategic deployability and emerging weapons capabilities is not a new phenomenon, but potentially could cloud the essential issue, developing a military force for optimum combat effectiveness. This study concludes by recommending the optimum squad-level organization for the Objective Force.

Link: http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=...fier=ADA407058

The first author belives the squad should fire or manuever but not both. So he thinks nine men is plenty for that purpose and that battle drill begins at platoon level, not squad. I suppose that has proven to work for more open combat but I think it limits the options, especially for MOUT.

The second author believes the squad should fire and manuever but sticks with the idea of two big fire teams. I think that's a step in the right direction but still not as good as the USMC squad.

These are lengthy PDF documents, so don't start reading until you've set aside some time. Or, print them out and analize them later. Enjoy.....er, uh, or not.

[jcustis]

I'll post more if I have anything to comment on regarding the two longer articles Rifleman posted, but until then I'll just leave this for folks to ponder. In the context of the first article, which references SLA Marshall, perhaps Dick Winters influenced the transition to an 11-man squad?

For those soldiers, sailors and airmen who participated in D-Day, June 6 was unlike any day in history. And it was on D-Day that Dick Winters had his rendezvous with destiny. Easy Company's mission, as with the other units within the 101st Airborne Division, was to seize the causeways behind Utah Beach to facilitate the expansion of the beachhead. Jumping from a C-47 Dakota at 150 miles per hour and at 500 feet and less, the Division's drop was scattered across the Cotentin Peninsula. Winters came down near the town of Ste. Mere-Eglise, several kilometers from the intended drop zone. Rallying a couple of troopers, he soon was en route to Ste. Marie-du-Mont, destined to be the Division's headquarters for most of D-Day. En route, Winters stumbled across the battalion staff and 40 men of D Company. By 7:00 a.m., E Company consisted of two light machine guns, one bazooka with no ammunition, one 60 mm mortar, nine riflemen and two officers. No one knew the whereabouts of the company commander, so Winters took command.

Three kilometers from Ste. Marie-du-Mont, the column encountered sustained enemy fire, and Winters was summoned to the front. The battalion commander informed Winters that there was a four-gun battery of German 105 mm cannons, a few hundred meters to the front across an open field opposite a French farmhouse called Brécourt Manor. The battery was set up in a hedgerow and defended by a 50-man German platoon. The guns were firing directly down a causeway leading to Utah Beach. The battalion operations officer directed Winters to take the battery. Taking his company, Winters made a careful reconnaissance and then issued orders for an assault. The attack would consist of a frontal assault led by Winters with covering fire from several directions to pin down the Germans. Winters selected three soldiers for the assault: Pvt. Gerald Lorraine, Pvt. Popeye Wynn and Cpl. Joe Toye. Asked later why he selected these three, Winters recalled, "In combat you look for killers.' Many thought they were killers and wanted to prove it. They are, however, few and far between."

Winters saw the impending attack as a "high risk opportunity." The key was "initiative, an immediate appraisal of situation, the use of terrain to get into the connecting trench and taking one gun at a time." Crawling on their bellies, Winters and his men got close enough and knocked out the first gun. Mowing down the retreating Germans, Winters then placed a machine gun to fire down the trench. He had also noticed that as soon as he got close enough to assault the first gun, the Germans in an adjacent hedgerow temporary lifted their fire so that they would not inflict friendly casualties. That was enough for Winters, who had a "sixth sense" that such a respite shifted the advantage to him.

With the first gun out of action, Winters grabbed two other soldiers and charged the second gun. Throwing hand grenades and firing their rifles, they took the second howitzer. Next to the gun was a case with a map that showed all the German artillery in the Cotentin Peninsula. Winters sent the map back to battalion headquarters and then directed another assault which rapidly captured the third gun. Reinforcements led by an officer from D Company soon arrived. Winters briefly outlined the situation and then watched D Company capture the last gun. With the mission complete, Winters ordered a withdrawal. It was 11:30 a.m., roughly three hours since Winters had received the order to take the battery. In summarizing Easy's action, historian Stephen Ambrose notes that with 12 men, what amounted to a squad, later reinforced by elements of D Company, Winters had destroyed a German battery, killed 15 Germans, wounded many more, and taken 12 prisoners. It would be a gross exaggeration to say that Easy Company saved the day at Utah Beach, but reasonable to say that it had made an important contribution to the success of the invasion.

Winters' action at Brécourt Manor was a textbook infantry assault, frequently studied at the U.S. Military Academy. Ever the self-effacing leader, Winters described the action to combat historian S.L.A. Marshall simply as laying down a base of fire to cover the assault. Left unsaid was his leadership by example. At every turn he had made the correct decision, from selecting the right men for each task, to making an accurate reconnaissance of the enemy position, to leading the maneuver element in person. In his own analysis, Winters credited his training and preparing for D-Day, his "apogee" in command. When the day was finally over, he wrote in his diary that if he survived the war, he would find an isolated farm somewhere and spend the rest of his life in peace.

[Norfolk]

I suspect, jcustis, that Winter's exploits didn't exactly have a negative influence on Marshall's own thinking about infantry combat and tactics - you might be hitting very close there. And considering Slam's impact on the thinking of the top brass (now where can we find a latter-day Slam of our own by which to insinuate our own nefarious agenda into the minds of the real decision-makers?...hmm), Slam's interest in what Winters did, and how he did it...jcustis, you are a sly dawg.

Those are some very thought-provoking articles you've got there Rifleman. I've got these, and a few others besides, myself, and I suppose that I am even more struck by the first than the second, and the second's pretty good. Yeah, when all is said and done, the infantry has got to have the bayonet strength to dig out and kill the (remaining) enemy, while the machine guns (and grenade launchers too) are what get you to that point.

And given that point, I think that the first article, proposing a squad with a single LMG and grenade launcher and no fire teams actually has a stronger case for itself than the second articles recommended 11-man squad with two fire teams and two LMGs. The second article even goes so far as to state that the Army's own tests demonstrated the necessity of having not less than 13 men in the 2-fire team squad in order to ensure that it could continue to use fire-and-movement after suffering heavy battle losses, whereas the recommended 11-man squad could only suffer modest losses before it lost that capability. I think that the Marine Rifle Squad is about right, but this still requires some more thought. Good post Rifleman.

[ROKMAN]

So in essence it is not the squad or the squad size but rather how they are trained? If that is the case then why are some Marine squad leaders in Iraq are splitting their squads into two teams of 6 Marines each?

Is this the case that the squad should not have permanent teams but rather be flexible for the situation? That the Squad leader can reorganize his fire teams into two teams or three teams so long as he has sufficient personnel to do it?

[Norfolk]

So in essence it is not the squad or the squad size but rather how they are trained? If that is the case then why are some Marine squad leaders in Iraq are splitting their squads into two teams of 6 Marines each?

Is this the case that the squad should not have permanent teams but rather be flexible for the situation? That the Squad leader can reorganize his fire teams into two teams or three teams so long as he has sufficient personnel to do it?

That's a good question ROKMAN, although it does seem that 1 element of a squad assaulting while 2 other elements of the same squad suppress the enemy with fire still seems to stand (I think). But what should the size, weapons, and composition of each of these elements be? And should they all be the same? Personally I think they should probably be all the same, but I'm open to better ideas. I'm not completely opposed to 6 men in each element, but I'm not convinced either; I think 4-5 is probably best. Let's see what others think.

[Ken White]

... If that is the case then why are some Marine squad leaders in Iraq are splitting their squads into two teams of 6 Marines each?
. . .

One of my best Marine Platoon Sergeants told me he did it on Okinawa because he had no faith in his youngest Team Leader. I saw people who had done that in Korea, generally for the same reason. I also saw those who refused to do it and either made the weak guy perform or made him a BAR man and put a sharp Private in as the Team Leader.

The latter would seem to me to be the better solution from the standpoint of accountability and leader selection and training. The former will work; the Squad Leader has -- or should have -- the flexibility to organize within reason the way he wishes.

I also saw a guy in Korea who had three fire teams; one with a really good shooter and one BAR; one with two BARs. Those two were his split base of fire. The third Fire Team was the assault element of five Riflemen (including one de jure Team Leader as a Snuffy) under his best Corporal. His rationale was that accurate and automatic fire kept the bad guys down and the BAR Men weren't as mobile and flexible as riflemen. He went where he thought he needed to be at the time.

Wouldn't have done it that way myself but whatever works.

[Norfolk]

For those of us who just can't get enough of this thread (or who just suffer from insomnia) :

Are you actually saying, openly, Rifleman, that my posts are insufficiently long, ponderous, and pedantic to cure your (and others') insomnia? Well...wait for it...

And a word about what one of the articles also mentioned: that the whole Squad - Section concept needs to be looked at again and seriously considered; just as the articles says, the Fire Teams of today really are, more or less, the Squads of old, and present-day Squads really are closer to the Sections of old than they are actually to being Squads. But just a matter of terminology.