Thailand (catch all)

[Jedburgh]

Here are a couple of articles discussing migration of IED TTPs from the Middle East to South Asia:

UPI, 15 Feb: Thai Militants Learn From Iraq Insurgency

Islamic separatists in violence-wracked southern Thailand have begun to employ weapons and tactics that appear to be imported from the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to analysts and experts.

One technique in particular, the use of a cement casing around a homemade bomb which both disguises it to look like a roadside marker and increases its lethality by creating razor sharp shards of concrete shrapnel, seems to have been imported directly from Iraq.

"That comes straight from Iraq -- or at least from the same training manuals they're using in Iraq," said Zachary Abuza, author of "Crucible of Terror" -- widely considered the definitive study of Islamic extremism in Southeast Asia. "Certainly, those kinds of tactics were never used in Thailand before."

Over the past year, the separatists have undergone "a remarkable transformation. It's unique ... I've never seen anything like it before in an insurgency," said defense analyst Jeff Moore who has written about the issue for Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre.

Moore told United Press International that during 2004 there were a half dozen raids and ambushes against Thai security forces and other targets, but in 2005, there were nearly 90. "Almost overnight they went from a gang of saboteurs and assassins to a small army. A guerilla army, but an army nonetheless," he said.

During the same time frame, Thai security forces also noted "an increasing sophistication in the construction and use" of improvised explosive devices by the insurgents, Panitan Wattanayagorn told UPI

Commentary from the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus:

Alternate Futures for Thailand's Insurgency

The Thai insurgency has formally entered its third straight year. Between January 2004 and January 2006, more than 1,200 people were killed. In January 2004, violent incidents averaged 30 per month; by December 2004, violent incidents averaged 120 per month. By June 2005, bombings averaged more than one per day. More than 300 were killed and more than 300 wounded in the six months following the introduction of the Emergency Decree in July 2005 (The Bangkok Post, October 24, 2005). In 2006 alone, 19 people have been killed, seven in one day—five of whom were policemen. The presence of over 40,000 security forces has done little to stop the insurgency.

While the majority of victims are killed in drive by shootings and assassinations, the technical capacity of the bombs has increased dramatically. Thai Muslim bomb-makers now assemble 10kg bombs composed of a variety of components, including powergel, TNT, potassium chlorate, and ammonium nitrate. The detonators have become sophisticated to the point that the government had to block all un-registered pre-paid cell phones in the three southernmost provinces. Authorities also have evidence that the militants are now experimenting with infrared devices as detonators, although they have not consistently deployed these bombs (The Nation, November 29, 2005). The Thai militants are also learning techniques from abroad. According to a senior intelligence official, "They have stolen cement kilometer road markers to make bombs, for which we have seen instructions posted on some web sites in the Middle East" (Reuters, October 6, 2005).

...and here's some additional background on the insurgency:

There is a decent discussion of the issue on the Counterterrorism Blog of 10 Jan 06.

ICG, May 05: Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Dec 04:
Trouble in Thailand's Muslim South: Separatism, Not Global Terrorism

Edit: When I reviewed this post after posting the follow-up below, I discovered that 3 out of 5 links no longer led to the intended article. All of'em are fixed, although the UPI article was no longer available through the original source, thanks to a blogger it is still on-line in its entirety.

[Jedburgh]

Jamestown Foundation, 8 Sep 06: A Breakdown of Southern Thailand's Insurgent Groups

Thailand has faced an Islamist secessionist movement since 2001-2002 that has led to the deaths of more than 1,500 people. There have been nearly 400 successful bombings, many more attempted bombings and more than 400 arson attacks. Militants have assassinated more than 600 people. Ten of the 33 districts in the deep south are "plagued by violence" according to the Thai Ministry of the Interior, and the number is increasing. Yet, little is actually known about the insurgents' structure and capacity. To date, there has not been a single credible claim of responsibility, nor have the insurgents publicly stated their goals or political platform. Their unwillingness to disclose any details has worked to their advantage and left Thai intelligence in a quandary. There are a number of insurgent groups working together, and unlike the insurgency in the 1960s to the early-1990s, when groups were sharply divided over their goals and ideology and proved absolutely incapable of working together, today's organizations share a common Islamist agenda and are demonstrating unprecedented coordination and cooperation. No organization is trying to discredit another to build up its own power base...

The Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO)

Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi

Gerakan Mujahideen Islami Pattani (GMIP)

The Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)

New PULO

Jemaah Salafi

...The preceding groups are responsible for the continuing insurgency in southern Thailand. The past few months have seen repeated coordinated bombing campaigns by these insurgents, such as an operation in June that involved more than 70 bombs, an operation on August 1 and the most recent operation on August 31 that targeted at least 20 commercial banks in Yala province. Coordination between the groups will continue to evolve as they pursue their shared Islamist agenda.

(group backgrounds at the link)

[SWJED]

25 September London Times / The Australian - Thais Change Tack on Islamists by Michael Sheridan.

The Royal Thai Army will adopt new tactics against a militant Islamic uprising, following the coup that sent Thaksin Shinawatra, the ousted prime minister, into exile in London last week.

According to sources briefed by the army high command, Mr Thaksin's bungled response to the insurgency in southern Thailand, which has claimed 1700 lives in two years, was a critical factor in the generals' decision to get rid of him.

Military intelligence officers intend to negotiate with separatists and to use psychological warfare to isolate the most violent extremists, in contrast to Mr Thaksin's heavy-handed methods and harsh rhetoric...

[Bill Moore]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6221177.stm

"A series of small explosions has left two people dead and at least 20 injured in the Thai capital, Bangkok.
At least six blasts at widely-scattered places occurred within an hour or so as streets were filling up with people ahead of New Year's Eve celebrations.

Our Bangkok correspondent says many Thais suspect the bombs were the work of opponents of the current military government, which forced Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra from office in September."

I hope the assessment by some of the locals that this is the work of opponents to the current government is correct. If it is related to the insurgency in Southern Thailand it would be a significant escalation and expansion of the conflict.

[SWJED]

... the post that is, not the bombings. I was just reading this post at the Counterterrorism blog by Zachary Abuza:

...The low profile targets at first led me and other analysts that I spoke with to discount the involvement of Muslim militants from the deep south. While I have long argued that they have never taken the option of targeting Bangkok off the table, nor are they ideologically against it, at the time they really don’t need to change their strategy. At this point the insurgents are winning (they certainly are not losing). What the attack seemed to reflect was ongoing elite strife over the 19 September coup. There have been several bombings in Bangkok in the past few years, but all have been linked to elite conflicts, not the insurgency. The higher profile bombing of the Siam Paragon – which this author was in shopping with his children a few hours before the blast – might mean something altogether. Then again, it could be the police or other forces disgruntled with the military’s takeover and simply be an attempt to discredit and destabilize the regime. The police are wildly unhappy about the reforms that the military is going to soon force on the police. Yet one of the bombs was placed at a small police kiosk wounding several police officers.

Officials from former Prime Minister Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party have denied any involvement in the blasts. But unnamed sources from the Council on National Security told The Nation newspaper that the CNS was considering seizing Thaksin’s assets so that he could no longer destabilize the country.

The southern insurgents clearly have the technical capacity to execute large-scale bombings in Bangkok. They detonate on a daily basis far more powerful bombs than what went off in Bangkok. Yet, to carry out so many bombings would require an infrastructure in Bangkok that few would consider them to have, The bombs were also not like the ones usually employed by southern insurgents, in terms of composition or detonation device...

[Bill Moore]

SWJED you beat me to it, I just got off the CT Blog. The smoke hasn't cleared yet, so everything falls in the category of speculation, but as this investigation unfolds it definitely needs to be followed. If the police did this it would explain the infrastructure, but Thai police (although they can be rough) aren't in the habit of killing incident Thai civilians. If they did escalate their rift with the Army to this extent, then we have serious security concerns in the Kingdom. If it was the separatists from the South, then it was obviously a warning shot in hopes of getting concessions, or provoking the Thai government into over reacting so they can garner more political support. Numerous third options also exist, but Zachary Abuza is a noted expert on the region, I look forward to his next post and analysis.

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 1 Feb 07:

2007 Marks the Key Year in Thailand's Southern Insurgency

January 4, 2007 marked the third anniversary of the outbreak of the current phase of Thailand's insurgency in the southern provinces of Narathiwat, Yala and Pattani. To date, the insurgency has claimed more than 1,900 lives. Many hoped that by this point the adoption of a more conciliatory tone by the government of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, which was installed after the army-led coup of September 19, 2006, and changes in government policy would have stemmed the violence. In fact, the opposite has occurred, with assassinations, bombings and arson attacks dramatically increasing post-coup. In Narathiwat, during the weekend of January 13-14, for instance, two bombs wrecked a railway line, a soldier was killed and five others seriously injured in a roadside IED attack and a government official and ice cream vendor were gunned down. In Pattani, a police officer was shot and killed. In Yala, the heart of the insurgency, a fireman and another man were shot dead in separate incidents, while insurgents beheaded a Thai Buddhist and his wife, leaving a note which read: "As long as you don't leave our country Pattani, we will kill all of you crazy Buddhists"...

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 15 Mar 07: Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup

The September 2006 coup in Thailand, despite its damage to democratic development, opened the way for improved management of the conflict in the Muslim South. Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont’s interim government has overhauled some of its predecessor’s worst policies and signalled willingness to address longstanding grievances. But verbal commitments in Bangkok have been difficult to translate into changes on the ground, and relations between security forces and local communities continue to be strained while violence mounts. Thais outside the South have exerted pressure for a return to heavy-handed crackdowns on suspected militants. The government must respond to the escalating attacks, but with care – widespread arbitrary arrests and civilian casualties would only increase support for insurgents....

[SWJED]

The Jihad in Indochina - The Belmont Club.

A little background research on the insurgency in Thailand's south turned up the little-known fact that it is Southeast Asia's deadliest insurgency. About 1,200 people have been killed in connection with it in the last decade but fully one thousand of those have been since 2004. Like most insurgencies, it has its roots in history; in disputes between the Kingdom of Siam and its Malay neighbor states to the south. It was exacerbated by colonial politics. Even World War 2 played a role when the Muslim Malays of the south requested British help against Bangkok, which had allied itself with imperial Japan.

But things got stirred up again under the impetus of the worldwide Jihadi resurgence in conjunction with an apparent Thai mismanagement of the insurgency. Strongarm tactics were substituted for intelligence gathering, possibly because police preoccupation with corruption undermined any efficiency. In the meantime, a new jihadi cadre began forming in the madrasas of Pakistan. Media reports following up the involvement of Britons of Pakistani origin in the London bombings uncovered the fact that nearly a thousand Muslim of Thai nationality (Patani) were studying in madrasas in Pakistan...

Much more at the link...

[SWJED]

27 May NY Times - Thai Security Chief Vows a Tough Stand Against Muslim Separatists by Thomas Fuller.

Frustrated by an inability to pacify a Muslim insurgency and concerned about rising dissent toward their rule, Thailand’s generals have chosen a former commando and self-described assassin as their top security adviser.

The appointment this month of the adviser, Pallop Pinmanee, a retired general notorious for his harsh tactics but admired for his survival instincts, appears to be a signal from the military-backed government that its conciliatory approach toward Muslim insurgents in southern Thailand will change.

And recent statements from General Pallop and other leaders herald a repressive turn toward dealing with political dissent as well...

[zenpundit]

Pallop's loudly announced appointment should be considered " fair warning" to Maylasia and Indonesia which are tolerating the stringpullers and bagmen of the Thai insurgency to operate unmolested. If it continues, there will be Muslim "businessmen" and "imams" in these countries getting their throats cut. Maybe some of their political friends as well.

Thailand has a long history of bareknuckle paramilitarism and also of keeping outside groups ( Khmer Rouge) sharply circimscribed. It sounds like the generals and the King have run out of patience with their southern neighbors.

[Bill Moore]

We all understand that insurgency is both a military/security and political problem, and trying to solve the problem with either a military or political solution to the exclusion of the other is bound to fail, so I'm cautiously glad to see that Thailand appointed a warrior that will take the fight to the insurgents, but only if he shapes the fight to facilitate a political solution (as they did when they battled the communist insurgents in Thailand). The Thais basically executed their own Phoenix type program. I think that type of program is a required element in any counterinsurgency. The hardcore elements need to either captured or killed, so they can no longer influence the population.

However, I think a word of caution is in order. The Thai insurgents have divisions within their camp, some want a political settlement, while others want a Jihad. An overly strong arm approach could shift the Muslim population in Southern Thailand to support their radicals. Furthermore, a strong arm approach could internationalize the conflict if the insurgents request assistance from their global jihad brothers. This remains a delicate and very important conflict that will require a well thought out strategy involving a strong (yet mostly covert) military approach and a stronger political approach.

[Firestaller]

You know that Islamic terrorism is a problem in Thailand when Buddhist monks are calling for war.

[Bill Moore]

Generally passive and believers in the eight fold path, the Thais, Khmer, and numerous other Buddhists have a warrior culture. The insurgents in S. Thailand are trying to provoke a Buddhist response (I mean local Buddhist citizens, not the Thai government) in order to mobilize more Muslims to join their radical movement out of fear, because they will need protection from the Buddhists. So far they have been unsuccessful with the exception of a few minor retaliatory attacks. This is similar to the strategy that the JI used semi-successfully in Indonesia a few years back. I think it is John Robb that refers to this as primary loyalties, which we’re seeing in Iraq. As long as the State remains viable and adequately provides for the people, nationalism can exist above tribalism. If the State falters, then tribes will become the primary loyalty base. That is why a ying and yang approach is required, if you’re all military action (I’ll make you tap out) you’ll facilitate their argument (their narrative) that the State is against them, and they’ll mobilize more to their side. If you don’t take sufficient military action, and you can’t create a secure environment, people will side with the insurgents unwillingly for protection. There are no easy answers to the problem in S. Thailand, but one of the keys is to keep it from escalating if at all possible. It may be too late, it is sort like a forest fire, once it gets so big it creates it own wind that drives the fire.

[tequila]

You know that Islamic terrorism is a problem in Thailand when Buddhist monks are calling for war.

Certain politically aligned Buddhist religious orders are some of the most hardline elements on the Sinhalese right wing in Sri Lanka. A Buddhist monk assassinated the country's first PM in 1959 over concessions to the Hindu Tamils. They recently formed their own ultranationalist party. Most Japanese Buddhist Zen Masters were similar in their enthusiastic support for Japanese imperial expansion prior to 1945, complete with proclamations of holy war.

There aren't any religions with clean records that I know of. Except for maybe Scientology --- they just want to make money.

[Fuchs]

Thailand, insurgents sign first ever agreement to start peace talks

Good luck.

[Bill Moore]

The Strange Thai Insurgents Who Like Sorcery and Get High on Cough Syrup

http://www.theatlantic.com/internati...-syrup/275614/

The distance from local problem to universal nightmare can vanish without warning: In Boston, that interval was as brief as twelve seconds. Awareness of the Pattani insurgency in Western governments today is limited to a tiny number of intelligence analysts and Southeast Asia hands. Among those few, there is a shared attitude of wary unease: We don't have the resources to figure out what's really going on, and we don't think it's hooked up with a global terrorist group -- yet . But any morning we may turn on the news and suddenly find that all our assumptions were disastrously wrong.

Analysts and intelligence officials of several nations scratch their heads at the inability of global extremist groups to lure the militants of the Thai south into their family. But the Pattani insurgency, in its very aloofness, may offer lessons to anyone seeking an elusive Unified Theory of Jihadism. For the Pattani rebels, as for so many others who use religion as a rallying cry, Islam is a symbol more than a set of beliefs. If that weren't the case, how could this uprising be permeated by such thoroughly un-Islamic practices as sorcery, narco-trafficking, butchery of innocents, and Coca-Cola cannibalism?

[davidbfpo]

The insurgency in Southern Thailand must rank as one of the most obscure and on SWC too.

Caught this via a Tweet from IISS and I noted:

The Thais have drawn on two classic models of COIN – from French military officer David Galula and Britain’s Sir Robert Thompson – to develop their own approach.

I'd missed that there was a new book The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency byDr. Jeff Moore; a recent IISS discussion features him and is the podcast at the end:http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices...WTL91E.twitter

[davidbfpo]

Two helpful articles on the bombing in Bangkok:http://www.vox.com/2015/8/17/9164963...g-what-we-know

http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/whats...y-bomb-blast/?

[davidbfpo]

An Open Democracy article, which is of interest, but has IMHO been overtaken by events:https://www.opendemocracy.net/alista...ry-junta-react

From the BBC a report which starts with:

Police in Bangkok have charged a man in connection with the bomb attack that killed 20 people in the Thai capital nearly two weeks ago. Officers say the suspect, who was charged with illegal possession of weapons, was involved in the attack. However, they say he is not the man seen on CCTV footage leaving a bag at the Erawan Shrine before the explosion.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-34101309

Last night on Twitter attention was drawn to the discovery of a pile of reportedly badly forged Turkish passports and the possible Uighur links, not to terrorism, but enabling refugees to travel.