Slap, buddy, I just listened to it. Not a big fan of R/B;Originally Posted by slapout9
Gian you need some Slapout MTV
as grand master of ebo (respectfully stated of course); what effect are you trying to produce.
gian
Slap, buddy, I just listened to it. Not a big fan of R/B;Gian you need some Slapout MTV
as grand master of ebo (respectfully stated of course); what effect are you trying to produce.
gian
Whatever it was I don't think I succeded....You seem like a Hendrix guy to me?
Well...
From my perspective (and I've sat through Kilcullen so I think I know his mindset wrt slide), I've started to form the opinion that Shinseki's call for larger force numbers wouldn't have made a difference. This runs totally counter to what I've opined in the past, and as painful as it is for me to retract my opinion, it's been an interesting ride.
I think we would have be able to smother areas with forces and make ourselves happy that we "had things on lockdown", but the reality is that we would have simply provided more targets, pissed off more people, and prolonged things.
We weren't ready for Phase IV execution, for a number of reasons we have beaten to death here. And since I believe we are just finally getting to a point where we are effectively understanding and employing COIN, we would have been woefully miserable at it five years ago, but would have just had more forces plodding around and breaking more pottery.
Gian, thanks,
I'm really glad I'm not alone and that you young whippersnappers can join me in my senior moments.
In some ways the Huk thing was a lot like El Sal. Lansdale had a small team to advise and work with Magsaysay. The rapport worked and they introduced an effective COIN strategy with suppoting operations and tactics.
Concerning numbers and Phase IV: JC, numbers without a good strategy would have been ineffective. But without the numbers I really don't think any strategy would have worked. We have the numbers today - not even mainly US but rather Iraqi...
Cheers
JohnT
Although I always read your thoughtful postings with interest, I have to disagree with you here. I think we have succumbed to a meta-narrative that tells us that we have been screwed up in Iraq up until Feb 2007 and then once the Surge hits then the corner is turned. As you probably can tell from my writings in other places I disagree violently with this interpretation.
I do think massive amounts of more troops would have made a difference if we were looking to really control the country with military force. I remember as a BCT XO in April 2003 in Tikrit trying to balance early Coin ops with raids, and with trying to secure all of the ammo dumps around; we simply did not have enough troops to do it all. To think that with the same number of troops but in your implied counterfactual having them trained on Coin and perhaps with a General like General Patraeus at the helm then things would have turned out differently places way too much on the idea that the American military is really in control of things in Iraq.
For example and jumping ahead to the current situation; if it was the additional brigades under the Surge practicing so-called new coin tactics that lowered violence in the latter half of 2007 and if the majority of those brigades continuing to practice their so called new methods are still in place, then how do you explain the recent increase in violence not only in the south but in Baghdad?
The assumption to Dr Kilkullen's thinking is that good Coin methods underpinned by sound theoretical thinking can replace mass of troops on the ground. I dont buy it and I never have. His Jenga slide actually reminds me of the way many airmen during world war II and even after would use metaphor and theoretical constructs to explain how the relatively simple act of dropping HE bombs on structures and blowing them up would have this sophisticated network-like, systems effect on the entire enemy economy. John Warden's rings comes to mind here too.
I have come to conclude from a military perspective that using American military power to conduct Coin in Iraq is impossible.
gentile
If I may ask sir, what was your BCT raiding? Were you going after FRLs? When elements of the 4ID came into zone vicinity of Samarra, Apaches went to work engaging targets across the the highway from an entire battalion coil (which I was a part of); "targets" in an area we'd already cleared and have control over. There was a lot of ordnance and weapons around in Tikrit when TF Tripoli moved south, but by the time we pulled out we had already established a pretty brisk trade in cigarettes and orange drink.I do think massive amounts of more troops would have made a difference if we were looking to really control the country with military force. I remember as a BCT XO in April 2003 in Tikrit trying to balance early Coin ops with raids, and with trying to secure all of the ammo dumps around; we simply did not have enough troops to do it all.
I'll have to disagree with you about COIN in April 2003. It wasn't happening. Sure, military leaders were trying to talk with Iraqi leaders and figure out whether we needed to be talking to mayors, sheiks, or some incarnation in-between, but we were also installing ourselves as "mayors" of sorts, and were all to quick to write PAO stories about it (which may have fueled our problems).
There's been substantial Bremer-beating concerning the disbandment of the military (and I don't want to belabor that here), but if we had been doing it with, by, and through Iraqis back then, does the large numbers hypothesis still hold true?
if it was the additional brigades under the Surge practicing so-called new coin tactics that lowered violence in the latter half of 2007 and if the majority of those brigades continuing to practice their so called new methods are still in place, then how do you explain the recent increase in violence not only in the south but in Baghdad?
I don't think we were screwed up in Iraq until 2007. I think we were simply screwed up in pockets, and those pockets served as areas (or seams/gaps if you will) where our enemy was able to get into our loop, build his center of gravity, and drive us to swat the fly with the proverbial hammer. We were not unifromly screwed up across the entire country.
As for explaining the current spate of violence, if you cull through my previous posts on the SWC, I believe that we did not surge enough in Baghdad (I was thinking a deliberate clear and hold through the city requiring several divisions), that we needed to square ourselves with Sadr, and that Iraq was only on a low simmer when we rolled into summer 2007. Come elections in the US, the violence would pick up for sure. Maybe that is coming true, but I don't know.
Perhaps you and I read Kilcullen differently sir, but I don't see him as actually having this sort of underpinning in his work. I think he believes that lower numbers of troops, actively practicing COIN and not wrapping themselves in too many force protection pillows, and working through the folks who really know that turf, are going to get you to your endstate faster than plodding around en masse.The assumption to Dr Kilkullen's thinking is that good Coin methods underpinned by sound theoretical thinking can replace mass of troops on the ground.
I think he recognizes there is a time and place for large formations, but if they aren't being employed properly, the are just shooting our strategy in the foot. We did not have the aptitude, temperance, nor patience to do a good job in 2003-2005, regardless of how many boots we had on the ground. Tie this problem to the woefull reconstruction efforts during that period, and I can totally agree with you that the military was not in control of things in Iraq. Like John T. Fishel said, no matter of troops would have mattered with a crappy strategy.
totally; and thanks for the tip on "25." fixed it.
although I am sure the great Jimi had some threads to plenty of good R/B folks.
gian
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