COIN & The Media (catch all)

[Cow Cookie]

I’m a lurker on this board who’s a student of the media. In addition to viewing all the usual COIN topics, I spend much of my time reading comments about the media’s actions. The tone seems to me to be generally critical of the media’s performance.

While I can think of good arguments both for and against this assessment, I’m intrigued at how the media, especially our own Western media, seems to be treated differently than other players in the COIN fight. Many who are adept at co-opting former enemy fighters into their COIN strategy are quick to malign, insult or disparage media organizations who, like it or not, will be the ones telling the story to the local populace or those back home.

The media is clearly a part of COIN strategy at higher levels, but for some reason this view does not seem to have trickled down to lower levels to the extent that other COIN strategies have. I’ve heard many soldiers in Iraq tell reporters that they don’t like the media in general or the reporter’s paper in particular. I’ve never heard soldiers tell Iraqis that they just don’t like that person’s neighborhood, party or sect – even if they might feel that way privately. I think you can see this on these very boards: Many complaints about the media, very few complaints about the local populace or their organizations. This seems counterproductive.

My gut feeling is that many view the media as somehow outside the COIN fight instead of an integral part of it. Ironically, it seems many find it easier to conceptualize Arab and Afghan media as part of COIN than Western media. My guess is that this is because we already view the Arab and Afghan populations as the target of our efforts, while we view Western media as unfaithful allies. I’d argue that COIN efforts must target both local media to undermine the insurgency and domestic media to build support for the counter-insurgency.

I’m not saying much of the reaction against the media isn’t justified. I just don’t think leaders and soldiers are as pragmatic in their attitude toward the media as they are with other aspects of COIN.

This is not to say that media shouldn’t be held accountable when they screw up. Yet the top-to-bottom focus should be on relationship-building efforts the same as with any other part of COIN. Even commanders who lose a soldier to an IED don’t stop community development altogether, although they may berate the local council. If they can work with complicit locals in that environment, it should be easy to set aside suspicions and work with media organizations.

So I’m curious, whether you think I’m completely off base. Is the media, particularly Western media, an accepted part of the COIN at all levels or is it seen as an opponent in an us-versus-them conflict?

[ODB]

If I post on pure emotion I will not stay with the good graces of the SWJ. I will sleep on it, then answer with a level head.

Additionally please go here link and introduce yourself

[Cavguy]

Cow,

Read this article by LTG William Caldwell, CG of Fort Leavenworth and former MNF-I spokesman and the discussion on the board here. I'm happy to say my initial reservations have all been well addressed. He's been requiring all officers and organizations at Fort Leavenworth to regularly engage with the media - traditional and non-traditional.. In fact, it's a CGSC graduation requirement.

My opinion, we have to engage with the media to win, and accept that some of the time we won't get the reporting we want - the benefits of engagement usually outweigh the costs.

[Tom Odom]

Also look at this newsletter from CALL--put together by yours truly from JRTC.

Media is the Battlefield

And its follow on

Media relations

That has an article by LTG Caldwell

Best

Tom

[Cow Cookie]

ODB, those are exactly the emotions I’m interested in exploring.

I’m a reporter, so I admittedly come at this from a different perspective. But I have a hard time understanding why soldiers get so angry at the media when they deal so calmly with so many other situations that, to my mind, are much worse than even the most unfair news story.

For example, I’d been with a unit for a few weeks when an IED killed a soldier. The soldiers went door to door asking neighbors near the blast if they’d seen or heard anything. Each said they were inside at the time, even though it was a beautiful day. I was amazed by how calmly and professionally the soldiers handled the situation even though residents clearly knew more than they were saying. A platoon sergeant later confided that he was seething inside, but he never gave any hint of that to the Iraqis. The mindset was, “Mission first.”

That pragmatism isn’t always there with the news media, though. I’ve had countless soldiers tell me when I show up for an embed that, “I’ve just got to warn you, I don’t like the media. It’s nothing personal, but I had a bad experience one time and I can’t stand journalists.”

Even if that bad experience was unjustified, this strikes me as a very unpragmatic approach in an organization that prides itself on pragmatism. And chances are, the soldier has had many other bad experiences in other arenas that he or she doesn’t allow to affect the mission. What about the media gets under soldiers’ skin?

Cavguy, great article and discussion. I see that on the ground. Leaders in many units have a required number of “leader engagements” in which they must talk to the media (although I can also see arguments that that might be swinging the pendulum in the other direction). In general, I think the leaders generally have it down pretty well.

But where most junior soldiers have a very good understanding of the soft approach that COIN requires (limit damage, build relationships, etc.), I haven’t found that to be the case in regards to the media. Tom Odom expressed this very well in the discussion you reference:

We have been pushing the idea that the media is much like terrain; it is part of the battlefield and you have to adapt to it. No one I know likes humping a ruck through mountains. But most of us don't waste our time disliking the mountains. Instead we change loads or find another way to go. The same line of reasoning applies to the media.

And like I said earlier, I think soldiers conceptually view the Arabic and Western media differently. As a westerner myself, I can be just as guilty of this misconception (ie. IO is something the military does to them, while PAO is something the military does for me).

[Schmedlap]

Even if that bad experience was unjustified, this strikes me as a very unpragmatic approach in an organization that prides itself on pragmatism. And chances are, the soldier has had many other bad experiences in other arenas that he or she doesn’t allow to affect the mission. What about the media gets under soldiers’ skin?

My observation is that you are just as likely to have a Soldier deal in a counterproductive fashion with the media as with the indigenous population. I think the difference is that, as a media member, you are more likely to notice ill will towards the media whereas I, as a former small unit leader, was more likely to notice inappropriate behavior towards the population.

If there is a more commonplace acting out of resentment towards the media - which I admit is possible - then it is most likely because reporters seem to be drawn towards the dumbest guy in the unit who is most likely to say something stupid. But, that is partly a leadership shortcoming for allowing it to happen, so I don't place all of the blame for that on the reporter. Another possible reason is that we think we have a better chance of influencing the population and it is more directly tied to the mission. Many of us feel that we're never going to get a fair shake from the media in this war, because this war was started by someone whose ideology does not line up with the dominant ideology of the media. For example, when I was in Bosnia, we did not view the media as hostile. It seemed that they wanted to report good news because they liked the guy in the White House. After 2003, hating the President seemed to be the media version of converting to the one true religion. Was it really necessary for the NY Times to put Abu Ghraib photos on the front page 30 times? There is a difference between reporting the news and actively seeking to create a sensationalized propaganda coup for your enemies. The NY Times did not just slightly cross that line - they sprinted across it and then did an end-zone dance.

I would also add that there is a special type of resentment set aside for the media because they've seemed to take such pride, since 2003, in taking cheap shots at the men and women who risk their lives to defend their rights to disparage us. Even when they are not taking cheap shots, there is an amazing propensity for many journalists to demonstrate almost unfathomable ignorance in their reporting and they have a seeming inability to not view the news through a bizzaro lens that fits their often woefully incorrect preconceived notions. I'm not saying that any of this justifies counterproductive interaction with the media - and I've never let it affect me when dealing with the media. I'm just trying to shed some light on the source of the resentment. The resentment is justified. But, as Soldiers, we are not justified in losing our bearing.

Just to reiterate, while I recognize that I may be wrong, I think that counterproductive interactions with the indigenous population are more common and more problematic than counterproductive interactions with the media, so I question your assumptions. If it is your anecdotal experience against mine, then I guess we'll just agree that you'll say tomato and I'll say tomato (that never comes across well non-verbally).

[Ken White]

Tales of misquotes and out of context statements drive the troops to avoid the media. There are exceptions and a few have told me of specific reporters -- also few -- that were always welcome. In fairness to the reporters on the ground, they have frequently complained to people I know that their stateside editors changed the story. My sensing is that AP is held in particularly low regard in this regard...

There were problems early on with local stringers who would appear before fire fights. Thus the troops inferred, rightly or wrongly, that they had connections with the bad guys. Stuff like that gets passed along and grows as it travels. Most outlets then tried to do a better job with the stringers but the problem persisted in Iraq until recently. Afghanistan seems to attract wandering western journalists who appear to want to show NATO / US atrocities or cluelessness more than they wish to get accurate stories. Not there, haven't been -- but have heard that perception voiced by some who have been there.Each theater is a little different.

Tom Odom is correct, the Armed forces and the Media have to live with each other. The Officers and senior NCOs will do that -- however, the lower ranked guys are not as constrained by a sense of duty so they let their feelings show. With them, a lot of trust has been abused in their view and they are not a forgiving bunch of people. It's easy for many media types to dismiss them as the great unwashed and Joe Sixpack in ACUs -- but the troops sense that and they resent it strongly. Some will get along with the media, most will not. I doubt they will try to mend the rift -- and there is one. It doesn't serve either side well but in the view of most I know, the media screwed the deal and Joe isn't disposed to try to unscrew it.

A recurring complaint, minor and even petty to some but serious to those making it, is that the media is pretty ignorant about things military. Improper terminology, wrong names and a host of minor misunderstood things appear in print and foster the perception that many in the media don't know much and do not care that they don't know much. That to some is an indicator of low regard and no one likes to believe they are held in low regard. Some media folks have written books about the current wars; I have not heard one universally praised by anyone in uniform, on the contrary, most have been panned for "making stuff up that the writer couldn't have known."

FWIW, this is not a new phenomenon, same thing happened in Korea to a lesser extent and in Viet Nam to about the same extent.with the same set of complaints at about the same volume.

Interestingly, there may be a Texas factor at work here. In SEA in the early days, the Press was enamored of Kennedy and thus, anything we in the area did was fine and was well and pretty accurately reported. After Johnson became President, it all went down hill rapidly. Johnson was not popular with the media and it showed in coverage in Viet Nam post 1965. Some will say it was due to other factors but having been there at the time, that was not my sensing; it was going to be wrong, no matter what.

[joelhar]

...So I’m curious, whether you think I’m completely off base. Is the media, particularly Western media, an accepted part of the COIN at all levels or is it seen as an opponent in an us-versus-them conflict?

Of course the media is a part of COIN but there has to be a balance. The US Military is not allowed to "lie" to the media, I'll be gosh-darned if I know what law prevents this, but Public Affairs officers are loathe to even stretch the truth. Their overriding concern is always to be perceived as truth-tellers. When Information Operations operators and planners work with PA folks there used to be a lot of animosity and mistrust, but this appears to no longer be the case. As a matter of fact in Afghanistan it is codified that they work together and on almost all staffs there is cooperation.

But, there are two primary parts of Information Operations that make it difficult for PA and IO to work together, sometimes to the detriment of PA. Psychological Operations and Military Deception. The perception that PSYOP lies, while thy usually emphasize facts supporting their point, implies to some in the media that working with PSYOP means you might be not telling the truth (a misperception). Military Deception, by its very nature, either hides the truth in plain sight or absolutely obscures our true intentions, this could be perceived as outright lying. Thus there is a perception that anyone working in IO may or may not be telling the truth. This has also seemed to lead a misperception by some media members that the military is always 'not telling the truth'.

Another problem is that bad news sells. I can walk the media through countless shows of positive progress but the story that will sell deals with tragedy, corruption, illegal activities or another sort of a negative story. I've seen media folks not paying attention at demonstrations and slip away to find a "Joe Tentpeg" and ask their story, hoping to find a scoop. I can't fault them for this, not personally, but professionally it hurts.

Another problem is presenting the story. Dead babies worked great in Lebanon in 2006, showing the Israelis to be brutal, cruel, heartless - terrific negative press. The 2008/2009 Israeli-Hamas war saw Israel controlling media access to the battlespace and maximizing a myriad of media to portray their story, but the media was hobbled and spoon fed some stories.

How does this relate to COIN? Embedded media works, but it has inherent risk. Press releases are boring, press conferences are useful because it is more human, but empowering the press allows them to roam and see the truth for themselves. Issuing a list of 'must sees' to the media is an idea that occasionally works, but generating interest outside what appears to be official channels will draw media reporting - and this is a true challenge.

Cultural sensitivity is another really important issue. The military is beginning to understand that cultural differences create problems and is aggressively solving the problem when it occurs. But the media has the same problems, especially if they are foreigners... highlighting the difference between two very disparate cultures shows how well the situation is being addressed when successes do occur.

This is all difficult but must be done...

[George L. Singleton]

Cow Cookie:

Take a look at my posting last year [2008] pushing for revived Voice of America programing as per the 0/11 Commission Formal Recommendations, to counter Arab media negative to us, in particular al Jazeera.

As an older hand who used to work wargamming as a Chief of same for old USREDCOM, which then became USSOCOM (I was a reservist at the Assistant Chief of Staff level in both outfits, a weekend warrior, not an active duty type) civil affairs and psychological warfare was then, at least, one of our greatest weak spots.

Since 9/11 however, I thought we had changed over to the imbeded media people with all our units and forces in the field in Iraq and perhaps Afghanistan.

Did you overlook imbedded media in your comments?

Did you think about inclusing of Voice of America in the overall media umbrella efforts in your comments?

Youger, educated Pakistanis, Pukhtuns, and Iraqis do listen to and watch TV broadcasts from and by VOA current tense and many comment on their native websites that they like the programming, particuarly the Western music on air for them to enjoy.

Low key sideline comments by me for your reply or reaction.

[davidbfpo]

A story in The Daily Telegraph (UK) on UK-sponsored adverts in Pakistan, to show the West is not the enemy: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-Pakistan.html

The Guardian (UK) slightly more detailed report: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009...ising-campaign

Might fit in a Pakistani thread, but this one is about media and COIN.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Currently there are two UK TV series on Afghanistan; a popular "hardman" with the British troops, two episodes so far and he is respectful of the Taliban's fighting skills, with 1m viewers: one review article http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/t...ghanistan.html and to the programme http://sky1.sky.com/ross-kemp-2

To come, I think next week, is a fly-on-the-wall documentary on the medics who serve, mainly reservists.

Maybe some unintended effects, dispite "minders" and spin doctors. Ross Kemp's comment for example on the lack of helicopters will be noted widely.

davidbfpo

[ilots]

Did you think about inclusing of Voice of America in the overall media umbrella efforts in your comments?

Youger, educated Pakistanis, Pukhtuns, and Iraqis do listen to and watch TV broadcasts from and by VOA current tense and many comment on their native websites that they like the programming, particuarly the Western music on air for them to enjoy.

However, for quite a while, "we" insisted on promoting objectives other than (& often counter to) our COIN objectives. This have included such things as the diss. of radio media with female broadcasters & singers in heavily Pashtun areas. The BIG picture is often too clouded by our political & social agenda.

[TristanAbbey]

Folks,

Some may be interested in this Q&A with John Nagl I've just posted. The basic theme is whether counterinsurgency is even possible given:

a) media-driven society
b) counterinsurgencies take a long time
c) counterinsurgencies are very messy

Nagl says yes. URL is:

http://bellum.stanfordreview.org/?p=370

Here's a quote:

The fact that a think-tank had to publish a statement on war aims seven years into a war is not a ringing endorsement of strategic communications policy to date, but it does not prove that the American people are unwilling to bear the burdens of counterinsurgency campaigns if they are explained as honestly and completely as possible.

While I agree with him on strategic communication, I'm not sure we are willing to bear the burdens. Of course, this is just based on discussions with average Americans...i.e. my friends.

Happy to discuss. I imagine this question has come up before.

Tristan

[John T. Fishel]

on Ameirican willingness to bear the burden of war has been done by Peter Feaver of Duke. Although it was written pre-9/11 the Iraq war data seems to bear him out. Sorry, don't have the cite but you should be able to find it pretty easily.

Cheers

JohnT

[politicsbyothermeans]

I wonder what's worse... an honest national dialogue concerning our strategic aims, to include counterinsurgency, or the national apathy we are currently experiencing.

Oh wait, nevermind.

[Ken White]

non-interference and allowing people to get on with their job only intruding if they see what looks like a potential screwup or something they don't like.

The public reaction to these wars is not one bit different than it was to Korea or Viet Nam -- 1/3 supports (President's Party), 1/3 objects (opposition party) and 1/3 swings back and forth depending on how well or bad the war is going.

Right now we're in a State of flux because for only the second time in our history, we've got a political party transition during a war. The Korean transition was different because there was only one theater and the transition President had campaigned specifically on ending that war. Today, the transition President has said he will end (sort of, not well defined) operations in one theater and ramp up operations (sort of, not well defined) in the other...

It's going to be interesting to watch the Republicans and their supporters transition to anti-war types. I figure that will take about 18 months to two years. I'm also curious to see how the old 'anti-war' crowd that was adapts to the new regime.

So Joe Six Pack is waiting to see what happens. It's not apathy.

[jmm99]

from Ken
Right now we're in a State of flux because for only the second time in our history, we've got a political party transition during a war. The Korean transition was different because there was only one theater and the transition President had campaigned specifically on ending that war.

I can see why you'd want to forget Vietnam. Same deal as Korea - Nixon's secret plan to end the war, etc.

Yes, it will be interesting to see if our crystal balls are accurate as to your first two sentences.

from Ken
It's going to be interesting to watch the Republicans and their supporters transition to anti-war types. I figure that will take about 18 months to two years. I'm also curious to see how the old 'anti-war' crowd that was adapts to the new regime.

and, as to the last sentence, I have been watching that - some (majority ?) of the left anti-war crowd are now becoming a bit hawkish; some are feeling betrayed - and their sense of betrayal will grow.

The old 'anti-war' crowd on the farther right (good daily press links), as they have from the time of Bosnia, will continue to deliver their message, which also often appears in the American Conservative.

Here is a sample article on dove to hawk conversion.

[Ken White]

I can see why you'd want to forget Vietnam. Same deal as Korea - Nixon's secret plan to end the war, etc.

Viet Nam the war was effectively decided and over when Johnson announced he would not run for reelection.

Therefor, the election changed no attitudes and thus, in the sense of the political parties attitude toward our wars, Viet Nam was an aberration, By the time of the 1968 election the Democratic Party and its supporters were as opposed -- or perhaps more -- to the war as the Republican side had been.

The major difference between Viet Nam and all our other wars with respect to the 1/3 rule was the worldwide late 60s 'counterculture revolt' of the Baby Boomers which totally skewed the norm. Their mostly anti-military (anti-draft, actually) 'protests' were far different from previous or later protests about various wars. They were admittedly manipulated by North Viet Nam and US leftists. They also got undue media attention so they impacted the norms of war support or opposition.

They wanted to "change the system." They did, they became the system -- and they have almost totally screwed it up (check your daily news for details...). Maybe totally. The only thing they learned was 'don't knock the troops;' so in this war, we get "I support the troops but not the War" from a bunch of flakes that would go berserk if their son or daughter decided to be one one of those troops.

Thank you for allowing my earlier suppressed and possibly over lengthy rant to emerge.

[TristanAbbey]

on Ameirican willingness to bear the burden of war has been done by Peter Feaver of Duke. Although it was written pre-9/11 the Iraq war data seems to bear him out. Sorry, don't have the cite but you should be able to find it pretty easily.

Cheers

JohnT

Remember reading about Feaver in the context of the Bush administration's focus on the word "victory" to describe the Iraq strategy. Wikipedia says he worked for both Clinton and Bush admins, but I'm not sure if that's as rare as it appears.

[Ken White]

well documented, what difference does it make who a researcher 'worked for?'

That's like saying a news report on Fox or MSNBC is invalid based on one's ideological viewpoint. I've never understood that logic.