Platoon Weapons

[kaur]

"On the Terminal Effectiveness of Small-Arms Ammunition"

The difficulty with achieving good terminal effectiveness with a PDW round have led some to argue that the whole concept is a waste of time: that everyone, regardless of role, should carry the standard rifle. The risk with this is that non-infantry soldiers, concerned with their primary roles, will stow the rifle somewhere out of the way, where it may not be available when required.

http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/terminal.htm

[120mm]

"On the Terminal Effectiveness of Small-Arms Ammunition"



http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/terminal.htm

A couple notes: First, an Army shouldn't equip itself based on what the capabilities of the worst soldiers are. I'm a combat arms guy, with significant experience working in a major CSS HQ, and those guys couldn't fight their way out of a wet paper bag. It wouldn't matter HOW "handy" you make a weapon, it's just a paperweight to them.

Second, I read, corresponded with and have learned a bunch from Tony Williams, but like the great majority of technological historians, he is a collector of trivia. An extremely talented and readable collector of trivia, but a collector of trivia, nonetheless. And the problems with trivia collectors is that they are seldom burdened by functionality.

[jcustis]

2.) How do soldiers perceive the power of a round, when only a very tiny proportion ever see their rounds hit a target? The highest rates of fire are used for suppression, where they can rarely, if ever, see an effect.

In terms of gun culture it is interesting to note that the perceived lack of effectiveness of 5.56mm is a mostly a unique US issue. I have asked every Israeli, UK and even South African combat experienced soldier I have interviewed in the last three years, and none of them have said its an issue.
Only one of the 14 SOG veterans I talked to ever raised it, and the IDF guys only pointed out that they liked 7.62mm for GPMGs because it went through walls better than 5.56mm SAWs - as did the US OIF guys I talked to.

Ding....ding.......ding. I've heard myself saying the same thing to folks who are dismal on the 5.56 and never carried the weapon before.

[Uboat509]

My issue with the 5.56 is based on admittedly anecdotal evidence but evidence from sources I trust. The most telling is the stories from guys I knew in Afghanistan. Doing CQC in the caves they ran into numerous situations where they were putting two, three or more rounds in the boweling pin and not putting the bad guy down immediately. The guy was dead but he did not know it yet and often got several shot off before he died. As a a result of this, some of our guys were killed or wounded. I have heard similar stories from Iraq and the Philipines. Having said that, green tip was id'd as being a significant problem, which is why so many of us started loading LR which has somewhat better ballistic effect.

SFC W

[kaur]

I found interesting topic "6,5 Grendel vs 7,62 NATO" and in the middle of next link, there are nice penetration tables (I have never met before).

http://www.65grendel.com/forum/showt...6&page=2&pp=25

[120mm]

I've thought about this issue for a couple months now, as something bothered me about it, but I couldn't think what it was. This afternoon, as I wrap up yet another meaningless Reserve Drill, it suddenly came to me:

This whole issue about PDWs and teenie-tiny projectiles and the statistical gunfight strikes me as being the modern day incarnation of the pre-WWII Royal Air Force "Area Attacks".

Basically, "Area Attacks" was based on the exact statistics that "prove" that individual fighter plans can't possibly accurately target enemy bombers, so therefore the RAF went to rifle caliber guns, instead of cannon, mounted 8 per aircraft, and synchronized to provide a "suppressive spray" at extreme range. And the squadron leader would maneuver the entire formation to "saturate" a box of sky, therefore "statistically" shooting down any bomber present in that sky "box".

"Area Attacks" were popular among theorists, and scientifically supported by all sorts of "facts"..... But were a complete and utterly impractical failure, that put the RAF back a year in the fight against the Luftwaffe, which valued individual marksmanship, airmanship, and automatic cannon mounted on aircraft, synchronized to hit at a focussed range.

The more I examine the analogy, the more I like it, and see it's relevance. Sure, well-emplaced GPMGs and Mortars will do excellent work on the majority of engagements, but I don't think that is a good reason to do away with the rifleman.

[Sabre]

Thank you, Wilf, for writing such a thought-provoking article.

Why only one GPMG or LMG per squad/section?
Assuming some flavor of FN MAG or FN Minimi, the weight of that extra gun would equate to 300 to 500 fewer rounds of ammunition. However, a squad/section that is otherwise equipped with PDW's, and, for whatever reason, loses its one and only GPMG/LMG is in dire trouble on the battlefield.


I must admit that my bias is that I spent most of my time in mechanized units, so I am used to having a vehicle handy for the carrying of stuff (heh, and almost unbelievably, once you add up body armor, weapon, ammo, radio, NVG's, spare batteries for everything, water, and some "because you never know" survival items, what one carries still pushes the 30% bodyweight limit). Of course, in Iraq, most units do have a vehicle handy, and the latest re-org in the US Army even puts a fair number of vehicles back into the light infantry brigade (and where, exactly, in the MTOE *are* we going to put all of those MRAPs?) So, I happen to fall into the category of person that would prefer a heavier round than 5.56...

[William F. Owen]

Thank you, Wilf, for writing such a thought-provoking article.

Why only one GPMG or LMG per squad/section?
Assuming some flavor of FN MAG or FN Minimi, the weight of that extra gun would equate to 300 to 500 fewer rounds of ammunition. However, a squad/section that is otherwise equipped with PDW's, and, for whatever reason, loses its one and only GPMG/LMG is in dire trouble on the battlefield.

Very happy and even honoured that you are happy. It was to provoke thought. Unfortunately that upsets a lot of people!

The one MG per section is actually one MG in 50% of the fire teams. The others have MGL.

GPMG/LMG is not the only way of creating useful fires, and I focus on the platoon, or multiple as the minimum element, not the section. Survivors from a badly mauled section, can always be usefully employed supporting the platoon in other ways.

As an aside, I am not sure I would support the move to a PDW, without extensive testing to prove the concept and then, if proved a huge education program to bring the boys up to speed. Hope this helps.