Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence

[marct]

This report from the Canadian Senate just came out and has some interesting conclusions and recommendations.

From the Recommendations section:

6. In order to address the shortage of Canadian Forces soldiers and to preserve, for a longer period of time, the personal relationships developed among Canadian Forces soldiers on the ground and the local population, the Committee recommends that the Canadian Forces consider lengthening the normal operational rotation in Kandahar to a tour of nine to twelve months depending on the role of the personnel involved. (see p. 42)

7. In order to increase the effectiveness of Afghan National Police training and mentoring in Kandahar, the Committee recommends that the Government of Canada send 50 RCMP officers and 150 civilian police officers from provinces and municipalities across Canada to Kandahar to be embedded in the Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams. (see p. 38)

8. Additionally, the Committee recommends that the Government of Canada recruit and deploy up to 500 recently-retired police officers from across Canada to Kandahar province to further enhance Canada’s role in the training and mentoring of Afghan National Police in Kandahar. (see p. 95)

9. In order to help improve morale and lower corruption within the Afghan National Police and encourage more Afghans to join and stay within the force, the Committee recommends that the Government of Canada financially assist the Government of Afghanistan to ensure that Afghan National Police officers have the appropriate equipment to fulfill their tasks and are paid a salary that is similar to that of Afghan National Army soldiers. (see p. 31)

10. Canada’s military cooperation with the local Afghan people is critically important to the success of our mission. The Committee therefore recommends that the Government of Canada increase the number of Canadian Forces Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) teams deployed to Kandahar province. (see p. 41)

11. In order to encourage more Canadian non-military government employees and government contractors to deploy to Afghanistan and especially Kandahar, the Committee recommends that the Government of Canada raise the pay, bonuses and leave time for those who volunteer. (see p. 38)

12. In order to enable more development and governance efforts, the Committee recommends that the Government of Canada continue to apply pressure on its NATO allies to provide 4,000 additional combat troops to assist our troops in securing Kandahar province through mentoring the Afghan National Army and by providing force protection to civilians and Canadian Forces Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) teams. (see p. 39)

Full text available here.

[Norfolk]

Great find Marc, and I have to say that when Sen. Kenny speaks, my ears do prick up, eager to listen.

Re: the 9-12 months deployments instead of the present 6-month standard deployment. The first 3- or 4-months of each 6-month deployment is partially wasted just learning the about the enemy, the people, and the area, while acclimatizing and learning how to operate efficiently in the prevailing conditions. Nine months is better, but not good enough; full 12-month standard deployments are necessary.

Problem is, the CF never fully recovered from the 1990's, and probably never will, so deep was both the institutional damage and its ability to attract recruits. Standards are also not the same as they were up until the early 1990's (even if increasingly more so on paper than in reality). Consequently, 12-month tours will only serve to empty Battalions that much quicker after the end of each deployment as individuals' contracts (especially the 3-year initial engagements) end.

The fact remains that even with some very capable leadership at the highest levels, aggressive media handling, and at least lukewarm Government support, the Armed Forces are still haemoraging, only more slowly than during the 1990's. The brief uptick and partial recovery in the form of increased resources and higher recruiting levels that followed 2001 only lasted a few years, and has effectively been more or less over for the last couple years.

[marct]

Hi Norfolk,

Re: the 9-12 months deployments instead of the present 6-month standard deployment. The first 3- or 4-months of each 6-month deployment is partially wasted just learning the about the enemy, the people, and the area, while acclimatizing and learning how to operate efficiently in the prevailing conditions. Nine months is better, but not good enough; full 12-month standard deployments are necessary.

I'd agree, a 12-month standard deployment would be much better.

Problem is, the CF never fully recovered from the 1990's, and probably never will, so deep was both the institutional damage and its ability to attract recruits. Standards are also not the same as they were up until the early 1990's (even if increasingly more so on paper than in reality). Consequently, 12-month tours will only serve to empty Battalions that much quicker after the end of each deployment as individuals' contracts (especially the 3-year initial engagements) end.

I've had a few chats with Alan Okros about this issue. From what I have seen and read, there are significant problems both with retention and with PME.

The fact remains that even with some very capable leadership at the highest levels, aggressive media handling, and at least lukewarm Government support, the Armed Forces are still haemoraging, only more slowly than during the 1990's. The brief uptick and partial recovery in the form of increased resources and higher recruiting levels that followed 2001 only lasted a few years, and has effectively been more or less over for the last couple years.

True, but that is possibly because the recruiting campaign is not handled well. Hmm, sorry, I'd better pull that apart. The "Fight Fear" campaign is probably one of the most brilliant recruiting campaigns I've ever seen, but it doesn't jive with a lot of the reality of PME and the skills sets that are available. Given the relatively small size of the CF, we need a PME model that is aimed at producing multi-skilled people along the line of the Roman Legionaries (high quality to make up for low numbers).

We already have quite high quality in most of the directly military areas, but a lot of the auxilliary skill sets, the ones that would also lead to higher paying non-military jobs, aren't that available. We also need to reinvigorate the social cachet of holding a commission (I know, it was a status marker because you used to have to buy them ).

[Ken White]

...Given the relatively small size of the CF, we need a PME model that is aimed at producing multi-skilled people along the line of the Roman Legionaries (high quality to make up for low numbers).

We already have quite high quality in most of the directly military areas, but a lot of the auxilliary skill sets, the ones that would also lead to higher paying non-military jobs, aren't that available. We also need to reinvigorate the social cachet of holding a commission (I know, it was a status marker because you used to have to buy them ).

And applicable to others as well as -- or more so than -- Canada.