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Thread: The Advisory or Advisor Challenge

  1. #61
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    Default The Alternative

    I fully understand both of your concerns. However, I am at a loss as to what the alternative might be. Occupation comes to mind, but that can be long and messy and woefully unpopular both at home and in the HN.

    Let's keep this discussion rolling.

  2. #62
    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Old Eagle View Post
    I fully understand both of your concerns. However, I am at a loss as to what the alternative might be. Occupation comes to mind, but that can be long and messy and woefully unpopular both at home and in the HN.

    Let's keep this discussion rolling.

    In my Rethinking Insurgency study, I argued that rather than viewing Foreign Internal Defense, with its emphasis on advice and assistance, as a one-size-fits all model, we only use it where it has a good chance of working--there is a reasonably effective security force and government willing to undertake serious reform, and which view the conflict the same way we do (e.g. El Salvador). When there is no functioning security force or government (e.g. Iraq), if there is mulitnational and U.N. support to create and sustain a trusteeship for a decade, we participate. If not, we simply work with neighboring states to contain the conflict and limit the humanitarian suffering through aid and the creation of safe zones (e.g. Somalia, initially).

    On nations not yet facing conflict, advice and support can be positive but, again, it often will not work. Many African states, for instance, have what we consider to be ineffective security forces. So our instinct is to provide advice and support to make them more effective. But we forget that African governments often see their own military as a greater threat than insurgents, so they don't want them to be more effective. This sort of dissonance is a real problem for us.

  3. #63
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    Default Additional DIME

    Steve

    Yep. I like your categories. BUT

    Future efforts, as you imply, have to be across all elements of national power and aimed at broader HN targets -- gov't, economy, etc.

    Means future efforts have to be interagency, and probably multinational, etc (JIIM).

    Therefore, places where we were originally having success in Africa, or where we need to have success in the future, need to be engaged on a much broader scale than in the past. If the central government does not evolve, I truly doubt that we can be successful.

  4. #64
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Old Eagle View Post
    Steve

    Yep. I like your categories. BUT

    Future efforts, as you imply, have to be across all elements of national power and aimed at broader HN targets -- gov't, economy, etc.

    Means future efforts have to be interagency, and probably multinational, etc (JIIM).

    Therefore, places where we were originally having success in Africa, or where we need to have success in the future, need to be engaged on a much broader scale than in the past. If the central government does not evolve, I truly doubt that we can be successful.

    I think we pretty much agree.

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    Default And

    We may actually end up organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising non-state security forces. SF mission in the past, but may need to migrate to GPF.

    What think?

  6. #66
    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Old Eagle View Post
    We may actually end up organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising non-state security forces. SF mission in the past, but may need to migrate to GPF.

    What think?

    I don't know if GPF would be good at training militias and irregulars.

  7. #67
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Couple of points, Old Eagle

    Quote Originally Posted by Old Eagle View Post
    "Iraq isn't going to be in the current state much longer, nor is Afghanistan. The potential for another commitment needing such capability in large numbers anywhere in the next few years is slight."

    Gotta disagree here. I see a very large requirement for continued advisory capacity among GPF.

    First, I'm not convinced that the Iraq and Afghanistan missions are going to end any time soon, at least not the advisory portions.

    Secondly, when I look across the horizon, I see numerous countries that are important to us, threatened by disruptive forces of various ilks. Developing their indiginous capability to protect themselves is the only long term solution to their stability. The requirements of the future outstrip the capacity of my friends with the funny green hats.

    Thirdly, we don't have sufficient tools in the rucksack to perform the required advisory functions. Train and equip doesn't work unless you're working with a sophisticated, capable ally -- sellin F-16s to NATO partners, T&E works. Other traditional security assistance also falls short. Shortly after the Nixon Doctrine was announced, stating that we would in fact bolster host nation capabilities to look after themselves, congress placed heinous restrictions on the programs to ensure that they would not be effective (AECA 76 (as amended)).

    We now have an opportunity to move forward and develop truly effective means of organizing, training, eqiupping, (re)building and advising foreign security forces. The requirement to do so will remain large for the forseeable future.
    Re: my quoted statement, you'll note I said that the two nations were not going to be in their current state much longer. That doesn't say or imply that the missions will end soon; I believe we'll be in both for many years. It does mean that the types and numbers actions are changing daily and that the situation will differ in the near and distant future. Yes, there'll be an Advisory requirement but it can be met by the 1st ID model with a MAAG add-on.

    So, first, we'll be there and the advisory effort will continue. The question is does that require a 'dedicated' advisory corps or such like. My answer would be no. The GPF are capable of doing the job in the ME with minimal extra training.

    I've been a MAAG Adviser in the ME and in SEA and worked elsewhere with Advisers including some from other nations who have a far, far, smaller but more effective foot print than we do. I've been to Iraq and my guess is that the number of Americans that would gain real traction there as Advisers is microscopic. The capability to fully integrate and be effective in that job is a crap shoot; it's personality dependent and whether or not your counterpart likes and trusts you -- or to what extent he does those things. Culture, religion and traditions all have a very significant effect on the abiltiy to establish real rapport and lacking that, the Adviser is only marginally effective -- and may even do harm. In that light, the conventional wisdom says that long advisory tours are preferable. I disagree, short tours are better to offset the personality disconnects that are bound to occur -- that and the Stockholm syndrome effect...

    Secondly, I agree with your view. The question is will Congress agree with it? Another question is how many of those nations are likely to invite us in any significant numbers? Some will take Advisers -- but only to insure the benefits and equipment with which we bribe them to take an Advisory Team (or for the money a MAAG will spend in country), such nations Armed Forces tend to be very polite to the advisers and yet change their processes only slightly. I think 1st SF Gps efforts in the Phillipines and elsewhere offer a far better model than the large Advisory Team effort.

    Recall I said "for the next few years." That is, IMO, due to Congress and the fact that we're on the world's nasty list right now (not a problem, we have been before and I don't think it's as bad as it was during Viet Nam) and will be for a bit. We have to time to think and do something smart instead of just jumping into a large structure that will be underemployed for a while; say in the 2010-2015 period.

    Thirdly, you're correct -- and I seriously doubt a large advisory effort will improve our ability in this regard. I also doubt Congress will relax those restrictions to any significant extent in the near future. A more important point is that other nations have seen that failure to implement the Nixon Doctrine, watch the current disconnect in Congress and have significant doubts about our ability to stay the course. Justifiably, I might add...

    I submit the number of invitations to us for help (other than $$ and goodies) will be slim for a few years. A small footprint may be accepted; few will want a large one.

    Don't misunderstand me; I agree we need to work on the Advisory bit, reinvent that wheel as it were and I agree that the effort is important. I am, however, saying that the "Advisory Corps" is massive overkill and is unlikely to be approved by either DA or Congress in any event. The 1st ID effort is a fair start and an adequate base and the SF model in Asia has more merit than it is given credit for, it's been successful and the Army cannot say that either the Afghan or Iraqi campaigns have been. Yes, that's partly due to some factors from outside the Army but we did not do it well. Thirty plus years of ignoring the developing nation issue were the Army's fault. That damage will not be repaired by over reacting in trying to jump back into the ball game willy nilly. My fear is that we will do the age-old American thing and swing too far as we oscillate from virtually no involvement with developing nations to attempting to overdo said involvement.

    As to your conclusion, we can disagree on that

  8. #68
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    Default Not that far apart

    Ken,
    Like you, I am examining John's proposal for an advisory corps, not buying it outright. The capacity to advise is still critical.

    Rob's "nation-building" unit, or whatever he calls it blends with this concept because of the disconnects between security forces and some governments you point out.

    If it is necessary, according to U.S. interests to bolster the security forces of a given country, then we need to find the $$$/equipment enticements you refer to to make it happen.

    SF is still the weapon of choice. A coupla problems:
    1. SF was built for an A-Team to train, equip and advise a light infantry battalion. That leaves a lot of area uncovered by their capability (other branches of military, other echelons above bn).

    2. SF is too small to do it all, as we see in Iraq and Afghanistan where we are training/advising hundreds of thousands of HN forces.

    3. SF's other missions in the Long War, DA, SR, CT, etc., have pulled them away from the train/advise mission.

    Steve,
    Even in your third case where we contain a smoldering insurgency by assisting neighboring countries, we may still need to develop their security forces.

    And it's not just FID. We need the capacity to develop security forces capable of deterring/defending against conventional incursions from neighboring states. Kinda like KMAG after WWII.

    Bottom line -- this is going to be a GPF mission over the next decades.

    Sorry that was so disjointed, but I didn't want to write an epistle.

  9. #69
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default Link HASC O/I on CH 7 ref. TTs/Advisory mission

    OE,
    I posted the HSC report link under the FID category, but you can get some of their thought/recommendations in CH 7 which looks at the past/present/future of TTs.
    Regards, Rob

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    Default

    Yeah, I saw that. Recommendation for a thousand more reports. Reminds me of the Wellington quote from Spain about defeating Napolean or accounting for jams and jellies.

    Still, the issue has some visibility in DC.

  11. #71
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    Default CALL Newsletter 07-28 Advisor Team

    Council members,

    This is just to announce that the CALL Newsletter 07-28 Advisor Teams is on the CALL gateway for those with access.

    I should also like to thank the Small Wars Journal community because that community played a large role in this effort.

    Special thanks go to Council members:

    Rob Thornton

    RTK

    Sullygoarmy

    Finally I would again like to thank everyone who helped in anyway. Dave Dilegge and Bill Nagle are of course the real heros because they are SWJ.

    Best

    Tom Odom

  12. #72
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    Default Max Boot - Rejecting Nagl

    Max Boot - Rejecting Nagl (Commentary Blog)

    I’ve blogged before about Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl’s idea to create an Advisor Corps within the army that would focus on producing training teams to work with foreign militaries.

    I thought Nagl made a convincing case for such an unorthodox approach, and he certainly knows what he is talking about: He is in charge of a battalion at Fort Riley, Kansas, that trains advisors for Iraq and Afghanistan, and he has concluded, based on that experience, that the current training and manning system for advisory teams is too haphazard and too small to meet all of our national security needs.

    Not surprisingly, the army doesn’t see it that way. The newsletter Inside the Pentagon reported on September 13th that the army has officially decided, in the words of a public affairs officer, “that is not the way to go.” The army would prefer building cookie-cutter Brigade Combat Teams and relying on a small number of Special Forces to specialize in the training mission. This decision comes, by the way, in the face of copious evidence that there are not nearly enough Green Berets to meet all the demands thrown their way.

    There are certainly good arguments that can be made against Nagl’s proposal. But my suspicion is that the army’s view is simply the default position of a lumbering bureaucracy averse to new thinking—even when it comes from within its own ranks. (Perhaps especially when it comes from within its own ranks.)

    The larger problem here is the difficulty that the armed services have in assimilating and rewarding brainy officers like Nagl (author of a much-cited book on counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam) who don’t fit the standard mold. Others in that category include a pair of Ph.D. colonels—H.R. McMaster and Peter Mansoor—who have both earned stellar reputations not only in the academy, but also on the battlefield. But they are both in danger of not being promoted to general. Mavericks like them deserve support from the outside—especially on Capitol Hill—to help transform the military in spite of itself.
    Quoted the entire blog post because it was relatively short.

    You can find the "Inside the Pentagon" story cited in the post by going to google and searching for: "Fawzia Sheikh" Nagl

    You should get two results returned. The story is the first result and is visible through google's caching system.
    "In times of change learners inherit the earth; while the learned find themselves beautifully equipped to deal with a world that no longer exists." - Eric Hoffer

  13. #73
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default

    I think you really need concrete rationale for visible, large scale organizational change. As it considered how to use the increase, it probably scrutinizing what the nation is asking it to do, and has assigned it to do, and made some hard choices about organizations and force structures.

    Maintaining an OPTEMPO of sustaining sufficient BCTs in OIF and OEF while allowing flexibility for other contingencies and resting and refitting those BCTs out of the rotation is a tall order. Add in attempting to keep the Reserve Component BCTs free to perform their Civil Support roles in their home states is also very challenging

    There are no easy choices. I believe Army leadership strongly considered (and is still considering) all the options in meeting the needs of its commitments.

    What can drive the major changes in the Armed Forces:

    What are our foreign policy goals - and how do we provide means and describe the ways in which we will best achieve them?

    The congressional involvement in the various HASC, SASC, Foreign/International Affairs committees that consider the roles/missions, authorities, etc.

    The service involvment and obligation to provide our best military advice to civilians in helping make the above decisions - this last one is a bit subjective, because we may be culturally predisposed within our comfort zone - so while it takes the civilian side to provide the binding action - the uniformed side is expected to articulate why and to live with the consequences.

    This is not to say that the civilian side does not have alternatives. If they feel that they are not getting the best advice, they can call pretty much anybody they want to testify. This also is not without consequence.

    I think at this time the creation of a permanent advisory corps is part of a much larger question that involves all the instruments of national power - the Inter-Agency question and the threats/challenges of the post 9/11 world. Remember the sense of urgency where Congress asked GEN P/AMB C about the linkage between AQ and Iraq - they were not just sharpshooting the Executive - they were examining the relationship between foreign and domestic policy. Since their constituents are more concerned with domestic policies they must always consider that as the primary and the influence of foreign policy as the secondary - all politics are first local. However, 9/11 was a watershed event - it was a very terrible but visible event that stated that foreign policy "matters" (as in its damned important to domestic politics), national security matters, and that in this increasingly globalized world, the ties between domestic and foreign policy get stronger everyday. Congress must play an important role in the "debate" that shapes the policies/ends, has the legal responsibility for allocations/means & must remain informed and understand the implications of the strategies/ways - IMHO, to ignore it would be great domestic political risk.

    My sense is we are just starting to sort things out. Leaders (inside and outside the military) are starting to ask the right, hard questions. I apologize for making the detour, but this is not just a simple Army decision, and we have to understand that. There are "Must Dos", "Have/Need to Dos", and there are "Would like to Dos". Its nice when they all three (or even two of them) coincide, but its not usually the case when you are talking about doing something as big as meeting the NSS. If the civilian side really wants something done, they make it a "Must Do" - but unless they provide the additional means to make it happen, they risk compromising a "Have/Need to Do".

    So we'll see what happens.
    Best regards, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 09-19-2007 at 11:42 AM.

  14. #74
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    Military Training Units seen as Career Detours - Washington Post, 24 Oct.

    The United States' exit from Iraq and Afghanistan depends on stepping up U.S. advising of those nations' security forces, Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Wednesday as he visited military training teams preparing to deploy.

    "It's the way out, no question, in both countries," Mullen told Lt. Col. Geoffrey D. Ellerson, whose 11-man training team will leave in three weeks for a year-long tour in a volatile region of Iraq east of Baghdad. "I can't overstate the importance" of the teams, he said.

    The military is planning to expand the advisory teams and expects to have a decision by spring on the numbers and composition of additional U.S. forces needed for the effort, said Maj. Gen. Robert Durbin, who oversees the training. Durbin said he could easily double the number of troops going through the 72-day training program. In all, about 4,800 team members have been trained over the past year.

    The teams are critical to the U.S. military strategy in Iraq, where they include about 1,500 military personnel, and in Afghanistan, where they have about 600 members. In Iraq, the teams live and work alongside Iraqi army and police units, teaching them basic tactics and planning, providing them with intelligence, air power and other support, as well as monitoring their operations for signs of sectarian activity and other abuses.
    One challenge to expanding the advisory effort, however, is attracting highly qualified Army officers to leave traditional career paths to join the teams, which some see as hurting their chances for promotion, according to several officers interviewed this week ...

  15. #75
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    Default

    Is the negative impact just hype, or concrete and damning? I could esily grasp how a infantry major might assume that advisory duty isn't sexy, and thus not career-enhancing, but I wonder if the promotion board preceptss tell a different tale.

    Many months ago I stated here that the services need to make a concerted effort to recognize the advisors for the sacrifices they make in this mission, as well as for the experiences that they gain while in the breech.

    If Xenophon's recent update about his advisor team training cycle is any indication, we are still getting th pre-deploy training wrong. And why are we getting it wrong? Because someone senior enough doesn't care enough to devote the resources and time to doing it right.

    I've long wanted to put my hat in the ring to go out on a team, but the more and more I think about it, it may just be a fool's errand akin to putting a bullet in a .38 and spinning the cylinder.

    I suspect that we are drawing some talent to the effort, otherwise we wouldn't get the articles that pop up in the various professional journals, but we will need more of it if we are to break out of the cycle of pulling team structure out of units on the on deck circle to deploy.

    Anyone here from either the Army of USMC who is involved in the advisory effort (from policy perspective) and is willing to dispell any myths?

    All this tracks into another thought I had while listening to NPR on the way home from work recently. We (as a military establishment) had better get our act together real quick and decide if we subscribe to the "Long War" concept of 15-20 years of conflict. Then we need to decide if FID and advisory efforts are going to remain the province of SF and bodies like the Corps' MSOAG, or are we going to make a call and align resources to the mission at hand and deal with the reality that "conventional forces" need to do heavy lifting in this arena. Same holds true as to whether we are going to analyze the long-term impact of COIN operations, and start training our new warriors to be able to tread lightly as well as they can flip the kinetic switch.
    Last edited by jcustis; 10-25-2007 at 06:34 PM.

  16. #76
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    You know it is interesting though. The job has not shown up on my ORB as a position - instead its listed as incoming personnel to FT Knox - not exactly something that is going to express what we say you gain by going out on a TT, although its in the OER I got for the deployment. This goes back to LTC Nagl's comment about how do we show something is important? If its not on your ORB - the chances of the board even considering it are lessened. Its hard to make a case about professional enhancement in subjective terms for allot of folks if they can not correlate it to something - when you weight it with BQ jobs - it will take on different meaning.

    For me, I got an experience out of it that really means something - but I'm getting older, my kids need roots and my wife has pretty much made clear her thoughts on staying in past 20, and like I told you at Quantico my interest in being an 06 or GO is fleeting (in regards to the former) if existent at all (in regards to the latter)

    Best, Rob

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    I have it on good authority that you can get the job title changed. Best COA is to get it to reflect whatever the duty title on your OER was. I am also told that "savior of the Iraqi Army" may meet some resistance.

    Needless to say, this is one of the major issues we're trying to deal with under the "P" of DOTLMPF. Hopefully the personnel weanies will be cooperative.

  18. #78
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    I was thinking more along the lines of "Chief Plate Spinner". I'll check on getting the title changed - my faith in the bureaucracy at this point has parity with DFAS

    I look forward to getting out there and putting the family in a house.

    Best, Rob

  19. #79
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default A piece of good news

    I just got off the phone with my old BDE MiTT Chief - one thing you can put out that is positive is he got picked up for senior staff college on his 3rd look - he told me that the only thing that got special consideration was his time on the MiTT. Everybody may not see the significance of that, but very few folks get selected, and if it does happen its usually on the first or second look. He's a good officer, and the Army is well served sending him to the AWC.
    Best Rob

  20. #80
    Council Member Xenophon's Avatar
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    There's a lot of high echelon thinking in this thread, but this little point caught my eye:

    There needs to be much more in terms of a cultural evaluation like the one you suggested before making an advisory program the main focus of effort.

    Agreed. But, IF we decide that an advisory program should be the main effort, we don't have the capability to properly support that decision. Yes, we can produce ad hoc teams at the rapid rate and get advisers out there. But we're doing that now and we're doing it wrong. At the very least an advisory corps would provide a core, pardon the bad play on words, around which the US military can rapidly stand up more training teams with a standard, effective training program if needed (Hopefully completely unlike the one currently in place).

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