Afghanistan RFI

[Steve the Planner]

Tracking back a few centuries, my understanding of the ancient empires in which Afghanistan's territory was actually a part, I think of them in terms of I'll pretend to be in your empire if you don't bother me, and I get something out of it---maybe that's the local leaders getting payments, or more lucrative trade routes (same as today), or I get access to markets/goods I need.

If anybody wants to pretend they are a part of their empire, there is always something that has to be worked out.

I just finished reading the new Exum Report for CNAS---somehow it always comes back to---its not military, it is political, so the US really needs to ramp up the billions, send tons of civilians, and transform the country. Alway military think tank guys with no clue what they are actually talking about, and no domestic, economic will/support for it.

I did, however, appreciate the marked shift from "lets do CERP," to the realization that our money is creating a lot of the instability and obstacles we face. Why not just all sit down and pass crack pipes amongst each other while playing russian roulette. Whether you win or lose, you lose.

Given the real resources and commitments, what is the best strategy to accomplish realistic US goals? The practical demands, resources and time needed to "create" a new Afghanistan are different orders of magnitude than the $53 billion used to stabilize/minimally reconstruct Iraq. They are two completely different problems.

Forget the clear hold bribe that worked in Iraq, and the billions in payola washing through Kabul, and get them focused on taking control of their country with their resources. (No it will not have a school building in every community, and health clinics will be far between, but it is theirs and sustainable.

What if we took over and really ran things badly? Would that help to promote indigenous efforts to run themselves better? Why does everything have to end, not in teacups, but in mega-NGO contracts, and projects?

COIN is not a strategy, it is a tactic or technique to be applied when and where it can work, and our resources can be aligned to a successful outcome. If COIN is the only answer to Afghanistan (which it is not), then let's find a real strategy that macthexs the problem.

[Schmedlap]

I just finished reading the new Exum Report for CNAS---somehow it always comes back to---its not military, it is political, so the US really needs to ramp up the billions, send tons of civilians, and transform the country. Alway military think tank guys with no clue what they are actually talking about, and no domestic, economic will/support for it.

I just read that today, too, and agree with your assessment.

COIN is not a strategy, it is a tactic or technique to be applied when and where it can work, and our resources can be aligned to a successful outcome. If COIN is the only answer to Afghanistan (which it is not), then let's find a real strategy that macthexs the problem.

You know, his blog quoted a passage from some article (about his "report") that stated...

"'Good counterinsurgency tactics and operations cannot, in and of themselves, win a campaign,' according to the report being released Thursday."

When I read that, I first thought, "holy crap, they're waking up." Nope. Reading on, Exum drops this whopper...

Last fall, I sat down with LTG (Ret.) David Barno and asked him what he thought was missing from our research on Afghanistan. He said that while we had done a good job talking about counterinsurgency at the tactical and operational levels, we had not tackled counterinsurgency at the strategic and political levels.

W.T.F.? Oh yeah, the strategic and political things. Did we forget about that? I mean, did Colonel Gentile not nail this problem a few months ago when he pointed out that our COIN fetish is a bunch of tactics that are driving strategy? This is the smoking gun.

[Steve the Planner]

PS

The real clock ticking in Afghanistan is the national election cycle. This problem will be well on the way to success before then, or it will be remarkably transformed by a relentless domestic problem---budgets.

For those of you who remember domestic budget cycles (adopted in June for FY2011, 12), there is serious emerging crisis, patched over last year by stimulus grants.

When the locals start screaming for help, and there is no more borrowing capacity without inflation, a new hand will be dealt. We will begin to see the domestic state and local budget cards in June of this year, and June of next.Then we have to watch how the deck is shuffled, dealt and played.

Going in to Afghanistan was a serious endeavor. Suppressing OBL/ Taliban was real. Creating a new Afghanistan (or improving our relationship with Karzai, etc., as Exum suggests) is the smoke coming out of a hash pipe.

[Steve the Planner]

Schmedlap:

We cross-posted that last one.

Really. They need a better quality of advisers. If it is not a military problem, find somebody who is not military to answer it.

My fingers are crossed that in then next review, the White House will ask the same unanswered questions from last year, and start to realize how very wide the chasm is between problem, tools, and solution paths (currently being employed) and, with a relentless eye on the election clock, finally say: Let's get real, here.

What are we trying to achieve and how can we really achieve it.

[Bob's World]

I haven't seen the Harvard piece; but I will lend my vote that the greatest COIN tool in the US is not the military nor the state department, but is our Constitution. But most of us really don't appreciate that fact, and even fewer still appreciate why this position is likely true.

In 1976, my 8th grade civics teacher (who as a member of the 82nd Airborne made the jump on Normandy) taught as about how the Judiciary, Legislative and Executive Brranchs are designed to complement, counter, and balance each other. But it has only been in recent years that I really have come to appreciate "the fourth Branch" (hmmm, there is a book, or at least an article in that) of the populace. Today many 8th grade civics teachers probably think Desert Storm was "The Big One."

It was the Bill of Rights that really empowered The Fourth Branch. Amendments one and two ensured we could preserve access to the truth and the ability to think and believe what we individually want to think and believe, not what the government wants us to collectively think and believe; and that the governement would never forget that the people are both informed and armed, and not for the other three branches to get together and impose their will upon us.

The rest of the Bill primarily identified some specific and recent abuses of such power and prohibited them specifically as they were known to drive a populace to insurgency; closing with a couple of catch-alls to keep crafty lawyers in check from circumventing the intent of the bill.

The Fourth Branch will express itself. A good constitution will determine the frequency and legality of that expression. Keep it between the lines, so to speak.

A bad constituion forces The Fourth Branch to act out illegally; most often, violently, to voice their rights to good governance.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

You puncuate the accidental, divine, or historical collection of facts and circumstances that led to the creation of a viable USA---many of which are, in fact, outside the system and structure of governance. Some of the many peices:

=A common british heritage of constitutional law, writs and rights of the people;

=A population that was generally consistent in language, culture and essential religious positions;

=A common challenge/opportunity (facing a great and dangerous continent chock full of unexploited opportunities);

=Contact with indigenous populations w. organizational systems adapted for life on the big continent; and,

=And a tradition of information-sharing rapidly expanding due to the printing press and news systems (pamphleteers, Franklin's postal routes).

Even with all of that, our constitution had to be strong and resilient enough to survive and adapt to: civil wars, massive corruption, major economic failures (growing pains) that took at least 150 years to survive to a modern era that later encompasses waives of immigrants and industrialization.

What lessons do we take from this about the complexity of trying to turn Afghanistan into something like us? First, it is a chance collection of facts, resources and cultural heritage not really applicable there. Second, it is internally created, and not imposed from outside. Third, it takes generations, and so many external supporting factors that it could not come in a box, or be pushed of the ramp of a truck or helo.

[Bob's World]

Simple, flexible, designed by and for the populace that will be governed by it; and designed to keep individuals, organizations or government itself from being able to abuse power to subjugate others. And also designed preserve the four causal perceptions of Good Governance: Respect, Justice, Legitimacy and Hope; for everyone.

Our role should be one of mentoring rather than directing, and if the government insists on adopting something outrageous to simply say "good luck with that" and leave them to their devises. If we are too much the "big brother", when it goes bad or is tested, and it will be tested, it will be blamed on us.

I just don't know how you can get to Legitimacy and Hope with the current Afghan Constitution, even in the near-term, yet alone over time. I'd advice the "good luck with that" approach as the best bet for the coalition; or at least have that conversation and be willing to play that card.

[Schmedlap]

I just don't know how you can get to Legitimacy and Hope with the current Afghan Constitution, even in the near-term, yet alone over time. I'd advice the "good luck with that" approach as the best bet for the coalition; or at least have that conversation and be willing to play that card.

I'm curious if anyone knows what kind of constitution Afghanistan has. For example, in France there is a saying (not sure if this translates exactly) that the law is a screen. Once a law is promulgated, its constitutionality cannot be challenged because its passage is the implementation of the will of the people, expressed through the parliament. Our own Constitution contains rights and powers that aren't even articulated (for example the "right to privacy" that is unmentioned but apparently exists under a "prenumbra") and "implied powers" of Congress that are pretty broad.

In Afghanistan, if a law is passed that defies the constitution, but goes unchallenged, and is in accord with Islam (at least Hanafi fiqh), then would this really be problematic? If the government took some actions not explicitly laid out in the constitution, but were "necessary" then is this unconstitutional?

Building upon the second question... while I understand that the 2004 constitution provides for a hierarchy of provincial/district/other bodies, I'm curious if this necessarily means that there cannot be parallel, unofficial structures relied upon until those state agencies mature. Okay, we need to establish a provincial office and district offices. So what? Why can't we also establish district jirgas, if the people prefer that, and provincial jirgas, if the people want that as well? Similarly, if courts in a rural area are inaccessible or suffer from lack of legitimacy, then what's wrong with using a court of sharia or a mediator as screening mechanism? If the court of sharia or mediator works out - great. Or, if the parties are not satisfied then they bring their case to the state court - voluntarily - thus bolstering the legitimacy of the state court and not creating an impression of the state forcing itself upon the community.

I've read lots of comments, here and on other sites, about the apparent straightjacket that the constitution places us in. But I wonder if this is a straightjacket that we can't break free from - or a wet paper bag that we're not struggling against.

[Dayuhan]

Our role should be one of mentoring rather than directing, and if the government insists on adopting something outrageous to simply say "good luck with that" and leave them to their devises.

The only problem with this formulation is that it overlooks the reason why we're there in the first place. We didn't go to Afghanistan to mentor the Afghans on governance: if governance were the issue we'd never have gone near the place. We went there to deny sanctuary to AQ, and if we "leave them to their own devices" at this stage we will compromise that goal, or more likely surrender it.

We have a dog in this hunt; that's why we're there. That reality limits our options, but it's still reality.

[Steve the Planner]

PS:

What history, structure and opportunities do Afghans have that are different from ours, and define the what can and should happen there in a nation and organizational sense?

Consensus based formal and informal systems across a resource-limited and geographically distinct and disaggregate environment.

Very different, and very limited in producing a modern high-performing, service-intensive nation state.

Build a school? Great. Funded by foreign aid? Sure. (that's eating fish, not teaching to fish)

Build a self-sustaining national system of public schools for universal and compulsory K-12 education for 12-14 million students? With armies of supporting bureaucracies, teachers (400,000), textbooks, and facilities maintenance.) Impossible without a structure and system to sustain it. Taxes, accounting, logistics, distribution of authority, decision-making. Many internal languages, religions, historical and cultural narratives.

That's a multi-billion dollar intergenerational effort predicated on an effective national political, economic and governance system that has never existed in Afghanistan, to date.

Things can be done there, but only within the limits of what is possible.