War on the cheap?

[Rank amateur]

Victory is when you are standing on the other guys neck, using his bathroom when you feel like it, and his wife and kids are cleaning your vehicles.

Serious question. Has anyone ever done that without deliberately attacking and terrorizing civilians? I can't think of any examples, but there certainly could be examples that I don't know about.

[Ron Humphrey]

I think the public awareness and acceptance of the facts about what it takes to really win wars is valid. One need only look as far as any example of someone being shot and killed by police for walking around pointing a real looking gun at night in a dangerous part of town.

We are not wrong for wanting to do anything we can to keep this to a minimum but it is important that the public responsibilities and thus expectations be relatively closer to reality than they are right now.

One would think if those small lessons were learned the larger ones pretty much follow accordingly.

[Ski]

Some problems here:

1. Is the threat existential or not? Have to answer that question first.
2. What is the real definition of victory and what is the endstate? The National Security Strategies of 04-06 do not list out credible and acheivable goals.
3. The current admin has zero credibility. Have to wait until after the next admin for any real change and that's up in the air...

[Ken White]

1. In whose definition or opinion? Our system, probably mostly correctly, allows one person to make that determination. It does require a simple majority of 535 not terribly learned folks to agree or not to one extent or another but by and large your opinion and mine count for little.

2. Generally undefinable -- or indefinite. No enunciated strategy will ever be credible in any sense, the statement of it removes the uncertainty and thus starts the ebb of credibility The Powell / Weinberger doctrines (and the Monroe doctrine, among others, for that matter...) weren't credible either. An endstate in any war will always be unknown to at least some extent. See Korea or Kosovo...

3. May I say again: ""Lest I be accused of picking on the current crew; I've been around through 12 Presidents and the concomitant number of Congresses -- all have erred in the same way (all also "lied to the American people," generally about national security matters as well; but that's another thread) to one degree or another. Not likely to change, either."" (Emphasis added / kw)

No intent to be snarky, Ski, just an old cynics take on your reasonable and intelligent questions / statements -- and that last item, BTW, is also applicable to the other two items.

Oh, and R.A.:

Next to none if any -- wars are messy like that. That's why they're all dumb and immoral. Even if some are necessary.

Which ones are necessary? See Ski's problems and my responses...

Ron: I agree but reality is offensive to some.

Ain't life grand, Guys? People have more fun than monkeys...

[William F. Owen]

Serious question. Has anyone ever done that without deliberately attacking and terrorizing civilians? I can't think of any examples, but there certainly could be examples that I don't know about.

Can't think of any good examples, but I was trying to make another point. The Enemy has to fear loss, and harm. The problem with many avant-garde concepts like EBO and MW is that then denigrate the actual and symbolic need to take and hold, as in conflict in a physical dimension. While my example may have been clumsy and even crass, it would stand by it, in that it clearly demonstrates unambiguous victory.

[Rex Brynen]

..I'm at a loss to know who such overwhelming conventional force would be applied, to deliver this hypothetical victory.

The fact is that in this global war against non-uniformed, religiously motivated foes who live with and are supported by their civilian brethren, and who are perfectly willing to use a nuclear device against the U.S., victory is only possible through the use of massive, largely indiscriminate military force.

Occupy Iran? Or perhaps Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco too, since much (or more) of the threat emanates from non-state groups there? And then there is Iraq, where large-scale application of military force (albeit, now with COIN discrimination) has succeeded in creating a radical Islamist threat where one did not previously exist.

Did overwhelming Soviet force--which left one million or more dead, far more injured, and 7 million refugees and IDPs (one third of the population)--intimidate the Afghans into submission? Of course, Pakistani/Saudi/US/UK/etc material support to the mujahiddin helped a great deal, but the essential point was that it was an enabler in the context of a population whose will was unbroken despite quasi-Roman pacification methods.

There really aren't a lot of useful "get tougher/kill more people" counter-terrorism strategies. There are rather more "get smarter" ones (which involve as much issues of politics, diplomacy, and development), although they're complex, difficult, and don't always produce immediate results.

[Tom Odom]

..I'm at a loss to know who such overwhelming conventional force would be applied, to deliver this hypothetical victory.

...There really aren't a lot of useful "get tougher/kill more people" counter-terrorism strategies. There are rather more "get smarter" ones (which involve as much issues of politics, diplomacy, and development), although they're complex, difficult, and don't always produce immediate results.

Ken, I interpreted your posting this as an indicator that you see war as less elegant tham some would wish it to be. I completely agree with that assessment. For that I would offer the Doug Feith school of thought as an example.

My problem with Scheuer's essay is that he offers no clear line of thought on the piece. Yes war is not a neat chess game. Yes we need capacity to wage war in a way that makes our enemies hesitant. No he does not identify or even hint against whom such a force could be applied to fight.

Part of the issue is that Scheuer was a manager not an operator and he certainly has little if any meaningful military experience. What is therefore clear to him (at least I hope it was clear to him when he wrote this) is not clear to me.

Best

Tom

[Ski]

Ken

No offense taken.

For some strange reason, I am starting to see historical trends emerging again. Great tactics, decent operational art, piss poor strategy. I'd say you have to get all three right if you want to win a COIN fight, but that's one mans opinion.

Otherwise, we're just shadow boxing.

[Rank amateur]

For some strange reason, I am starting to see historical trends emerging again. Great tactics, decent operational art, piss poor strategy.

Agreed, although I'm not sure that "good" strategies are available: maybe only "less bad" ones.

[Ken White]

Ken

No offense taken.

For some strange reason, I am starting to see historical trends emerging again. Great tactics, decent operational art, piss poor strategy. I'd say you have to get all three right if you want to win a COIN fight, but that's one mans opinion.

Otherwise, we're just shadow boxing.

Thanks.

Not sure I totally agree on either the operational or strategy parts, though. IMO, COIN efforts become the Operational level when instituted and we took almost three years to get there. Way too long. Strategy wise, if you accept that Iraq is only the tip of the iceberg as I believe, I think it's too early to make that judgment. Based on what is now known, seems to me it has at least a 60:40 chance of being good as opposed to poor...

I don't think it's possible to 'win' a COIN fight. I cannot think of an instance since G. Khan where one has been one. Certainly in the last century all that's been able to be achieved is an acceptable outcome (and that includes the oft touted Malaya) and thus far, I think, an acceptable outcome in both Afghanistan and Iraq is achievable.

Rank Amateur has a good point -- in the case of the Islamists, there aren't any great strategies I can see, only less bad ones and this one, while not one I would have chosen is, I think, no worse than mine, far better than many (including the diplomacy / hearts and minds foolishness) and has a decent chance of success. We'll see.

[Ken White]

Ken, I interpreted your posting this as an indicator that you see war as less elegant tham some would wish it to be. I completely agree with that assessment. For that I would offer the Doug Feith school of thought as an example.

True. The fact that it is less elegant (Great phrase!) means that one should be judicious in applying it as a solution -- a factor Scheuer seems to miss as you note:

My problem with Scheuer's essay is that he offers no clear line of thought on the piece. Yes war is not a neat chess game. Yes we need capacity to wage war in a way that makes our enemies hesitant. No he does not identify or even hint against whom such a force could be applied to fight.

Part of the issue is that Scheuer was a manager not an operator and he certainly has little if any meaningful military experience...

Which I suspect is part of his problem.

What is therefore clear to him (at least I hope it was clear to him when he wrote this) is not clear to me.

Nor to me, I just put it down to a Ralph Peters-like hyperbolic wake up call.

Rex said:

There really aren't a lot of useful "get tougher/kill more people" counter-terrorism strategies. There are rather more "get smarter" ones (which involve as much issues of politics, diplomacy, and development), although they're complex, difficult, and don't always produce immediate results.

Quite true and I totally agree. Regrettably, the US psyche is strongly attuned to immediate results; thus I think that the judicious application of force when required should always be an option but have to acknowledge that we won't always do it wisely. Rex also said:

"Occupy Iran? Or perhaps Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco too, since much (or more) of the threat emanates from non-state groups there?...

I disagree with that aspect. Notably with "occupy" -- we shouldn't do that, we're not attuned to the requirements. The British do that sort of stuff fairly well but even they are not great at the job because it is quite difficult. Not to mention that occupying other nations is really dumb and to be avoided if at all possible. That is not a wise application of force.

I'm in agreement with Steve Metz -- it's not our thing; we need to apply force massively, we're good at that; do a lot of damage and not plan on a long term presence. That would annoy our 'friends' (but then we don't really have any of those in any event ) but it would certainly serve as a cautionary to others who might want to trifle with us. That's the epitome of the old 'walk softly and carry a big stick' and the new 'you're either with us or against us.'

I also disagree with this:

And then there is Iraq, where large-scale application of military force (albeit, now with COIN discrimination) has succeeded in creating a radical Islamist threat where one did not previously exist.

The threat, as you sort of note, was endemic to the area and that was true before we invaded. Thus, we did not create one; it existed and we simply bought some of it to a head or out in the open. Deliberately.

Iraq was just militarily and politically the best target in an attempt to short circuit that ideal you cited: "There are rather more "get smarter" ones (which involve as much issues of politics, diplomacy, and development), although they're complex, difficult, and don't always produce immediate results." and change the dwell time for change from three to five generations doing it your ideal way to just one or two of them doing it our abrupt way. We'll see how it works out.

[Rex Brynen]

I also disagree with this:The threat, as you sort of note, was endemic to the area and that was true before we invaded. Thus, we did not create one; it existed and we simply bought some of it to a head or out in the open. Deliberately.

Iraq was just militarily and politically the best target in an attempt to short circuit that ideal you cited: "There are rather more "get smarter" ones (which involve as much issues of politics, diplomacy, and development), although they're complex, difficult, and don't always produce immediate results." and change the dwell time for change from three to five generations doing it your ideal way to just one or two of them doing it our abrupt way. We'll see how it works out.

I don't think this was a primary intent of intervention in Iraq (unless one argues that Iraqi democratization was supposed to have a domino effect of regional regime changes that would result in a raft of new, secular-ish pro-Western governments.. which was never likely).

Moreover, I think it is demonstrable that the war in Iraq has radicalized a great many Middle Eastern youths who otherwise would not have been mobilized into militant groups, and helped train them for a fight they now pursue in other places (as evidenced, for example, by the arrival of so many Iraq veterans, and Iraqi-insurgent-wannabes, in Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in Lebanon, resulting in the confrontation there last year).

Be that as it may, you're there now, and the better it ends for Iraq the better it ends for all of us.

[Ken White]

I don't think this was a primary intent of intervention in Iraq (unless one argues that Iraqi democratization was supposed to have a domino effect of regional regime changes that would result in a raft of new, secular-ish pro-Western governments.. which was never likely).

Notably this. I believe it was the principal of well over a dozen (or slightly more) lesser but synergistic reasons. The 'domino effect' being a far lesser one of those.

Moreover, I think it is demonstrable that the war in Iraq has radicalized a great many Middle Eastern youths who otherwise would not have been mobilized into militant groups, and helped train them for a fight they now pursue in other places (as evidenced, for example, by the arrival of so many Iraq veterans, and Iraqi-insurgent-wannabes, in Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in Lebanon, resulting in the confrontation there last year).

I agree. We probably differ in that I see that as a non-problematical, natural and to be expected result of the intervention that will ultimately be to their disadvantage even though in the near term it does not appear to be so. Such confrontations in the near term as opposed to festering for a few years only to later erupt are advantageous to the west even if they are unpleasant.

Be that as it may, you're there now, and the better it ends for Iraq the better it ends for all of us.

True.