TE Lawrence: a merged thread

[Steve the Planner]

Amateur/Professional/Whatever?

Starbuck: Burke's Lawrence piece was very good.

I particularly liked:

While experts in the ivory tower of academia may debate whether or not the military is best suited to restore civil and social services to a city after capture, the argument is moot. In many instances, such as Damascus the military may be the only organization around with the manpower and equipment to restore civic order.

There was a very unique group of Brits "walking around" the Middle East in the mid-1910's. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell are the two known in our histories.

They were studying societies, histories, architecture, structure of organizations...

I was amazed in the Burke article to not see any reference to Bell, who shared many a camel ride with Lawrence throughout that period. The two, as I understood it, were two branches of the same tree, and were constantly cross-fertilizing the Arab Nationalist Ideal, one coming from Egypt to Damascus, and the other coming through Basra and Mosul to the same spot.

As far as I know, the corresponding westerners that were "walking around" the Middle East (at different, but recent times) were Ryan Crocker and Rory Stewart. Neither was really successful in the military, but, like Lawrence as a practical matter, were really external influencers of the military.

I take a little discomfort with the military analyst's idea of correlating Lawrence/Bell with Petreaus/Nagl for a lot of reasons, but particularly because what Lawrence and Bell knew was social/cultural/organizational, which was adapted to military, while Petreaus/Nagl were military who, at most, learned enough social/cultural/organizational insights to play them for military purposes (often short-term ones).

The gap is most evident in the failings in Iraq to understand how to manage the civilian structure and systems, and in Afghanistan to grasp the anti-foreign aspect that is deep rooted and confounds our efforts.

Lawrence was a welcome chameleon in the Arab insurgency against the beastly and inept Turks, but was adamant and protective of their aspirations for self-rule.

I find that authors like William Dalrymple, who are Lawrence-like in their immersion in Northern Indian post-colonial society provide a very important set of insights into much of what Lawrence and Bell were studying and using.

Eating soup with a knife is a great symbol, in my mind, of the continuing failed effort to learn just enough to coopt a few people to temporarily join OUR side, but with little real comprehension of where enduring success lies.

The above quote is right on that a military can and should be capable of effective public administration when needed. We have not yet demonstrated that capacity.

Heck, even Lawrence could have just paid out some graft (Clear-Hold-Bribe) along the way and have travelled far but accomplished nothing.

Even with that, he and Bell's fixation with Arab Nationalism proved to be, in the best light, a premature aspiration, and in the worst light, the seeds of much of what led to future problems.

Maybe they just didn't build enough "capacity" before they left?

Clearly, aiming the right folks to the right challenges is the path to success (at the risk of being too much of a Toynbeeist).

[Steve the Planner]

Found this in "Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890-1908" By Gökhan Çetinsaya:

“In your humble servant’s opinion, no idea has ever circulated in central government, other than the forcible repression and devastation of the Arabs. And they (the Arabs) have never been viewed as potential friends…The Arabs are not savage, but they fear and hate us.
Abdullatif Suphi Pasa to Sultan Abdulaziz, 1864”

Cetinsaya's Introduction uses this 1864 report as a frontispiece to explain the internal politics of the Ottoman Empire to its Arab territories, as they struggled to reform the struggling empire.

This stuff that Lawrence was feeding on was the air that Arabs breathed for generations: Hatred of the Turks.

How does this parallel our efforts in Kabul? Substituting Pashtuns for Arabs?

Which side are we on?

Is Lawrence's approach more useful to us or to Mullah Omar?

[Bob's World]

How does this parallel our efforts in Kabul? Substituting Pashtuns for Arabs?

Which side are we on?

Is Lawrence's approach more useful to us or to Mullah Omar?

So, we took the Lawrence approach when we sided with the Northern Alliance; to take the Lawrence approach today would be to side with Mullah Omar and the Taliban.

I would argue that our goals in AFPAK today are far different than British goals in the Middle East 100 years ago. For them, picking a side made sense. For the U.S. I recommend a more neutral approach is the best; as we have no desire to establish our dominion over the region, do we?

Our problem is that our words, and perhaps intent say: "We're here to help,"
but our actions, as guided by a COIN manual derived from such colonial ventures, say "We're here to establish a government that we approve of."

We're conflicted, and the results of that inner conflict speak for themselves.

[Steve the Planner]

Wilf:

Couldn't have said it better myself.

Military power should set the conditions (security) and logistics for civilian operations.

Lawrence (and Bell) became too enthralled with love and admiration of the Arabs wrapped in a western sensibility about national self-determination and premature aspirations of the dream state of an Arab Nation.

Bob:

C'mon. We ARE picking sides.

Where you draw distinctions as to what we are not doing, it begs the question of why, if that is a well-trodden path to success, we are not following it.

[William F. Owen]

While experts in the ivory tower of academia may debate whether or not the military is best suited to restore civil and social services to a city after capture, the argument is moot. In many instances, such as Damascus the military may be the only organization around with the manpower and equipment to restore civic order.

This is not the debate. Those of us focussed on informing practice are well aware that Military Power can and should be used to restore order. That is restore and maintain it, so as a political entity can exploit it.
Martial Law works. Ask Allenby! - not Lawrence!

There was a very unique group of Brits "walking around" the Middle East in the mid-1910's. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell are the two known in our histories.

They were not unique. There were hundereds (possibly 1000+) of British Civil Servant and Army officers in the Mid-East who spoke Arabic and in many cases much better than Lawrence.

Lawrence was a welcome chameleon in the Arab insurgency against the beastly and inept Turks, but was adamant and protective of their aspirations for self-rule.

Lawrence was a Britisher Officer tasked with getting the Arabs to defeat the Ottoman Empire on behalf of the British. When he started to speak for the Arabs, he was basically guilty if a mis-conduct and should have been charged and dismissed. Only his self started publicity machine prevented that happening.

What most people don't get is that the old-school British Army is not proud of Lawrence. What you see today is the flow down of 1960's Liberal hero-worship. He contributed very little of use and probably did more damage with his dreaming that good. Of course what sells books is saying "Hero." Last time I counted there were 11 Lawrence Biographies.

[Jedburgh]

...They were not unique. There were hundereds (possibly 1000+) of British Civil Servant and Army officers in the Mid-East who spoke Arabic and in many cases much better than Lawrence....

Priya Satia's Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle East provides excellent insight into the depth and nature of penetration of Brits in the Middle East during that period; not just civil servants and Army officers, but also academics and private citizens.

However, as a focused read on the subject, it has its faults and does not provide as much value as either Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 or Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern Intelligence War.

[Bob's World]

Wilf,

I appreciate where you are coming from in regard to Lawrence. I can see where the British military establishment would have problems with the self-promotion, etc.

As a point of comparison though, I am curious how they feel about an officer who had a similar mission of building local militia to defeat a rebel insurrection. One of the great villains of U.S. military history is Colonel Banastre Tarleton for his operations in the Carolinas. How does the "old-school British Army" judge him?? Obviously the American bias casts him as a war criminal of the highest order. I would expect more favorable treatment at home, but I am curious.