How Insurgencies End

[Dayuhan]

You use armed force against armed force. An insurgency is the use of armed force. Destroy or defeat that armed force and you have solved to problem in terms of the problem being an insurgency. Anything else is simply none of your problem.

Or, if you're dealing with a revolt or rebellion, you could resolve the issues that started and sustain the revolt or rebellion and end it without the need to destroy and defeat.

This may not necessarily be a military function, but it should certainly be considered in any broad discussion of revolt and rebellion or in discussion of any specific revolt or rebellion. I wouldn't see anything wrong, for example, with a military leadership that was summoned to suppress a revolt pointing out that the revolt had reasonable and understandable causes and that resolving the causes might be easier and less destructive that wading in with killing and destruction.

I think BW has a point about "winning" vs transient suppression. Mindanao is a good example of a fight that has been repeatedly "won" without ever being resolved. If the issues that started the fight remain unsettled, a day, week, month, or year without violence is no more a "win" than a half-time lead is a victory in a football match. Of course military action alone can't achieve resolution, it can only open a space to permit political resolution... but that doesn't make political resolution any less necessary for achieving a permanent conclusion.

We do have to be careful about assuming that conclusions drawn from a broad study of insurgency can be applied to any given insurgency, since every fight is different. This is why I'd like to see the terms defined more clearly and used less casually. An "insurgency" that consists of a populace or portion thereof fighting its own government is a very different thing from an "insurgency" primarily driven by opposition to a foreign occupier; both are very different in turn from the (IMO absurd) construct of a "global insurgency".

[William F. Owen]

Or, if you're dealing with a revolt or rebellion, you could resolve the issues that started and sustain the revolt or rebellion and end it without the need to destroy and defeat.

You could, but that is not the job of the Army

I wouldn't see anything wrong, for example, with a military leadership that was summoned to suppress a revolt pointing out that the revolt had reasonable and understandable causes and that resolving the causes might be easier and less destructive that wading in with killing and destruction.

Maybe - but folks revolt against ideas or actions other folks believe reasonable.

I think BW has a point about "winning" vs transient suppression. Mindanao is a good example of a fight that has been repeatedly "won" without ever being resolved. If the issues that started the fight remain unsettled, a day, week, month, or year without violence is no more a "win" than a half-time lead is a victory in a football match.

I agree. ALL war is "80%" political, but the Armed force is not there to solve the problem. It's there to defeat the other armed force, so as the political solution is made a reality.

[Dayuhan]

You could, but that is not the job of the Army

True, but I'm not in the army, nor do I see any particular reason to confine discussion to what can or cannot be accomplished by the army.

I do think that part of the role of the military is providing honest advice to the civilian leadership on what they can and cannot accomplish with armed force.

[jmm99]

Politik by other means, how do you derive this:

from Wilf
ALL war is "80%" political....

It would seem that ALL war is "100%" political following that CvC logic.

Now, if one accepts the concept that each war has some effort made toward the "political struggle" and other effort made toward the "military struggle", then one could assign percentages of effort to each struggle. But, do you, Wilf, accept the concept of a "political struggle" as a part of war ?

Regards

Mike

[William F. Owen]

But, do you, Wilf, accept the concept of a "political struggle" as a part of war ?

Absolutely! All War is a political struggle, but the Armed Force can only be part of the Armed struggle. Armed force can only be instrumental. Armed force is never The Policy.

a.) If there is no use violence, it is not war
b.) War is political violence.
c.) Armed Forces are purely instruments of actual or threatened violence for what ever policy they are required to set forth
d.) The cause of all conflict is political.

[Dayuhan]

Absolutely! All War is a political struggle, but the Armed Force can only be part of the Armed struggle. Armed force can only be instrumental. Armed force is never The Policy.

a.) If there is no use violence, it is not war
b.) War is political violence.
c.) Armed Forces are purely instruments of actual or threatened violence for what ever policy they are required to set forth
d.) The cause of all conflict is political.

This is true. That's why discussion of war, small or large, must also involve discussion of policy, and why a discussion such as this one invariably involves policy aspects. no need or reason to shy away from it, no?

[William F. Owen]

This is true. That's why discussion of war, small or large, must also involve discussion of policy, and why a discussion such as this one invariably involves policy aspects. no need or reason to shy away from it, no?

Dam straight! It may be that your policy aim cannot be set forth via violence, or is not effective in doing so. Military force is a tool to be applied very selectively. It cannot set forth every policy, and using military force changes the policy being set forth!

The error in the US Military way of thinking is to say "our policy should be X, so we can employ military power", as opposed to "We can destroy the enemies armed force using military power," and leave it to the policy makers to answer the exam question. It also largely ignores that policy does not stay static and is almost never based on a deep understanding of military power.

[Bob's World]

To throw another monkey wrench into the gears, I don't think Insurgency should be classified as "war" at all.

It's kind of like a tomatoe. All your life you think its a vegetable, becuase everyone has always told you it was a vegetable, you've always treated it like a vegetable, you always mix it with other vegetables; and then one day some horticulturist comes along and tells you its really a fruit.

I won't take that any farther, but I think we gain clearer insights as how to approach insurgency and the relative roles of the Host nation government, its military and that of any outside governments and their militaries that intervene to assist by looking at insurgency not as war, but as a civil emergency. Not to apply the rules of war, but to apply the rules of military support to civil authorities. Not to supplant the civil leadership, but to supplement the same, holding them to task.

We've been treating insurgency like war for too long. Its violent like war, it has an "enemy" like war, it will kill you and drain your national blood, treasure, and influence like war. But it isn't war. If I eat tomatoes all my life and refuse to recognize they are a fruit it really doesn't matter much. But if I mischaracterize a major event like an insurgency, I could inadvertantly harm, or even destroy my nation.

Ohh yeah. And Wilf asked a few posts back about "non-violent insurgencies." Here is where I largely agree with Kitson. He saw this as a spectrum along a scale of violence. The causal factors being the same, but what begins as "subversion" at some point becomes "insurgency", not because the events somehow changed in nature, but merely becuase it had become more violent. So, Kitson would call non-violent insurgency "subversion." Same event, just different stages. Sometimes the subversives win without having to employ violence, as with Ghandi or King. Or sometimes an insurgency is suppressed back down into a subversive phase for a number of years before it goes "insurgent" again, as in Mindanao. You solve it when you address the root causes, and level of violence is only one of many metrics to measure success with, and certainly not the decisive measure.