US policy with an ally like the Saudis till 2016

[davidbfpo]

Dayuhan,

I suppose what General Petraeus says is indicative, in a speech in London on the 18th September 2009:

Meanwhile, in the Arabian Peninsula, we have seen important signs of progress against Al-Qaida and extremist organisations, with the exception of Yemen that is. The progress in this arena is especially significant to the United States and Europe because of the extensive political and commercial connections we have with the Gulf states and because of the concerns we’ve had over the years about the growth of extremism on the Peninsula and its transnational nature. It is hugely significant, therefore, that Saudi Arabia has virtually eliminated Al-Qaida from its territories, though the attack on Deputy Minister of Interior Mohammed Bin-Naif was unsettling, to be sure. That notwithstanding, the kingdom has implemented an impressive and effective comprehensive counter-extremist programme.

From: http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/news/news.cgi?id=749

The other issue that few seem to raise publically is the external role of Saudi agencies in promoting their version of Islam and the number of scholars studying there. Other threads may have touched upon this and IIRC reference was made to Saudi funding appearing in parts of Nigeria.

davidbfpo

[tequila]

This, I think, will be of concern in the next few years.

...

In July, Richard C. Holbrooke, the Obama administration's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, said the Taliban was reaping the bulk of its revenue from donors abroad, especially from the Persian Gulf.

Other U.S. officials have noted that the Taliban received substantial financial help from Gulf countries during the 1990s, when Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates -- along with Pakistan -- were the only nations that gave diplomatic recognition to the Taliban government ...

[davidbfpo]

Tequila,

It is worthy of note that the UAE contributes to ISAF. IIRC Special Forces at one point. ISAF's webpage shows 25 troops: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf

As always there are different aspects to their role: a 2007 report of a defector: http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2...138362757.html and a 2008 BBC report: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7318731.stm

There are no Saudi troops in ISAF.

davidbfpo

[Bob's World]

http://news.yahoo.com/ny-judge-al-qa...002608127.html

I recommend we send this bill to the King.

It was due to our policy of preserving his family in power that created the causal linkage between his oppressive regime at home and the decision of a handful of Saudi insurgents working with AQ to attack the US to advance their ultimate goal of bringing the Saudi reign down.

Now, granted, that is an arrangement that US officials entered into and sustained of their own free will; but the only thing we seem less willing to do than recognize the role of Saudi governance in the birth and growth of AQ, is to recognize the role of US-Saudi foreign policy in the same.

[Dayuhan]

It was due to our policy of preserving his family in power that created the causal linkage between his oppressive regime at home and the decision of a handful of Saudi insurgents working with AQ to attack the US to advance their ultimate goal of bringing the Saudi reign down.

Have we ever preserved the Saud family in the face of a domestic threat? The hypothesis that American support has allowed the Saudis to avoid evolutionary changes that would have been necessary without that support seems to me historically insupportable.

Both the description of the 9/11 terrorists as "insurgents" and the causative link you suggest remain largely speculative... part of the picture doubtless, but only one part. Exaggerating that part and focusing on it to the exclusion of the many other parts does not improve our understanding of the entire picture.

[Ken White]

It was due to our policy of preserving his family in power that created the causal linkage between his oppressive regime at home and the decision of a handful of Saudi insurgents working with AQ to attack the US to advance their ultimate goal of bringing the Saudi reign down.

You may have seen something that purports to be proof of that. I have not and I therefor question the validity of the "causal linkage" portion that statement. It smacks of a standing broad jump at a convenient conclusion...

Had you said contributed in part, I would likely have just kept driving but "causal linkage" smacks of more positivism than seems warranted. I don't think this -- or the whole 'governance is the cause of it all' thing -- is nearly as simple as you'd like...

[Bob's World]

You may have seen something that purports to be proof of that. I have not and I therefor question the validity of the "causal linkage" portion that statement. It smacks of a standing broad jump at a convenient conclusion...

Had you said contributed in part, I would likely have just kept driving but "causal linkage" smacks of more positivism than seems warranted. I don't think this -- or the whole 'governance is the cause of it all' thing -- is nearly as simple as you'd like...

Actually, much of this is very simple, it is just inconvenient. Complexity if vastly over-rated and over-sold of late.

As to Dayuhan, the Saudi's are a major purchaser of US military hardware, yet while certainly their Wahabist doctrine makes them a sworn enemy of Shia Iran, that is their problem and not ours. They employ the majority of what they buy for internal purposes, as they know (as do the Iranians) we will come running if any true external threat should emerge. So, yes, protecting the Saudi regime has been a central component of our Middle Eastern foreign policy since at least 1944.

bin Laden and most of the 9/11 attackers, and the core of AQ are Saudi for a reason. They hate the Saudi regime and the US for a reason. We can ignore it or address it. So far ignoring it is not working.

We've invested Billions, perhaps Trillions in "complex." Would it kill us, given the failure of that to do much more than kill a bunch of individuals while at the same time stimulating the overall organization to grow and become more wide-spread and durable, to switch to cheap, simple, and smart for a change??

The nature of US - Saudi relationship; and the nature of Saudi governance, is the core of the war on terrorism. I stand by that. I have yet to see anything that would prove that wrong, but I am open to informed arguments on the topic.

[Ken White]

bin Laden and most of the 9/11 attackers, and the core of AQ are Saudi for a reason. They hate the Saudi regime and the US for a reason. We can ignore it or address it. So far ignoring it is not working.

We've invested Billions, perhaps Trillions in "complex." ...become more wide-spread and durable, to switch to cheap, simple, and smart for a change??

The nature of US - Saudi relationship; and the nature of Saudi governance, is the core of the war on terrorism.

Aside from the fact I suspect the reasons for things are not as clear cut as you wish to assume -- ask any kid why he joined the US Army...

Trillions are not necessary; cheap, simple and smart are desirable, no question. Dogmatism is cheap but it isn't smart.

I thought you disliked the term "war on terrorism?"

We're not going to agree on this aspect, we never have. While I agree that Saudis have taken advantage of us and agree that our relationship with them needs change, they are far from the only opponent out there. It is possible to over-simplify things...

Poor governance is not the only cause of insurgency.

My perception, right or wrong, is that you've got some bad cases of tunnel vision and while we agree on many things, we still do not agree on those two things. That's okay, we can disagree. The good news I'm not going to influence anyone in a position of power. You may. I suggest one thing only...

Be careful.

[Dayuhan]

the Saudi's are a major purchaser of US military hardware, yet while certainly their Wahabist doctrine makes them a sworn enemy of Shia Iran, that is their problem and not ours.

The issue between the Saudis and the Iranians is not just about Wahhabi vs Shi'a, it's about two regional powers glaring at each other across a whole lot of a very valuable resource. It is our problem, like it or not, because if a fight breaks out the price of oil will go to the stratosphere and stay there. The US desire to keep Gulf oil out of the hands of Iran (or in prior days Saddam) has nothing to do with support for the Saudis. It's self defense.

Saudi arms purchases are not US aid to Saudi Arabia. If anything it's Saudi aid to the US: those purchases do a great deal to keep our defense industries viable, and the Saudis could easily buy the stuff elsewhere.

They employ the majority of what they buy for internal purposes...

When was the last time you saw Saudi F15s or M1s used against domestic opponents. They probably would if they thought they had to, but they haven't had to: they've never faced an internal threat that required more than a police response... a very ugly police response, yes, but not one that requires any help from the US. The Saudis don't need our help to manage their populace, and they sure as hell aren't going to ask our permission or pay attention to our objections.

as they know (as do the Iranians) we will come running if any true external threat should emerge. So, yes, protecting the Saudi regime has been a central component of our Middle Eastern foreign policy since at least 1944.

Protecting the Saudi regime against external aggression has been a central component of our Middle Eastern foreign policy. We haven't had to protect them from domestic dissent.

bin Laden and most of the 9/11 attackers, and the core of AQ are Saudi for a reason. They hate the Saudi regime and the US for a reason. We can ignore it or address it. So far ignoring it is not working.

They hate the US for a wide variety of reasons, and they're pursuing a variety of goals, many of which are proactive, not responsive. You focus on one small portion of that picture, because it fits the model you're trying to present.

Would it kill us, given the failure of that to do much more than kill a bunch of individuals while at the same time stimulating the overall organization to grow and become more wide-spread and durable, to switch to cheap, simple, and smart for a change??

The nature of US - Saudi relationship; and the nature of Saudi governance, is the core of the war on terrorism. I stand by that. I have yet to see anything that would prove that wrong, but I am open to informed arguments on the topic.

You've seen a number of informed arguments, but you've already made up your mind.

Would you care to elaborate on "cheap, simple, and smart"? The suggestions you've made in the past have typically been based on the premise that the US has far more influence on Saudi domestic policy than the US actually has, and that's a very risky premise. Any plan based on urging or encouraging the Saudis to change the way they govern is really pointless from the start. It might feel good, but it will have no more effect on the Saudis than the periodic European criticisms of US policy have on us. Neither will it be appreciated by th Saudi populace: no matter how they feel about their own government, they hate it when we lecture them. It doesn't come off as support for the populace, it comes off as arrogant, patronizing, contempt for their nation and culture.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

I suppose what General Petraeus says is indicative, in a speech in London on the 18th September 2009:



From: http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/news/news.cgi?id=749

The other issue that few seem to raise publically is the external role of Saudi agencies in promoting their version of Islam and the number of scholars studying there. Other threads may have touched upon this and IIRC reference was made to Saudi funding appearing in parts of Nigeria.

davidbfpo

What the governments of the Arabian Peninsula have been doing under the guise of "counter-extremist" programs are in fact ramped up efforts to suppress those members of their populaces who dare to challenge what are widely recognized as some of the most oppressive regimes on the planet.

We have spun this problem in terms favorable to the US and these dodgy allies by branding these revolutionaries as "extremists" or "terrorists" or "radical islamists" or any of a wide range of disparaging terms. This is what governments do. The fact that Yemen is the best physical terrain to hide in from one's government leads various insurgent members from a number of states to flee to their for physical santuary. The fact that the rural tribes of Yemen are equally oppressed and dissatisfied with their own government provides a populace base for this sanctuary as well. Of course AQ goes to Yemen as well to conduct their UW campaign to support these nationalist insurgent movements.

We need to set our Kool-Aid down and step back and put all of the intel products we are using to drive our thinking under a strategic microscope and as free from the bias of our relationships with the governments of the region and our concern over interests related to oil and access to critical sea lanes that oil and other commodities travel through as well. These things are important, vitally so. But we must evolve in our approaches to securing them.

Propping up friendly despots is obsolete. Just because we have done it for generations does not mean it cannot be obsolete now.

The US applied an offical policy of ethnic cleansing to the Native Americans; we now recognize that as obsolete in the current environment.

The US applied an offical policy of slavery to develop the agriculture of the South; we now recognize that as obsolete in the current environment.

Similarly the US applied an offical policy of adopting and sustaining a collection of despots in power throughout our colonial and cold war eras to help secure our interests; we need to now recognize this apporach as obsolete as well.

[Bob's World]

Also worth considering here are the strong parallels between the US relationship today with the Saudi family and that we had with the Shah of Iran in the early 70s.

There too we balanced the extreme amount of capital we were shipping to the Shah in exchange for Iranian oil with massive sales of military hardware.

There too the Shah (with no help from us, not needed, just as the Saudis do not need our help in this mission so long as the people remain cowed) acted ruthlessly to keep an extremely oppressed and insurgent populace in check with one hand, while he entertained US dignitaries in opulent excess with the other.

There too, as late as 1977 the DIA predicted that the Shah would remain strongly in power for at least another 10 years; as I suspect estimates for the Saudi family are at least as bold.

But in such a powder keg of oppression it only takes a spark, and with Arab spring burning brightly all around the Kingdom, such sparks are easily found.

These were and are complex and important relationships. We bite off our nose today to spite our faces over our anger and embarrassment at being rebuked by the Iranians over 30 years ago; can we afford risking a similar 30 plus years of national sour grapes when (and it is when, not if) the Saudis meet their come uppence from their populace as well?? We need to work to get straight with the governments AND the populace of both of these important nations sooner than later.

All I have ever advocated is that we need to focus less on attacking and defeating symptoms, and spend more energy focusing on repairing the flawed dysfunctional relationships that I see as the causal roots of those same symptoms. So what if I am wrong, what do we lose by getting straight with our own professed principles? Nothing. We can begin to repair our reputation in the region, and an honorable reputation is a hard commodity to put a price on.

We Americans can be generous and honorable and self-less to a fault; we can also be self-serving, callus, arrogant and petulant. The problem is that sometimes we act like the latter while seeing ourselves as the former. We can be better than this. We are better than this. But the first step to getting better is to recognize we have a problem and to take responsibility for our actions that contributed to bringing us here.

[Dayuhan]

The comparison with the Shah of Iran is I think a bit strained. To an American it seems absurd and incomprehensible, but throughout the Gulf, even when there's criticism of a monarch, there's enormous respect for the monarchy, which is widely perceived as having inherent traditional legitimacy. That respect isn't universal - nothing in a populace ever is - but it's very widespread and is a real factor. A ruler who claims traditional power without actual blood right (the Shah) or rulers such as a Mubarak or a Saddam, who simply seized power, are seen as fundamentally different from a true traditional ruler. To us they're all just despots, but the distinction is meaningful in these places.

I've never noted any great enthusiasm for the idea of democracy in the Gulf, except among a few western-educated individuals, most of whom tend to keep it quiet. There's a very widespread perception that democracy would bring chaos and open the door for foreign domination. In much of the Gulf it's simply taken as a given that the American enthusiasm for promoting democracy is a vehicle for gaining power: the CIA would manipulate the elections (the ability to do so is presumed) and reduce them to US puppets.

It's easy to say this, and it sounds good:

We need to work to get straight with the governments AND the populace of both of these important nations sooner than later.

but when you get down to specifics, it always seems to presume influence that we haven't got, and to involve a level of interference in domestic affairs that's likely to be seen as unacceptable by both government and populace.

The cold war paradigm of dictators that are dependent on the US is not applicable here: these despots do not depend on us, and our influence over them is very limited. They are not client states and we cannot dictate policy changes or exert substantial influence over domestic policy. Neither governments nor populaces want us meddling in their domestic policies, no matter how high-minded our declared objectives are. These are peer-peer relationships, and if we treat them as patron-client relationships we will achieve nothing and antagonize everyone in the picture.

Meddling in the past hasn't given good results, but the answer to bad meddling isn't good meddling, the answer to bad meddling is less meddling. That won't change perceptions overnight, but neither will anything else. Attempts at good meddling will just reinforce the perception of self-interested interference: no matter what we say we're trying to accomplish, our actions will be interpreted as a self-interested attempt to gain control.

[Ken White]

There (Iran) too we balanced the extreme amount of capital we were shipping to the Shah in exchange for Iranian oil with massive sales of military hardware.

We bought very little oil from Iran -- our relationship involved the extraction of oil and the concomitant money from the soil of Iran. Those massive sales of military equipment did not start until the US and the Saudis sabotaged oil prices and inadvertently (on our part, almost certainly deliberately on the part of that Saudis) Iran and the Shah at the Doha Conference in 1976, mostly at the behest of William Simon -- the Shah then began to realize that the US was perfidious and decided to embark on his own program, telling us he preferred to buy here but was going to buy what he wanted from somewhere. Speak to Zbig and Jimmy -- they sold him everything and then pulled the rug out from under him.

There too the Shah (with no help from us, not needed, just as the Saudis do not need our help in this mission so long as the people remain cowed) acted ruthlessly to keep an extremely oppressed and insurgent populace in check with one hand, while he entertained US dignitaries in opulent excess with the other.

Where do you get this stuff? The Shah played rough, no question -- but Khomeini killed more people in his first two years than the Shah had in the previous 25. Opulent excess. Poetic -- and wrong. the Shah didn't like American and didn't entertain much, the minions did and not all that opulently.

There too, as late as 1977 the DIA predicted that the Shah would remain strongly in power for at least another 10 years...

Accurate at the time but that was before Carter told the CIA to get him dumped in late '78. I wish people who decide to use Iran as an example for much of anything would get their facts together before they write...

But in such a powder keg of oppression it only takes a spark, and with Arab spring burning brightly all around the Kingdom, such sparks are easily found.

Sounds good. Idealistic but good. We'll see.

These were and are complex and important relationships...

But Bob, you just told me we over complicated things and that this was simple. Which is it?

But the first step to getting better is to recognize we have a problem and to take responsibility for our actions that contributed to bringing us here.

I'm not at all sure that will be enough, taking responsibility is just saying things -- actions completed are hard to undo. Particularly in an area that throws words around willy nilly and operates on Ta'arif -- tell people what they want to hear. They're subject to think that we're doing just that. Rather than trying to re-do the past, better to just move on.

[Bob's World]

Ken,

I know you have history with Iran, so I trust your insights. I am currently working through "Reset" by Stephen Kinzer; and while I am sure it has its own bias and inaccuracies, I believe it to be an important and generally fair position.

Note, in my condemnation of the Shah I never praise the Mullahs. As I often state, insurgency is natural, and when certain conditions come to exist within a populace due to the nature and actions of their government as assessed by the populace, insurgency becomes inevitable. WHO shows up to lead the people is another matter. Iran began moving toward more modern and democratic governance with the Revolution of 1906, and yes it is and will be a bumpy ride. Our action to take out Muhammad Mossadeq at Britain's request and elevate the Shah back into power ultimately pushed the people into the hands of the Mullahs. Who else was going to help them??

Similarly our blind support of the Saudi family is helping to push elements of the Saudi popualce into the hands of AQ. Again, who else is going to help them??

The Ayatollah and the Mullahs are a curse on the people of Iran; as is AQ on the Sunni Arab populaces of the Middle East today. The truth of that in no way excuses the actions of the respective governments whose actions and policies have pushed their populaces into the arms of these shady "saviors." Similarly, it does not excuse US foreign policy that has in many cases empowered and enabled these same governments to act with the impunity that sped them on their collision course with their own populaces. We love to blame ideology, or point out the truely evil aspects of these men and organizations that step up to exploit conditions of insurgency for their own gains, particularly where it challenges positions that we seek to nurture and advance for our own interests. We need to be less petty in our analysis, more intuned to the true grievances of the popualces involved; less risk adverse in terms of letting others self-determine their own governance; and less blindly supporting of "allies" in the form of protecting specific dictators or regimes.

Desprate situations call for desperate measures.

So, yes, these relationships are complex; but the fundamental principles of human nature and insurgency that provide the foundation they are built upon are indeed simple. I generally pick my words carefully, though rarely edit them to avoid taking positions that are unpopular or contrary to what people want or need to hear.

As to Dayuhan, the comparison of Iran in the 70s vs Saudi Arabia today is not a strain at all. In fact, it is shockingly on point. The more you research the topic the more you will see that to be true. Or you can just wait a few years and read it in the newspaper if we continue on our current track.

Cheers!

Bob

(Oh, and my research shows that in 1974 the US purchased 463 thousand barrels from Iran to 438 thousand from the Saudis; by 1978 we were indeed buying twice as much from the Saudis (1142 to 554); but to minimize the importance of Iran to our energy economy in that era is not accurate; nor would it be fair to minimize how the Iranian people felt about the Shah and our role in squelching their quest for democratic reforms by bringing him back as part of Ike and the Dulles brothers program of covert regime change and manipulation to wage the Cold War.)

[Ken White]

I am currently working through "Reset" by Stephen Kinzer; and while I am sure it has its own bias and inaccuracies, I believe it to be an important and generally fair position.

Read it. Agree with your first statement, not so much with the second -- though I suspect you will like the book.

The WaPo says sorta correctly that Kinzer is "among the best in popular foreign policy storytelling." I'm quite sure that Kinzer's suggested tripartite effort wouldn't be nearly as smooth as he envisions -- I am reminded of Hillary Clinton's 'Reset' button.

I suggest the issue is not how and with whom we should 'partner' in the middle east but whether we should at all...

Our action to take out Muhammad Mossadeq at Britain's request and elevate the Shah back into power ultimately pushed the people into the hands of the Mullahs. Who else was going to help them?

There you go, over simplifying again. Way over...

Similarly our blind support of the Saudi family is helping to push elements of the Saudi popualce into the hands of AQ. Again, who else is going to help them?

You assume they need or must have help. Careful with assumptions; you know what they say...

Desprate situations call for desperate measures.

Avoid the Kool Aid. What desperate situation?

I generally pick my words carefully, though rarely edit them to avoid taking positions that are unpopular or contrary to what people want or need to hear.

Of course you pick your words carefully, you're a Lawyer and a Colonel -- that's not an insult, merely an observation that both categories are noted for relatively careful choosing of words. Thus one can be sure you're doubly careful...

Unpopular is in the eye of the beholder. So is the selection of things people "need to hear." Been my observation that users of such phrasing are on 'missions.' Self assigned, usually.

(Oh, and my research shows that in 1974 the US purchased 463 thousand barrels from Iran to 438 thousand from the Saudis; by 1978 we were indeed buying twice as much from the Saudis (1142 to 554); but to minimize the importance of Iran to our energy economy in that era is not accurate; nor would it be fair to minimize how the Iranian people felt about the Shah and our role in squelching their quest for democratic reforms by bringing him back as part of Ike and the Dulles brothers program of covert regime change and manipulation to wage the Cold War.)

Your research should also show that the 1974 oil purchase figures were influenced by the Saudi driven OPEC cut in exports to raise the price and 'punish the US for supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur War.' Fortunately our then friend the Shah willingly upped Iran's production just to support the US and cock a snook at the Saudis by temporarily making up for the Saudi cut. We never imported much oil from Iran other than that spike.

You seem to not only choose your words carefully but also your research quotes...

[Dayuhan]

Similarly our blind support of the Saudi family is helping to push elements of the Saudi popualce into the hands of AQ. Again, who else is going to help them??

Is AQ helping "elements of the Saudi populace", or is it the other way around? AQ has traditionally drawn support from the Saudi populace when it has taken the role of resistance to foreign occupation of Muslim lands. AQ's efforts against the Saudi government have drawn much less support: they've developed a very small core of vigorous opposition, but failed to gain traction with the broader populace or to gain anything close to the critical mass needed to drive a credible insurgency. AQ's efforts to generate a Saudi insurgency in the 90s fell flat, despite highly conducive conditions (economic crisis and a prolonged US military presence). That doesn't mean the Saudis love their government, but it strongly suggests that very few Saudis see AQ as a desirable alternative.

Similarly, it does not excuse US foreign policy that has in many cases empowered and enabled these same governments to act with the impunity that sped them on their collision course with their own populaces.

You have yet to demonstrate that anything the US has done has "enabled or empowered" the Saudis to act as they do toward their populace. The Saudis don't need our help or approval to oppress, and they would do it no matter what we said or did. The comment above suggests that without US help the Saudis would be forced to take a more accommodating stance toward portions of their own populaces, which seems an unsupportable contention that presumes a dependence that is not in fact there. The danger in assuming that we enable or empower is that it implies that we can force policy changes by ceasing to enable or empower. That's not the case in Saudi Arabia, and basing policy on the assumption of influence or dependency that does not in fact exist is a good way to devise ineffective policy.

the comparison of Iran in the 70s vs Saudi Arabia today is not a strain at all. In fact, it is shockingly on point. The more you research the topic the more you will see that to be true. Or you can just wait a few years and read it in the newspaper if we continue on our current track.

I've looked into the topic. Been looking at it for well over a decade, since I started spending time there. Oddly, I started out from a frame that is not too different from yours. Had to change my mind. Embarrassing, but it happens.

I think political disruption and forced change is ultimately likely in Saudi Arabia. I do not think it's going to involve AQ. I doubt that it will happen in the next few years. I don't think anything the US says or does is going to have any bearing on it. We do not have the capacity to change - or even significantly influence - Saudi domestic policy.

[Bob's World]

Well I will agree with Dayuhan that AQ is largely moot. They do not create insurgency with either their actions or their ideology. They are opportunists who seek to leverage the conditions of insurgency that already exist. Those conditions are shaped by the perceptions of distinct and significant populace groups within a wide range of countries that are primarily Sunni Muslim in religion, and Arab in ethnicity. That is their core target audience. Obviously others who buy in to their message and mission get on board as well. Those popular perceptions are based on how those populace groups feel about certain key aspects of their governance situation and their perceived lack of effective legal options for addressing the same.

The Saudi people, like people across the Middle East, will either pressure their government to evolve or will openly revolt (violently or non violently, that is a tactical choice) because of how they feel about their government, not because of how they feel about AQ.

For the US, the critical question is not how we perceive our role, it is how these same populaces perceive our role. This is where the material questions lie for the US; and there are shocking similarities between Iran-US in the 1970s to Saudi Arabia-US today. Just something for Americans to consider. As Ken points out, we were not all that reliant on Iranian Oil, so when we got PNG'd from that country by the revolutionary government we could simply buy more oil from our remaining "friends" in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and our new friend (a guy named Don Rumsfeld was sent by Reagan to make nice with a guy named Saddam and offer any help we could provide in Saddam's new war with Iran) in Iraq, etc. If we are PNG'd by a revolutionary government in Saudi Arabia we will not have the same options. In fact, we will be much like the Brits were when they were PNG'd by Iran in the early 50s.

In the evolving conflict-competition ecosystem the nature of conflict remains fairly stable, but the characteristics are evolving on the back of evolving technologies (primarily of the Information variety), and what worked for centuries in many cases is becoming obsolete today. It is my opinion that "friendly despots" are obsolete. (and like "friendly fire," are not all that "friendly" either).


Yes, there are millions of differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Noted. It is the critical similarities that cause me to raise the red flag.