While youre point is appreciated, I don't think its related to my question. I'm trying to understand a comparison of the training and tactics of the two forces.
To discuss strategy would be like two guys talking about fire arms in WWII, and somebody else entering the conversation with a bunch of guff on the atomic bomb.
But to take your bait, was the Rhodesian Strategy really failed? I think its one thing to say your strategy is failed, when you have the best funded military in the world making little progress, but its something else to say an isolated country in an underdeveloped part of the world had a failed strategy, with almost zero trade partners, and borrowed or stolen equipment.
To take up Wilf's earlier point - you haven't articulated a thesis, you've articulated a topic. You still have to do that before we can truly critique you. Also, for an academic paper, you seem starting with a conclusion and looking backwards for evidence to justify it rather than observing the evidence and drawing a conclusion.
Yes, their tactical performance with little resources was brilliant, but it also didn't matter. What Steve and I are saying is that we get obsessed as a military with tactical innovation while ignoring our deficit in strategic thinking.
Totally true on all counts.The Rhodesians showed great tactical competence in an existential war, a really rather common occurrence.
In our last existential war, 1942-45, the US showed tactical competence. I have little doubt we will again when needed -- right now for most people, it simply is not needed, adequate will suffice. That's unfair to the guys and gals on the ground now but that's the way it has always been and is likely to stay. Democracies will not invest in really good and hard training short of existential wars -- the Mothers get too upset at the 2-5% casualty rate caused by rigorous training. So does Congress, it's expensive to pay those folks for the damage to their little bods thus incurred and in a tight recruiting market, unnecessary (in the eyes of the budgeteers and politicians) losses are frowned upon.
All the lessons from Rhodesia are readily available and have been studied, some are applicable, some are not. Those that have applicability have already been adopted. Ever notice how the US Troopie carries a weapon now versus say 15 years ago? That may be why some of us cannot understand what you're trying to do.
In any event, the tactical side isn't a problem, the politics of restraint, risk avoidance and getting out of Dodge are the problem. Regrettably, the Rhodesian tactical lessons don't cover that. Their strategic error let down all those great tactical moves. Ours looks about to repeat the flaw...
If you do not get the strategy right, you are not going to succeed tactically even though there will be (and are, in Afghanistan; were in Iraq...) a number of great tactical ploys, moves and operations. The TTPs aren't the problem, the politics are.
Yes in that it was indeed an existential war. Remind me of some other existential wars?
MaybeIn our last existential war, 1942-45, the US showed tactical competence. I have little doubt we will again when needed -- right now for most people, it simply is not needed, adequate will suffice. That's unfair to the guys and gals on the ground now but that's the way it has always been and is likely to stay. Democracies will not invest in really good and hard training short of existential wars -- the Mothers get too upset at the 2-5% casualty rate caused by rigorous training. So does Congress, it's expensive to pay those folks for the damage to their little bods thus incurred and in a tight recruiting market, unnecessary (in the eyes of the budgeteers and politicians) losses are frowned upon.
Studied by whom?All the lessons from Rhodesia are readily available and have been studied, some are applicable, some are not. Those that have applicability have already been adopted. Ever notice how the US Troopie carries a weapon now versus say 15 years ago? That may be why some of us cannot understand what you're trying to do.
Carries his weapon? Hanging a weapon on a sling around your neck (hands free) is called carrying a weapon?
Every aspect deserves study as competence is required at every level. Regardless of Carter's success in defeating Rhodesia politically any tactical lessons as there may be still stand.In any event, the tactical side isn't a problem, the politics of restraint, risk avoidance and getting out of Dodge are the problem. Regrettably, the Rhodesian tactical lessons don't cover that. Their strategic error let down all those great tactical moves. Ours looks about to repeat the flaw...
"Tactically" means what happens at tactical level. Success there like "they never lost a battle" is meaningful (even if not fully true) regardless of what the politicians foulded up or they could not withstand in terms of international pressure.If you do not get the strategy right, you are not going to succeed tactically even though there will be (and are, in Afghanistan; were in Iraq...) a number of great tactical ploys, moves and operations. The TTPs aren't the problem, the politics are.
Many in the US. Not least the Infantry School and RAND (as Jslade0 mentioned).You miss that?No. That's called hanging your weapon around your neck (hands free). The pictures below shows the new and the old carry. The Recruiting Poster is from whence we learned it. You miss that, too?Carries his weapon? Hanging a weapon on a sling around your neck (hands free) is called carrying a weapon?It's meaningful to those who fought those battles -- to others, not so much. And as you say, even if not fully true. Add that if, in the end, for whatever reason if the tactics were great and Rhodesia is no more, then the strategy was flawed. Rightly or wrongly, the actions of the US , UK and moist of the Europeans were fairly predictable -- as were those of Russia and China."Tactically" means what happens at tactical level. Success there like "they never lost a battle" is meaningful (even if not fully true) regardless of what the politicians foulded up or they could not withstand in terms of international pressure.
You guys did good because you had to, that lends an impetus missing today. That simple.
Last edited by Ken White; 10-27-2011 at 01:20 AM.
They mostly come at night. Mostly.
- university webpage: McGill University
- conflict simulations webpage: PaxSims
I suspect he means that efforts to delay or avoid black majority rule were ultimately doomed to failure.
As Steve said:
Quite right. Nor can it substitute for a lack of realism at the national level about what is, or is not, achievable.Word. Tactical acumen cannot compensate for a failed strategy. Afghanistan anyone?
They mostly come at night. Mostly.
- university webpage: McGill University
- conflict simulations webpage: PaxSims
Circa. 1960 to delay was the (historically proven) intelligent approach but to avoid would have been futile.
Perhaps your attention (and that of a few others around here) should be drawn to the Southern Rhodesia proposed Constitution 1961 where the "Europeans" (meaning whites) accepted a qualified franchise system which would have led to an "African" (meaning black) majority in parliament within 7-8 years (soonest) or 10-15 years (more likely).
But the Brits - Alec Douglas-Hume and his flunky Duncan Sandys (Commonwealh and Colonial Secretary) - being led by the nose by that other "great" African democrat and champion of one-party elections Julius Nyerere - whose country (Tanzania) under his "enlightened" leadership went from the largest exporter of agricultural products in Africa to the largest importer of agricultural products - demanded that one 5 year term of parliament leading to a one-man-one-vote... once ... was the best they could offer and the best that - "great" body of democrats and human rights activists - the Commonwealth would accept.
In addition those two liberal authors (by the US definition) of Rhodesian military history - Moorcraft and McLaughlin - state in the preface of their 2008 edition:
That make one think?... Nevertheless, after nearly three decades, and in the light of the near-total destruction of the state by Robert Mugabe, many will look back and reflect that the Rhodesian rebellion, although doomed, was perhaps not so damned.
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