If what GEN Petraeus articulated to Ralph Peters ref. Afghanistan were translated into a language of strategy (Slap, I concede there are more ways to look at it) it might look like this - end = deny sanctuary to X-national extremists, ways = Afghan Security Capability and Capacity, means = OTERA (SFA as a force employment concept). The LOE timeline would have to be laid out, but it would seem to be significant – although it may vary in terms of level of effort. I think design when applied this way may provide the level of understanding in terms of requirements and capabilities to guide policy, and help us align the broader generating force with the operating force. In addition to being more effective, I also think it would be more efficient as identifying capability requirements early keeps us more proactive then reactive, and as such would support keeping the numbers of individual augmentees much lower – which since they are largely drawn from the generating force would reduce the risk in that area, and keep our force generation systems operating at a higher level of output. This would support balance through flexibility.

As a follow on, and to a point John Fishel made on the SFA as an individual capability thread, it would also allow us to look at what capabilities are required outside of DoD. In example - if the objective requires a greater capacity of FSF then the partner is currently able to generate, employ and/or sustain what are the contingent developmental objectives that must occur outside the SFA LOEand who should do accomplish them? Looking forward, this may allow the USG to adjust its polices, authorities, programs and priorities to meet those capability requirements and as such avoid risk to the other policy ends it must consider.

SAMS at Fort Leavenworth is the home of design, and CAC has now mainstreamed design into Army doctrine. At JCISFA we are looking at how to incorporate design into our SFA planning documents and tools.

Best, Rob