I see alot of humping grunts on tv from the safety of my living room
I think another issue with mechanization in COIN is the basing and logistics requirements it brings. Basing equals a larger "foreign" presence, which in turn creates an issue that an insurgent force can exploit. Since mechanized forces consume and need more in the way of supplies, they require a more extensive support network than light units, in turn creating insurgent-exploitable issues and targets.
You make a good point regarding the possible causal impact of mechanization; one that I think the original paper missed. As for the million-dollar question...it may come down to having units/forces that are trained/optimized for COIN and others that deal with larger conflict issues (which as I recall was one of the original arguments for the light divisions). Mechanized units have a clear place and utility in COIN, but their role is different than what you would see in a more conventional conflict. That might require different training and equipment (a good role for the traditional-style dragoon force slapout mentioned...or the traditional function of US cavalry prior to the world wars). Usually it's a question of force scale, and sadly our institutional "either/or" mindset hinders our ability to find that balance.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I see alot of humping grunts on tv from the safety of my living room
Sure....but I think the points of interest (at least in terms of this study) areOriginally Posted by goesh
a) What unit do they come from (mech or leg)?
b) How many of those grunts does the unit have to put on patrol?
c) Does that tie into success in COIN?
The questions raised are important for this conflict...and the one after it...and the one after that...
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
As indicated by my handle, I'm not impartial in this discussion.
I think most of the good points have been well said already, but will clarify some points:
1) 3ACR did not stable its horses. It did dismount a lot and patrol, but rarely out of sight from its vehicles for a number of security and C-IED reasons. It used them smarter. But absolutely the focus was population-centric. (source: 2 weeks in RIP/TOA with 3ACR with a company commander observing ops) It is partially true that the Dragoon concept largely won the Indian wars in the west from a tactical standpoint.
2) There are two issues here - the platform and the leader.
a) The ideal platform for COIN depends on the situation. Ramadi in mid-06 was ideal for tank/bradley ops due to its heavily kinetic nature, and you needed that armor and firepower to survive. Tal Afar in the same period was M1114/Stryker terrain where you wanted to avoid annoying the locals with a heavy footprint. In general, I'll agree that lighter vehicles able to protect a fair number of dismounts is ideal - as long as you have a few big guns to back you up.
Case study: April 2004 in Sadr City. A 1st CAV BN did not bring its tanks/bradleys because of the assumptions above - light was better. On April 4th a HMMWV patrol was attacked in central Sadr city, and cut off in a "Black Hawk Down" scenario. The 1st CAV unit was unable to get to the patrol due to a lack of Armor. In fact, a QRF launched in trucks suffered severe casualties. 2-37 AR (my BN) had to launch a tank company attack through Sadr city to rescue the patrol. The M1A1 was the only platform able to run the RPG gauntlet. They loaded the infantry on the backs of the tanks and shot their way out. I bet the Rangers/Delta in Mogadishu wished they had the same support inherent rather than begging from the Pakis and Bangledishis.
I'm certainly not saying Armor is the best platform for COIN, but you have to have it to get your nuts out of the fire.
Decision: Slight win for lighter forces. Every platform has its place and use though, the key is HOW you use it.
b) Leader mindset is a separate and highly subjective discussion in a "branchist" tone. Each branch has mentally agile and adaptive leaders.
That said, I can't resist plugging for Armor officers.A salient point was made by an SF LTC to me at the Carr Center conference. He pointed out that the majority of successes and best conventional COIN commanders from Iraq seemed to be Armor guys. He was asking me (an Armor guy in a COIN schoolhouse assignment) why that was. My best answer (I'm really not sure) was that most of the people he was citing (Chiarelli, MacMaster, Hickey, MacFarland, Mansoor, May, White, Tien) had Cavalry backgrounds. Cav is to Armor what Airborne is to Infantry (no flames from the airborne guys, thanks). Cav trains a decentralized, high initiative mindset that encourages innovative solutions with little higher guidance. Armor is more controlling and top down. That's my best explanation.
That said, I would say that all the branches have an equal number of leaders who get it and those who don't, and I've certainly seen more than one bonehead in Armor. I think generalizations about which branch and which profile (light/heavy) has a better mindset is nothing but speculation. You can make the argument that Tom has that the light guy is unencumbered by a maintenance tail and vehicle to attach himself to, but the Armor/Cav guy can argue that the light guy thinks in terms of short range objectives, and not an adaptable and rapid maneuverist approach. That's why the Army (until recently) sought to rotate infantry officers between light and mech and armor officers between armor and cav.... to balance the perspective.
Decision: Draw, based on individual leader personalities.
Now that I've stirred the pot ....
Last edited by Cavguy; 09-20-2007 at 03:57 PM.
I'm not exactly impartial either. I firmly believe you need a strong armor/cav force in place to serve as the sort of reaction/striking force you mention, CavGuy. Going back to Vietnam, there are too many examples of armor being able to shoot its way though just about any ambush to be ignored. The size of that force, of course, varies depending on the nature of the local threat, but you still need it.
At the end of the day, it really does come down to the leaders.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Just to add some more depth to your excellent choice of a "case study", here's an article from the Nov-Dec '04 issue of Armor Magazine describing that fight:
Sadr City: The Pure Armor Assault in Urban Terrain
Baghdad, Kut, and An Najaf were scenes of concerted attacks by the Mahdi army throughout Iraq on 4 April 2004. On that afternoon, elements of the Mahdi army engaged multiple elements of 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment (2-5 CAV), 1st Cavalry Division, nearly simultaneously throughout Sadr City in northern Baghdad. Twenty soldiers from Comanche Red Platoon, 2-5 CAV, had become isolated in the northern central portion of Sadr City, and available vehicle assets prohibited the unit’s exfiltration. Soldiers from C Troop, 2d Battalion, 37th Armor (Crusaders), attached to the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), conducted a hasty attack into Sadr City to relieve the isolated infantry platoon....
Ken,
Still, the biggest difference is in the mindset and willingness to kick out Squads and even Teams in some case versus fighting as a platoons -- and doing it all on foot...
I don't necessairly disagree with you, but will make two observations from Iraq experience:
1) Your dismounted, vehicle unsupported squad is attacked by 5-10 AIF. Your soldiers return fire and the enemy begins to displace. Your soldiers give chase, but are unable to move quickly enough to catch them because he is weighted down with 25 lbs of armor plus his weapons, ammo, etc. Being able to rapidly mount, maneuver, and disembark a team in urban warfare is key to getting the insurgents. Secondairly, if you get pinned down, joint patrolling near your vehicle provides cover, firepower, and rapid CASEVAC.
2) In my Sa'ad neighborhood efforts in Tal Afar, my infantry platoon patrolled exclusively dismounted. We began to discover more and more small IED's hidden that were only effective against dismounted troops. While reacting to a mortar attack against the patrol base, one of these IED's killed one and wounded two more of my soldiers in what I believe was a baited ambush. The IED was a remote controlled IED, which a HMMWV with countermeasures following the squad would have interdicted.
I completely agree that COIN must be done dismounted and interacting with the people, but in urban warfare getting too far away from your supporting vehicles can be dangerous, in my experience.
(Another TTP we used was to drop the patrol, and the vehicle section maneuvered in the area, but not with, the patrol, sometimes to "Beat the bush")
Again, it's your task, purpose, and method for the patrol, not the asset itself. A dismounted only team without backup in a place like Ramadi in 2006 is asking to take unnessary casualties.
But I think we agree in principle.
John Moore, the author, is a friend of mine. He is currently a Russian FAO stationed at the hardship post of the Marshall Center in Garmish, Germany. I was the BN S4 at the time.
He received the Silver Star for his action, along with one of his Platoon Leaders. A mechanic from his company filling in as a tank loader was killed in the early stages. Most everyone on the assault got (deserved) valor awards. My OIF 05-07 XO was one of his PL's and has two BSM/V's.
That issue of ARMOR also has the story of how 2-37 re-took Najaf from the Mehidi army during the Sadr Rebellion.
Great Plug!
Last edited by Cavguy; 09-20-2007 at 07:10 PM.
Hey Shek,
That is the one that concerns me.Absolutely. The interesting policy question that stems from this is still the same million dollar question - how do you (and can you) develop an Army that can truly be full spectrum and not one that pays lip service to full spectrum operations while treating small wars as the lesser included case?
We can't allow ourselves to believe we can make a rule (in a biological or physics sense) that our opponents will follow - or put another way, - that our enemies will abstain from casting a vote in the action, reaction, counter-action cycle. Even now our enemies (that would be them that are opposed to us due to their own interests or feel threatened by ours) are considering our trends, acquisitions, thoughts and actions and how to best prepare to defeat us with the means available to them. Unfortunately, the battlefield only seems to get more lethal because the technologies associated with it are prolific by being both increasingly cheaper and available. They will apply the full range of options available to them and they are keenly aware of our requirements to be better then them at everything we do in what is often their own neighborhood.
We face a myriad of counter-punchers in that regard. The best hope, and I believe our strength, is that we grow counter punchers at the unit and leader levels and provide them with the technologies in sufficient depth and quantities to adapt, innovate & prevail. However, as many have agreed, without the continued (and I'd argue increased) investment in the people (the leader and the led), the tech cannot be applied on the battlefield to good end (either the intended or adapted).
Best regards, Rob
Mechanized Beasts
Steve, your points are well taken and having only humped in my life, I am biased but it is not a stretch of imagination to assert that the COIN impact is one-on-one, small unit to neighborhood and the mechanized component is irrelevant from a purist perspective. Iraqis distinguish between man and machine, why wouldn't they? They certainly distinguish between man and beasts as tools. In other words, a tank might scare the hell out of some but not the men and visa-versa. The mechanized component gives a clear tactical and logistics edge so why slap the numbers to it and quantify and assess the impact from that perspective when truly non-tradional uses of the mechanized component are what should be exploited, or at least explored?
Has a Bradley or Stryker ever been parked beside a house so the man of the house could stand on it and make repairs to the upper wall/roof? How many older boys in very secure areas have gotten a ride in a tank and been allowed to drive it a little bit? Have any kids been given crayons and allowed to draw pictures on the side of a Hummer while the crew sits and sips tea and has a good laugh with the Iraqi parents and neighbors? If you want to get the locals to like the iron beast, get a few of them old WW2 Harleys with sidecar and start giving kids rides. Fun for the troops, fun for the locals and upsetting to AQ/insurgents. That's the ticket, ain't it?
Cavguy, No flames but for accuracy the horse quote was mine and I said it kind of tonge in cheek. Because the writer did not realize the concept of Dragoons fighting dismounted but using mounted mobility has been around for some time. The exact quote is on page 23 of the study 3rd ACR "innovation" it placed its heavy armor in storage(a practice known as"motor-pooling") and proceeded to patrol with dismounted infantry.
Next you beat me to it but there is something about the Cavalry organization that seems to make leaders different. Like you pointed out Macmaster could fight the HIC Gulf War1 and then was able to switch to COIN. In WW2 the the Constabulary force was based on a Cavalry unit not an LE unit. So Cavalry is able to HIC' em, LIC' em and CIC' em a full spectrum unit. And if you go Airborne you will be able to do this all around the world.
Last edited by slapout9; 09-20-2007 at 05:08 PM. Reason: fixes
When you opt for your airborne Cav mode, just don't expect to do much IED stopping with one of these:Cavguy,So Cavalry is able to HIC' em, LIC' em and CIC' em a full spectrum unit. And if you go Airborne you will be able to do this all around the world.
Cavguy,That said, I can't resist plugging for Armor officers.
Maybe because it's easier to read riding around versus humping a ruck
Seriously though, I think this is a great example of where the mechanization variable doesn't serve as a solid proxy for doctrinal approach/mindset. While having big toys, the goal on average for the cav is not to use them if possible, which is certainly a different mindset than an armored division designed and trained to take it to the enemy directly.
However, I'd suggest that this might not be the full story. Of the five names I recognize from your list, I see two masters degrees and two PhDs, all of them in the social sciences/humanities realm. The exception is COL McFarland, who did RIP/TOA directly from 3 ACR and thus, transitioned with a unit already successfully performing COIN. I'm not trying to detract from their successes, but I think you can attribute some of it to the learning curve that has occured across the Army as we've adapted to the war we need to fight. I'd be curious to find out what experiences (Bosnia? Kosovo? grad school? just general Cav experience) you'd attribute as being the foundation of success for Colonels May, White, and Tien. Thanks.
Shek
When you opt for your airborne Cav mode, just don't expect to do much IED stopping with one of these:
I thought these were supposed to be relaced by the M-8 Buford or something like that?
I think the Cav mindset is one component. Part is education, both military and civilian. For example, COL MacFarland is not a PhD, but was a SAMS grad. LTC Tien was a Rhodes Scholar, White House Fellow, and now a Harvard Fellow. Mainly it's being open minded enough to assess each situation for what it is, and adjust the plan accordingly. Adaptive leadership styles and being placed in situations where authority was decentralized is a common theme. None of those mentioned was a micromanager, but each provided an extremely strong commander's intent. Each placed their subordinates in the positions where they could best use their talents and personality to influence success. Each was willing to adjust the plan when it wasn't working, but recognized the necessity of perseverence through rough times.
I would also say each is a scholar and a reader, and learns from studying.
I am beginning to think that there is a connection between humanities education and success in challenging, unscripted situations, if for no other reason than history provides a framework of principles applicable to those situations. I have no backup for that.
I am sure I missed a host of great leaders from downrange, those listed (except Chiarelli) I have personally met or served for and can discuss why I listed them as such.
It's a topic worth studying, I'm not sure you can point to a single answer. I would also say that the officers listed above are generally less "narrow minded" than many other commanders I have observed, tolerate (to a reasonable extent) both pushback and discussion, and don't have a need to be right all the time.
Actually I think it was replaced by something called a Stryker, to which folks have had to add a bunch of funny cages and slat armor upgrades to make it survivable against WWII-vintage technology weapons like panzerfausts (oh excuse me, I mean RPGs) and such.
Seriously, I suspect that there is much to be said for keeping a balanced force. I concur that having a few M1A1's would have been very helpful in Mogadishu in 1993. The Germans found out the hard way about the mistake of not developing a mechanized force to complement their superb infantry back in WWI.
The Army cancelled the M8 AGS in the late 90's to fund the Crusader and Comanche. We saw how well those worked out. There was a movement in both 2000 and again in 2003-2004 to fund it instead of the Stryker 105mm variant and as a COIN/LIC tank.
My one experience on a M551 was as a cadet during CTLT at Irwin, it finalized Armor as my branch choice.
Absolutely. During ROTC Advanced Camp at Ft. Bragg I remember being on mile five of a road march in 100 degree heat and 100 percent humidity. "F*ck this, I wanna ride for a living" was my final conclusion on any infantry delusions I may have harbored.
As a result, I got Armor, but then was assigned to 25th ID (Light), where I proceeded to hump for three years as one of the five Armor LT's authorized to the Div Cav Squadron. Fate has a cruel sense of humor. When we did our HMMWV recon, I would look out the window at the poor SOB humping the mortar baseplate or the Dragon missile and thank God I went Armor.
Then I got to Iraq the second time and had to hump again to do COIN ops. <sigh>
Love the infantry, but not my passion.
Last edited by Cavguy; 09-20-2007 at 06:26 PM.
I think you are proposing one side of an interesting variant on the old nature vs. nurture chicken and egg question--Did these guys have a previous mindset/character/ disposition (nature) that made them choose a humanities education or did the humanities education develop (nurture) that predilection for open-minded flexibility? I know that I've just set up a false dichotomy, but it makes a nice LD (Does the Army still have, or need for that matter, Lines of Departure as an control measure in a non-linear war?) for further discussion of this topic.
For what it's worth, I think it's a combination, but with the mindset pointing the person toward the humanities path (not in all cases, obviously, but I do believe it's mindset then development). I also tend to think that the reputation and history (both real and perceived) of cav can draw people in that direction early on. There's been something of a historical trend of our more innovative, flexible officers coming from (or going into) the cav community. All branches produce innovative thinkers, but cav has that certain intangible that may attract them. All IMO, anyhow.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Correlation is not causality
This reminds me of a study that concluded that homes with more books in them tend to have children who are better readers. One should not conclude from that study that if you drop your entire paycheck at Barnes & Noble that your 6-year-old will be reading at the 12th grade level. It was not the presence of the books that made the kids better readers. The parents thought that reading was worthwhile and that good reading skills were important, so they owned lots of books. The children inherited the values of their parents. They thought that reading was enjoyable and important and put forth more effort to become better readers.
Likewise, there is a root cause to mechanization that correlates with a reluctance to do necessary dismounted work, but this does not imply a causal relationship. I would assert that militaries become more mechanized only after their country has modernized. An increase in modernization correlates with less tolerance for casualties in the so-called “middle wars” that include COIN. Less tolerance for casualties leads a military to reduce exposure to enemy actions by placing more armor between the Soldier and the enemy, as in Iraq, or to neglect the armor protection and then retreat in short order after fatalities hit double-digits, as in Mogadishu.
It’s not mechanization. It’s modernization.
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