COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

I'm often confused, Wilf, by what you write. At times, it seems you are saying that the military effort is the only material factor; but are you really advocating the Indonesian model ?

Well then I am at fault for being unable to progress my idea, in clear and simple terms. Here's the "Wilf for dummies" version.

A.) Use military force to confront military problems.
B.) If someone/your enemy, is using military means, then it's a military problem.
C.) People only use military means to promote political agendas.
E.) The political agenda and how it is changed and altered by the means used to promote it and counter it, is what you are fighting about. Therefore, always relevant in every type of conflict for the last < 3,000 years.
F.) Morality is a function of politics. Political belief is a statement of a moral position. Warfare promotes political positions, therefore moral positions in the eyes of those doing it. If actions undermine that, then it is nearly always problematic and usually counter-productive.

... and nothing we see today is new, in terms of the nature of war. Warfare yes, but the purpose to which it is put.

...and Carl Von Clausewitz, said everything I say, better and said it long ago.

[Tom Odom]

Well then I am at fault for being unable to progress my idea, in clear and simple terms. Here's the "Wilf for dummies" version.

A.) Use military force to confront military problems.
B.) If someone/your enemy, is using military means, then it's a military problem.
C.) People only use military means to promote political agendas.
E.) The political agenda and how it is changed and altered by the means used to promote it and counter it, is what you are fighting about. Therefore, always relevant in every type of conflict for the last < 3,000 years.
F.) Morality is a function of politics. Political belief is a statement of a moral position. Warfare promotes political positions, therefore moral positions in the eyes of those doing it. If actions undermine that, then it is nearly always problematic and usually counter-productive.

... and nothing we see today is new, in terms of the nature of war. Warfare yes, but the purpose to which it is put.

...and Carl Von Clausewitz, said everything I say, better and said it long ago.

Your best post ever, Wilf

"Cept for the CvC stuff...

Tom

[libertariansoldier]

I'd amend Rex's statement to delete the "pop-centric" adjective (which leads to debate as to what it means) and simply say:


The basic "political" insurgency can be reduced to three main groups, which are interactive and which may shape shift back and forth as to roles.

1. The combatant group - legally irregular combatants.

2. The infrastructure group - legally ?; should they be treated as combatants or as civilians ?

3. The supporting group - generally, legally civilians. The source of logistics, financing, personnel and intelligence.

But it is rarely basic, rarely falls into such neat categories, and that is what makes POP COIN problematic. There are also criminal gangs (such as narcotraffickers here in AFG or oil smugglers in the Niger Delta), there are corrupt officials playing both sides of the fence with their own private militias (and their name is Legion in AFG), there are part time fighters, who also raise crops or work in businesses and trade, and there are groups who will not actively seek to overthrow a central government, but fight ferociously for regional/local autonomy.

If your focus is targeting bad guys doing bad things, then the target set is relatively clean, if difficult to find. But if your focus is protecting the population, then you can find yourself in a bind (what percent of the time must x be doing things we don't like before we intervene? And is refusing to obey a corrupt official and firing him up a bad thing or a good thing, especially if there are no Good Governance/Rule of Law alternatives for the populace?).

So, I think that while POP COIN can be good tactics, like any good tactic its utility is situationally dependant. But once you make it your strategy, you are tied to it regardless of its applicability.
Regards.

[Fuchs]

I think it's legal to intern non-combatant supporters.

[William F. Owen]

Your best post ever, Wilf

"Cept for the CvC stuff...

Tom

Coming from you Tom, I don't take such a compliment lightly. - and if it wasn't for some of your more challenging observations, I do not think I'd have been forced to really examine these issues to the degree I now find necessary.

You've made me a better Clausewitian!

[marct]

Really great layout, Wilf!

A.) Use military force to confront military problems.

More on this, but generally agree.....

B.) If someone/your enemy, is using military means, then it's a military problem.

On the whole, I agree, but there is a fuzzy zone surrounding "military means". For example, look at the early 20th century use of military tactics by unions.

C.) People only use military means to promote political agendas.

Hmmm, I might shift that somewhat. In a few cases, there is plausible evidence that the "political agendas" are only surface solutions to deeper social / ecological problems, and that combatants can accept the same political agendas but still fight - the Aztec Flowery wars are a possible example of this.

D.)

????

E.) The political agenda and how it is changed and altered by the means used to promote it and counter it, is what you are fighting about. Therefore, always relevant in every type of conflict for the last < 3,000 years.

Interesting and, IMO, accurate in some ways. I'm not sure how exactly to untangle this, but if there are competing political agendas, then they are probably vying for popular support before conflict breaks out. This means that they will be idealized via the use of political and interpretive rhetoric. So, for example, the real political agenda may be to keep a small group of people in power while the rhetoric may be to bring power "to the people". In some cases, the underlying reality may be the same, just with different players and rhetorical rationales (cf here).

As I said, I'm still thinking about this one.....

Oh, yeah, I would boot that back to 6000 years, since there is some very good evidence of a MAJOR war back in about 3450 bce.

F.) Morality is a function of politics. Political belief is a statement of a moral position. Warfare promotes political positions, therefore moral positions in the eyes of those doing it. If actions undermine that, then it is nearly always problematic and usually counter-productive.

I'm not, quite, in agreement with the equation implied between morality and politics. I think that morality operates at a slightly different level (what Durkheim called "intermediary groups") and, while politics operates at that level, it also operates at larger levels. Having quibbled, I don't really have an argument that politics, wrfare, morality and individual ethics are all entwined.

Great post, Wilf !

[Graycap]

You've made me a better Clausewitian!

This one is really great!!!

Wilf, how could you find it?

[jmm99]

This

from Fuchs
I think it's legal to intern non-combatant supporters.

is correct - under GC IV, if they present a security risk, as supporters would.

That being said, many (e.g., Robert Thompson) recommend that both infrastructure and supporters be tried in the normal civilian court system to emphasize the Rule of Law. That apparently worked most of the time (not all of the time) in Malaya.

One problem that recurs is where the detainees have to be handed over to an HN court system which is a revolving door (examples in both Iraq and Astan).

Have to run now, but I do have some added comments on Wilf's response, which did not fully answer my question. It does nicely set out the theory behind the military effort. It does not take into account the political effort and who is supposed to do that.

Separate post to follow this afternoon.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Wilf, that was a great video, and I see now it will be more challenging than ever to convince you that the "hero" didn't discover everything about war and conflict as it is practiced in the 21st Century. While I will keep attempting, I see clearly now this effort will be as difficult as convincing a Japanese teenager that Michael Jackson, in addition to being a great artist, also had some flaws.

BREAK

If it is even possible can anyone define what political means in a useful manner?

Kilcullen wrote in his book "Accidental Guerrillas" that the current conflict with extremist Islam (Takfiri) is about politics, not religion. What does that mean to you? The responses will let us know if we're generally in agreement, or if there are significant differences in interpretation of what we mean by political.

I still think there is a significant difference between what political means in an an insurgency versus a State on State conflict that is largely conventional in character. The insurgent and counterinsurgent are organizing the populace at the grassroot level to achieve their objectives (not quite, but similiar to a bottom up approach). That is why it is frequently characterized as a war of infiltration and subversion (which Jmm captures to a large degree in his comments). Quite different from two conventional armies meeting on the battlefield. Political agendas are being pursued not through the local populace, but rather on the field of battle in an attempt to impose one State's will upon another through military force (e.g. pushing Saddam out of Kuwait). Of course there are political aspects to both forms of conflict, but there are considerable differences in how the political aspects of the conflict are pursued.

IMHO this is the real difference between unconventional and conventional warfare, and there is a large gray area in the middle. Did Clausewitz capture this?

[slapout9]

I still think there is a significant difference between what political means in an an insurgency versus a State on State conflict that is largely conventional in character. The insurgent and counterinsurgent are organizing the populace at the grassroot level to achieve their objectives (not quite, but similiar to a bottom up approach).

That is the problem. We were attacked by an Enemy organization (system) not a country!!! Until we understand that there will be no true progress IMO.

[jmm99]

this:

from Wilf

Here's the "Wilf for dummies" version.

A.) Use military force to confront military problems.

B.) If someone/your enemy, is using military means, then it's a military problem.

C.) People only use military means to promote political agendas.

E.) The political agenda and how it is changed and altered by the means used to promote it and counter it, is what you are fighting about. Therefore, always relevant in every type of conflict for the last < 3,000 years.

F.) Morality is a function of politics. Political belief is a statement of a moral position. Warfare promotes political positions, therefore moral positions in the eyes of those doing it. If actions undermine that, then it is nearly always problematic and usually counter-productive.

Point F muddies the waters, and is not material to my presentation - so, for the present, I place it on the shelf.

Points A, B and E correctly state CvC's: War is a continuation of Politik (inclusive of both politics and policy in German) by other means. So, no argument there since CvC is one of my favorite law books.

Point C ("People only use military means to promote political agendas.") is simply wrong on its face.

------------------------------
I am happy enough to use the term "political agenda" as a good starting and end point. Might as well start with Lenin, Mao and Giap as examples for use of the political effort and the military effort (in their terms, the Political Struggle and the Military Struggle).

As to the Political Struggle, use of your Points A and B is appropriate by changing a few words:

A.) Use political means to confront political problems.

B.) If someone/your enemy, is using political means, then it's a political problem.

Also your Point E (should be "D" ?) is valid in the Political Struggle:

E.) The political agenda and how it is changed and altered by the means used to promote it and counter it, is what you are fighting about.

although "struggling" (closer to CvC's "wrestling match duel") is probably a better term.

OK so far - we are following CvC (as our Com friends did also, starting with Lenin), and now have to ask: What was the common political agenda of Lenin, Mao and Giap ?

The basic answer is that their political agenda was a desired end state which would see the coming of the dictatorship of the proletariat which would in turn wither away leading to the utopian communist paradise. None of them deviated from that end goal; but they all realized that the precise paths to be followed were dependent on the particular conditions and contradictions of the country in which they worked.

This brings us to the political effort, which must be distinguished from the overriding political agenda. The political effort is framed by The Narrative (the apparent ideology, cause, slogan - which may be multiple and which does not necessarily include explicit reference to the political agenda).

For example, The Narrative in Russia, China and Vietnam focused on anti-feudalism and anti-imperialism (a different set of messages for each country based on its particular conditions). The Narrative is more operational and tactical than strategic; but The Narrative must in the end lead to the end goal of the political agenda (in the Com case, the dictatorship of the proletariat).

The nuts and bolts of the Com political effort was ideally to develop broad popular fronts encompassing causes that appealed to a broad spectrum of the populace. The Coms did not try to sell full-blown Communism to the masses (knowing they would not understand it), leaving that field of study for education of the Party infrastructure. In short, their political effort did not include their political agenda; but the Party kept in control of that political effort (e.g., the NLF in Vietnam via COSVN controlled by the Lao Dong).

However, The Narrative (which defines the political effort) had to be flexible enough to allow development into the political agenda's end goal. Example, land reform: kill or drive out those greedy landlords; distribute their lands to the tenant farmers; raise the political consciousness of the farmers (e.g., we gave you land, you give us your sons and also logistics, etc., help); and mobilize the farmers (note that "mobilize" goes beyond neutrality or even passive support) into active supporters of the revolution (even if they don't know what the political agenda calls for once the revolution succeeds). Of course, collective farms were the end goal of the Com's political agenda re: agrarian reform, but that knowledge was kept to the cadre (the "well-educated" party members).

Since The Narrative (apparent ideology, cause, slogan) is not the political agenda, The Narrative can (and will) morph as the revolutionary situation gets nearer and nearer to success. That is the doctrine of the Manipulation of the Cause (or Slogan). The Political Struggle (like the Military Struggle) may be viewed as a series of political engagements (each with its own character as determined by situational awareness), which are strung together as beads of pearls into a necklace which culminates in the end goal determined by the political agenda (the true ideology).

Now, since the political agenda (the Politik in CvC's words) controls both the Political Struggle and the Military Struggle by defining the end goal, both the Political Struggle and the Military Struggle have to end up at the same place. They also have to support each other during the period when they are stringing their respective engagements together to reach the common end goal.

The bottom line is that the political agenda should be distinguished from the political effort - they may be the same (as I view Malaya) or they may differ in apparent ideology, cause or slogan.

I am also not saying that the political effort can or should be used in all situations. The Indonesians saw no real need for a political effort; and Sri Lanka seems to also fit that mold.

Anyhowways, that's my take on the political agenda and the political effort. The latter, in a revolutionary insurgency, is basically Saul Alinsky + armed propaganda teams (convert and if not, then kill).

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

The problem with insurgency, of course, is that it is a Civilian government problem, not a "military problem."

The confusion comes because most civilian governments are slow to address the inadequacies of their approach to governance in the eyes of the populace (usually written off as the grumblings of crackpots and criminals) until it gets so out of control that it exceeds their capacity to address. At this point they dial 911 for the military to come in and "defeat the insurgency."

Nice to have a well behaved military who will respond to such calls. Some places the military comes in and simply defeats the government instead.

Always dangerous though to think of insurgency as a military problem. The problem for the military is how to best assist the civil government in restoring order. Certainly some of that must address the violence, but that should always be with the ultimate purpose in mind of repairing, or creating maneuver room for the repairing of governance and restoring a trusting relationship between the popualce and the government.

Merely sicking your military on the wayward populace like a well trained attack dog has never produced more than temporary success that I am aware of. And an insurgency fought and "won" every 20 years is one that has never been won at all, and is typically because of an inappropriate use of the military based upon an misplaced belief that COIN is warfare. Insurgency is warfare. If your vote doesn't count, your bullets may. But COIN is governance.

How you see the problem shapes how you address the problem, and my personal opinion is that most focus far too much on the symptoms that manifest in violence and turmoil, rather than on the root causes. Looking at the root causes is to look in the mirror as often as not.

[Mark O'Neill]

Great post Bob,

Mark

[Entropy]

The problem with insurgency, of course, is that it is a Civilian government problem, not a "military problem."

Is that still true when a country comes in, deposes the old regime and puts in a new regime, which the insurgents oppose? In that case the goal, it seems, is not simply to restore order, but to recreate it from scratch using a different recipe.

[William F. Owen]

Wow, what a response. OK, taking ALL of you as best I can....

a.) I don't differentiate between Religion and Politics. When they create "policy" they are both the same. Crime can also do the same thing. - and Clausewitz knew this. He knew all about the wars of "religion" in Europe.

- thus with all respect to Dave Kilcullen's, observation that the current conflict with extremist Islam (Takfiri) is about politics, not religion, is banal and obvious. ALL CONFLICT IS ABOUT POLITICS! - and How do you differentiate?
How does making that statement get you further forward?
Name me one violent Muslim group that does not have a clear political policy to set forth? A Caliphate is political!

b.) Military means using organised violence for the purpose of furthering policy. "Legally" that can include "criminal acts" but this speaks to intent. - but police enforce the law and the military enforce/resist policy.

c.) People only advance the political agenda they see as right. No one has political beliefs that they know are wrong. Hitler had a moral compass, and so did Mao and Stalin. People may do immoral things in war, but they are convinced that they are doing them for the right reason. - and thus Clausewitz just always assumes the moral purpose of war is right. - why would it not be?

Jmm:

War is a continuation of Politik (inclusive of both politics and policy in German) by other means.

Well I read that as "War is a setting forth of Policy with an admixture of other means" - but basically what you cannot get by diplomacy, argument and discussion, you force using violence. - and you may or may not keep talking while you do it - so basically "Had enough yet? - or do you want some more?"

So, Bob's World, you use military force to address the military problem. No conflict is purely military. WW2 certainly wasn't - ask the Italians and the Finns for the more obvious examples!
In so called "COIN", you are merely using force to confront a competing use of force. As I have said many time before, the political agenda will always still run - and will even be altered by the use of force - as when the US bomb's a village, and the ROE tighten to restrict the use of force, or troops loses cause you to re-evaluate the campaign objectives and thus the limits of what can be achieved. Ways Ends and Means, all alter as they are employed.

NONE OF THIS is "How to." It's all WHY, not how - and it's all been written down before by men far smarter than me.

[Firn]

I just wanted to add a second take on the most quoted phrase by CvC with some more contest.

CvC (Book 8, Chapter 6B):

Now, this unity is the conception that war is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself.

We maintain, on the contrary: that war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means. We say, mixed with other means, in order thereby to maintain at the same time that this political intercourse does not cease by the war itself, is not changed into something quite different, but that, in its essence, it continues to exist, whatever may be the form of the means which it uses, and that the chief lines on which the events of the war progress, and to which they are attached, are only the general features of policy which run all through the war until peace takes place.

Accordingly, war can never be separated from political intercourse, and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way, all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent, broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object.

a) I agree with Wilf, perhaps because I also see religion just as culture or a economic system mostly in the context of the (political) intercourse when concerning organized violence. The degree of their (perceived) influence differs greatly in time, space and society but are as a whole part of the game of politics.

If we think about the reasons of the choice of a poor farmer's son in the tribal areas of Pakistan to join the fight in Afghanistan this might not seem easily understandable. He might be attracted by the strict religious beliefs, a hate for the immoral and yet rich West, the shining guns, the booty, the bread to feed his family, the social acceptance of parts of the society, spirit of adventure, power, security, friendship - the list goes on and on. But their is no doubt he is and becomes part of a political game. A game fueled by dire economic conditions, specific views of a religion, a conservative culture, an explosive demography, tribal and family alliances, a game full of self-interest and interest into the well being of one's family, friends, village and tribe. A game with shifting alliances, internal and external conflicts and a lot of goals. Politics in the broad German sense seems to be sole sensible overarching term of the processes which initiate war and which permeate it.

To reduce this to 'culture', 'religion' or 'economy' is at best naive, but war is such a dangerous business that such mistakes can be among the very worst.


Firn

P.S: @Jmm99. Can we not see the 'political agenda' as the purpose, the 'way' or 'effort'as means and the goals as goals? Other than that I pretty much agree with your thoughts.

[jmm99]

My take on this:

from firn
P.S: @Jmm99. Can we not see the 'political agenda' as the purpose, the 'way' or 'effort'as means and the goals as goals? Other than that I pretty much agree with your thoughts.

The political agenda (policy) sets the initial purpose (the end goal or endstate), which is subject to policy changes. I look at means as the capabilities which determine and constrain the ways available to reach the end goal set by the initial purpose. So, the effort (whether military or political) consists of the means and the ways selected. Of course, there may be intermediate goals: engagement 1 > engagement 2 > engagement 3, etc.

CvC put down his sword and took pen in hand to write a philosophy of conflict. Since he was a soldier and general, he focused on military history and exemplified his concepts by using military examples. Of course politics is also a conflict, but not an armed conflict (as we presently define that in the GCs); although politics may include an element of violence, just as a "peaceful society" (one not in armed conflict) includes some measure of violence. Litigation is also a conflict, although on a much more micro-scale than either politics or war.

The passages you quote (Book 8, Chapter 6B) point to the unity of war and politics as part of the larger German concept of Politik. The last two paragraphs of the same chapter also make the same point:

Also auch die wirklichen Veränderungen der Kriegskunst sind eine Folge der veränderten Politik, und weit entfernt, für die mögliche Trennung beider zu beweisen, sind sie vielmehr ein starker Beweis ihrer innigen Vereinigung.

Also noch einmal: der Krieg ist ein Instrument der Politik; er muß notwendig ihren Charakter tragen, er muß mit ihrem Maße messen; die Führung des Krieges in seinen Hauptumrissen ist daher die Politik selbst, welche die Feder mit dem Degen vertauscht, aber darum nicht aufgehört hat, nach ihren eigenen Gesetzen zu denken.

Therefore, the actual changes in the art of war are a consequence of alterations in policy; and, so far from being an argument for the possible separation of the two, they are, on the contrary, very strong evidence of the intimacy of their connexion.

Therefore, once more: war is an instrument of policy; it must necessarily bear its character, it must measure with its scale: the conduct of war, in its great features, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen, but does not on that account cease to think according to its own laws.

Taking this and moving to the concepts of a Political Struggle and a Military Struggle (which must have a common endstate set by policy), each struggle has different means (capabilities) and ways to reach the common endstate set by policy. Because the means and ways are different, the Political Struggle and the Military Struggle each has its own character and laws; but each of them has to incorporate the basic character and laws of the overriding Politik. Otherwise, there is a disconnect (in Marxist terms, a contradiction) between the two struggles. They have to work together in an armed conflict, unless one finds it impossible, needless or counter-productive to use the Political Struggle (for which, a number of historical examples have been cited).

As to the relative use of the the Political Struggle and the Military Struggle, I turn to Bill Moore:

from Bill
I still think there is a significant difference between what political means in an an insurgency versus a State on State conflict that is largely conventional in character. The insurgent and counterinsurgent are organizing the populace at the grassroot level to achieve their objectives (not quite, but similiar to a bottom up approach). That is why it is frequently characterized as a war of infiltration and subversion (which Jmm captures to a large degree in his comments). Quite different from two conventional armies meeting on the battlefield. Political agendas are being pursued not through the local populace, but rather on the field of battle in an attempt to impose one State's will upon another through military force (e.g. pushing Saddam out of Kuwait). Of course there are political aspects to both forms of conflict, but there are considerable differences in how the political aspects of the conflict are pursued.

Consider, at the far end of the spectrum, Thermonuclear War where, once the policy decision is made by one party to turn the missile keys, politics disappears from the picture.

In the much larger grey area of lower-intensity armed conflicts, the decision has to made as to whether to engage in both the Political Struggle and the Military Struggle, or in the Military Struggle alone.

As to that, I look to your example:

from firn
If we think about the reasons of the choice of a poor farmer's son in the tribal areas of Pakistan to join the fight in Afghanistan this might not seem easily understandable. He might be attracted by the strict religious beliefs, a hate for the immoral and yet rich West, the shining guns, the booty, the bread to feed his family, the social acceptance of parts of the society, spirit of adventure, power, security, friendship - the list goes on and on. But their is no doubt he is and becomes part of a political game. A game fueled by dire economic conditions, specific views of a religion, a conservative culture, an explosive demography, tribal and family alliances, a game full of self-interest and interest into the well being of one's family, friends, village and tribe. A game with shifting alliances, internal and external conflicts and a lot of goals. Politics in the broad German sense seems to be sole sensible overarching term of the processes which initiate war and which permeate it.

where the Political Struggle is very likely to be pursued by at least one of the parties. If pursued by one, must or should it be pursued by the other ?

As to that question, there are many differing views - across the spectrum here, we have:

from wilf
... basically what you cannot get by diplomacy, argument and discussion, you force using violence. - and you may or may not keep talking while you do it - so basically "Had enough yet? - or do you want some more?"

and

from Bob
Merely sicking your military on the wayward populace like a well trained attack dog has never produced more than temporary success that I am aware of. And an insurgency fought and "won" every 20 years is one that has never been won at all, and is typically because of an inappropriate use of the military based upon an misplaced belief that COIN is warfare. Insurgency is warfare. If your vote doesn't count, your bullets may. But COIN is governance.

Despite this divergence of views, I'd hope that there is agreement that merely stringing together a bunch of TTPs does not equal a strategy.

[jmm99]

My quote of CvC re: War is a continuation of Politik by other means, is derived from his notes, see Nachricht and Notice (in pertinent part; emphasis as in origiinal):

Nachricht
....
Außer diesem faktisch bestehenden Unterschied in den Kriegen muß noch der ebenfalls praktisch notwendige Gesichtspunkt ausdrücklich und genau festgestellt werden, daß der Krieg nichts ist als die fortgesetzte Staatspolitik mit anderen Mitteln. Dieser Gesichtspunkt, überall festgehalten, wird vielmehr Einheit in die Betrachtung bringen, und es wird sich alles leichter auseinanderwirren. Obgleich dieser Gesichtspunkt hauptsächlich erst im achten Buche seine Wirksamkeit haben wird, so muß er doch schon im ersten Buche vollständig entwickelt werden und auch bei der Umarbeitung der sechs ersten Bücher mitwirken. Mit einer solchen Umarbeitung werden die sechs ersten Bücher manche Schlacke loswerden, manche Spalte und Kluft wird sich zusammenziehen, und manche Allgemeinheit wird in bestimmtere Gedanken und Formen übergehen können.
....
Berlin, den 10. Juli 1827

NOTICE
.....
Besides establishing this real difference in Wars, another practically necessary point of view must at the same time be established, which is, that WAR IS ONLY A CONTINUATION OF STATE POLICY BY OTHER MEANS. This point of view being adhered to everywhere, will introduce much more unity into the consideration of the subject, and things will be more easily disentangled from each other. Although the chief application of this point of view does not commence until we get to the eighth book, still it must be completely developed in the first book, and also lend assistance throughout the revision of the first six books. Through such a revision the first six books will get rid of a good deal of dross, many rents and chasms will be closed up, and much that is of a general nature will be transformed into distinct conceptions and forms.
....
Berlin, 10th July, 1827.

Trusting this will clear up any issues as to my source.

The Notice is also a reminder that On War is not a finished product. In present Joint terms, it would be a well-worked "concept", but not quite a "doctrine".

Regards to all

Mike

[M-A Lagrange]

Hello everybody,

Coming late in the debate, I took the time to read most of the post (My apologies to those I did not read).
As first comment, I would say: one thing that stunned me is how COIN has became the model of war rather than one way to do war. COIN is just one way to do war. What is different is the war among the people (And it's an old history) rather than COIN.

Secondly, not here but sometime ago, most of the authors, including P Gentil, were found of Algeria war. And here we have the exact opposite of Wilf position: Algeria war was a defeat despite a military victory. At the end of the war, most of FNL were jailed and FNL was no more a threat. OAS was a threat and a real one.

This to come to several thoughts:
1) Military action is the main part of war but not all of it. War has several fields, including military. Politic is one of them. Algeria or Suez just prove that you may military win a war and politically lost it (which is in accordance to Clausewitz but not with Wilf post). I'll take Suez as it was an attempt from France and UK to re enforce their political position through military operation. But they just forgot they were no more the world power they used to be at that time. So even with political will you may loose a war on the political field.
2) Nature of the insurgents may change even during war. Iraq is a good example of a multi nature enemy conducting multiple insurgencies. To caricature a complex situation: Us fought an insurgency lead by Sadam and at the same time several insurgencies lead by various groups who did not agree with the fact to be colonized by US, by Al Quada and finally by the government they putted in power (may be the easiest one). Some may even add that this turned, at some stage into civil war… COIN was the requested tool for the US but was not the nature of war.
3) It is too easy to say all who is against a state power is an insurgent. The qualification of insurgent is not a neutral term, unlike enemy. There was even an article in SWJ stating that civilian non violent actions to overthrow a government could be seen as an insurgency. Gandhi was an insurgent for the British but not for the Indian. (And he was not non violent neither).
4) Tomorrow's war will be something we did not see coming and the response still has to be invented. As theoretical example, if an enemy overflows US with fake money, conducting to massive economical break down and violence among civilian be an insurgency? Would the response be a COIN operation? Not sure. But here, I go out of Wilf mantra: war is just a military operation between military.
5) Insurgency as in Afghanistan and Iraq, from my point of view, comes more from an approximately planed occupation/stabilization phase rather than a purposely planned operation from the enemy. COIN has been a way to adapt to an enemy using terror and irregular warfare from the US but insurgency takes its roots elsewhere.
6) War is hard and tuff for everyone who lives it, including civilian. Personally I prefer that others did land on D Day rather than me. But I am not sure the average WWII soldier would have liked to be involved into internal fights between armed villagers for a reason he barlly understand. Neither would a nowadays soldier like to go, unarmed, to explain to unfriendly crowed that he is coming to help him and build a school and reinforce the central power they are against. At war, everyone task in not easy and dangerous even just being there is dangerous.
What COIN acknowledged is the fact that war do not end up in occupying a land and putting all the heads down. But this is a comment from Gallieni in 1898. And I am sure that looking into historical records, we would find a guy saying the same thing during the Roman Empire.
But what makes COIN or its extension in future interesting is the development of interaction between civilian and military power to achieve the same goal while they internally oppose to each others. (This may be taken as too think tanker… I which I could be one. I would be in a cozy office rather than a dirty container.)

Hope I am not too much out of the target.

[slapout9]

Always dangerous though to think of insurgency as a military problem. The problem for the military is how to best assist the civil government in restoring order. Certainly some of that must address the violence, but that should always be with the ultimate purpose in mind of repairing, or creating maneuver room for the repairing of governance and restoring a trusting relationship between the populace and the government.

The military just needs to be concerned with guard duty. In the 1975 guard manual I posted a while back under Exterior Guard there is even a short section on how this is there primary purpose during Guerrilla Warfare, to include special orders (rules of engagement) for how to handle them. This myth of COIN being some graduate PHD level of War is the biggest Con game going out there now. As Wilf said it is nothing but a way to rip off taxpayers with big consultancy contracts.

Link to the Real COIN Manual FM 22-6 Guard Duty aka How To Protect The Population.
https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPo...m/22-6/toc.htm