Who are the great generals?

[Bob's World]

Excellent book and excellent point. Just curious, I read it in 2006, has it been revised to cover the resurgence of the Taliban?

The most recent chapter, at the end of this version covers through 2008. I hesitate to say final chapter, as that will not likely ever be written for this land that sits at the crossroads of so many diverse cultures.

[j earl]

I think they should offer a supplement to the original book every couple years. Maybe we can talk McCrystal in 50 years or so.

The most recent chapter, at the end of this version covers through 2008. I hesitate to say final chapter, as that will not likely ever be written for this land that sits at the crossroads of so many diverse cultures.

[Xenophon67]

Ah...the age old debate. I realize the following suggestions will present further consternation, but I can think of no other definitive way to template this very important activity.

Categories:

1. Tacticians
2. Strategists
3. Masters of the Operational Art

Periods:

1. Antiquity
2. Medieval
3. Early Modern Era to 1792
4. Modern to 1919
5. 20th century
6. OOTW

A GOOD READ:

(Note: "An All-Time Command Team" by Lieutenant Col. George L. Simpson (1937) The Infantry Journal Reader by Col. Joseph I. Greene. Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc. 1943)

[Xenophon67]

In response to "It rasies the question who are the great generals, why were they great and why are we not producing their equivalents today?"

(Apologies for this only being bullet points)

- We may in fact be producing top quality commanders, yet are there the opportunities to be 'great'.
- The emphasis upon scholarship today is profound, more so and at lower levels, therefore Napoleon would be happy "Read the campaigns of the Great Captains..." therefore the potential is there
- The mission(s) are not conducive to grand, sweeping campaigns requiring a dynamic commander (?)
- The political/administrative limitations on a commander are very restrictive, therefore no one commander (in the field) will every have the opportunity to be a Zhukov or even a Patton.

Perhaps we consider - in more depth - the qualities necessary to earn the title great?

[Bob's World]

If it is for the want of opportunity, I raise my glass to "No more great generals!!"

[Firn]

If it is for the want of opportunity, I raise my glass to "No more great generals!!"

It is pretty hard to argue with that. Sadly there will be opportunities, hopefully just not too grand ones, at least in the near future.

Firn

[Bob's World]

I've been a huge fan of U.S. Grant as the greatest general the U.S. has ever produced in my opinion. Others who actually knew him regarded him highly as well:

"When hearing Grant referred to as a "Military Accident," with no distinguishing merit, one who had achieved success through a combination of fortunate circumstances, Lee responded by saying, "Sir, your opinion is a very poor compliment to me. We all thought Richmond protected, as it was, by our splendid fortifications and defended by our army of veterans, and could not be taken. Yet Grant turned his face to our capital and never turned it away until we had surrendered. Now, I have carefully searched the military records of both ancient and modern history, and have never found Grant's superior as a general. I doubt his superior can be found in all history." -- General Robert E. Lee, commander of the Army of Northern Virginia


"I'm a darned sight smarter than Grant; I know a great deal more about war, military histories, strategy and grand tactics than he does; I know more about organization, supply, and administration and about everything else than he does; but I'll tell you where he beats me and where he beats the world. He don't care a damn for what the enemy does out of his sight, but it scares me like hell." -- Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman

[libertariansoldier]

The greatest (because they also ran their empires/republics as an additional duty):
Alexander the Great
Genghis Khan
Napoleon
Caesar (the Leonardo of military leaders--general, statesman, engineer, writer and excelled at all of them)

the best of the rest (chronologically):
Hannibal (tactically, not strategically)
Scipio
Belisarius (another tactical genius)
Gonsalvo de Cordoba
Marlborough
de Saxe
Davout
US Grant
Moltke the Elder
Manstein
Slim
MacArthur (WWI heroics, plus island hopping, plus Inchon)

Plus 1 squid--Nelson

2nd Team All-Stars
Phillip of Macedon (hey he designed the Army that conquered most of the known world, plus Chaeronea)
Gustavus Adolphus
Turenne
Louis II de Conde
Eugene of Savoy
Allenby
Rommel


Honorable Mention
Cornelius Sulla
Alessandro Farnese, Prince of Parma
Cromwell
Charles XII of Sweden (tactically)
R.E Lee
Patton
Zhukov

And having been on the CENTCOM staff at the time, the idea of Zinni being anywhere near this list makes me want to hurl. Generalship is not measured by how smooth you are.

[John T. Fishel]

Like Bob's World, I have long been a fan of Grant. Although he was pilloried as a "butcher" (of his own troops) an examination of his record on casualties shows that his losses were either comparable or less than those of his contemporaries on both sides. So, Grant clearly meets my criteria for greatness.

The Lee and Sherman quotes are fantastic! Sherman also shows the importance of competence among subordinates that was pointed out by Ken when talking of MacArthur. A Sherman, Sheridan, Krueger, (possibly an Odierno) can make a Grant, MacArthur (or Petraeus). A Willoughby or an Charles Lee can cost his principal - MacArthur or Washington - a battle, campaign, or war.

I like Libertairian soldier's comprehensive list although I might add or subtract a few names.

Cheers

JohnT

[Fuchs]

I've always been astonished by the focus of Americans on their Civil War whenever the topic moves to military history. Even really smart Americans seem to treat that one few-year civil war as a kind of inexhaustible reservoir for military history insights.
I've yet to meet a British, French or Russian who's comparably fixated on the Crimean War, for example.

I understand the the choice of national military history isn't very rich for Americans - but shouldn't that motivate a broader look at military history?


It's certainly unnecessary and kind of rude, but I'd like to remind you all that the U.S.Civil War wasn't nearly as modern as it's often believed to be. Yes, there were telegraphs, railroads and rifles. Mobilization included industrial output and millions of men. The navy had some naval mines and iron-plated/steam-powered ships in use.

Nevertheless, the ground war equipment was quite obsolete in comparison with Europe (Prussia had introduced a breech-loading firing pin rifle in the late 40's and stomped the Minié-rifle equipped Austrians with it at about the same time as the civil war + the U.S. Civil War saw few if any breech-loaded guns and modern shells).

The tactical skill was mostly amateurish - as it was to be expected with such a rapid and extreme army expansion. Corps commanders were comparable in skill to Prussian wartime Majors in my opinion (and Lincoln's issues with officers reflect the competence problem).

The operational skill was marginal except for deep raids. Compare the Battle of Sedan or the (way to the) Battle of Königgratz with any USCW battle for comparison.

The USCW is a war like many others to me, without particularly valuable lessons. In fact, it seems to be have been the beginning of an American habit to simply overcome inadequacies by throwing superior quantities of resources at a problem. That's the opposite of skill (except if you look at logistics only, of course).

The (rare) episodes of U.S. warfare with inferior resources (such as guerrilla warfare on Mindanao, opening weeks of Korean War, Defence of Bastogne) are much more of interest and much more inspiring in my opinion.

Nobody suggested an officer of the 101st at Bastogne so far, but we've had mentions of a long list of USCW characters already.

[JarodParker]

I might catch some flak for this but I’d have George Washington on my Top 10 list. Even though some of his engagements turned out to be disastrous, he also had his share of daring victories which I find that much more impressive when considering the fact that most of his subordinate officers and troops were learning how to soldier on the fly.
He was adept at managing IO and military intelligence. He also had one quality that no great general can go without... luck.

But above all else what I find most admirable about GW is that, as ambitious as he was, he was willing to relinquish power when the time came instead of crowning himself Caesar (or Napoleon).

[John T. Fishel]

a year after the American Civil war ended. As for breechloaders and repeating rifles, they played a role in the Civil War. In one of the great delaying actions of all time, IMO, BG John Buford, commanding a cavalry brigade on 1 July 1863 at Gettysburg PA, using seven shot Henry and Spencer repeating carbines fought a dismounted delay of the Confederate advance from the West (led by Heth's division) until Reynolds brought First Corps up. If you wish to discuss strategy, there was nothing in Europe (other than the invasions of Russia in 1812 and 1941) that was anywhere near so vast as the theaters of the American Civil War. The Western campaigns being fought at the same time as those in the east dwarf anything in Europe in the 19th Century. When both theaters are addressed at the same time the Crimea, the wars of German unification ending with the Franco Prussian War become minor skirmishes. The fighting around Richmond in 1865 very much foreshadows the trench warfare of WWI. One last element of technology was the introduction of the rapid fire gun in the form of the Gatling gun whose principles are still used in modern weapons. Oh, I forgot, the USS Monitor (and her successor monitors) introduced an entirely new principle of naval shipbuilding/gun platform - the rotating turret which reached its epitome with Dreadnought type battleships. but it had not been seen prior to 1862 in Monitor's class with CSS Virginia. Between 1815 and 1914 the only major war between peer competitors was fought in North America between two American militaries - the USA and the CSA.

[Schmedlap]

I've always been astonished by the focus of Americans on their Civil War whenever the topic moves to military history. Even really smart Americans seem to treat that one few-year civil war as a kind of inexhaustible reservoir for military history insights.
I've yet to meet a British, French or Russian who's comparably fixated on the Crimean War, for example.

I think it's due to the social impact, rather than the military prowess. Southerners still identify partly as "rebels" and re-enactments are performed on the grounds that they were fought on, which tend to be on the outskirts of current towns. It is really quite a spectacle to behold, seeing drunken southerners throwing beer bottles at the triumphant union reenacters, shouting, "you cheated!" I'm guessing that most Brits and Frenchmen don't identify strongly with the side that they fought on in the Crimean War.

There is also the fact that the loss of life was crazy at places like Antietam and Gettysburg and there's the dynamic of friends, cousins, and even brothers fighting against one another (rather than nationalities). It is also noteworthy that this war was not about a great game or access to ports or resources. It was about the survival of our nation and it nearly destroyed us. And then there's the whole freeing the slaves thing.

Deep down, we're an idealistic bunch of folks and stuff fought over ideals really resonates with us, which goes a long way in explaining how the recent adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan were sold to us.

Slightly on topic: I would also like to nominate a worst General. My nomination is General Tso. As someone who lived on General Tso's Chicken t-rations for a year, I will curse that name until the day I die.

[marct]

Hi John,

Between 1815 and 1914 the only major war between peer competitors was fought in North America between two American militaries - the USA and the CSA.

I'm not sure I would agree with you on this. First off, calling the USA and CSA "peer competitors" is really pushing it. While they were up until, say, the end of 1861 or early 1862, the manufacturing, population, infrastructure, etc. imbalances were profound. Second, and this is a quibble with the word "major", I would argue that the Crimean war was also "major" with actions from the Pacific to the Baltic as well as the main theatre in the Black Sea. I guess it all depends on how "major" is defined .

Cheers,

Marc

[Bob's World]

Come on guys, most Europeans take Fuch's position that there was nothing to learn from the American Civil War;which is why they fought WWI to such a bloody stalemate accomplishing nothing except the demise of a generation. Amercia didn't get there soon enough to help with much of the fighting, but unddoubtedly most of the Europeans who fought in WWII were half American, so we like to think we countributed in a meaningful way regardless.

Once we've had our cities burned, our treasures plundered, or borders erased and redrawn by others and our women violated a few times we too can be as savvy of warriors as the Germans.

Oh, but I do find the whole re-enactor thing a bit bizzare. I think 5 minutes on a real Civil War battlefield would cure most re-enactors from a lifetime of marching around on fake ones.

As to Bastogne, the only General there was Anthony McAuliffe; becuase his boss went on leave. The German army wasn't stopped by Generals, they were stopped by Privates.

[John T. Fishel]

Peer competitors: I'm glad we agree that USA and CSA were "peers" in 61 and 62. Agree that the Yankees brought population and industry to bear by 63 and they were no longer "peers" - the Gettysburg campaign in the East and Vicksburg campaign in the West are, I think, indicative of that. My sense of "peer competitor" is really at the beginning of the conflict and to some extent the perception of the combatants but not entirely. For example, in 1845 the US and Mexico perceived each other as peer competitors - they weren't, it was just a misperception. But I do think that, as you said, in 61 and 62 the USA and CSA were.

Crimea as a "major" war: Yes, there were more theaters than just the central one in and around the Black Sea. But the Baltic theater was almost entirely limited naval action as was the Pacific coupled with a few amphibious raids. Nothing really decisive happened outside the Black Sea/Crimea theater. By contrast, the American Civil War had two major land theaters and an extraordinarily difficult supporting sea war - blockading the entire American East and Gulf Coasts (from the MD/VA border to TX). The Western theater involved cutting the Confederacy in two at the Mississippi River depriving the Confederate heartland of its Western food resources and LOC from Mexico. The eastern theater is more well known. But it was from the West that Sherman, with Grant's support and Lincoln's approval, launched his biltzkrieg from Atlanta to Savannah and then north through the Carolinas while Grant drove on Richmond all over the ground of the 62 Peninsula campaign in a giant strategic pincer.

Must be your old Tory ancestors trying to tweak this Yankee Doodle

Cheers

JohnT

[Firn]

Come on guys, most Europeans take Fuch's position that there was nothing to learn from the American Civil War;which is why they fought WWI to such a bloody stalemate accomplishing nothing except the demise of a generation. Amercia didn't get there soon enough to help with much of the fighting, but unddoubtedly most of the Europeans who fought in WWII were half American, so we like to think we countributed in a meaningful way regardless.

Once we've had our cities burned, our treasures plundered, or borders erased and redrawn by others and our women violated a few times we too can be as savvy of warriors as the Germans.

This is a post with which I have to disagree rather strongly. While the first part is questionable the second is rather offensive, to say the least. The implied connection between individual or tactical performance and ultimate victory can be very easily disputed, but what strikes me a bit is the beginning. Burned cities (with burned human beings in them) and violated womens don't go too well with a smile, at least for me.


Firn

[Schmedlap]

While the first part is questionable the second is rather offensive, to say the least... Burned cities (with burned human beings in them) and violated womens don't go too well with a smile, at least for me.

I think the gist of it was that there is some irony in poo-pooing one country's interest in its civil war when a disregard of the issues underlying the conflict led to a far more uglier war in one's own backyard. Maybe not the most tactful way of putting it, but I think it was made in the spirit of what we Americans refer to as "ball busting."

Emoticon etiquette is still in development phase.

[Fuchs]

I think the gist of it was that there is some irony in poo-pooing one country's interest in its civil war when a disregard of the issues underlying the conflict led to a far more uglier war in one's own backyard.

I do strongly doubt that the tactical and operational experiences from 1861-1865 had much value in regard of the problems of 1914-1918.


The machine gun invention, smokeless powder invention (which made the machine gun really useful), widespread introduction of explosive and shrapnel shells, standardization on breech-loaded guns, standardization on quick-firing guns, the rise of technical troops, introduction of automobiles, introduction of spitzer bullets, introduction of open battle order (the version of that period), development of telephones, late industrialization population growth, introduction of railway artillery all came after the USCW.
The development of a general staff, the skilled application of operational and tactical art (such as encircling à la Sedan), fortress networks, central fire cartridges, high population density were pretty much absent and other advances of the time such as standardized arms production were iirc not fully implemented yet as well.
These changes changed the face of modern conventional ground war several times between 1865 and 1914.

The Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars were more highly regarded as lessons before 1914 and that was right. Both were totally inadequate lessons (as were all wars post-'45 in regard to today's state of the art), but still much more relevant than the USCW simply because they were fought with more similarities to the situation of 1900-1913 than the USCW had to offer.

The lessons of 1865 cannot have been too valuable anyway because the U.S. Army quickly turned itself into the apprentice of the French army and learned the "firepower destroys, infantry occupies" attitude.
(The U.S. Navy became apprentice of the Royal Navy, having been late with the Dreadnought and central fire control revolutions).


The USCW (ground) had its interesting facets in regard to telegraphs, railways, marauding and industrial production - but it wasn't interesting in regard to operational art and tactics in general. Napoleon was better - MUCH better.
The use of telegraphs in the Prussian wars +/- 10 years was more professional, while superior operational art offered less time for industrial mobilization (the war was won without throwing huge quantities of newly produced resources at its problems).


Accordingly, I have a rather low opinion of the generals involved and suspect a tunnel vision whenever an American expresses his admiration of a USCW general.

[Schmedlap]

I do strongly doubt that the tactical and operational experiences from 1861-1865 had much value in regard of the problems of 1914-1918.

Agree. I think the real lessons are political, strategic, economic, et cetera. I, too, never had much interest in the minor details of how some General executed a wagon wheel left or integrated artillery in support of a bunch of guys standing up shoulder-to-shoulder in the open.