Planning and the proverbial "Squirrel!"

[Fuchs]

Hmm, I read an article in Armor Magazine (or was it infantry?) from the 90's which was about how a U.S. division fought its way through France and Germany iirc almost entirely without written orders.

I do also recall a document about a U.S. Corps wargame from about 82' where the U.S. corps in Germany had invited iirc Balck and v.Mellenthin to participate. The two veterans stressed how decision-making had to be done in a few minutes, and both the two veterans and the American team were able to put together a mobile defence battle plan for the corps in a few minutes. The veteran's plan was more daring and radical, but both chose the same basic approach.

Officers up to army commander level (above corps) had issued 'spoken' orders without written backup regularly in WW2; in Wehrmacht, Waffen SS and Patton.


Now, could someone please tell me why only written orders should be used above Coy level? TAH?

[Steve Blair]

Now, could someone please tell me why only written orders should be used above Coy level? TAH?

Very simple, Fuchs. CYA.

[Fuchs]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cover_your_ass ?

So why exactly should a modern officer in a should-be command system have a need to cover his rear like that when officers who served under a murderous, micro-management-obsessed dictator didn't?


Isn't "CYA" an explanation for an interim solution instead of for a really good command system?

edit: Lest I forget; aren't spoken orders not actually preferable for "CYA" because their existence can be denied?

[Steve Blair]

Because it's the business school mentality that's been drilled into the US forces since the middle 1950s, Fuchs. That's why. And no, I don't support it or believe in it. You would be sadly confused if you thought I believed that the current "system" was a good thing.

[Cavguy]

Hmm, I read an article in Armor Magazine (or was it infantry?) from the 90's which was about how a U.S. division fought its way through France and Germany iirc almost entirely without written orders.

It was by Don Vandergriff in ARMOR about a decade ago about MG Wood and 4th Armored Division. I have it in my files somewhere. Will try and find a link.

[Jobu]

To keep pace with the fight, or the information overload that we have these days? When fax machines began showing up in the field in 1983 I could see that the floodgates were just starting to open up, information-wise.

That's a good question...and one that goes back to my original point. Are we in an age where it is expected to both digest and produce a large amount of info (for CYA and other reasons)? Does that explain the large staff sizes? Is there any turning back? I'm not sure using the excuse that there's too much info will hold water these days.

[Kiwigrunt]

Is there any turning back? I'm not sure using the excuse that there's too much info will hold water these days.

Probably not, we simply haven't got enough info to make that case.

[Eden]

That's a good question...and one that goes back to my original point. Are we in an age where it is expected to both digest and produce a large amount of info (for CYA and other reasons)? Does that explain the large staff sizes? Is there any turning back? I'm not sure using the excuse that there's too much info will hold water these days.

Staffs are large because commanders are asking them to do a lot. They are large because we have rank-inflation, with three-stars doing a one-star job and so forth. They are large because we are doing things jointly, which requires more liaison and coordination. They are large because it is much easier to start doing things than it is to stop doing things. They are large because the headquarters they service don't have to move.

They are large because commanders have the leisure to micromanage (see rank inflation, above). They are large because many of the functions that used to be performed by subordinate units are now performed by staffs. They are large because our current operations are labor-intensive when it comes to staff work; you can't do key leader engagement, for instance, with a computer program.

They are also large because a lot of information is coming into the headquarters, but any body who thinks that is the prime mover is mistaken. It is much more a result of American military culture meeting Parkinson's Law

[Pete]

True enough, Jobu, but some information is a lot more important than other information. "Glass cockpit synrome" is said to happen when a pilot becomes overloaded with information; it also happens to air traffic controllers or new lieutenants in FDCs. In the Army people are supposed to stay in their own lanes and do their jobs to the best of their ability, including staff officers working in their comparatively trivial niches. The net result is that we're overwhelming ourselves with our own staff processes.

When the COIN manual was being conceptualized I believe Gen. Mattis said that journalists made some of the best contributions, probably because they'e big-picture guys who don't stay in narrow little lanes.

[Fuchs]

http://www.knox.army.mil/center/ocoa...00/5wood00.pdf

After viewing his division’s first written order in combat, MG John S.
Wood, commander of the 4th Armored Division, told his G3 (operations officer)
not to issue any more. Wood believed the formatted, five-paragraph
order taught to U.S. Army officers at the Command and General Staff College
at Fort Leavenworth would only slow down his division’s decision cycle
in combat.
The fact that MG Wood could dispense with written orders while leading
his division across France highlights the level of training, cohesion, and education
that a unit would need to achieve in order to execute verbal mission orders.
The 4th Armored Division’s “daring, hard-riding, fast-shooting style” was
made possible through the execution of mission orders. But only by “throwing
away the book,” ironically, did the division accomplish the armored warfare
envisioned by the writers of FM 17-100, Armored Command Field Manual,
The Armored Division.2

The war exposed Regular officers to responsibilities far beyond anything
they had experienced, and forced them to rely on subordinates who were
essentially commissioned amateurs.
Most division commanders and their regimental commanders, who were
largely pre-war regulars, turned toward authoritarian, top-down methods of
command. They issued detailed orders, insisted on unquestioned obedience,
and used their staff officers to check on compliance. Reposing trust and confidence
in a subordinate entailed the possibility that he might fail, and embarrass
his ambitious superiors with their eyes on one of the many commands
being formed.13
Wood was the exception to this trend, taking the pain of creating autonomy
that would allow his officers to learn from their mistakes. He won their loyalty,
and developed subordinate leaders not afraid to take risks in the face of
German actions.

Wood speeded up decisions by using this ability to change task organizations
to solve a particular tactical problem. From the first day of his command,
Wood did his utmost to ensure that his commanders and their staffs were not
focused on processes or formulas. Wood understood that over time,
through constant training, officers memorized and verbalized a seemingly
complex decision-making process He was against these tidy methods of control
and written prescriptions for ensuring control.

The division trained on how to task organize for a particular
mission, and then, on Wood’s orders, reform the task forces while on the
move to meet a new threat. Wood did this with no fancy briefings or lengthy
rehearsals. He used the radio, and face to-face oral instructions to train his
division to operate without written directives.
Speed was always on Wood’s mind as he trained, not just speed of
motion, but speed in everything the division executed. The training enabled
the division’s officers to do away with many standardized procedures that
would slow down their actions, such as abiding by strict radio procedures.
For example, Wood’s battalion commanders and the division command
learned to recognize each other by voice — authentication by familiarization.
This increased flexibility, and translated into the ability of commanders
to change directions more quickly, without worrying that the orders received
were false. Rapid decisionmaking increased with operating procedures
that eased the ability of commanders to make decisions. This translated
into fluid tactics.

The article is probably a bit coloured by the fact that Vandergriff is a Maneuver Warfare mafia guy.

[Pete]

Keep in mind that Wood commanded the 4th Armored Division during Third Army's breakout from Normandy and the exploitation across France, a very fast-moving time when Third Army would literally advance right off the maps it had. Wood was removed from command during the more static campaign in Lorraine in the vicinity of Metz for arguing with his corps commander, a man who also was sent home a couple of months later for health reasons. Wood was upset by how his 4th Armored was being repeatedly used as a fire brigade to bail out less dynamic units. At the time the fuel and ammunition shortage and a reconstituted German line had slowed things to a crawl.

[Cliff]

Quick question-

I have heard that the 5 paragraph order and the MDMP process were developed in case the Big One kicked off vs. the USSR. The story was that if the IRR/inactive reserves were activated the AD cadres could use MDMP as a simple way of leading the not as proficient callups.

Any truth to this? Thanks!

V/R,

Cliff

[Fuchs]

edited away