Son Tay raid: stop or go? Vietnam

[jmm99]

And so it goes with counterformists.

On the other hand, I'm gratified that Bill Moore and Ken White picked up on my presentation. BTW: Bill expressed one of the thoughts I've had but didn't express: "... perhaps it was better they weren't there, because PW casualties during the raid may have resulted in negative press that undermined the desired strategic message."

Melvin Laird was less than articulate at times, but, in terms of the Nixon-Kissenger principals re: Vietnam, Laird was relatively straight-forward (e.g., the Cambodia bombing ought to have been made public upfront). I also read his interview with MAJ Mitchell in which he stated what he believed at the time he met with Nixon:

from JMA's snip of interview
... Do you understand? I know what you are asking. The Hanoi information was simply not believable.
....
Do you understand? I believed the information to be inaccurate. I informed the President about new information concerning the deaths of additional POWs being held. The CIA passed that as many as 10 more POWs had died in captivity.

Based on both Amidon and Michell (the latter more detailed at pages 6-7), on 20 Nov, Blackburn, Bennett and Moorer were faced with a non-consensus by the DoD analysts as to whether the POWs were at Son Tay or not. That military trio decided it was more likely than not that the POWs were there. Moorer and Bennett then met with Laird. See also 1988 SOCOM at post end.

BTW, Moorer was well aware by then of Nixon's position; from Amidon (p.5 pdf)

“When [Admiral Moorer] mentioned that the mission would be canceled if there was any sign that the enemy was aware of the objective, Nixon protested: ‘Damn, Tom, let’s not let that happen. I want this thing to go.’”[29]

29. Vandenbroucke, p. 63.

Before Laird went in to see Nixon, he met with Dick Helms. They discussed (1) the Hanoi information; and (2) the most recent POW deaths (the latter detailed in the Laird interview snip above). I've found no details re: the Laird-Helms conversation re: the Hanoi information. So, I can't prove that discussion created or reinforced Laird's belief that the Hanoi information was "inaccurate" and "not believable" - it clearly did not lessen that belief if it already existed.

BTW: While it may shock some, Presidents (with some exceptions) are not interested in intelligence details - only the adviser's BLUF.

As we know, information + analysis = intelligence. Son Tay definitely suffered from "information paucity" (if that is an "intelligence failure", so be it). In what (if any way) the analysis was faulty has not been laid out in anything I've read. In an low information environment, a single bit of new information easily may be perceived to be great import. It may or may not be of material import to the larger picture.

We do have "eyewitness testimony" from a number of Son Tay particupans in 1988 (link to pdf, 93 page transcript):

SON TAY RAID PANEL DISCUSSION
USSOCOM COMMANDERS CONFERENCE
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA
29 MARCH 1988

Participants:
Lieutenant General LeRoy J. Manor, USAF (ret)
Brigadier General Donald D. Blackburn, USA (ret)
Colonel Elliott P. Sydnor, USA (ret)
Colonel John V. Allison, USAF (ret)
Colonel Richard A. Dutton, USAF (ret)
Introduction by General James J. Lindsay
Moderator: Colonel Wayne E. Long, SOJ3-S

BG Blackburn specifically addressed the "no POWs" issue (pp. 78-82) - to my satisfaction; but undoubtedly not to anyone whose position is so far out on the limb as to be unable to come in from the cold.

To those who are undecided about this mission, I ask this hypothetical:

1. The Hanoi information is taken absolutely at face value.

2. The policy for the mission is "if POWs, raid; if no POWs, no raid".

3. Pursuant to that information and policy, the raid is aborted (19 Nov)

4. That same day, the NV move the 10 Catholics (earlier moved out to isolate them) back into the otherwise vacant camp.

Now what flak would have resulted from that "intelligence failure" ?

Regards

Mike

[Surferbeetle]

On the other hand, I'm gratified that Bill Moore and Ken White picked up on my presentation. BTW: Bill expressed one of the thoughts I've had but didn't express: "... perhaps it was better they weren't there, because PW casualties during the raid may have resulted in negative press that undermined the desired strategic message."

Mike,

I always appreciate/admire your analytical skills and efforts, and this latest effort is once again excellent.

Commanders on and off the battlefield do find it useful to demonstrate to opponents that they are able to act with impunity at a time and place of their choosing. Perhaps it's a base hit, perhaps it's a home run, the important thing for a commander is to keep slugging at a ferocious pace, or in a cunning manner, or both.

Although I am not in agreement with the outcome of JMA's analysis regarding ADM Moore's character, I do find it interesting and instructive to consider JMA's visceral reaction. It makes me think about the necessary skill sets selected for when serving at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels (a gauntlet inhabited by both Darwin and Sun Tzu ). I suspect that JMA was very successful tactically and that his unit would have been a valuable place to learn tactics.

As long as we are working on a number of topics simultaneously...if you get a chance, perhaps some of your skills would be available for an analysis of the options available to France at the Future of European Stability or the EUCOM Economic Analysis - Part I thread?

[jmm99]

I'm also gratified to receive a positive comment from you.

I'd suspect you're on target here:

from SB
I suspect that JMA was very successful tactically and that his unit would have been a valuable place to learn tactics.

based on the conversations I had with JMA re: the Rules of Land Warfare.

Critique of tactics (outside of the courtroom) is not one of my strong suites; so also, neither is economics:

from SB
As long as we are working on a number of topics simultaneously...if you get a chance, perhaps some of your skills would be available for an analysis of the options available to France at the Future of European Stability or the EUCOM Economic Analysis - Part I thread?

You should be a Civil Affairs recruiter

Yup, I took Econ 101-103 (basic 1st year; and managed As); but I also had a roommate for a year who wrote his Master's thesis on the French Economic Plans of the 60s (in French) and was working on a PhD in the same topic (he later switched to law and did well there). So, this old country boy knows his own limitations.

My primary interests here are ROEs and HVTs. Son Tay fits into that subject matter - from viewpoints other than the purely legal, which is a welcome switch.

Regards

Mike

Lest one figures the roommate was a drudge, he was a German-American who more than matched me each nite in pitchers of dark. We thought we were pretty good until we ran into a friendly bunch of Aussies. Those guys are very simply outstanding.

[JMA]

Although I am not in agreement with the outcome of JMA's analysis regarding ADM Moore's character, I do find it interesting and instructive to consider JMA's visceral reaction. It makes me think about the necessary skill sets selected for when serving at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels (a gauntlet inhabited by both Darwin and Sun Tzu ). I suspect that JMA was very successful tactically and that his unit would have been a valuable place to learn tactics.

What would you be knowing about strategy then?

[Surferbeetle]

What would you be knowing about strategy then?

...can't resist...about as much as you?

[JMA]

...can't resist...about as much as you?

I can't remember making a personal observation about you? Did I?

[Surferbeetle]

I can't remember making a personal observation about you? Did I?

No, and my answer was not one either.

The bulk of my work has been small team work and I do not buy into the false hierarchy of strategy>operations>tactics in terms of social standing.

Walking a mile in the shoes of others....I suspect that you and I are not aware of the context and nuances involved in the formulation of the Admiral's decision. We are also aware that POW's and fellow soldiers want to know that they (and theirs) are not going to be left out in the wind with no concern as to their welfare.

Not to put too fine a point on it but, as you know better than I most probably, battlefields are tough places where tough calls are made and horrible things regularly happen. The Admiral made a tough call, and from this armchair it appears to have been the right one.

[JMA]

No, and my answer was not one either.

Could have fooled me.

The bulk of my work has been small team work and I do not buy into the false hierarchy of strategy>operations>tactics in terms of social standing.

'in terms of social standing' ? No idea what you mean.

Walking a mile in the shoes of others....I suspect that you and I are not aware of the context and nuances involved in the formulation of the Admiral's decision.

Your man Colin Powell once said:

Great leaders are almost always great simplifiers, who can cut through argument, debate and doubt, to offer a solution everybody can understand.

In other words cut through the crap and get to the crux of the matter. Moorer should have done this, he failed.

You are talking about the CJCS, he should be a quite exceptional person and not unable to make even the most basic decision.

We are also aware that POW's and fellow soldiers want to know that they (and theirs) are not going to be left out in the wind with no concern as to their welfare.

You do the best you can to bring them home. In the case of Son Tay it was merely a gesture. It also blew any chance of actually bringing any POWs home as the North Vietnamese they were moved beyond reach. Asl any POW would they have preferred a handful being brought home or just a token gesture?

Not to put too fine a point on it but, as you know better than I most probably, battlefields are tough places where tough calls are made and horrible things regularly happen. The Admiral made a tough call, and from this armchair it appears to have been the right one.

The Admiral was also in an armchair... a comfortable one in Washington. He can claim no excuse like the fog of war etc etc. He made a bad call and has no excuses.

[JMA]

From here we get:

If blame must be assigned, responsibility for MARKET GARDEN’s failure can be given to planners at the strategic and operational levels who seemed hell-bent on carrying out the operation ...

... and in the case of Son Tay we have in Brig Gen Blackburn's own words:

And the sum of the substance was that if we didn't do it now, we would never be able to pull this thing together later on.

How was "troublesome" INT dealt with on Market Garden?

"... the 10 September 21st Army Group intelligence summary (INTSUM) stated that “elements of the Second SS Panzer Corps, the 9th (Hohenstaufen) and 10th (Frundsberg) S Panzer Divisions, were reported to be refitting in the Arnhem area.”

Major Brian Urquhart, the staff intelligence officer for the 1st British Airborne Corps personally ensured that Browning saw the 10 September INTSUM but was told by Browning “that the reports were probably wrong, and that in any case the German troops were refitting and probably not up to much fighting.”
To convince Browning otherwise, Major Urquhart ordered that oblique photographs be taken of German troops in the area of the Arnhem drop zone
from low altitude. The pictures confirmed the 10 September INTSUM and showed German tanks and armored vehicles parked under the trees within easy range of the 1st Airborne Division’s main drop zone. Browning again dismissed this evidence.

Then from Son Tay (Amidon):

When faced with the unwanted report that the camp was empty, General Blackburn asked his DIA intelligence team: “How in the hell they could make heads or tails of the data? He was flabbergasted by their interpretation. One minute they were sure the prisoners were gone, the next they were suspicious they had moved back into Son Tay.” This caustic reaction was prompted by intelligence that did not fit the desired picture. The implied message to the “dissenters” was, “I will stop yelling at you when you tell me what I want to hear.”

So that's how Blackburn dealt with the troublesome 'messenger' what did Browning do?

Browning dismissed his (Urquhart's) claims and ordered the division's senior medical officer to send Urquhart on sick leave on account of 'nervous strain and exhaustion.'

Tragically similar isn't it. Quite impossible for two separate events totally unconnected to each other to coincidentally be so similar. Any serious officer should study this phenomenon so as to be able to identify it should it rear its ugly head during the course of his career.

Any other contributions of similar occurrences of this phenomenon?

[JMA]

And so it goes with counterformists.

There are those who desperately want to believe that Moorer got it right in this case.

On the other hand, I'm gratified that Bill Moore and Ken White picked up on my presentation. BTW: Bill expressed one of the thoughts I've had but didn't express: "... perhaps it was better they weren't there, because PW casualties during the raid may have resulted in negative press that undermined the desired strategic message."

Mike, you find and post documents which inform on the subject then go and spoil it by selectively quoting and mixing in your own unsubstantiated conclusions. Just let the facts speak for themselves.

Melvin Laird was less than articulate at times, but, in terms of the Nixon-Kissenger principals re: Vietnam, Laird was relatively straight-forward (e.g., the Cambodia bombing ought to have been made public upfront). I also read his interview with MAJ Mitchell in which he stated what he believed at the time he met with Nixon:

Oh yes, but if he said anything in that interview which casts doubt on what you are trying to sell here it was because it was one of those occasions when Laird was not at his articulate best, yes?

Based on both Amidon and Michell (the latter more detailed at pages 6-7), on 20 Nov, Blackburn, Bennett and Moorer were faced with a non-consensus by the DoD analysts as to whether the POWs were at Son Tay or not. That military trio decided it was more likely than not that the POWs were there. Moorer and Bennett then met with Laird. See also 1988 SOCOM at post end.

Mike, non consensus among intel analysts is a constant. As there was no urgency (other than in the mind of Blackburn) there was no sane reason to proceed with an operation where no POW presence was confirmed.

The docs you cite do not support your position at all (Mitchell makes liberal use of his own interpretation of events which possibly confuses you). Neither does the SOCOM document support your position.

That said you are deliberately ignoring comment from Adm Train relating to what Moorer knew before the op went ahead.

Yes Blackburn and Bennet were part of the whole cock-up but they were subordinates of Moorer. The buck stops with Moorer.

BTW, Moorer was well aware by then of Nixon's position; from Amidon (p.5 pdf) [

Page 6? The document I have numbers from page 119-131

What we do know from Amidon is that Laird did not inform Nixon of the "troublesome" HUMINT. (page 128)

Before Laird went in to see Nixon, he met with Dick Helms. They discussed (1) the Hanoi information; and (2) the most recent POW deaths (the latter detailed in the Laird interview snip above). I've found no details re: the Laird-Helms conversation re: the Hanoi information. So, I can't prove that discussion created or reinforced Laird's belief that the Hanoi information was "inaccurate" and "not believable" - it clearly did not lessen that belief if it already existed.

Laird admits that he did not inform Nixon of the "troublesome" HUMINT (see above). The Helms/ Laird conversation is irrelevant to Moorers lack of moral courage.

BTW: While it may shock some, Presidents (with some exceptions) are not interested in intelligence details - only the adviser's BLUF.

Irrelevant to this issue.

As we know, information + analysis = intelligence. Son Tay definitely suffered from "information paucity" (if that is an "intelligence failure", so be it). In what (if any way) the analysis was faulty has not been laid out in anything I've read. In an low information environment, a single bit of new information easily may be perceived to be great import. It may or may not be of material import to the larger picture.

You don't have to take my word for it but it is safe to assume that if you are going to fly in to North Vietnam to within 23 miles of Hanoi one would like to believe that the INT would be good if not excellent.

The lack of INT confirming the POW presence in this case reflects on Blackburn as much as it asks questions about the competence or otherwise of the Bennett and the DIA... and is something Moorer should have immediately picked up on when he became CJCS in July 1970.

We do have "eyewitness testimony" from a number of Son Tay particupans in 1988 (link to pdf, 93 page transcript):

Read it... what's your point?

BG Blackburn specifically addressed the "no POWs" issue (pp. 78-82) - to my satisfaction; but undoubtedly not to anyone whose position is so far out on the limb as to be unable to come in from the cold.

You're such a push over Mike (if that convinced you of anything).

Note: careful with the side swipes or you will have Ken on your case... then again maybe you won't

A key admission by Blackburn (in the SOCOM doc) you missed (or chose to ignore) was:

"And the sum of the substance was that if we didn't do it now, we would never be able to pull this thing together later on."

This does not give you any inkling as to why he would have found that "troublesome" HUMINT coming in at the last minute to be unconvincing?

To those who are undecided about this mission, ...

No Mike, this is not about the raid it is about Moorer's failure to pull the train's emergency brake when it became clear that nobody was at home.

At possibly the one time in his career when called upon to show moral courage Moorer wimped out and thereby placed the lives soldiers at needless risk.

I ask this hypothetical:

1. The Hanoi information is taken absolutely at face value.

2. The policy for the mission is "if POWs, raid; if no POWs, no raid".

3. Pursuant to that information and policy, the raid is aborted (19 Nov)

4. That same day, the NV move the 10 Catholics (earlier moved out to isolate them) back into the otherwise vacant camp.

Now what flak would have resulted from that "intelligence failure" ?

Regards

Mike

No, no, no, Mike. It is quite obvious that had the (available) INT been properly interpreted as to the likelihood of the presence of POWs at Son Tay the Raid would never have got off the ground.