Sadr and Jaysh al-Mahdi

[wm]

Just saw this on the BBC news site. Any thoughts on what prompted this and what the next steps are likely to be?

Radical Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada Sadr says he is freezing the activities of his Mehdi Army militia for up to six months in order to re-organise it.
He has also called on all its offices to co-operate with the security forces and exercise "self-control".

Analysts see the move as an attempt by Moqtada Sadr to regain control over his increasingly divided militia.

Do folks agree with the "analysts" mentioned in the story? If the militia has fractured, what is the cause? Is it a good news story for coalition efforts?

[kit]

I don't trust al Sadr enough to believe anything he says. He has an ulterior motive.

My guess is it's to lie low, giving the American's a chance to claim "progress" and begin withdrawing. After that's in motion (once started, it won't be stopped), he'll make his move take over the government.

[cmetcalf82]

My guess is it's to lie low, giving the American's a chance to claim "progress" and begin withdrawing. After that's in motion (once started, it won't be stopped), he'll make his move take over the government.

I believe Kit is quite right. The positive impacts of the current "surge" include the increased targeting of both AQ and Shia militia's. Thus by freezing the Mahdi Militia Sadr likely hopes to prevent further targeting and attrition of his militia. The likely long-term intent for Sadr is to retain a measure of military power in the event the U.S. Congress or Presidential elections force the U.S. to significantly or completely withdraw U.S. forces. If this happens Sadr and others must be prepared to contend with increased ethnic conflict as the Sunni and Shia continue to struggle for control. My guess is right now Sadr is betting on that drawdown as a consequence of reporting on political events in the U.S. Bottom line is Sadr must retain his military power to retain his influence.

[kit]

Bottom line is Sadr must retain his military power to retain his influence.

Which is just another way of saying Iranian influence.

In future, if we conduct similar operations in another country, we should just find the local equivalent of al Sadr, put him on the payroll and leave. That's a whole lot cheaper, faster and more effective than wrapping ourselves in ideologies and trying to "help" them into the 21st century.

[Ken White]

using them -- and they him -- but very few things in the ME are as they seem.

Most Iraqis are pretty xenophobic (as are the Iraniha), the schism between Persians and Arabs is deep and I suspect that if he hews too much to the Irani, his Mahdi Army will dump him -- and he knows it. He can use but not cleave to...

[Dennis]

I don't trust al Sadr enough to believe anything he says. He has an ulterior motive.

I don't disagree with that assessment, but it seems to me that this is a no win situation for him.

If violence does stop immediatelly due to this then there is absolutely no doubt in anyone's mind that the MM was behind a majority of the recent violence, not that there was a lot of boubt about that in the first place.

If it continues then it will be percieved that he has lost control of the group.

I think I will be more worried if this does reduce violence.

Even more so if due to the reduced violence, in conjunction with the withdrawal of British forces in the South, the US doesn't apply enough forces there.

[kit]

I don't disagree with that assessment, but it seems to me that this is a no win situation for him.

If violence does stop immediatelly due to this then there is absolutely no doubt in anyone's mind that the MM was behind a majority of the recent violence, not that there was a lot of boubt about that in the first place.

If it continues then it will be percieved that he has lost control of the group.

I think I will be more worried if this does reduce violence.

Even more so if due to the reduced violence, in conjunction with the withdrawal of British forces in the South, the US doesn't apply enough forces there.

Apply what forces there? We've commited all we have and sending some to the south would require taking them from someplace else in Iraq, leaving the door open for al Queda or some other group to return.

[Dennis]

Apply what forces there? We've commited all we have and sending some to the south would require taking them from someplace else in Iraq, leaving the door open for al Queda or some other group to return.

I am not disputing that fact; but if the British leave then we will have to cover down on it somehow.

[tequila]

Sadr suspends military operations - NYTIMES, 30 Aug.

The radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr said Wednesday that he was suspending for six months his Mahdi Army militia’s operations, including attacks on American troops, only hours after his fighters waged running street battles with Iraqi government forces for control of Karbala, one of Iraq’s holiest cities.

The surprise declaration was widely taken as a tacit acknowledgment of the damage done to his movement’s reputation by two days of Shiite-on-Shiite in-fighting, which killed 52 people, wounded 279 and forced thousands of pilgrims to flee birthday celebrations for the Mahdi, one of Shiite Islam’s most revered medieval saints.

Mr. Sadr’s aides declared an unequivocal end to all militia operations. Ahmed al-Shaibani, the chief of Mr. Sadr’s media office in Najaf, confirmed that this “includes suspending the taking up of arms against occupiers,” a reference to American-led coalition troops ...

[SWJED]

12 October New York Times - Relations Sour Between Shiites and Iraq Militia by Sabrina Tavernese.

In a number of Shiite neighborhoods across Baghdad, residents are beginning to turn away from the Mahdi Army, the Shiite militia they once saw as their only protector against Sunni militants. Now they resent it as a band of street thugs without ideology.

The hardening Shiite feeling in Baghdad opens an opportunity for the American military, which has long struggled against the Mahdi Army, as American commanders rely increasingly on tribes and local leaders in their prosecution of the war.

The sectarian landscape has shifted, with Sunni extremists largely defeated in many Shiite neighborhoods, and the war in those places has sunk into a criminality that is often blind to sect...

[skiguy]

Is this as big a thing as I think it is, (a Shiite awakening?) or am I making too much of it?

In a number of Shiite neighborhoods across Baghdad, residents are beginning to turn away from the Mahdi Army, the Shiite militia they once saw as their only protector against Sunni militants. Now they resent it as a band of street thugs without ideology.

The hardening Shiite feeling in Baghdad opens an opportunity for the American military, which has long struggled against the Mahdi Army, as American commanders rely increasingly on tribes and local leaders in their prosecution of the war.

The sectarian landscape has shifted, with Sunni extremists largely defeated in many Shiite neighborhoods, and the war in those places has sunk into a criminality that is often blind to sect.

....

Among the people killed in the neighborhood of Topchi over the past two months, residents said, were the owner of an electrical shop, a sweets seller, a rich man, three women, two local council members, and two children, ages 9 and 11.

It was a disparate group with one thing in common: All were Shiites killed by Shiites. Residents blamed the Mahdi Army, which controls the neighborhood.

"Everyone knew who the killers were," said a mother from Topchi, whose neighbor, a Shiite woman, was one of the victims. "I'm Shiite, and I pray to God that he will punish them."

The feeling was the same in other neighborhoods.

"We thought they were soldiers defending the Shiites," said Sayeed Sabah, a Shiite who runs a charity in the western neighborhood of Huriya. "But now we see they are youngster-killers, no more than that. People want to get rid of them."

While the Mahdi militia still controls most Shiite neighborhoods, early evidence that Shiites are starting to oppose some parts of the militia is surfacing on American bases. Shiite sheiks, the militia's traditional base, are beginning to contact Americans, much as Sunni tribes reached out early this year, refocusing one entire front of the war, officials said, and the number of accurate tips flowing into American bases has soared.

Shiites are "participating like they never have before," said Major Mark Brady, of the Multi-National Division-Baghdad Reconciliation and Engagement Cell, which works with tribes.

LINK

[tequila]

Sadr militia moves to clean house - LATIMES, 7 Dec.

Militia commander Abu Maha had studied his quarry carefully, watching as the man acquired fancy suits, gold watches and the street name "Master." Now, heavily armed and dressed in an Adidas track suit, Abu Maha told his followers it was time to act against one of their comrades.

A dozen of them gripped their assault rifles and headed out. The Master, accused of sliding into immoral behavior after stoutly defending Shiite Muslims in Iraq's sectarian violence, was about to learn that justice in the Mahdi Army could be very rough.

Fighters such as Abu Maha have taken on a new role in recent months in the militia of Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr. Instead of battling Sunni insurgents and U.S. troops, they are now weeding out what they consider to be black sheep within their ranks ...

[Dennis]

I think that what's going on right now is a practical response from Muqtada. Over the last 4 years if Muqtada has demonstrated anything it's that he is practical and flexible enough in basic ideology to cooperate or fight against just about any group if it suits the purposes of the Sadr movement.


This aspect is what I think doesn' get enough attention. Muqtada is more than a common street thug and there are some pretty good reasons why he has and will continue to have support from Iraqi's.

1. His personal lineage
2. The fact that the Sadr movement represents one of the only ones that is distinctely Arab, Iraqi, and Shia.
3. The focus on providing support and services to the Shia urban poor.
4. The perception that Sadr leaders have always stood, fought(physically or ideologically), and represented their constituency in the face of oppression while others have fled to exile.

What's holding Muqtada up is his ability to appeal to the merchant and elites of Iraq. These groups have been allying more with groups like SCIRI and follow leaders such as Sistani and Hakim. However, both of these are regarded as Iranian in origin and influence. If Muqtada is to take the Sadr movement to the next level he has to bridge the gap between appealing to the urban poor and also appealing to the elites.

He can only accomplish this if he can attain designation as an "object of emulation" within Shia Islam. What's going on right now is more about Muqtada getting his ideological house in order to have the greatest appeal to all Iraqi constituencies. He has a built in base of support, due to the group he leads, however he has repeatedly hit a wall by either overplaying his military capability or reaching the limits of his base of appeal. If he is to move to the next level he must have credentials on par with his uncle and father who preceded him.

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 7 Feb 08: Iraq's Civil War, the Sadrists and the Surge

.....Among Sadrist rank and file, impatience with the ceasefire is high and growing. They equate it with a loss of power and resources, believe the U.S. and ISCI are conspiring to weaken the movement and eagerly await Muqtada’s permission to resume the fight. The Sadrist leadership has resisted the pressure, but this may not last. Critics accuse Muqtada of passivity or worse, and he soon may conclude that the costs of his current strategy outweigh its benefits. In early February 2008, senior Sadrist officials called upon their leader not to prolong the ceasefire, due to expire later in the month.

The U.S. response – to continue attacking and arresting Sadrist militants, including some who are not militia members; arm a Shiite tribal counterforce in the south to roll back Sadrist territorial gains; and throw its lot in with
Muqtada’s nemesis, ISCI – is understandable but shortsighted. The Sadrist movement, its present difficulties aside, remains a deeply entrenched, popular mass movement of young, poor and disenfranchised Shiites. It still controls key areas of the capital, as well as several southern cities; even now, its principal strongholds are virtually unassailable. Despite intensified U.S. military operations and stepped up Iraqi involvement, it is fanciful to expect the Mahdi Army’s defeat. Instead, heightened pressure is likely to trigger both fierce Sadrist resistance in Baghdad and an escalating intra-Shiite civil war in the south.

Muqtada’s motivations aside, his decision opens the possibility of a more genuine and lasting transformation of the Sadrist movement. In the months following his announcement, he sought to rid it of its most unruly members, rebuild a more disciplined and focused militia and restore his own respectability, while promoting core demands – notably, protecting the nation’s sovereignty by opposing the occupation – through legitimate parliamentary means. The challenge is to seize the current opportunity, seek to transform Muqtada’s tactical adjustment into a longer-term strategic shift and encourage the Sadrists’ evolution toward a strictly non-violent political actor.....

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 7 Feb 08:

Becoming an Ayatollah: The New Iraqi Politics of Moqtada al-Sadr

As a political and military force, Iraq’s Shiite Sadrist movement has undergone a number of radical transformations since 2003, when its leader, Moqtada al-Sadr, surprisingly emerged as a leading political figure. Al-Sadr’s recent decision to continue with his seminary studies and graduate as an ayatollah at the conservative seminary school of Najaf underpins a major change in the movement’s structure that could have serious repercussions for the future of Iraq. Against the backdrop of changing political alliances between Kurds and Sunnis, al-Sadr is transforming his movement into a new political phenomenon with implications for the country’s political structure and security dynamics. The consequences are also immense for Shiite Iraq, posing serious challenges to the conservative clerical establishment in Najaf.

Al-Sadr’s attempt to become an ayatollah follows his earlier call to suspend operations by his militia, the Jaish al-Mahdi (The Mahdi Army, or JaM) in the summer of 2007. Together with his decision to study in Najaf, this has marked a decisive new beginning in the organizational structure and leadership dynamics of the Mahdi militia. The decision to suspend JaM was made largely because of the outbreak of violence between Mahdi forces and the rival Badr Organization in Karbala in August 2007. The incident was a major embarrassment for al-Sadr, who had been seeking the support of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Shiite Iraq’s grand cleric, and the conservative establishment in Tehran against the rebellious splinter groups within his own militia since 2005. The suspension, which came in August 2007, was a way to ensure his Shiite partners that he was willing to restructure his forces for the sake of Shiite unity at a time when US—or Israeli—forces seemed to be on the brink of starting a major military conflict with Iran.....

[Darksaga]

From the BBC

Mehdi Army to give peace a chance?

Influential Iraqi cleric Moqtada Sadr is expected to use Friday prayers to tell members of his Mehdi Army militia that they should stop carrying weapons for the time being.

The BBC's Crispin Thorold in Baghdad assesses this latest move by the Shia leader.

The war is not yet over for the Mehdi Army, but the Shia militia appears to be giving peace a chance.

Moqtada Sadr's spokesman has told the BBC that until the future status of US troops in Iraq is decided, no member of the Mehdi Army may carry weapons on the streets.

[MSG Proctor]

This is a demonstration not of Moqtada al Sadr's strength, but of (a) the strength of Grand Ayatollah al Sistani, and (b) the power of religion in the contemporary Middle East.

Sadr grabs the headlines, but Sistani is the true wielder of influence. Sistani was supposed to issue a fatwa (probably already has) defining the duty of Iraqis to submit to the government's authority. He is against the 'occupation' but not by military means. Sadr's tack is to employ bellicose rhetoric and limited displays of force to keep the followers of the Sadr Trend (his father's movement, Moqtada does not have any serious influence as a cleric, only as a militia leader) fired up and supportive. Sistani as one of the four Grand Ayatollas comprising the Najaf Marja (supreme theological council) is far more influential and posits true Shiaism as 'quietist' not activist - viz a viz eschewing direct political involvment in state affairs.

While Sistani is against the presence of CF on Iraqi soil, he is also against clerics running the state (as in Iran) and against the wanton spillage of Iraqi blood. Sadr's stand down of JaM probably has more to do with his aspirations to become an Ayatollah (which requires submission to the current Marja) and less with political jockeying against the CF.

[Schmedlap]

What is the current policy regarding how we refer to Sadr's militia in public statements? I always asserted that we should refer to it as "Sadr's militia", since referring to it as the Mahdi Army/JAM seemed to lend it undue credibility as having legitimate religious justification, rather than being a bunch of well-meaning Shia misinformed and misled by Sadr and his fellow money-hungry thugs. But then I was told to get back into my box.