The John Boyd collection (merged thread)

[Ken White]

...
Ken - Read, and listen to everything, it cost nothing and you might even learn something...

True.

...otherwise if you have any questions ask me (probably been there done that.

Not so. I'll try to answer but lots I don't know -- fortunately, I probably do know someone who's covered the things I missed. We all offer the testimonial that whatever we did and where ever we did it, we're still here to talk about it so we musta done sump'n right. Better hurry, there are fewer of us every day...

[zenpundit]

Hey all,

I'd like to thank the following gents:

Jik for the kind mention here and the original suggestion to invite Wilf Owen to the online symposium.

Wilf Owen for graciously agreeing to participate in reviewing Science, Strategy and War by Col. Frans Osinga and share his insights in greater detail.

Other SWC members who took the time to help bring me up to speed. Much appreciated!

Dr. Chet Richards suggested to me today that I should ask Col. Osinga to participate as well and I readily agreed to do so.

Addendum:

Regarding Boyd's OODA Loop; neuroscientists using MRI and EEG studies have discovered quite a bit about the brain in the last ten years or so regarding it's structural modularity. If this early indication pans out in further peer-reviewed research, in terms of mapping cognitive processing during learning, then John Boyd had, in my view, a remarkably significant insight regarding human intelligence.

[Norfolk]

Happy to see you back.

[William F. Owen]

Regarding Boyd's OODA Loop; neuroscientists using MRI and EEG studies have discovered quite a bit about the brain in the last ten years or so regarding it's structural modularity. If this early indication pans out in further peer-reviewed research, in terms of mapping cognitive processing during learning, then John Boyd had, in my view, a remarkably significant insight regarding human intelligence.

I would dispute that assertion. Boyd may have described a process that sometimes occurs (like flatulence!). That is not to say that it forms the basis for anything useful in military thought or science. I have talked to at least three behavioural scientists and psychologists, who have all told me that even Boyd's most detailed OODA does not describe a decision making process that user awareness would enhance. The OODA loop assumes rational collective human decisions under stress. Humans don't work like that.

EG- Someone learning to play chess could be said to be using an OODA loop. How does knowing that help, or speed their decision making process. If they can't see the other sides pieces, (as in conflict) how does understanding of OODA aid them?

How do you ensure all your command staff are using the same OODA loop?

[Jik K]

Hi Ken – sorry for the delay in replying, dammed real world intruded into my OODA Loop
I must say that I am struggling to find a difference between us, which I suspect means that our differences – if they exist – lie at a deeper level than has yet been revealed. It is my understanding that Manoeuvre Warfare is a development of the operational art arising from the practice of the German Army between 1917-1943/5, and not a subversion of the principles of war as espoused in Clausewitz, etc. Indeed the German General Staff would have been scandalised to find themselves considered to have done so.
You say, “Long way of saying there are aspects of MW that I agree with, there are aspects I take with a grain of salt -- and with knowledge that the US Armed Forces are now (in not all but too many cases) risk averse and (same caveat) excessively over centralized.” And I agree. I also believe that the proponents of MW recognised this and sought to promote a change in the cultural environment that would facilitate a flexibility of operational and tactical response that would be required in a changing operational environment – a culture built upon what Boyd termed the principles of the blitzkrieg:
• Without focus and direction (Schwerpunkt) at all levels, people will not know what to do
• Without mission responsibilities (Auftrag), people will not take the initiative
• Without intuitive competence (Fingerspitzengefühl), people will not spot mismatches
• Without mutual trust (Einheit), there is no moral force to put group goals above individuals’
In seeking to promote such a change they sought to establish a doctrine, i.e. a mutually understandable language, in which to express their ideas, and, whatever its admitted limitations, the vehicle they chose to express the difference between the current culture and its preferred model was the generational one, i.e. current meme of the US Armed Forces is second generation. At the same time they seek to illustrate the requirement for a new meme through an exposition of the new operational environment, i.e. the rise of non-state actors as the primary challenge to American/Western national/Geopolitical interests, and express this meme as fourth generation.
If we take Clausewitz’s trinity of state, people and army and recognise that American military superiority is such that no opponent, state or non-state, could hope to militarily defeat the US, we may recognise that any sensible opponent will aim to strike at one of the other foundations – generally choosing the will of the people to sustain a conflict by extending the war’s longevity whilst avoiding direct confrontation and maximising American expenditure of blood and treasure.
At the same time a profound change has taken place in the attitude to the utility of force in Western civilisation. Speaking of the Falaise gap Eisenhower wrote of the possibility of walking for yards at a time whilst stepping on nothing but enemy corpses, and the world looked upon his creation, shrugged its shoulders, and said it was good; at the end of GW1 the infamous “Highway of Death” became a precipitating agent in the political requirement for a ceasefire. Even if we can fix our enemy in one place long enough to apply massive firepower to him we become revolted by the mass extermination of our enemies, without even consideration to the moral effect of any collateral damage to the innocent.
Even if we refuse to espouse MW ourselves we must be cognisant that our enemies don’t share this view, as we have seen recently in the Red Sea:
“Iranian naval swarming tactics focus on surprising and isolating the enemy’s forces and preventing their reinforcement or resupply, thereby shattering the enemy’s morale and will to fight. Iran has practiced both mass and dispersed swarming tactics. The former employs mass formations of hundreds of lightly armed and agile small boats that set off from different bases, then converge from different directions to attack a target or group of targets. The latter uses a small number of highly agile missile or torpedo attack craft that set off on their own, from geographically dispersed and concealed locations, and then converge to attack a single target or set of targets (such as a tanker convoy). The dispersed swarming tactic is much more difficult to detect and repel because the attacker never operates in mass formations.” Fariborz Haghshenass, 211206, Washington Institute Near East Studies..
The Iranians clearly see something in this MW stuff, and are actively seeking to shape the battlefield by getting us used to them performing a “Crazy Ivan” whilst permitting them to close to within 200m of our vessels, i.e. where no defence is possible to a multiple missile launch. Where would they get such an idea? Perhaps from an American military exercise conducted several years ago in which a retired Admiral ‘sank’ so many Blue Force ships that the exercise had to be stopped and then restarted because the Red Force was using the ‘wrong’ tactics.
Mr Owen I haven’t read Mr Leonhard’s or Mr Simpkin’s works and so cannot comment upon them, perhaps somebody else has and can?

[Jik K]

I would dispute that assertion. Boyd may have described a process that sometimes occurs (like flatulence!). That is not to say that it forms the basis for anything useful in military thought or science. I have talked to at least three behavioural scientists and psychologists, who have all told me that even Boyd's most detailed OODA does not describe a decision making process that user awareness would enhance. The OODA loop assumes rational collective human decisions under stress. Humans don't work like that.

How do you ensure all your command staff are using the same OODA loop?

I believe that the link between orientation and action is intended to demonstrate precisely this phenomena, i.e. that humans react in pre-programmed ways to stimuli and create narratives to explain their actions post facto.

The way to develop your command staff is to create a shared orientation, in the way that the German General Staff did, by training in peacetime and shared experience in war, the 'Einheit' of the principles of the Blitzkrieg.

"Balck (General Herman Balck) emphasised the importance of leadership in creating moral strength among toops. Leaders allowed subordinates freedom to exercise imagination and initiative, yet harmonise with the intent of superior commanders. cohesion during combat relied more on moral superiority than on material superiority. Leaders must create this. This requires them to create a bond and breadth of experience based upon trust. They must also lead by example, demonstrating requisite physical energy, mental energy and moral authority to inspire subordinates to enthusiastically cooperate and take the inititative within the superiors intent." Osinga, Science, Strategy & War, Pg 170.

[TT]

Jayhawker posted: In order to clarify it more correctly perhaps we should talk more about why an entity like a state or a group, fight the way they do. I think Van Creveld did this to a degree and I would recommend John Linn's book Battle for a good attempt at describing how various cultures manifest their style of warfare. Either Linn or Herodotus! Linn is not hung up on a progressive timeline, but rather discusses the nature of a culture. Interesting similarities appear then, across cultures, not governed by the date but rather more determined by their cultural aspects. He explicitly takes on Victor Davis Hanson.

I concur that the influence of culture is, or 'can be', very significant, and Linn’s book is very good on this question. If you are interested in the impact of culture on military behaviour, Isabel V, Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany is good, and JE Lendon’s Soldiers & Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity’ is interesting.

Jayhawker posted: Once a reader is out of the linear mode, one begins to see that cultures have their own characteristics and that will determine how they will conduct war.

A caveat to your point, however, is that most military organizations in the world today have by and large adopted the European (Western if you will) model of organizing and equipping themselves and often adopt the way our militaries conduct warfare as well (whether they are very successful at these forms of warfare is another matter), so the influence of culture on the conduct of war ‘may be’ greater on nonstate actors. A possible example of the former aspect of this is the Indian military, which in spite of its very different society and culture which does influence its strategic culture, seems, from what little I do know, to be organized and to fight much like our militaries (but I could be wrong on this point). A possible example of the latter are nonstate fighters in Africa, where often they incorporate elements of mysticism (charms) and contemporary pop culture (Rambo, Reeboks and Raybans) [see, for example, Paul Jackson, ‘Are Africa’s Wars part of a Fourth Generation of Warfare?’, Contemporary Security Policy 28/2 August 2007, pp 267-86]

As for 4GW, as I am lazy and busy today, to quote myself from #38 on this threat
…few advocates claimed that ‘4GW’ entities would use new tactics, rather their point has always been that they would use conventional and unconventional means (ie, not new ones) to achieve their ‘new’ aims and because of this and because of cultural differences that they might use old approaches in potentially new ways. (stress added for this post).

Jayhawker posted: Then, with that in mind political leaders and senior military planners begin with examining cultural manifestations in order to understand their adversary's "Clausewitzian Trinity." In other words, for starters....what is the war worth to them and at what point might they consider negotiating or capitulating (depending upon what you seek to achieve). At that point we could get away from technology or Slings and Stones and begin to understand the nature of the war - not the weaponry.

Proponents argued (argue) that the key drivers underpinning 4GW would be ‘ideas’ and ‘technology’, with an emphasis that ‘ideas’ would be more important than ‘technology’. I cannot remember if Hammes takes this position in his interpretation of 4GW, but the Slings suggest that he too emphasized ‘ideas’.

J

ayhawker posted:This is an interesting thread. Very illuminating to this AF guy who believed thinking Marines began and ended with Ellis!

Once upon a time, in a misty isle far, far away filled with castles (actually I still live there ), I pretty much believed the same thing. But my research and Marines learned me better .

[Jik K]

Just catching up on some of them, particularly Jayhawker. That's what I meant by Edpanding the debate.

[TT]

Wilf posted: Oh but you don't Understand! As long as the hamsters seeks to shatter the bears situational awareness through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions, which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the bear cannot cope, they can defeat the bear through an effects based approach!

I believe they do this very thing – run, jink, junk, duck, hide, gone. Poor bear, there was snack right there, absolutely sure it was there, but now it has vanished. Where oh where did that meaty pretzel go? Confusion. Bear leaves, goes to find something easier to browse on (berries when in season, or roots and shoots). Hamster says, ‘Whew’, goes back to eating roots and shoots.

Wilf posted: ...remember, 4th Generation Hamsters spend a lot time running on their OODA loops!

I would think a hamster running hard inside of its 'OODA loop' is perfectly safe from the threat of being eaten by a bear. Mind, it may have to worried about the household cat

[Jik K]

It takes a great deal of time to marshall the resources required for attack compared to the time it may take to establish that for defence. Attack, by its very nature, normally requires a substantial degree of manoeuvre; defence, by comparison normally does not require the same degree of manoeuvre. And the resources required for Attack tend to considerably outweigh those required for Defence, and thus require much more time to assemble. In the meantime, the enemy must be held off, and this requires Defence even in the midst of preparing for Attack.

Under the constrained conditions of war, Defence, and subsequently "Attrition", for lack of a more palatable term, is the norm; Attack, and subsequently "Maneouvre", is the intended decisive moment of action that the Defence has been building up to. Manoeuvre is necessary for victory, but it is not always necessarily available; "Attrition" is in effect a sort of typical condition, and not by any means necessarily as a result of Doctrine or inability or unwillingness to seek "Manoeuvre". This does not excuse those who eschew the opportunity to resort to "Manoeuvre" and instead resort to "Attrition". But when even the German Army, that model of MW that Lind holds up, spent most of its time in the later years of WWI and throughout most of WWII engaged in nothing less than "Attrition Warfare", and not by choice, then it is most important to bear in mind the practical limitations of Manoeuvre Warfare ("3GW") in particular, and 4GW Theory in general.

The Germans so perfected their operational art that they operationalized everything, including strategy, which is what eventually got their ass kicked. The Russians started as a pure attrition force - largely as a result of the Army purges which nullified its ability to Operationalise those MW concepts it had theorised prior to the war. Subsequently the Russians developed into able proponents of MW at the operational and strategic/Grand Tactical level, but by and large remained attritionists at the tactical level. Glantz's two volume work on the Manchurian campaign sets this out very well.

In the current era wars are games of two-halves, the collapse of the armed forces of a nation, whether to the rapier of a Manoeuvreist , the sledge-hammer of an Attritionist, or to the cut-and-thrust of a practitioner combining the best of both arts does not automatically lead to the collapse of the people's will to resist, even if it brings about the destruction of the state. What, of utility, does the attritionist bring to the second-half. Iraq 2003-2006 indicates the answer may be little. Iraq 2007 appears to indicate that an able practitioner with many strings to his bow can achieve much - at least in the military field.

It doesn't have to be either/or. Sometimes it's one, sometimes the other, sometimes it's both.

[selil]

I would dispute that assertion. Boyd may have described a process that sometimes occurs (like flatulence!). That is not to say that it forms the basis for anything useful in military thought or science. I have talked to at least three behavioural scientists and psychologists, who have all told me that even Boyd's most detailed OODA does not describe a decision making process that user awareness would enhance. The OODA loop assumes rational collective human decisions under stress. Humans don't work like that.

EG- Someone learning to play chess could be said to be using an OODA loop. How does knowing that help, or speed their decision making process. If they can't see the other sides pieces, (as in conflict) how does understanding of OODA aid them?

How do you ensure all your command staff are using the same OODA loop?

Meta-cognition (thinking about thinking) is an incredibly important skill for understanding how the decision cycle occurs. Maybe not all ranks in the military need to do so, but it is important to understand how perceptions and queries of thought occur. Understanding meta-cognition allows for perception and misperception to be managed. I won't wade into the OODA/EBO/TLA debate, but one of the earliest educators to look at the decision cycle critically was John Dewey.

[William F. Owen]

The way to develop your command staff is to create a shared orientation, in the way that the German General Staff did, by training in peacetime and shared experience in war, the 'Einheit' of the principles of the Blitzkrieg.

Shared orientation? Like an operations map, and a set of orders? That's nothing to do wit the OODA loop. Indeed how would explaining the OODA loop to your staff help? I have yet to see one aspect of operational art or tactics that the OODA explains any better than many of existing and proven concepts we have all used for some considerable time.

[William F. Owen]

Meta-cognition (thinking about thinking) is an incredibly important skill for understanding how the decision cycle occurs. Maybe not all ranks in the military need to do so, but it is important to understand how perceptions and queries of thought occur. Understanding meta-cognition allows for perception and misperception to be managed. I won't wade into the OODA/EBO/TLA debate, but one of the earliest educators to look at the decision cycle critically was John Dewey.

The decision cycle or a decision cycle? By what methods do you consciously engage in the decision cycle that differs in any significant way from the process you normally use to make descision?

The Intelligence Cycle has existed for 50 years. It works and it is used. It's not the OODA loop and no one would claim that going round it faster means you'll win. It's just a staff procedure. In order for the OODA loop to work at the operational level it has to be useable by a Staff.

[selil]

The decision cycle or a decision cycle? By what methods do you consciously engage in the decision cycle that differs in any significant way from the process you normally use to make descision?

The Intelligence Cycle has existed for 50 years. It works and it is used. It's not the OODA loop and no one would claim that going round it faster means you'll win. It's just a staff procedure. In order for the OODA loop to work at the operational level it has to be useable by a Staff.

Well I don't know about 50 years, but John Dewey in 1911 described how we think. My perspective right or wrong is that how we learn, is directly related to how we think, which is directly related to how we make decisions. Dewey split thinking into the logical and psychological one being the mental processes and the other being the strategies. His process has been used and adapted over time but is the root of much consideration of analysis. A complete thought within his system has five distinct stages or steps of reflection. 1) A felt difficulty; 2) it's location and definition; 3) suggestion of possible solutions; 4) development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion; 5) further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection (Dewey, P.72).

Many decision processes have been built around the Dewey construct. When you look at the andragogy and pedagogy required for transference of expertise the thinking processes are what you are trying to build. In the example of the chess master (a classic example) the chess master may not make a great general but the general may make a passable chess master. Patterns of thought and reasoning skill levels within artificial rule sets can be transitioned from the real world to the game world. Not so much the other way.

I do think that meta-cognition is important to understand so that decisions are based on reason and logic rather than simplistic response. What we refer to as autonomic response (instant response) is actually expertise and ingrained response from training and education. Most practitioner's of education never really consider the steps of the decision process. I doubt a drill instructor really cares about meta-cognition even as he trains soldiers.

When we talk about staff or soldiers using analysis models we are likely talking about layering bureaucratic needs on top of something much more elegant and simplistic. The resultant concept or construct can often be polluted to the point of absurdity. That doesn't mean they can't be used to illustrate what is happening so we can analyze points where misperceptions of egregious mistakes are made.

[stanleywinthrop]

Nor is war an intellectual exercise. Regrettable but true. Reality is such a bore.

As you and many here are not boyd fans i know you'll reject it out of hand, but to quote boyd "War is not fought by equipment or by terrain. It is fought by people--who use their minds."

[stanleywinthrop]

The decision cycle or a decision cycle? By what methods do you consciously engage in the decision cycle that differs in any significant way from the process you normally use to make descision?

The Intelligence Cycle has existed for 50 years. It works and it is used. It's not the OODA loop and no one would claim that going round it faster means you'll win. It's just a staff procedure. In order for the OODA loop to work at the operational level it has to be useable by a Staff.

I think you are confusing the OODA loop with some sort of 'checklist' that one must follow. The OODA loop is more of a parable about how we think.

Many in religious circles make the same kind of mistakes about the bible--some confuse parables (thou shalt take up snakes) with actual rules (10 commandments).

[Steve Blair]

As you and many here are not boyd fans i know you'll reject it out of hand, but to quote boyd "War is not fought by equipment or by terrain. It is fought by people--who use their minds."

This is also something of a key component of many of Clausewitz's ideas. He considered the most important changes in war to come out of the Napoleonic era to be social and political, not technological. I'd tend to agree in most cases: technology often serves as an accelerator for human thoughts and impulses.

[stanleywinthrop]

This is also something of a key component of many of Clausewitz's ideas. He considered the most important changes in war to come out of the Napoleonic era to be social and political, not technological. I'd tend to agree in most cases: technology often serves as an accelerator for human thoughts and impulses.

Boyd was not referring to changes in warfare, he was referring to what to him is the most fundamental aspect of war, wars are fought by human beings who (at least for about 99% of the popluation) think to some degree to another before they act. Therefore, according to boyd, a key to understanding war is understanding how people think.

[Norfolk]

In the current era wars are games of two-halves, the collapse of the armed forces of a nation, whether to the rapier of a Manoeuvreist , the sledge-hammer of an Attritionist, or to the cut-and-thrust of a practitioner combining the best of both arts does not automatically lead to the collapse of the people's will to resist, even if it brings about the destruction of the state. What, of utility, does the attritionist bring to the second-half. Iraq 2003-2006 indicates the answer may be little. Iraq 2007 appears to indicate that an able practitioner with many strings to his bow can achieve much - at least in the military field.

It doesn't have to be either/or. Sometimes it's one, sometimes the other, sometimes it's both.

Much agreed on the latter, as both DePuy's piece and my own posting try to point out. It is creating a false dichotomy (as so many have observed) that either "Attrition" or "Manoeuvre" offer mutually exclusive approaches to the same end - victory.

But both the DePuy piece and my own post try to outline the conditions under which "Manoeuvre" is possible, and why "Attrition" persists even despite the best efforts of the willing. Very often, as the Soviets found in the early years of WWII (as a result of the purges of the late 1930's) and the Germans discovered in the later years of WWII, that "Manoeuvre" is either limited or rendered effectively impossible by casualties or logistical problems, and "Attrition" becomes the default. As I stated earlier, it takes a great deal of time and resources to assemble the means required for "Manoeuvre" operations at the Operational level; even at the Tactical level, which the Germans really excelled at, manoeuvre can be constrained by such factors, and attrition take over by default.

What I am trying to point out is that, depending upon conditions, Manoeuvre, especially at the Operational level, is an option that is not always available, even to the able and willing. And, as in the Soviet Union in the early years of WWII, or in Iraq in 2003, decisive Manoeuvre may not prove sufficient to break the enemy's will or ability to resist. The Germans predicated their War Strategies in both the West in 1940 and in the East in 1941 upon an Operational Method of Manoeuvre, which is good. But the events of 1940 led to over-confidence in the method applied in 1941; whereas France in 1940 was politically divided, and much more susceptible to the strategic shock-effect of the fast-moving German campaign, the Soviet Union was not, though the regime tottered briefy.

The Coalition was most successful using a Manoeuvre approach in 1991, but ended up with an insurgency on its hands in 2003 even after use of much the same method destroyed the Iraqi Armed Forces; the will to resist was not destroyed however, and the Coalition found itself engaged in a long war of attrition with the Insurgency within Iraq itself. The Coalition Strategy had been predicated on a Manoeuvrist approach, albeit one in the vein of the RMA - with all the problematic assumptions that is burdened with, and which Mr. Lind has argued forcefully against. The early failure of that approach resulted, as previously mentioned, in a long war of attrition.

That said, I am not proposing "Attrition" as being normally preferable to "Manoeuvre". They are in reality two aspects of the same whole, but circumstances do have their influence upon which is most viable in a given situation, and moreover, which is possible. Ideally, both "approaches" are available to the Commander to use as suits his needs best; in practice, there may be serious constraints upon using one or the other. More often than not, those constraints are levied upon Manoeuvre, owing to the skill, resources, and time required to create that skill and assemble those resources necessary to carried out decisive manoeuvre.

Few are unaware of the dangers of the so-called "Attritionist" approach - WWI went a long way to pointing those out. I would very much agree with William Lind, however, that many Western Armies have never really detached themselves from it in substance, even if they have in theory.
But there is a danger in subscribing to "Manoeuvre Warfare Theory" in so far as it is predicated upon collapsing the enemy's will to resist and possibly avoiding the wholesale slaughter of pure Attrition; sometimes nothing less than the physical destruction (or "neutralization" if you will, as in COIN) of the enemy will suffice, and that must always be the battlefield object. The German discovered the potential shortcomings of over-reliance upon that approach in WWII, and we have discovered it in Afghanistan since late 2001 and Iraq since late 2003.

In spite of decisive conventional military defeat, the enemy nevertheless persisted in an irregular war of attrition aginst us, and has come close at times to breaking our will to win, even though we continue to resort to Tactical and sometimes even Operational-level manoeuvre, and successfully on the battlefield, against our opponents. Physical destruction of the enemy, sometimes considered an "Attritionist" approach, is the necessary end of decisive manoeuvre. If the enemy will to fight collapses in the interim due to any shock-effect afforded by Manoeuvre, so much the better.

I am not clear that we are in any substantial disagreement here after reading your response to my post; but I am not clear that we agree on physical destruction or "neutralization" (that can be defined in a myriad of ways) as being necessary rather than the destruction of the enemy's will to resist. Quite agreed that the latter is most preferable, but given that that may not occurr, it may be prudent to attempt the former whilst holding the latter to be a most agreeable possibility - if it occurrs.

[Norfolk]

As you and many here are not boyd fans i know you'll reject it out of hand, but to quote boyd "War is not fought by equipment or by terrain. It is fought by people--who use their minds."

I like Boyd's point about taking what is useful from various Doctrines, etc., and rejecting what is not. That's the very definition of using one's mind. There is no substitute for good judgement.