How to build a State in a non State environment?

[slapout9]

To infuse foreign money in large quantities is actually dead-on wrong.
This should be obvious by now.

Except I didn't see anybody proposing that. The way I understood it was that cash would be available to build the needed Infrastructure projects that will support life for the local population. A great deal of which could be done through "checkbook" money, the actual need for currency vs. money could be fairly small compared to the actual physical project cost. In fact if there is a large demand for cash to specific individuals that would be a warning bell that something is wrong.

[TheCurmudgeon]

To infuse foreign money in large quantities is actually dead-on wrong.
This should be obvious by now.

Foreign cash leads to corruption and the corrupt people in whatever power position send a large share of their booty to other countries to secure their wealth.

Foreign cash can furthermore establish itself firmly and the abundance (the infusion is often disproportionate to the countries' economy) of it leads to inflation (wages rise - measures in foreign cash).

This all makes it extremely difficult for the addict after withdrawal.

I agree with Slap, I think you misunderstood. No one is saying dump a ton of foreign cash into the local economy. The idea is to use foreign currency where there is no established government (hence no local currency) and we are installing a caretaker protectorate until such time as a new government can be formed.

Step one, security. Step two, economy. Once the economy is established and we have some idea of what the country can actually sustain for a government, then, together with the locals, we build THAT level of government rather than try to install a democracy, the Cadillac (or Mercedes or Jaguar) of governments from the start.

At least I think that was where we were going

[Stan]

Except I didn't see anybody proposing that. The way I understood it was that cash would be available to build the needed Infrastructure projects that will support life for the local population. A great deal of which could be done through "checkbook" money, the actual need for currency vs. money could be fairly small compared to the actual physical project cost. In fact if there is a large demand for cash to specific individuals that would be a warning bell that something is wrong.

What in fact happens, is the defacto govt forces the so-called loan to the project builder with a hefty 25% (approval costs) and the bank provides 60 to 70% of the total cost (up front) to the construction company (really bad mistake in judgment), then the structure or building is coincidentally 60% built when the money runs out and the company abandons the project and you have this odd looking thing in the middle of town that, 10 years later, looks exactly the same as it did on day one (but there's more grass overgrowth than before)

Something's really wrong with this picture

[TheCurmudgeon]

What in fact happens, is the defacto govt forces the so-called loan to the project builder with a hefty 25% (approval costs) and the bank provides 60 to 70% of the total cost (up front) to the construction company (really bad mistake in judgment), then the structure or building is coincidentally 60% built when the money runs out and the company abandons the project and you have this odd looking thing in the middle of town that, 10 years later, looks exactly the same as it did on day one (but there's more grass overgrowth than before)

Something's really wrong with this picture

Yeah, this is part of what I was hoping to avoid. Westerners like to build things without any thought about whether the things are sustainable. We build hospitals without doctors or any hope of it being financed into the future. We build schools without teachers. We build dams cause ... we like big puddles of water. Without a long term, sustainable economic plan nothing works for long. I built a lot of paved and gravel roads in Afghanistan but there is no Department of Transportation with the equipment, financing, and workforce to maintain any of it (at least that I saw in the areas I worked in, maybe in Kabul or Kandahar).

What is worse is that, if the project is not funded with donor money, then someone is going to expect to be repaid. Easy answer, as mentioned before, print more money resulting in runaway inflation.

Again, I am venting.

[Surferbeetle]

Interesting conversation, which sparked some late night thoughts on this last day of the year 2010.

Hubris can drive us to apply levers without understanding where to place them. A starting point on the journey towards understanding would be to develop a comprehensive assessment of the demographic groups competing for resources and influence in a social system which lacks centralized controls. In my travels I have seen groupings which specialize in violence (gangs, militias, internal and external security forces -GMIESF) economics (families, tribes, guilds), governance (bureaucrats and technocrats), and politics (religious and political figures). Each of these groupings associate with one another for gain both covertly and overtly according to METT-TC. Each of these groupings can be systematically used as levers to form and control a social system. Historical examples of individuals and groups who were able to do so are legion (Alexander, Peter the Great, Rome, etc.). Authors who have examined the methodologies used are also legion (Sun Tzu, Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Locke, Paine, Smith, Newton, CvC, Marx, etc.). #Just like anything else in life, timelines and outcomes are largely dependent upon the level of skill and resources applied to the effort.

[Fuchs]

I agree with Slap, I think you misunderstood. No one is saying dump a ton of foreign cash into the local economy. The idea is to use foreign currency where there is no established government (hence no local currency) and we are installing a caretaker protectorate until such time as a new government can be formed.

To make a decision on currency means to either use local currency or to infuse a ton of foreign cash.

You cannot say 'use foreign cash' and *bling* the people have foreign cash.
They need to sell something to get foreign cash or you need to spend the same in the country.
An alternative would be to buy local cash in exchange for foreign cash, but that is either uninteresting or it's going to overvalue the local currency in the exchange rate and will thus lead to terrible economic effects as observed in Eastern Germany 1990.


What's really happening is that foreign powers and foreign NGOs will hire locals with foreign cash and the new government will be financed with foreign cash. This leads to a huge infusion of foreign cash into the country with the terrible effects as observed in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

[TheCurmudgeon]

To make a decision on currency means to either use local currency or to infuse a ton of foreign cash.

You cannot say 'use foreign cash' and *bling* the people have foreign cash.
They need to sell something to get foreign cash or you need to spend the same in the country.
An alternative would be to buy local cash in exchange for foreign cash, but that is either uninteresting or it's going to overvalue the local currency in the exchange rate and will thus lead to terrible economic effects as observed in Eastern Germany 1990.


What's really happening is that foreign powers and foreign NGOs will hire locals with foreign cash and the new government will be financed with foreign cash. This leads to a huge infusion of foreign cash into the country with the terrible effects as observed in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Actually I like the idea of trading existing currency for a foreign currency since it will allow you to look for entities with too much cash. Also, whatever currency is used by the NGOs can be coordinated to be the same currency as the substitute. Of course, this is not without its problems and I have said already I am not expert on economic theory.

Do you have an alternative suggestion?

BTW, Happy New Year!

[Bill Moore]

I agree with Dayuhan's comments about what is commonly called the Powell Doctrine. It has not been proven to work anywhere and to date has only led to losses or a situation where you can't tell who is winning. I have yet to see any "credible" reporting where our economic development efforts are effective in stopping the insurgency in Afghanistan. At times as Bob as stated we may be able to bribe a temporary cease fire/reduction of violence in a region with these projects, but if we did analysis over time I suspect we would see a troubling trend where all of these successes are undone over time. The reason is understandable, development didn't do one thing to stop the insurgents from returning from Pakistan, and the villagers will never be strong enough on their own to repel them when they return in force. Of course let's not forget who the foreigners really are here, and the importance of that on the people's psych.

This article illustrates the complete lack of our pragmatism.

http://http://www.nytimes.com/aponli..._r=1&ref=world

American commanders have called the Pir Mohammed primary school "the premier development project" in Zhari district, a Taliban heartland in Kandahar province at the center of President Barack Obama's 30,000-soldier surge.

The small brick and stone complex represents much of what American forces are trying to achieve in Afghanistan: winning over a war-weary population, tying a people to their estranged government, bolstering Afghan forces so American troops can go home. But the struggle to open Pir Mohammed three years after the Taliban closed it shows the obstacles U.S. forces face in a complex counterinsurgency fight, in which success depends not on firepower, but on the support of a terrified people.

I still find our focus on development to defeat the Taliban as sadly comical and completely disassociated with reality on the ground. Just another line of operation (another failed concept) to no where. It appears that too many commanders and policy makers have confused the great book "3 Cups of Tea" as a strategy book. It is a book about a passionate man to gave his all to help the people in the region, but nothing in that book addresses defeating the Taliban. The Taliban didn't arise due to a lack of schools, they arose for strategic reasons related to Soviet Invasion, a proxy war between India and Pakistan and now a U.S. invasion. Building schools and roads "may" eventually help the people, but it won't defeat the Taliban or stop them from returning in the areas where we think we have pushed them out (drove them underground is probably more accurate).

The exact numbers are probably classified, but several schools we built were turned into IED factories. While the structure is important, what is more important is the actual instruction. I remember talking to one town leader (not a village) and he said the coalition built a school and that was the end of it. Now we have Mullahs from Pakistan teaching there and recruiting our kids to fight for the Taliban. I'm sure we have a great ribbon cutting photo of the school opening that we still sell a success. As the article stated real teachers won't go there due to threats from the Taliban who we haven't come close to defeating. We're blinded by our own propaganda and our faith in these population centric approaches.

I think it was Selil who said just because it isn't working doesn't mean can't work. That is definitely true, but to do it right would require going back to the basics of really getting to know the people (live with them like the ODAs are now doing), negotiating and fighting and compromising where need be to set conditions for development that actual matters. Really listening to the people can't be accomplished with key leader engagements. That is our approach now outside of the ODAs. The commander does a patrol, talks to someone we think is a leader, then returns to his FOB with 1/100th of the story. Normally a school isn't on the top of a village's list that living off the land, but none the less we love building schools because we love to get photos of smiling kids and then convince ourselves that this means we're making progress. That is the acme of hubris.

I'm not opposed to humanitarian assistance, we're Americans we like to do it, but don't confuse it with defeating the Taliban. Winning the people's hearts and minds will only result in a temporary win in a very small place unless we do a lot of other things first to set conditions for longer term success. Now we're simply taking a Kentucky shower by facing into the wind and pee'ing away.

[slapout9]

Actually I like the idea of trading existing currency for a foreign currency since it will allow you to look for entities with too much cash.

That has actually been talked about in Counter-Drug Operations for this country, instead of foreign currency it would be a new currency of a very different and distinctive design, which allow you to drain all the excess drug dealer cash out of the system. It is one of those ideas that sounds good but would probably have created such a panic that any good would have been surpassed by a great panic.


IMO you would be better to eliminate cash altogether(just get foriegn bank credits for the value of the currency) at least for awhile and just issues an electronic accounting card. Handheld scanners could be issued at all the Strategic points of sale and would give you very detailed accounting information (which is all money is) also with encryption you would not have much of a counterfeiting problem.

[Fuchs]

Do you have an alternative suggestion

That's reserved for the blog.

[slapout9]

Bill Moore, if you were General in charge of fixin A'stan and could do anything you wanted.... what would do?

[Bill Moore]

Slap,

Coming up with a strategy is easy when you don't have to execute it, but some rough ideas I would bounce off my staff are, and not in order of priority. There will be no separate lines of operation, we will have one strategy that will be synched by coaliton and Afghan officials. The rest of them largely reflect a former Commander's approach to COIN.

1. Personnel policy that allows me relieve the chicken littles who won't get out and really engage with the populace. Not taking casualties is NOT a success metric. The key leader engagements are a farce for the most part, so they would be reduced and I would trust the ODAs to live with and engage the people. My intell staff would be focused on putting it all together to see what it really means. I need to understand all the dynamics, not just a 10 digit grid for the next target. Why do people think and act the way they do? Force protection will be achieved by defeating the enemy not hiding in the FOB drinking Green Bean Coffee.

2. Consolidate operations geographically in key areas and gradually (but fast as possible) expand the zone of control (SOF and select GPF would still conduct deep disruption operations). ODAs partnered with locals are with living with the locals. GPF supports and is ready to bring the hammer in as required. These would be real zones of control where the shadow government and Taliban supporters were identified and neutralized through robust HUMINT supported by the TECHINTS (think PHOENIX). We're too busy now chasing IED makers instead of getting after the real bad guys who control the show.

3. Once cleared, really cleared, and the people demonstrate support to the government (no free lunch), then I would enable development. Until they show some inclination of support it is martial law. I'm not helping those who are fighting me. Development will be focused on the people's stated needs, not what we think they need. That will be assessed by our folks living with the locals, not through key leader engagements where we too often empower the wrong people.

4. Clarify with Washington what are real objectives are (hard to do, we all know that). However, if it is only defeat AQ then I would establish very limited objectives for Afghanistan. If they're bigger than that, then adjust accordingly.

5. Push to establish an emergency zone of control in parts of Pakistan where the Taliban and other insurgents and terrorists seek shelter. Strategic comms are we're in Afghanistan to win, if you can't address these issues we will. I can hear the uproar now, but my narrative is these folks are killing coalition troops and Afghan civilians with immunity (with the exception of an occassional UAV strike). We're incompetent if we continue to allow that to happen, our patience doesn't extend into infinity. By the way our coalition in effort in Pakistan would be subordinate to me in a perfect world. Right now they're getting away with being PAKMIL lap dogs, while we do plane side ceremonies nightly.

6. If required establish martial law in key regions and implement strict population control measures. They'll be eased when the enemy is cleared and the populace is begining to support the Afghan Gov. Key to success is the invaders (us) don't lead these efforts. Instead of just saying it, actually mean it when we say we can be your best friend or worst enemy, it is up to you.

7. Completely revamp the training of the Afghanistan police and army, with the exception of the Commandos and a few other small organizations it is largely a failure. One person will be overall in charge and it won't be a committee vote on how to do business. First step would be to recruit a tiger team from former SF Officers and NCOs (the young kids no longer understand how to train armies, because they have been DA focused the last few years, but they can train outstanding strike forces) to study the current training process and identify what needs to get fixed, and weight my main effort there, again with SF officers/NCOs (active duty or retired) in the lead.

8. Define realistic objectives and get consensus from Washington, then ISAF, and of course in partnership with the Afghanistan Gov. If Karsai won't play, I would turn a blind eye and let the Afghans address that problem. We can't be seen supporting someone (if this is really the case) that is an enemy of the people. I don't think we need to define their government for them. If they want a King they can have a King, if they want a democracy they can have a democracy. My mission is to stabilize, not build a city on the hill.

Of course these are harsh methods, but I would argue in reality their less cruel than the game we're playing now which is just extending the misery of the Afghan people. I think the reality is we have painted ourselves into a corner with false assumptions and a series of crippling policies to gain consensus with the wrong people. If we really wanted to win this conflict we could, but not with the current approach.

Obviously in the 10 minutes I took to write this I can't develop a comprehensive plan, but the key point is to challenge our current assumptions and ways of doing business. We have a bunch of nice guys trying to great things for the Afghan people thinking this is going to defeat the Taliban. Not in our wildest dreams.

[Surferbeetle]

Bill, it’s good to see that you are still around and that you are still wrestling with violence, development, lines of operation, definitions of foreigners (is it us or them? ha ha, ha), the simple fact that a KLE should not be mistaken for a relationship, and why is it that we are we so blind? Me too. Here are some additional thoughts sparked from your two posts on this thread.

What does it take to motivate a large group of disparate folks with many different agendas to accomplish a multi-faceted long term goal? The phrasing and answer to that question speaks to ones upbringing and experience. Westerners, to my eyes, often approach this question sequentially and in a linear manner. Other inhabitants of our shared globe use very different methods to include actively/consistently trusting in God to sort things out. No matter what the method used, exclusively focusing upon one line of operation/effort/action (violence, economics, governance, or politics) leads to lop-sided ‘solutions’ which lead to dissatisfaction and additional efforts by the living towards neglected lines of operation/effort/action. There will never be a perfect solution/endpoint/goal instead it’s a continual journey that everybody participates in.

Entropy is a concept which does a good job of explaining why all ‘successes’ are undone over time. Schools continually rise from, crumble, and return to their constituent parts over the long run. Young men try to use the power of life & death and old men try to use the power of wisdom to shape the world. The next morning the sun still rises. Roger.

My experiences in the arena have been in Iraq, but it is my opinion that whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, or Vietnam in order to achieve success it all comes down to the amount of resources we are willing to allocate to our efforts. Hopefully those we elect are capable of cost/benefit math, because America is still very much learning on the job. It’s a good thing we are strong because this is going to take a while to get sorted out. Maybe it’s time for me to retire from the violence business and head over to the governance (development subset) business or politics (diplomacy subset) business. We will see.

Steve

[Stan]

I built a lot of paved and gravel roads in Afghanistan but there is no Department of Transportation with the equipment, financing, and workforce to maintain any of it (at least that I saw in the areas I worked in, maybe in Kabul or Kandahar).

What is worse is that, if the project is not funded with donor money, then someone is going to expect to be repaid. Easy answer, as mentioned before, print more money resulting in runaway inflation.

Again, I am venting.

Some real salient points and hard to answer questions !

While I fully agree with your below quote and the order of precedence, I would add that if some sort of infrastructure is not rebuilt, we're not going to get those teachers or doctors to go to an imaginary school house or clinic. If you don't build the roads, then building the school house is sort of a mute point. No ?

Step one, security. Step two, economy. Once the economy is established and we have some idea of what the country can actually sustain for a government, then, together with the locals, we build THAT level of government rather than try to install a democracy, the Cadillac (or Mercedes or Jaguar) of governments from the start.

At least I think that was where we were going

Some good examples of what we tried to do in Sub-Sahara (failed and stymied to death by WAWA) and what we have successfully done here. There were some challenges and the order of precedence often switches at times. I can't complete my economic growth assistance if for example I don't initially clear a farmer's field of UXO or mines (meaning he won't be planting his crops) and I can't expect the new harbor or bank's sky scraper being built if I don't first clear the site of ordnance.

However, I can't do much clearance work without economic assistance. Similar to your situation, the project had to be funded from outside sources as the local economy couldn't support our objectives.

We can't take foreign financial injection out of the State Building picture. What we did end up doing was funding the development of people and provided jobs for the short term hoping the local government would sustain the program.

While somewhat backwards at times, we were able to slowly increase economic development together with security (protection of innocent civilians being goal one and returning usable land being goal two).

[TheCurmudgeon]

Bill,

First I don't mean to oversimplify. If anything the task is more complicated than any one department or agency can handle.

3. Once cleared, really cleared, and the people demonstrate support to the government (no free lunch), then I would enable development. Until they show some inclination of support it is martial law. I'm not helping those who are fighting me. Development will be focused on the people's stated needs, not what we think they need. That will be assessed by our folks living with the locals, not through key leader engagements where we too often empower the wrong people.

I take issue with (or possibly completely agree with) is you jump from clearing the territory of obvious hostiles and support for governance. This implies that there is some form of government in place. If that is the case you are beyond where I am.

Disregard everything going on in the security realm, people will still have to eat. Either we are feeding them (which provides another level of control) or they have some form of economy going on of their own. My point with economy is not to develop it - it is that,concurrent with security operations, we look, listen, and learn what the society's economy consists of. That level of economic production gives you the baseline you can use to determine what the government can actually support.

Actually, now that think about it, controlling food distribution might be a good idea in certain conditions.

[slapout9]

Obviously in the 10 minutes I took to write this I can't develop a comprehensive plan, but the key point is to challenge our current assumptions and ways of doing business.

Nice plan Bill,
10 minute Strategic Planning seems to be superior to anything else we are doing

[slapout9]

Actually, now that think about it, controlling food distribution might be a good idea in certain conditions.

Ever see Warden's 5 ring analysis of how to attack/affect a terrorist/guerrilla organization? Food,water are critical just as they wood be to a civilian population. It is the basic Input Energy into the Life support/people system.

[Bill Moore]

A few short notes:

Posted by Surferbettle,

What does it take to motivate a large group of disparate folks with many different agendas to accomplish a multi-faceted long term goal?

Steve, first off great seeing your posts again. Hopefully the more we bounce ideas off one another the closer we'll get to functional answers. In the meantime I will continue to post provocatively regarding development, because I have yet to see a meaningful correlation between development and solving conflict. I'm waiting for that great post, then I'll thank that individual profusely.

Reference your comment above, I think we need to issue mandatory humility pills to the force every Monday morning in addition to our malarial prophylaxis. Without a good deal of force we can't force people to change, and even with force those changes are often only durable as long as the force is being applied. First off, what do we really want to change in Afghanistan? They have survived for many decades living the way they do. More importantly what change do they want? Maybe they just want the foreigners out?

They'll evolve on their own at their own rate based on their perceived needs, not some idealistic dream we're trying to cram down their throat. This is one of those situations where we can't have our cake and eat it too. We can't prevent the Taliban from returning when we don't neutralize the Taliban's center of gravity which is Pakistan support. ISAF is like ranchers and the Afghans are like livestock and the Taliban are like wolves and of course Pakistan is the Wolves Den. When the ranchers return to their houses at night to eat dinner and go to bed the wolves will return to pray on the livestock. It really doesn't matter if we give the livestock some basic organizational and fighting skills, the wolves are still stronger and will prevail, and in turn strike terror in the hearts of the remainder of the livestock, which will limit their trust in the ranchers. Assuming livestock have a functional frontal lobe they're probably wondering why the Ranchers don't put together a patrol and go and wipe out the wolves den? It seems completely irrational to them the game the ranchers are playing.

Schools continually rise from, crumble, and return to their constituent parts over the long run.

I truncated your sentence to point out that I'm not refering to natural entrophy, but the very real challenges of holding any gains we make in this realm. I'm talking about never controlling the school or losing control of it within a period of months. My old high school has been standing for over 50 years, it hasn't fell yet, entrophy generally takes a while :-).

Posted by TheCurmudgeon,

I take issue with (or possibly completely agree with) is you jump from clearing the territory of obvious hostiles and support for governance. This implies that there is some form of government in place. If that is the case you are beyond where I am.

This is the real challenge internal to Afghanistan, and if the government is as bad as we make it out to be why are we protecting it and attempting to strengthen it? We fail to address the threat in Pakistan in a serious manner, and while simultaneously and perhaps unintentionally enabling an incompetent government to remain in office in Kabul. In frustration we now weight our efforts on the remote villages for a national solution? I do understand how these things happen over the years (one mistake at a time), so I'm not pointing a finger at any one individual, but simply suggesting instead of accepting what we know doesn't work , we instead change course in a major way.

Posted by Slapout,

Ever see Warden's 5 ring analysis of how to attack/affect a terrorist/guerrilla organization? Food,water are critical just as they wood be to a civilian population. It is the basic Input Energy into the Life support/people system.

To do this effectively you have to separate the insurgent from the populace and external support, we haven't none either yet. I haven't studied how we would cut off the insurgent's food and water supplies in Afghanistan, so no comment on its feasibility; however, there are other life lines we could target more aggressively: propagandists and financiers. You would be surprised at the limited effort to get after these critical targets, while instead the focus is on squad and platoon leader equivalent targets, which can be replaced indefinitely. Targeting is definitely an area we could approve upon.

Probably should have saved these ideas for an episode of "Deep Thoughts" on Saturday Night Live , but behind all the informed suggestions I know everyone is trying hard to get this right at great personal risk and personal sacrifice. Criticism doesn't mean we're not on the same team. Wish you all a Happy, Healthy and Successful New Year.

[TheCurmudgeon]

This is the real challenge internal to Afghanistan, and if the government is as bad as we make it out to be why are we protecting it and attempting to strengthen it? We fail to address the threat in Pakistan in a serious manner, and while simultaneously and perhaps unintentionally enabling an incompetent government to remain in office in Kabul. In frustration we now weight our efforts on the remote villages for a national solution? I do understand how these things happen over the years (one mistake at a time), so I'm not pointing a finger at any one individual, but simply suggesting instead of accepting what we know doesn't work , we instead change course in a major way.

This is the area that interests me - what is the nature of the relationship between the people and their leaders.

My current guess is that it is a mutual relationship where loyalty is exchanged by the followers, albeit unconsciously, for satisfaction of needs by the leaders. Needs vary and increase over time. In a tribal society the need being filled by the leadership is belongingness - having a place in society (along with lower levels needs of security, food and shelter). We, as an invading force, or an artificial central government, cannot meet these identity needs and the people will not recognize either us or the central government as legitimate. Unless you find a way to bring that traditional leadership into the fold of the new government you cannot hope to win the loyalty of the people.

You can, however, use the "Stockholm syndrome" - make them totally dependent on you for everything and create and artificial relationship built totally on fear. I don't think this is a viable choice.

The remaining alternative is to use the existing structures - these tribal and religious leaders, to positively influence the people to your cause. More difficult when your cause undermines their traditional leadership rolls and the foundations of their society.

These ideas do not represent any actual doctrine, simply a theory I have been working on.

[slapout9]

Link to an interesting paper on Mobilizing population groups.

"The Problems Of Mobilization And The Analysis Of Armed Groups" Parameters 2006.
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/P...ring/vinci.pdf