Is This The End of The Carrier

[pvebber]

In reply to Alfred the Great's post

In fact it's incredibly easy to run away from a cruise missile.

So why has the Navy spent 10s of Billions on Aegis and SM-2s to shoot them down?

You just need to get inside the sensor to shooter loop, and move enough

How exactly do you do that for say, an over the horizon radar hard wired into teh missile aunch sites C2?

The sensor to shooter loop of an airstrike is a similar problem. Why isn't it 'incredibly easy' to avoid an air strike by "getting inside its sennsor to shooter loop"?

then there needs to be some kind of final confirmation that the blip on the radar is actually your CVN.

We are very cooperative in the way we operate our CSGs so it is well nigh impossible to confuse a strike group conducting flight ops with anything else on the ocean.

Just like tanks did not result in the blitzkrieg transformation, the DF21 is not itself responsible for transforming war at sea. But the combination of space-based, over the horizon, and non-military platform sensing, resiliant command networks, and supersonic cruise missiles and TBMs enable Carriers to be threatened at ranges well beyond their aircraft's ability to fight back.

Operating as they do now.

That does not mean that the addition of UCAVs and the integration off CV based aircraft with long endurance aircraft from distant shore bases don't have the ability to counter these new threats. The question is are we agile enough in our procurement to work out a response strategy quickly enough?

[Bob's World]

Just as "amateurs argue tactics while professionals argue logistics" I would suggest considering the following twist on that logic:

"Amateurs argue programs and platforms while professionals argue policies."

A hard scrub of platforms and programs is at the heart of the QDR process, and is a massive game of inter-service head butting. But a hard scrub of just two or three outdated policies could sweep the table of dozens of programs and platforms across service lines in one stroke; and similarly create a new focus for those same services at the same time.

I was personally and professionally floored when I was politely told by the very smart, very nice DASD running a QDR group that I worked in that "we would work the programs first, and then get to policies later."

So, months of effort to debate and rack and stack programs and platforms based on old policies; then once that is done, create new policies, that will have to fit the military we have just built? I didn't get it then. I still don't get it. But I see the effects of it in both the QDR programmatic decisions and the post QDR policy positions that have been coming out.

[slapout9]

"we would work the programs first, and then get to policies later."

Bob, I keep telling you we use the Invisible Hand Theory in everything we do not just economics. It's the American way

[Alfred_the_Great]

In reply to Alfred the Great's post

So why has the Navy spent 10s of Billions on Aegis and SM-2s to shoot them down?



How exactly do you do that for say, an over the horizon radar hard wired into teh missile aunch sites C2?

The sensor to shooter loop of an airstrike is a similar problem. Why isn't it 'incredibly easy' to avoid an air strike by "getting inside its sennsor to shooter loop"?



We are very cooperative in the way we operate our CSGs so it is well nigh impossible to confuse a strike group conducting flight ops with anything else on the ocean.

Just like tanks did not result in the blitzkrieg transformation, the DF21 is not itself responsible for transforming war at sea. But the combination of space-based, over the horizon, and non-military platform sensing, resiliant command networks, and supersonic cruise missiles and TBMs enable Carriers to be threatened at ranges well beyond their aircraft's ability to fight back.

Operating as they do now.

That does not mean that the addition of UCAVs and the integration off CV based aircraft with long endurance aircraft from distant shore bases don't have the ability to counter these new threats. The question is are we agile enough in our procurement to work out a response strategy quickly enough?

AEGIS isn't against cruise missiles, it's against anti-ship missiles. A subtle difference, but an important one: cruise missiles tend to use inertial guidance and terrain following to locate their target, which may include GPS positions; anti-ship missiles will typically use an active radar seeker (at some point) in order to determine a contact that corresponds to the target type.

Given that a CVN will be doing in the order of 30kt during flight deck operations, then it will be upto 5 miles away from the original position at missile launch, making inertially guided weapons (without an ability to carry to terminal guidance within an area of say 10nm radius) useless.

Defence against ASM is nothing new, and lots of effort has gone into it (but I don't promise we'll shoot down everything that flies towards us). Defence against long range targetting is equally practiced (and has at least 2 NATO doctrine manuals associated with it). I can't comment on the USN's ability to maintain their readiness in accordance with doctrine, but the RN is consistently training (how well is a question for another day).

I also have my doubts that CVN ops in an area that may, or may not, be permissive will be exactly the same as peacetime ops. I suspect that hiding amongst merchant traffic, deceptive AIS etc etc may well be used.

As for the rest of it, it's all Naval Warfare; nothing can be guaranteed, but I don't think anyone, least of all the Chinese, are in the position to take advantage of it within the next 10 - 15 years. Your own sources are incredibly circumspect, with no positive statements and lots of hedging.

The argument of policy vs platform is instructive, would you care to outline which policies should/could/ought be scrapped? I know what I would propose for the UK, but don't really have a handle on the US internal politics. Moreover, isn't policy a Civilian function, into which sticking a Service Oar is loaded with problems?

[slapout9]

The argument of policy vs platform is instructive, would you care to outline which policies should/could/ought be scrapped? I know what I would propose for the UK, but don't really have a handle on the US internal politics. Moreover, isn't policy a Civilian function, into which sticking a Service Oar is loaded with problems?

That is really the problem and I would say it doesn't matter. As Ken White would say we don't do Grand Strategy or Policy by design it is whatever administration in power says it is. It is almost impossible to have a rational policy discussion with a 2 party system because each party wants to and has to claim credit for better policies so they can win elections.

This creates a constant state of confusion for war planners. Which is why they usually stay out of policy recommendations and focus on platforms, which in their defense is about the best they can do. And if they focus on flexible platforms that could be of value to any administration regardless of whether they are liberal or conservative that is about the best that they can do.

Aircraft Carriers despite their vulnerabilities are flexible platforms which is why I doubt they will go away, nor will the Marine Amphibious assault capability for the same reason. So how do you survive a high threat envronment.....build a lot of them and disperse them to ensure that they can survive the initial and sustained missile attack until they can counter-attack and destroy the opposing sides platforms.

One of the early 60's jump jet carrier platforms was literally a single aircraft carrier....one jet per carrier and disperse over a wide area until it they able to concentrate at the landing site. The problem is solvable because it has already been solved.

[Cole]

in terms of flexible deployment of airpower I really don't see a substitute for a carrier. Land-based aircraft are too short-legged, and a competent adversary would have an easier time knocking down a tanker (no refueling, no long legs) or AWACS (no eyes, no targets) than it would hitting a CVBG.

With the risk of Chinese missiles landing on Guam, Japan, and Korea, agree it seems unlikely you would want to park multiple fighters and tankers there. But with a strong Pacific aerial refueling capability out of Alaska, Australia, Hawaii, and Diego Garcia couldn't you simply employ greater carrier and fighter stand-off farther from Taiwan making the search for and attack of carriers and parked fighters more difficult?

Given AirSea Battle and the tyranny of Pacific distances, you would think an aerial tanker with greater long distance legs while retaining substantial fuel off-loading capability should have a major advantage. Yet that isn't a weighted priority in the requirements and no advantage is offered for additional capacity unless an unlikely price threshold is reached. That would seem to support COL Jones observation that programs were considered prior to policies.

Also in support of COL Jones observation, wonder why the QDR did not support a new long range bomber given Pacific distances? Were budgetary and F-35 considerations superseding the missile threat? Or was there an unspoken reluctance to fund another manned bomber when unmanned or optionally-manned might do? Yet a recent GAO report indicates little current service willingness to substitute unmanned aircraft to fill the "fighter gap."

Carriers also don't face as many overflight restrictions as land-based forces do, and Entropy is spot-on when it comes to airfields.

Pet theory time. Wouldn't a series of built-up island bases near the Tropic of Cancer (Midway, Wake, Northern Mariannas) effectively augment carriers in the Pacific? Wake Island for instance is already U.S. owned and 2/3rd of the way to Guam and would support aircraft heading toward Guam, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea while outside the range of more common Chinese missiles.

Agree that a threat exists to tankers so why not launch Navy/Marine F/A-18s and F-35 from these island bases to link up with and protect tankers and help them via buddy refueling of other aircraft. Couldn't these or other F/A-18E/F also carry anti-ballistic missiles to protect the island? Their AESA radars and AMRAAM would already support against cruise missiles and fighter-bomber attacks.

A pair of KC-X would fly from farther bases to refueling track/anchor locations near the islands where they would top off a pair of locally launching F/A-18E/F escorts to enable near-simultaneous refueling of 3-4 en route fighters. Navy F/A-18E/F already support hose and drogue buddy refueling and a small boom could be added to some F/A-18E/F to refuel USAF F-22, F-35A, and F-15E/F-16/A-10 as well.

Island-based catapults could be covered with concrete shelters to assure protected take-off. Use of underground shelters and elevators could protect aicraft parking. EW would jam Chinese GPS satellites. Land and nearby sea-based air defense systems would target inbound cruise missiles and ASBMs. Multi-spectral smoke generation could further obscure the island airfields during missile attacks to prevent IR and radar-targeting. Inertial nav would have a less accurate CEP given greater distances from launch location.

Stationing of Army and Marine forces and their equipment on such island bases could also be in position to protect the island from commandos and board JHSVs to transfer to forward theaters escorted by LCS. Troops could rotate to these islands from Hawaii, Alaska, Washington state and San Diego to preclude island fever.

Navy and Marine F/A-18E/F and F-35s could also rotate their from their east and west coast bases to further disperse squadrons not aboard docked carriers. That would place more Navy/Marine F/A-18E/F and F-35s closer to station even when carriers are not or are en route.

So with the couple of Navy experts on hand, couldn't the same sorts of systems protecting carriers also protect land bases located farther than Guam? You can't sink an island with torpedos or missiles/bombs, and ASBM "flechettes" or submunitions designed to damage a carrier deck would have more difficulty with hefty concrete shelters and runways that could be rapidly repaired. You can't protect a 10,000' runway but possibly could safeguard a concrete land-based catapult and hook line. And if/when those systems were being repaired, Harriers and F-35B could still function.

I'll add that loaded C-17s, airborne troops, and special ops C-130s also could launch from these island's regular runways...moved their when warnings and indications indicated a threat. If I was really bold, would suggest that CV-22 and MV-22 could centrally locate from these bases to link up with Special Ops and Marine amphibious ships that normally could carry only helicopters. Use the extra MV-22 range to reach the ships from afar to pick up other troops remaining not initially lifted by on board helicopters.

[slapout9]

Pet theory time. Wouldn't a series of built-up island bases near the Tropic of Cancer (Midway, Wake, Northern Mariannas) effectively augment carriers in the Pacific? Wake Island for instance is already U.S. owned and 2/3rd of the way to Guam and would support aircraft heading toward Guam, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea while outside the range of more common Chinese missiles.

Stationing of Army and Marine forces and their equipment on such island bases could also be in position to protect the island from commandos and board JHSVs to transfer to forward theaters escorted by LCS. Troops could rotate to these islands from Hawaii, Alaska, Washington state and San Diego to preclude island fever.


I'll add that loaded C-17s, airborne troops, and special ops C-130s also could launch from these island's regular runways...moved their when warnings and indications indicated a threat. If I was really bold, would suggest that CV-22 and MV-22 could centrally locate from these bases to link up with Special Ops and Marine amphibious ships that normally could carry only helicopters. Use the extra MV-22 range to reach the ships from afar to pick up other troops remaining not initially lifted by on board helicopters.

Old theory but a good one, what you are talking about was the basis of the by Warden "The Air Campaign" and he talks a great deal about how Marine and Navy forces were used in WW2 to seize the Air Fields in order to be able to strike Japan, the flip side is it can also be used to defend against attacks to.

This is why most people don't understand what he (Warden) means when he talks about Air Power Strategies, there will be a lot of other forces involved in a good Air Power Startegy. But if you loose Air Superiorty(includes missiles)....you will likely loose the War.

[pvebber]

"AEGIS isn't against cruise missiles, it's against anti-ship missiles."

Technically, most antiship missiles are ALSO cruise missiles, a cruise missile being one that has a jet engine rather than a rocket motor. I thought I was clear discussing 'ASCM's (anti-ship cruise missiles) when talking about defending aircraft carriers and brought up cruise missiles only in the context of the idea that firing a ballistic missile could be detered by thereat of a nuclear response, since you did not know if iit was nuclear or not. Such an argument would mean you could not use a tomahawk (or other nuclear-capable, cruise missile) near a nuclear power becasue it *might* have a nuke and *might* change course to attack them and there they would have to treat it like a nuclear attack.

"Given that a CVN will be doing in the order of 30kt during flight deck operations, then it will be upto 5 miles away from the original position at missile launch, making inertially guided weapons (without an ability to carry to terminal guidance within an area of say 10nm radius) useless. "

Previously Granted. We are not talking about purely ballistic missiles when talking about the DF-21 anti-ship varient. It is a ballistic missile that has the payload to carry 1 (or more) guided warheads. It is those warheads that cause all the problem for the Carrier, since the CV can't get out of their footprint, assuming they used a seeker with similar capability to ASCM seekers (which ships can't run out of the footprint of, when properly targeted).

"Defence against ASM is nothing new, and lots of effort has gone into it."

Yes, as I previuously argued, Aegis can be granted to have "solved" the high speed diving cruise missile problem of the 70s and 80s as evidenced by the fact nobody is producing them anymore. The ASM manufactuers realize that the way to combat AEGIS (and like systems) is by minimizing thee time it has to respond. By going as low as you can as fast as can, from as close as you can, you minimize the nimber and Pk of Aegis shots at your missiles. That is simple geometry. A Mach 2 missile takes ~30 seconds to get in from the horizon. That is an awfully short time to make a decision, designate a trget, deconflict with other ships and take the shot. That assumes verybody running around in "robocruiser" mode near a carrier conducting flight ops - a tough sell to the Air Boss. You better have Cooperative Engagement Capability annd a brandy new Hawkeye AEW bird up to attack beyond the horizon have a decent chance. If there are 20 or 30 incoming missiles, this puts even CEC in a royal hurt locker.

Defense against ASM's in general is nothing new. Defense against large salvoes of supersonic sea skimming missiles is. Combine that threat with ASBMs and you have a shift on the order of the one fromm attacking with guns, to attacking with planes. Without the right defenses, you are toast. And you better hope there is not a submarine around to lob a few torpedoes into the mix...

"Defence against long range targetting is equally practiced"

There is "long range targeting" practiced by opposing ships, and then there is national level targeting via "national technical means". We indeed do have good doctrine (and practice it) against an ennemy Surface Action Group trying to target you from over the horizon. That is a totally different problem from the one posed by the integration of over the horizon rader, space, and other stuff and you have a totally different problem that there is not much you can do to stop short of attacking either the adversaries territroy, or getting into a space fight that is highly escalatory as different countries have different interpretations of what consititutes "Strategic warning" capabilities.

"As for the rest of it, it's all Naval Warfare; nothing can be guaranteed, but I don't think anyone, least of all the Chinese, are in the position to take advantage of it within the next 10 - 15 years. Your own sources are incredibly circumspect, with no positive statements and lots of hedging."

Agreed in general. If you look back at the recent Chinnese rate of technical development, 5 years ago the notion of an anti-ship ballistic missile was roundly poo-pooed as barely even possible. Now its acknowledged they have demonstrated one. Add targeting that doees not rely on the survivability of naval platforms, and highly resilient communications networks, and you have a significant new threat.

My argument has not been that surface ships are today obsolete. Its that there is technology currently available that threatens the current U.S. CSG in ways that it currently has a very difficult time defending against. I'm not saying that any given country has fully exploited that capability, but at this point it is purely a matter of expense and effort to do so. The only response we have with our current CSG (and land bases as well) is a magazine arms race that we are on the more inefficient side of (baring a major breakthrough in high energy weapons).

When the enemy has the capability to place your capability to project airpower (from Carriers or landbases) becasue he has a weposn that outranges your aircraft, and requires several defensive weapons per target, you are on the inefficeint side of an arms race that we do not have the money to win.

On the policy side, why is it that we feel the only way to "keep China in its box" is to be able "dominate" China's back yard. IF the CHinese whhere selling SU-30s in large numbers to Cuba and sailing CSGs off our ports arguing that they consider it destabilizing for us to have the ability to deny access to say, the Carribean and the western Atkantic, would we just say "Sure China, we understand, we will just trust you to defend shipping in the Carribean." I don't think so.

If what we really want is to prevent China from a land grab, then all we need is the capability to similarly deny access - NOT to establish our own "dominance". Our policy is that we expect China to trust us to be the policeman on the beat in here backyard, becasue we don't trust them. They now have much of the capability they need, and simply demonstrate the will to build up the capacity.

We do not have teh money to maintain the Navy we have, let alone to buy the ships we say we want ((e.g. LCS is now 3 times more expensive than planned, yet there is no more money in the pot that is supposed to buy 55. Which means we can only afford to build 15 (a third minus some economy of scale loss), Even if we get 18 that is a drop in the bucket of what we need to execute a dispersal strategy (not to mention that LCS is not the right ship to do that anyway...).

The US 30 year shipbuilding plan is a travesty: http://www.militarytimes.com/static/...ipbuilding.pdf
It assumes cost savings in programs that are TREMENDOUSLY over budget.

My warning is that even if you build all the ships we say we want, the eriting is already on the wall that they are nott the ships we are going to need in 5 or 10 years, let alone 25-30.

[slapout9]

Link to 2008 presentation by Col. Warden on Long Range Strategy and why we have problems with it and what we might be able to do.


http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/joi...Warden-PPT.pdf