First, I would urge some caution on framing this discussion in "Islamic insurgent" vs. would-be life-givers/sometimes life-takers. In all your examples, religion is secondary to actual political control. Insurgents may claim that it is a contest between "Islam" and "the West," but the actual realities are very different.
This example isn't so much about message as it is control of the country. Aid isn't being applied, because the government is very weak. Al-Shabaab with support from Hizb al Islam owns most of Mogadishu and has strengthened its positions since Ethiopia's withdrawal. Much of the 'public discourse'--if it can be called that--is happening between "Islamist" factions as they jockey for control of the country. I put scare quotes around "Islamist," because the religious issues are at the very least secondary concerns in what is a contest for political control of the country. They aren't choosing between life-giving and life-taking; they are fighting to be in charge--in this case, between "Islamist" factions. Refusal, misuse, etc. of aid is not because they aren't getting a message but because control is not established. Given this environment, the only thing unreasonable is that anyone should expect aid to be effective.
There are other factors besides religion that make this a ripe place for radicalization: extremely poverty, limited resources including water, and ethnic divisions. Plus, there are safe havens for radical groups.
Again, I would say this has more to do with local choosing between governance rather than any Islamic vs. Western life-giver/taker divide.
Whatever the Taliban represent, Afghans are making a choice between two sides offering their brand of law and order. At the recent MCA Dinner, David Kilcullen laid this out very well. I won't recount the whole talk, but the Taliban have been able to deliver a message that they are less corrupt and offer a swift if brutal justice. Again, that message is enabled because ISAF and the Afghan government need to do a better job delivering on the promise of good governance than the Taliban is doing. Again, religion--in my view--is secondary.
The global discourse on US involvement in the world will go on no matter whether we are engaged in military invention or not. The US will be presented as a bogey-man, and there will be legitimate grievances against the US. Choosing to not address them is dangerous in my view.
What I want to debate is how to go about counteracting that message. If that means disengagement in favor of local actors debating and/or fighting it out among themselves, that is a valid option. However, there is no denying we have interests in these regions and, as such, have a stake in the local political discourse. Do we cut our losses?
More important than the local discourse are the global networks of insurgent groups that use media such as YouTube to support the political aspect of their missions. How do we go about disrupting that flow of information? Do we take a "CT"-esque approach using lawfare and denial of service to close down these sites as they pop up? Or do we engage in the discourse? Personally, I think we should acknowledge the limitations of the former and do much more of the latter in terms of trusted local partners.
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