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Doctrine & TTPs Enduring doctrinal principles, what really works now (or not), and the TTPs that deliver them.

View Poll Results: Evaluate Kilcullen's work on counterinsurgency
Brilliant, useful 26 45.61%
Interesting, perhaps useful 26 45.61%
Of little utility, not practical 1 1.75%
Delusional 4 7.02%
Voters: 57. You may not vote on this poll

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Old 12-30-2006   #41
Steve Blair
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Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
Gentlemen,

As defined by Hammes we are definitely (there is no gray area) involved in a 4GW fight in Iraq and Afghanistan.

One aspect I haven't heard discussed much is the difficulty that a democratic country has in dealing with 4GW, vice a totalitarian one. We have certain limitations based on our laws and values that are easily exploitable. Some advocate changing the laws (the big ones in the press are torture, eavesdropping, etc.) to deal with the emergency, but the reality is these wars will last several years, so changing our laws would not a be temporary fix, such as establishing martial law in New Orleans after Katrina.

There are several aspects at the strategic level we have yet to address. In 4GW you can't win the fight on the battleground, but you can lose it there. Please read Hammes's "The Sling and the Stone" for clarification.

Bill
I have to admit right from the start that I don't totally buy into the 4GW stuff. I just consider it a more developed (full spectrum, if you will) version of 3GW. Or an adaptation of old techniques to use new weapons and means of operations. That's my disclaimer.

That said, Bill makes a very valid point regarding the lack of serious discussion regarding the ability of an open democracy such as ours to succeed in this sort of warfare where one of the major weapons is PR. The United States has always had great difficulty in this sort of operation, precisely because of our free press and the way the press views its role with regard to government and military operations. Now I'm not advocating in any way changes to freedom of the press, but it's worth remembering that the British in their COIN-type operations (to include Northern Ireland) exercised much tighter control over the press and had more sweeping powers when it came to covert and military/police operations. Also, I would say the nature of our basic political system (with a controlled revolution every two years in the form of elections) makes it especially difficult to develop the kind of long-term, all aspect campaign plan that would be needed for this sort of conflict. Sometimes other countries have succeeded against a 3GW+ adversary because of subtle differences in their political system or the relationship their military has with the remains of a colonial police force.

From a military standpoint, we need things like what Kilcullen and Mattis have put out. Mattis has an exceptional ability to relate his thoughts to the men in the ranks, and that is something that is all too rare in our military today.
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Old 12-30-2006   #42
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Originally Posted by Fabius Maximus View Post

Again, thanks for sharing your insights and experience on this thread. Best wishes to you all for a great 2007.
Before you leave to your own devices, I'd like some response to the questions you were asked above. Additionally, what are your credentials and research methods to be able to intelligently write 20 articles over 40 months on Iraq?

I guess after 2 years in theater and an hour and a half responding to your question I expect I'm owed at least that much.
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Old 12-30-2006   #43
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Before you leave to your own devices, I'd like some response to the questions you were asked above. Additionally, what are your credentials and research methods to be able to intelligently write 20 articles over 40 months on Iraq?

I guess after 2 years in theater and an hour and a half responding to your question I expect I'm owed at least that much.
Based upon the personal message responses I've received over the last hour, don't expect answers to your questions. We were rode hard and put away wet. As for credentials, don't hold your breath; he won't even address that much.

expect to see your musing in a future blog with his name on it, proclaiming all thought to be his own.

Quite the professional....
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Old 12-30-2006   #44
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A spirited and heated thread. I have no visibility of what is going on in the PMs, just that there are many of those, too.

Points are strongly felt and generally professionally presented on both sides, despite the passion behind them. At risk of violating my content-agnostic personna when logged in under this identity, I have to say that I tend to support those who prop up Kilcullen. Nevertheless, I am also concerned that we are on the brink of some FM bashing. I, for one, appreciate his voice even as I disagree with it. I know the answer to cold fusion and world hunger is not on d-n-i net. It still makes me think. Plus everyone is all lathered up and writing good stuff here in reply.

My two cents -- the debate is welcome (even if one-sided), our charter is that contrarian viewpoints are welcome (even if unpopular), the tone has been largely civil, rock on. Happy god damn new year.

There's nothing that will replace a lifetime of PME. But it needs some cliff notes to get it rolling out of the mental cobwebs at the tip of the spear. Praise be to both. Kilcullen's 28 to me is sort of like the model T of COIN theory. Not perfect, available only in black, but darn good and reaching folks that weren't served before.
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Old 12-30-2006   #45
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Default Thou has spoken

Thank you for bringing us back into our charter where all voices welcome and needed in this council. I shouldn't have to remind anyone that we as a nation, or we as the West, or we as the collective against the Al Qaeda Network or AQN like threat have yet found and implemented an effective strategy to defeat this global movement (yes we hurt it, but that is far from defeating it). Fabius provides a voice contrary to many, and maybe in the end contrary is right. All the respect due to those currently in the fight (and it is a hell of a lot), winning battles (physical and perception) in your AO is critically important, and Kilcullen TTP should help, but it still won't win the conflict at the strategic level. We need to hear the ground truth from the Co Cdrs and NCOs out there now, but we also need to hear ideas from the stratosphere on grand strategy, then find ways to mesh them.

Great debate, still the best forum for professionals I have found on the net. I wish you all the best for a successful and happy New Years!
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Old 12-30-2006   #46
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1) Re: Crossborder sanctuaries for Malaya CTs: I am nitpicking--mea culpa: In fact, the then heavily forested Thai border did pose real problems for the British-led COIN effort in Malaya....Overthrow of Pibulsongram's pro-communist Thai government made a difference in Malaya. That said, no argument with the assertion that Malaya was not VN.....

2) Kilcullen's view, at least as he presents it, of the local citizen perusing the competing menus presented him by insurgents and COIN forces and judiciously selecting the best deal (one dish from the "hearts" column, a couple from the "minds" column), causes certain reservations to arise. This is not to say that there is no important role for the "carrot" in a carrot and stick approach...And of course, every place and every conflict are unique...Nevertheless, on the level of the general principle, far away and long ago, Thompson and Co. consistently drummed into our minds the concept that the Vietnamese peasant is not a free agent...(Indeed, as Fall pointed out, what freedom to choose was there between our offer to provide better hog breeding stock vs. the VC propensity to behead and disembowel with abandon?)...The Brits were so insistent on the not-a-free-agent point because of its obvious implications on application of a hearts and minds approach....They posited a corollary, viz.,: because he is not free to choose (and has, since antiquity, never been free to choose), we (i.e., COIN forces) must put him in a position where it will be physically impossible for him to provide any support to the insurgents--where he will not be subject to the pressures that would compel him to provide such support....In other words, make sure that he cannot choose the insurgent option, whether he wants to or not....Hence, the "drain the swamp/ confine the 'at risk' population in order to protect them" classical British approach....In the event, on the ground in VN, to be sure, the cogency of this argument led to a high level of adviser frustration, since the US did not hold sovereignty and loose-as-a-goose thirdworldism did not augur well for the application of air-tight controls on the movement of people and commodities. But that's another story.....

Cheers,
Mike.
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Old 12-30-2006   #47
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Mike in Hilo
1) Re: Crossborder sanctuaries for Malaya CTs: I am nitpicking--mea culpa: In fact, the then heavily forested Thai border did pose real problems for the British-led COIN effort in Malaya....
As an aside, the current Thai government often accuses Malaysia of lending succor to the ongoing insurgency in southern Thailand. Borders troubles can work in both directions...
Quote:
Originally Posted by Mike in Hilo
2) Kilcullen's view, at least as he presents it, of the local citizen perusing the competing menus presented him by insurgents and COIN forces and judiciously selecting the best deal (one dish from the "hearts" column, a couple from the "minds" column), causes certain reservations to arise. This is not to say that there is no important role for the "carrot" in a carrot and stick approach...
Anyone who doesn't believe that the indig "peruse competing menus" in order to select the path that is most beneficial to them personally is extremely naive. Of course, the fundamental "benefit" is that which permits survival. The indig understand more clearly than the average troop exactly how transient our presence really is.

The RAND pub On Other War, posted in another thread a while back, discusses the Hearts & Minds vs Cost/Benefit theories of COIN, and does a pretty decent job of putting them in context. In my mind, they are inextricably linked and it comes down to possessing enough knowledge of the local situation to effectively blend the two methods into a strategy that will eventually have a real strategic impact.
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Old 12-30-2006   #48
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Default free to choose?

Galula describes this as a battle between two camps on who will "control" the population, a battle the counterinsurgent must win, or he risks losing the war. I think it is important to take his words literally, because he specifies control, which does not necessarily equate to winning the hearts and minds. The terrorists don't control the population with carrots, they'll simply brutally them and family members if they don't comply. I would call that control. He also states that in many cases the villagers (or townsfolk, etc.) were previously under control of the insurgents overtly, and now that the counterinsurgent is there the insurgents will still most likely exert varying degrees covert control until we can root out these covert cells.

I don't see it as a competition of menus that the populace as the freedom to choose from, because we always offer the lobster and steak special, compared to the rice and stale fish menu from the other camp, but that rice and stale fish looks pretty good when some is holding a knife to your son's throat. Hell yea, they'll take our steak and lobster, but that doesn't give us control.

A technique he offered was to order the population to do certain tasks to teach them that the coalition is in charge, because our orders would give them an excuse for working with the coalition, so hopefully they would be killed by the insurgents.

Until we figure out the security and control piece, our fancy menu means very little.

Last edited by Bill Moore; 12-30-2006 at 06:06 AM.
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Old 12-30-2006   #49
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Default Pursuant to Jedburgh

I don't think I disagree....My point is the obvious one that keeping your head trumps the prospect of financial gain--And, for that matter, accepting the benefits of prosperity does not necessarily mean you'll favor the side that has brought you that prosperity....You'll favor the side that you know will prevail in the end, because to do otherwise would be suicidal. (ex.:all those prosperous communities where the VC taxation rate simply increased commensurate to the ability to pay, VCI called all the shots, and from which the VC Shadow Supply System got a significant infusion of rice for their troops).

Happy New Year,
Mike.
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Old 12-30-2006   #50
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Old 12-30-2006   #51
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Bill, I'm not sure this came out right...curious if you meant something else.


Quote:
A technique he offered was to order the population to do certain tasks to teach them that the coalition is in charge, because our orders would give them an excuse for working with the coalition, so hopefully they would be killed by the insurgents.
Both you and Mike are on the same vein that I've been before in trying to make peers understand part of the problem with civilian compliance/support. There are parts of Iraq that are like Little Italy. The residents know that the police cannot be everywhere and at all times, so they are not going to go against the mob and provide information.

Hence the sharp rise of powerful militias to protect neighborhoods (and whichonly require the right trigger to become sectarian thugs). Our inability to provide a security blanket, through whatever policy failure you want to pick, perhaps gave rise to the militias for two reasons.

1) There was an identified need for militia protection NOW and potentially for the future.

2) There was a forecasted need for militia protection as the coalition eventually reduced its footprint.

Anyone have a data source for the size and number of militias, and any recorded increases in the 2002-present time frame?
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Old 12-30-2006   #52
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Default Sheikhs on the brain

I was going to post this as an RFI, but jcustis' post convinced me the wheels ae already turning here
Quote:
There are parts of Iraq that are like Little Italy
. The sheikhs up here are a little like mafia dons, not exactly like the Gottis (but that is about as close as any US example (didn't Slapout mention a Patrick Swayze movie that might fit too?), but maybe closer to the ones you read about in Sicily.

I've been emailing back and forth between marct and a freind of his he introduced me to who works networks about trying to piece together how things are working up here. The sheikhs seemed linked to just abut everything. Example as in the "How to win in Al Anbar" cartoon, the sheikhs own all the good stuff (factories, mills, etc.); they are also tied to allot of bad things (corruption, AIF, crime, etc.); they have most of the real influence (muktars, government, people, mosques, foreign monies, etc.). Because they are somewhat low key to the Americans who only spend a year here, most of us don't really understand their role or influence. They sort of come across as the "wealthy uncle" because the Americans here mostly interact with the layers in between. We generally look for those people in roles we understand, and feel comfortable interacting with. The further west you from here, the less likely I think a person can make an association that makes sense.

They are the 4000 year old tradition behind the scenes who make phone calls and get things done, but they are also a kind of cultural icon; so much so that many officials wish they were sheikhs - kind of a strange 70s rock star idolation. The sheikhs are ancient compared to Ba'athism, but I think they more or less defined (or redefined) that political ideology to suit their needs.

To complicate matters in 2003 it seems we had a kind of 52 card pick up where all the cards got jumbled up. The sheikhs were the only face cards left after Saddam and crew were removed, and they more or less were left face up ( I mean we know who the sheikhs are). However allot of the sheikhs' men/buisness associates/friends of the family were put into positions of authority in the new government (includes the military and police). Now we have people who are in positions of authority where their loyalties should be to the government, but instead have interests more closely aligned to a sheikh or a group of sheikhs.

I think the IA (at least at the BN and BDE levels) should not be making deals with the sheikhs, maybe not even asking favors - here, deals and favors are two ways - (..and one day I'm going to need a favor from you...), and this would put the IA CDR with conflicitng loyalties and more then one master. However, the mayor/governor could probably pull it off, after all in a way - they are all politicians anyway, and all politicians are....well universal.

When it gets right down to it up here in Ninewa, it seems to be mostly about the flus (pronounced "floose" but meaning money) and influence and less about political ideaology and religion, those seem to be more tools to manipulate the populace. Make no mistake, they have their place, but it my observation that "cultural economics" drives the train here in Mosul.

So anybody out there got any thoughts on the sheikhs? Does it work this way in the other provinces?

The BN CDR for the IA BN I'm with told me one day, "you know Saddam either bought off the sheikhs or replaced them (those often referred to here as the 1990 sheikhs) in order to gain their influence; if the new government could get the sheikhs to go along, we could fix most of the problems." I'm not trying to minimize the influence of the big time clerics ( a kind of sheikh in their own right when it comes to influence), but after some of the stuff I've seen I'm inclined to agree.

Where does this tie in with Kilcllen? Maybe I'm paraphrasing way out there, but his work (and the body of work it has generated) has been useful to me in helping me see problems for what they are/might be vs. what I'd prefer them to be.

Best regards, Rob
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Old 12-30-2006   #53
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...I think the IA (at least at the BN and BDE levels) should not be making deals with the sheikhs, maybe not even asking favors - here, deals and favors are two ways - (..and one day I'm going to need a favor from you...), and this would put the IA CDR with conflicitng loyalties and more then one master. However, the mayor/governor could probably pull it off, after all in a way - they are all politicians anyway, and all politicians are....well universal....
Rob,

If you have the time, there are three books that talk in depth about the three primary sectors of Iraqi society (Sunni & Shi'a Arabs, and the Kurds) in the context that you are looking for.

The broadest (if you can only read one, this is the one) is A History of Iraq, by Charles Tripp. He takes a unique look at Iraqi history, by putting it in the context of the development of power bases, and the manipulation of support. If you are really pressed for time, get a hold of a copy and just read from Chapter 6 on - that covers the period under Saddam.

The other two are more narrowly focused: Agha, Sheikh and State, by Martin van Bruinessen, focuses on Iraqi Kurdish social structures. ("Sheikh" has a different meaning and context to the Kurds than it does to the Arabs.) If you work with the Kurds at all, I strongly recommend reading this one in its entirety.

The third and final volume is The Shi'is of Iraq, by Yitzhak Nakash. This is a very readable book with a tremendous amount of detail on Arab Shi'a history, culture and tradition. However, its over 200 pages of small print, so if you're not working with the Shi'a, it may not be worth the time invested...

Ted
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Old 12-30-2006   #54
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Default Directly from the book

Paraphrasing is dangerous, so I'll quote directly (but still there is the danger of missing the context if you don't read the entire chapter).

Counterinsurgency Warfare "theory and practice", David Galula, Prageger, 1964, reprinted 2005.

p. 116 (selected sentences) (Ops he used the word power over, instead of control).

Quote 1. Contact with the population. is actually the first confrontation between the two camps for power over the population. The future attitude of the population, hence the probable outcome of the war, is at stake. The counterinsurgent cannot afford to lose this battle.

even if there is every reason to believe that a majority is sympathetic to the counterinsurgent. The inhabitants will usually avoid any contact with him. there is a barrier between them and the counterinsurgent that has to be broken and can be broken only by force. Whatever the counterinsurgent wants the population to do will have to be imposed. Yet the population must not be treated as the enemy.

The solution is first to request, and next order, the population to perform a certain number of collective and individual tasks that will be paid for. By giving orders, the counterinsurgent provides the alibi that the population needs vis-a-vis the insurgent. A terrible error would be, to issue orders and be unable to enforce them; the counterinsurgent must be careful to issue orders sparingly and only after making sure that the population can humanly comply with them.

Starting with tasks directly benefiting the population- such as cleaning the village or repairing the streets - the counterinsurgent leads the inhabitants gradually, if only in a passive way, to participatein the fight against the insurgent by such work as building roads of military interest, helping construct the village's defense positions................... END QUOTE

What seems so clear now, obviously wasn't so clear during the planning phase for this war. As much effort should have been dedicated to making contact with the population (defined above) as with defeating Saddam's military. We dug a hole that we can probably get out of with a lot of effort, and a well thought out strategy, but it will be a lot tougher than it should have been.

I have some experience working with Sheiks, and while I felt I was the cat's meow while doing it, after looking back on it now (a few years later) I wonder who was playing who. It was obvious we were playing each other, each getting consessions, but he was playing long term, I was trying to achieve realitively short term tactical (for lack of a better word) objectives such as cooperation, stability, etc. I couldn't tie my actions into an overarching strategy, because we didn't have one in 03; however, now that hopefully has changed, but I would think we would want the Iraqi government representatives to make the contact and make the deals with the various sheiks, and if they can't, do we really have an Iraqi government? I think that is the $100.00 question, because if we don't we need to go back to the drawing board concerning our strategy.
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Old 12-30-2006   #55
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Default For Rob Thorton

Rob, I will try and run down a few things that may help that came up in your posts. I am not all the way awake yet so excuse the spelling and police language that may come out.

1-Next of Kin with Patrick Swayze is about a low tech southern tribe that gets some payback against a rich hi tech type mafia gang. It is a flaky movie in some places, you have the usual handgun that shoots 56 times before he has to reload type stuff, but it makes some good points about family tribes. Watch how the network works, low tech and cat dirt mean and very effective.

2-About 3 works ago the head of the Sicilian Mafia was arrested after a 50 year search??. He was at his goat farm. Note he never used a cell phone, land line, computer DVD,CD or BVD's or any other high tech ####. He used 3X5 cards and messengers.

3-I wrote a post awhile back called the Hatfield's vs. McCoys and I said alot of what goes on in Iraq was more like family feuds than classic insurgency. Tribal,Family, criminal gangs can be a real bitch because the population is flat out too intimidated to cooperate or they will be dead, their house burned, eat their chickens and go after their whole family, until they leave or pay tribute or agree to work in high risk sub-contractor like roles.

4-I also wrote a post on the 3F's (family,Friends and Finances)or how to analyze criminal gangs. Crime Networks are all about who is related to who,who knows who,who pays who. That is the system! That is the Network to watch! The small unit leaders handbook for COIN by USMC has an example of how to draw the family network (don't need a computer) I highly recommend this. It is how I learned years ago! I also added a 4Th F called who is ####ing who. A sexual relationship is a very exploitable situation especially outside marriage. I Iraq the 4Th may be Faith (Sunni,Shia, Etc.).

5-I don't know how familiar you are with Jedburgh but if I were you and he recommended reading something, I would be on it stink on ####.

6-And now for listening pleasure and cultural inspiration. Pump up the volume! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-5T3-bnaGA

7-I any of this helps I can try and think of more. Later
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Old 12-30-2006   #56
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Next of Kin was a pretty interesting "bad" movie. I remember seeing it on HBO or someplace a few years back and found the way they handled the family network very interesting.

Your point on the Mafia don who uses 3x5 cards is well-taken. High tech can only really defeat someone who chooses to meet you on those terms. If they avoid engagement there, you have problems. One example that folks tend to forget is operations against the Ho Chi Minh trail. The most successful ones were directed or initiated by SOG teams on the ground. The least successful relied on high-tech AF gear that could be fooled or tricked (although this also played into the AF reliance on numbers to quantify their Trail operations...the book "Setup" by Tilford goes into some interesting details about this).
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Old 12-30-2006   #57
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Gents,
I really appreciate the quick turn and the thoughts. Jedburgh, thanks for the titles - I was hoping to get something along those lines. Slapout - I like the 4th F - in terms of who is working against who. I'd not considered that as an angle, although I'm more aware of it within the ISF then outside (mostly that is based on who I'm exposed to more). Ref. the low tech - here its primarily cell phones and visits - but, its indirect - ex. someone makes physical contact and has some one else tell someone else to call this guy and tell so & so to have him release the brother of the first guy. They have gotten good at getting their point across while having to say very little at all. It makes my head hurt most of the time . Thanks again, I really appreciate the help.
P.S. - low key day here. CF kept a low profile, IA & IP did their thing though. First day I remember in awhile where I could not hear multiple IEDs going off on the MSRs. Could be the feast has something to do with it, could be several things- hopefully tomorrow will be the same, the Iraqis around here could use a break - its mostly the civilians who get wounded these days.

Best Regards, Rob
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Old 12-31-2006   #58
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Default For Jedburgh

Appreciate the link to RAND's "On 'Other War,' " and your pointing out the section on cost/benefit...Worth highlighting (again) the cautionary note on p.25 of the study with regard to a widely accepted "truism":

"[RAND analyst] Wolf further attacked the argument that increasing the standard of living through development would reduce insurgency"

Wolf was right on VN. Others may judge the value of Wolf's point in the current conflicts...

The logistical underpinnings of the SE Asian insurgency included an important, symbiotic component--put simply, the more materials became available to the economy, the more they were siphoned off to be used by the enemy. We even had a name for the well developed organizational network tasked with "diversion/local procurement" for the enemy, the "Shadow Supply System," which was an important VCI function. Without question, breaking the "System" was the CORDS advisorial priority in our border Province of Tay Ninh, hub of the System, during the last couple of years of CORDS's existence (and incidentally, one at which we failed miserably).

Cheers,
M.

Last edited by Mike in Hilo; 12-31-2006 at 04:28 AM.
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Old 12-31-2006   #59
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Mike,

This ties into my previous comments elsewhere that the carrot isn't a strategy, at least not without a stick in the other hand. We have been winning hearts and minds for years, but unfortunately that hasn't correlated with winning wars. When I use the phrase political correct war, this is definitely part of what PC war involves. The American population (and political body) expects to see its military handing out rations, building schools, building roads, etc. to demonstrate our good will, and while it plays nicely to the international audience (sometimes) and definitely to the home audience, it has resulted (in my opinion) that we just do these things without any real thought behind them except for a Kodac moment showing we're winning hearts and minds, but in reality we're only getting temporary positive press coverage, and no real effect on the local population. We simply can't stop doing this cold turkey without first educating our population and political leaders that these seemingly nice acts are frequently counterproductive.

I would love to hear some ideas/recommendations from the council on ways to get a quid pro quo from the local populace in return for our good deeds? I heard one from my boss recently where he recommends encouraging an amnesty program, but an insurgent/terrorist can't get amnesty without turning in at least one other insurgent. This betrayal tactic prevents him going back to the insurgency, so he has a vested interest in seeing the government win (this closes the revolving door, and really goes back to you either with us or against us). However, amnesty isn't a carrot like building a well, so what do we reasonably demand in exchange for digging a well, building a road, etc.? How do we enforce it? I know it is situation specific, but any ideas will generate further ideas that will our guys deployed.
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Old 12-31-2006   #60
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Default Carrots, sticks and ... elephants?

Hi Bill,

I think you've got a really good point here.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
I would love to hear some ideas/recommendations from the council on ways to get a quid pro quo from the local populace in return for our good deeds? I heard one from my boss recently where he recommends encouraging an amnesty program, but an insurgent/terrorist can't get amnesty without turning in at least one other insurgent. This betrayal tactic prevents him going back to the insurgency, so he has a vested interest in seeing the government win (this closes the revolving door, and really goes back to you either with us or against us). However, amnesty isn't a carrot like building a well, so what do we reasonably demand in exchange for digging a well, building a road, etc.? How do we enforce it? I know it is situation specific, but any ideas will generate further ideas that will our guys deployed.
On the amnesty program, I really think it would be counter-productive in that form. Make them take an oath on the Quran (get a local Imam to do the exact wording). It seems that a lot of the local AIF people are fighting in kinship groups, and most kin groups will be happy to have people in both camps (maximizes overall survival chances). Requiring a "betrayal", however, goes against honour.

On the quid pro quo for wells etc., why do you need one? The ideal QPQ is in the form of IO ops. I'll admit that this hasn't been done that wel so far, but that is because there have been serious problems in developing coherent, theatre wide IO campaigns. For example, put verses of the Quran on wells and schools and, if the insurgents blow them up, start rumour campaigns about heresy (NB: in Islam, you are not allowed to deface or destroy a Quaranic quotation).

Marc
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Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
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