Iran, Nukes, Diplomacy and other options (catch all thread 2007-2010)

[Jedburgh]

CH, 17 Dec 08: Iran: Breaking the Nuclear Deadlock

The dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme is deadlocked. Five years of negotiations, proposals, UN resolutions and sanctions have failed to achieve a breakthrough. As diplomacy struggles and Iran continues to advance its nuclear capabilities, the issue becomes ever more grave and pressing.

There is some encouragement for progress in 2009. Iran’s economic and political weaknesses could make it receptive to US president-elect Barack Obama’s willingness to consider new approaches.

This report examines the Iranian and regional context for decisions that the US and Europe will take on shaping their relations with Iran. It goes on to explore options for the nuclear negotiations and offers recommendations to policy-makers to break the deadlock.....

[goesh]

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,520779,00.html

Iran Says It Test Fired Missile That Could Hit Israel, U.S. Bases in Mideast

The U.S. has criticized Iran's missile development and said such launches stoke instability in the Middle East.

The solid-fuel Sajjil-2 surface-to-surface missile tested has a range of about 1,200 miles, far enough to strike at southeastern Europe......."

[AmericanPride]

That a country which perceives itself under siege is developing more advanced weapons systems should be of no surprise to anyone. It'll certainly make the Israelis uncomfortable, but I don't think that would be out of character for the Israeli security establishment. Should we expect any belligerency from Iran while its capabilities continue to develop? Or is this development an Iranian response instead of a provocation (though it'll definitely be interpretated as the latter)?

[Ken White]

They want the Empire back -- Darius and Cyrus are ever present in their thoughts. Yet they know that is unlikely to happen. Conflicted people are hard to figure on occasion. They generally do not like to be dismissed as irrelevant.

They are also natural born hagglers and chips or rhetorical points in bargaining are prized. They tend to make hyperbolic statements and claims that they have no intention of backing up. They'll offer merchandise they do not possess. They make a lot of and things out of pot metal and then tin or copperplate them; they look good initially but too much polishing shows the poor quality underneath...

Different strokes.

[bourbon]

They want the Empire back -- Darius and Cyrus are ever present in their thoughts. Yet they know that is unlikely to happen. Conflicted people are hard to figure on occasion. They generally do not like to be dismissed as irrelevant.

Is this the same Cyrus that rescued the Jews from Babylonian captivity? The same Darius that let the Jews rebuild the Temple?

[Ken White]

point? Germane questions do not always obviously show the point of their being asked...

[bourbon]

point? Germane questions do not always obviously show the point of their being asked...

Given the historically cordial relationship between Persian nationalism and the Jews, and the fact that Israel and Iran are natural allies; I find proclamations that an Iran armed with nuclear missiles is an existential threat to Israel to be dubious. Yet the calls for American intervention continue. Why?

IMHO, a nuclear Iran is a threat to Israel because it threatens Israel’s regional hegemony. Israel basing its security around the strongest tribe principle views this change in regional power as the threat, not the nukes in and of themselves. It becomes a matter of power politics, and not a matter of apocalyptic religion. The aim now for Israel is to thwart or slow Persian resurgence, be it through air strikes or increasing international sanctions.

Frankly I think it is hogwash; and they are trying to manipulate us.

[Ken White]

Frankly I think it is hogwash; and they are trying to manipulate us.

RE: that historical relationship. History is what was...

Things change. When I was in Iran, there were well over 75,000 jews in Iran and the Shah did business with Israel to the extent that Israeli firms had offices in Tehran, Shiraz and Ahwaz. After Khomeini took over, the attitude changed and IIRC, the Jewish population in Iran in 2007 was between 20 and 40K with most sources opting for a lower number. Most who departed emigrated to Israel, the UK or the US.

Thus I'm not sure that today the 'natural allies' are feeling all that much rapport.

Calls for the American intervention continue for a host of reasons, not least this at the LINK. Surely you remember that thread...

Proclamations by politicians are always dubious -- makes no difference where they are or what party they belong to -- thus I would agree -- the Iranians and the Israelis are indeed trying to manipulate us (that begs the question who is not doing so -- but that's another thread, I guess...)

I was just answering American Pride's question on whether the Iraniha were responding or provoking. I think I said a little of both. So too are the Israelis doing the same thing -- it's a middle eastern game. Haggling skills are more important some places on earth than others...

[Valin]

From the NYT by Brian Knowlton: Biden Suggests U.S. Not Standing in Israel’s Way on Iran



From the Times Online by Uzi Mahnaimi in Tel Aviv and Sarah Baxter: Saudis give nod to Israeli raid on Iran

Israeli sub sails Suez, signaling reach to Iran
Dan Williams Dan Williams – Fri Jul 3, 6:55 am ET

JERUSALEM (Reuters) – An Israeli submarine sailed the Suez Canal to the Red Sea as part of a naval drill last month, defense sources said on Friday, describing the unusual maneuver as a show of strategic reach in the face of Iran.
Israel long kept its three Dolphin-class submarines, which are widely assumed to carry nuclear missiles, away from Suez so as not to expose them to the gaze of Egyptian harbormasters.

(Snip)

EGYPTIAN POSITION

Egyptian officials at Suez said they would neither confirm nor deny reports regarding military movements. One official said that if there was such a passage by Israelis in the canal, it would not be problematic as Egypt and Israel are not at war
(Snip)

[Ken White]

"President Obama has committed to trying diplomacy to stop the Iranian bomb. Time, though, is on the mullahs' side, not least because so much of it was wasted after the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate made the improbable case that Iran had suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003. This assessment not only contradicted previous U.S. intelligence consensus but -- as recent court documents show -- also the conclusions of a key U.S. ally with excellent sources in Iran -- Germany."

From The Wall Street Journal at the LINK.

[Rex Brynen]

From The Wall Street Journal at the LINK.

The WSJ article suggests that the US intelligence community ignored information coming from the Germans.

Another plausible explanation is that the US intel community has access to information that the Germans don't....

[Ken White]

Another plausible explanation is that the US intel community has access to information that the Germans don't....

Equally possible is that the German information did not fit preconceived notions.

Is there some reason you advance your theory of plausibility?

[Entropy]

...but I wouldn't draw too many conclusions based on an oped with an obvious agenda.

Looking at the meager evidence provided in the oped, I don't think there's necessarily an inconsistency between the German intel and the NIE, but I haven't read the actual court report that's referenced, or the May 2008 BND report (if anyone could provide links, that would be great).

To begin with, the NIE conclusion was limited to Iran's work on warhead design and testing and not other, necessary, parts of a weapons development program. The article, however, makes no mention of that aspect in the NIE. Instead, it quotes from the report:

the development of a new missile launcher and the similarities between Iran's acquisition efforts and those of countries with already known nuclear weapons programs, such as Pakistan and North Korea

Work on a missile system does not conflict with the NIE conclusions on warhead work, nor does nuclear-related acquisition efforts. There is a lot of selective quoting about "development of nuclear weapons" but what does that mean exactly? The oped leaves us wondering and assumes we will draw the appropriate conclusions after leading us partway down the path.

That Iran is continuing work on enrichment, building a research reactor (which is, coincidentally, a perfect design for plutonium production), and working on delivery systems is enough for many to conclude Iran is "developing nuclear weapons" even if there isn't currently an effort on the actual warhead. So until I see more information, I don't see any serious conflict between the NIE and what is quoted in this opinion piece.

[Ken White]

People in surprising places have agendas.

I'm not drawing any conclusions -- nor did I draw any from the published unclas NIE at the time. In both cases, due to the agenda effect and because I don't have enough information to form conclusions. No comment on a public board is likely to offer more information. I posted it knowing that and that all you say is correct without comment for only one reason.

[Tukhachevskii]

Amitai Etzioni's take on the Iran nuclear issue from the PoV of deterence and rational actor theory, ‘Can a Nuclear Armed Iran be Deterred?’, Military Review, May-June, 2010;

Rationalist champions of deterrence often draw on the same assumption as mainline economists do: that people are rational. One way economists protect this assumption from obvious criticism is by using one data point to assess both the intentions and the actions of the person involved. Thus, economists have argued that if a person who never drank wine—and had no intention of drinking wine—suddenly purchased a bottle of wine, this must have been a rational choice—because otherwise why would he have bought it? And they state that when a person chooses to become a criminal, he “must have” weighed the pros and cons and made a rational decision that being a criminal was the optimal choice. As Nobel Laureate George Stigler pointed out, “A reason can always be found for whatever we observe man to do,” which “turns utility into a tautology.”(p.118)

In short, engagements and sanctions are very unlikely to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power. Hence, increasing attention is devoted to containment. It may well work, but given the high disutility of a nuclear strike by Iran, even a relatively small probability that Iran may use its nukes is unacceptable. The argument that the rulers of Iran are not irrational disregards that quite a few national leaders have in the past “bet” their lives and regimes and lost. Hence, a military option should not be off of the table. However, bombing Iran’s nuclear sites might not be the most effective one.(p.125)

By the way, does the picture on the first page look like the same old 60's vintage HAWK SAMs (though, perhaps, the airframe may be reverse engineered perhaps the guidance system is new?)?

[rborum]

In April of this year, there was hoopla surrounding SECDEF Gates' statement in a memo that he did not think the US had an effective strategy to deter Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Others have expressed similar sentiments, perhaps extended a bit further - essentially lamenting that the U.S. does not have an "Iran strategy."

I'm trying to understand if the essence of those concerns is really about strategy or more about policy.

I have always understood "strategy" to refer primarily to a plan for how to accomplish an objective through specific means (e.g., Liddell Hart's definition of strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy”).

The U.S. has been pretty clear, I think, that it does not want Iran to possess "nuclear capability." And it seems to me that the plan - at least for now - about how to accomplish that is to use the quasi-coercive lever of sanctions to get them to stop.

In that sense, it seems that a plan exists to employ identifiable means to fulfill the ends of policy. Would that constitute a "strategy"?

Now, whether it is an effective strategy is certainly a more complicated and debatable matter, but is it not a strategy -- or is there a broader connotation (or definition) of what can be called strategy than what I have used here?

If it is a strategy - generally speaking - then I wonder if the underlying deficit might really be that the specific goal (i.e., Iran will not possess "nuclear capability") is insufficient as a matter of U.S. (foreign) policy. It is stated as something we do NOT want rather than as an out we do wish to achieve. And the "no nuke" goal does not transparently reflect the U.S.'s underlying interests, either in deterring Iran nukes specifically or in prevailing in this battle of wills. Without a focus on "interests", it seems we get reduced to a struggle of "positions"?

When a nation outlines a policy objective, shouldn't it be able to answer the questions of "why?" "so what if we accomplish it?" and "so what if we don't accomplish it?" -?

I cannot recall reading anywhere a clear explanation of what the U.S. wants from Iran or what the U.S. would like for Iran to be or to do. Only what it should not be or not do. Perhaps I'm not reading the right things. I would very much welcome any guidance from fellow Council members.

Thanks - Randy

[slapout9]

When a nation outlines a policy objective, shouldn't it be able to answer the questions of "why?" "so what if we accomplish it?" and "so what if we don't accomplish it?" -?


Thanks - Randy

Thats why I have serious issues with the framework of Strategy being Ends-Ways-Means. I think a better framework is Motive-Method-Opportunity. Or why will you do it. Do you have a method to do it. And most important is there an opportunity in the enemy for your method to work.

[rborum]

is there an opportunity in the enemy for your method to work.

That's a very interesting point and adds another dimension to that series of questions. The "why" and "so what" questions I asked about interrogate the *purpose of pursuing the particular objective*.

Your point - with which I agree - interrogates the *rationale for the "means"* or proposed plan for pursuing that objective - "why do you think that objective will be accomplished in that way."

[Rex Brynen]

Randy:

I think there is a clear objective (no Iranian nuclear weapons), and a clear-ish strategy (which you correctly identify as using "the quasi-coercive lever of sanctions to get them to stop," while offering the hint of greater future engagement in trade and other forms as an implied incentive if they do).

Whether it is a strategy that is likely to work--and indeed, whether there is any possible strategy that is likely to work--is another question.

Why it is the West doesn't want a nuclear Iran raises some interesting questions about motives (Slapout) and the inherent contradictions of the policy. Typically, three reasons are put forward for attempting to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power:

1) Iranian nukes would strengthen Iran's regional influence. Obviously, this rationale is one which, on the Iranian side, only makes the prospects of of nuclear capacity more appealing.

2) Iranian nukes would go rogue, whether because the Iranian leadership are reckless, or due to some future instability. No one in Iran actually believes this, so it has little traction there even if it plays well elsewhere.

3) Iranian nukes would spark a regional arms race that would leave everyone less secure. This is an argument which finds some receptivity in Tehran as well as Washington.

Compounding all of this is the probable absence of a clear policy on the Iranian side. It is not at all clear that Tehran has taken the decision to build a weapon, as opposed to the decision to build the things that would one day allow it to build a weapon should it decide to do so. The issue is also overlaid with Iranian domestic politics--to the point that when Ahmedinejad appeared to be signalling some flexibility, he was criticized by the Green movement reformist for appeasement of the West.

[Bob's World]

So our "strategy" is based on one aspect of our relationship with one nation? Pretty much. We do far to much of this "pinpoint strategy." We need to stop sniping at issues that upset us and step back and take a broader, longer timeline, perspective.

This requires the development of a broad, simply stated, Grand Strategy that is easily understood by everyone at home and abroad. Then nested under this needs to be sub strategies for regions, then states/non-states, then specific pinpoint issues such as Iran's (reasonable for them) position that they require nuclear weapons in order to best promote their own national interests.

Another problem with our approach to strategy is the tendency to bin states out as "friend" or "foe." This causes us to abuse our friendships by expecting those allied nations to share our national interests (and subjugate their own to the same); and also to approach every issue with our "enemies" as a challenge, even when we often have major shared interests (such as Iran and the US both desiring stability in Afghanistan free from an extremist Sunni agenda). Far better that we see all others as "competitors" with varying degrees of shared and conflicting interests, and approach each with an understanding of where those points of concurrence and friction are; maximizing opportunities while minimizing risks.

Currently too much of strategy is about countering threats rather than on promoting advancement. In other words, most strategies are negative in nature, focused on preventing some other from advancing rather than on promoting our own advancement. You see this mindset in our approach to Iran. (And China, and Russia, and...etc)