Size of the Platoon and Company

[Infanteer]

Interesting. I used to love to debate the finer points of Platoon and Company TO&Es, wondering if adding/subtracting one or two soldiers here or there would make a difference. Then I actually commanded a platoon and found that:
1. Our doctrine is extremely disjointed - I can look in 3 different manuals (Bn/Coy/Pl) and find 3 different line diagrams for what a Platoon and/or Company should look like;
2. You never get a TO&E Platoon in garrison - vacant spots, courses, or other events mean your platoon is always different than the prescribed version;
3. You never get a TO&E Platoon in the field - casualties, leave (Canada pulls guys out of theater for a few weeks of leave on each tour), atts/dets, vehicles going down - you name it; it turns your 40-man organization into a 28-man or a 44-man in a flash. You work with what you got, not with what sounded good over beers in the Mess; and
4. Mission will always dictate - Getting tied to TO&E could take away from this. "Well, I have 3 Sections (are term for "Squads"), so I have 3 Tasks for this Mission". The mission may best be handled with 5 elements (busting up sections) or 2 (putting 2 together).

....This has led me to the belief that a TO&E's main purpose is twofold - administration and affiliation. Not tactics. The administrative part fills the legal requirements of "who is responsible for this guy" and "who manages his career, etc, etc".

The affiliation function is more interesting. I've found that each level fills a certain sociological function. A Platoon is "the family" - everyone knows everyone else. The Platoon Commander knows all his soldiers (or at least he should) and their specifics. All the troops know eachother and what is going on. The Company is "the clan" - companies have real personalities - platoons have personalities too, but these are often really shaped by the Company; you have a general idea who everyone is and recognize them. Experience is usually defined at the company level (Remember when we were in A Coy and we did that raid?). Battalions are "the neighbourhood" - you work in the same building but, for the large part, you don't know everyone. However, it is your neighbourhood, it is better than anyone elses, and it defines "where you were in the Big Army" at any point in time. Anything else is "Big Army" and really doesn't have a factor on day to day soldiering (aside from the more esoteric things like Regimental/Division identity).

I guess this is where the "So What?" comes into play. The So What? is that a TO&E is merely a start point - how you manage soldiers not actually fighting and what you (try) to launch to the fight with. Once you launch, princples, more than line diagrams, become the important thing.

1. Span of Control - Platoons are probably the size they are (and have been since their inception at the beginning of the 20th century) for a reason. I'm not talking about 8 or 9 or 12 man squads. I'm talking about roughly 40 dudes against 60 dudes/80 dudes/100 dudes. As a Platoon Commander, I've commanded, with atts, 7 other organizations that more than tripled the size of my Platoon. I never really "commanded" these guys (although there was a legal command relationship involved), but rather gave them my intent and some guidance (after questioning them on what they brought) and sent them on their way. I did this because it was not physically possible to command that many guys. I can command 3-5 NCOs who can command 3-5 dudes (or a Section with their 2IC). I can, through command, exhibit a degree of control over the other odds and sods that came out, but I really focussed my "command" on those 3-5 dudes. Otherwise, span of control would break down. So, in designing a TO&E for a Platoon, keeping it from 35-45 personnel is prudent.

2. Flexibility - Different missions require different tools for the job. In our Rifle Platoons, the commanders have (or at least should) 2 GPMGs, a 84mm Recoiless Rifle, a 60mm mortar and, these days, a DM Rifle. Depending on the mission, I can pick which 1 or 2 systems I need. I've seen this described as the "tool-box" or the "golf-bag" approach and it is really good. Give me a host of tools and I'll pick which one best suites the specific tactical problem. TO&Es should apply this approach to skillsets as well. I'm lucky enough to have a wide variety of skillsets in my NCOs. One guy is Urban Ops Instructor and knows all about angles, stacking, searching and breaching. Another guy is Gunnery Instructor which means he is a SME in vehicle gunnery. Another guy was Advanced Recce/Mountain Ops which meant he was the "Light Fighter". Having this variety of skillsets enabled the platoon to have the "toolbox" for different tactical problems. So, in designing a Rifle Platoon TO&E, the primary organizing principle after Span of Control should be Effects and the equipment and personnel required to employ those effect. A TO&E should prescribe the weapons and skillsets that are allocated to the Platoon "Golf Bag" so as to ensure effectiveness in any tactical scenario.

3. Fire and Movement - As long as your organization can do this and do it well, it will fight and it will win. It doesn't matter if an Section has 8 or 9 or 12 men. If it can do this, it should be good to go. If all that other stuff above comes into play and your using 7-man sections (as Canadian Dismounted sections are, ideally) you still see success. Heck, I've heard of 4 guys with a LAV III shooting them in being an effective tactical grouping. Therefore, in designing a rifle platoon TO&E, having enough leadership to be able to effect this (2-3 guys per section) is vital - it doesn't matter if they have 5 bayonets or 11.

4. Rule of Fours - For some reason I've found that conducting a mission usually forces you to adapt a "Rule of Four" even if your organization is built around a "Rule of Three" or a "Rule of Five". It could be "Assault, Support, Depth, Reserve" or "Assault, Firebase, Specialist, Security" or "Forward Security, Main Body, Close Security, and Rear Security". None of these elements are permanent nor are they the same size. This "rule" isn't a hard and fast rule, and there are always exceptions and variations, but I found that four offered the most flexibility in return for effort. So, in designing a TO&E, encouraging a "Rule of Four" for a Platoon is good - this means four Sections that can be grown/shrunk as the situation dictates.

Therefore the ideal Platoon is 35-45 guys, has about 8-12 NCOs with a "golf bag" of weapons and skillsets and can apply a "Rule of Four". Anything beyond that doesn't really affect the effectiveness of such an organization.

I believe these principles apply across the spectrum of conflict (ie: there is no such thing as a "COIN Platoon") and at the Company Level as well (just up the numbers).

Well, I'm rambling. There it is for y'all to take apart.

Cheers,
Infanteer

[Ken White]

So no pick apart from here. I also have always found that fours make more sense than the triangular bit. There may be some who come along to debate esoterics but basically, you've figured it out -- what ever works for you is okay.

[William F. Owen]

....This has led me to the belief that a TO&E's main purpose is twofold - administration and affiliation. Not tactics. The administrative part fills the legal requirements of "who is responsible for this guy" and "who manages his career, etc, etc".

That is largely correct, yet the tactical employment of the platoon is nearly always used to justify it's structure.

1. So, in designing a TO&E for a Platoon, keeping it from 35-45 personnel is prudent.

Really? I think that is a very general statement, and I'm not sure it gets us further down the road, but let's run with it.

2. A TO&E should prescribe the weapons and skillsets that are allocated to the Platoon "Golf Bag" so as to ensure effectiveness in any tactical scenario.

The Golf Bag sounds good, but it's usually a cop out for "we don't really knows what we do." See my article here. The Golf Bag has to have set limits, or else it degenerates into outfitting GI-Joe for the next game.

3. . Therefore, in designing a rifle platoon TO&E, having enough leadership to be able to effect this (2-3 guys per section) is vital - it doesn't matter if they have 5 bayonets or 11.

OK, that makes sense.

4. So, in designing a TO&E, encouraging a "Rule of Four" for a Platoon is good - this means four Sections that can be grown/shrunk as the situation dictates.

DGD&D in the UK commissioned a DERA report to support the "Rule of 4" in doctrine and found there is no Rule of 4. It's an opinion based on opinion. It simply does not exist, and there is no evidence it works.

Therefore the ideal Platoon is 35-45 guys, has about 8-12 NCOs with a "golf bag" of weapons and skillsets and can apply a "Rule of Four". Anything beyond that doesn't really affect the effectiveness of such an organization.

Ideal Platoon? You've got some huge margins in there, for something "ideal."
I'd say 24-30, with 6-8 Officers/NCOs and a very basic weapons set.
I think the "ideal" will remain elusive, and alter given context.

However, I largely agree with your approach, especially focussing on the platoon and "some assembly required". There is some good indications that this does work, but it does require some pretty deep education at all levels to get people to be able to apply it in a large number of very different conditions.

[Infanteer]

Really? I think that is a very general statement, and I'm not sure it gets us further down the road, but let's run with it.

I guess that is as specific as I cared to get - I've worked with 7, 8, 9 and 11 man sections on the ground to some extent and have found that it really doesn't make a huge tactical difference.

The Golf Bag sounds good, but it's usually a cop out for "we don't really knows what we do." See my article here. The Golf Bag has to have set limits, or else it degenerates into outfitting GI-Joe for the next game.

Interesting article - Canada has, at least since the adoption of the AR series/Minimi and GPMG in the 80's, maintained alot of those systems (M-72, 60mm mortar). However, we are experiencing some foolishness as a simple, lightweight mortar is being replaced by a heavy, computerized AGL with electronic ammunition (just begging for Murphy to intervene there).

The "Golf Bag" approach is, in my opinion, a sound one. My "HQ Section" has - at any time - 3 to 5 soldiers. In the carrier we keep a mortar, a GPMG (with more in the other cars), a recoilless rifle and - now - a DM rifle.

The sections are pretty much equipped with what they have, but the Platoon has some options. With those soldiers, I can decide if I need indirect or direct suppression, precision fire, or a big-boom at, more or less, 600-800 meters, to support the sections. I guess the strength of the "Golf Bag" is that I have more capabilities than simply "1 x GPMG Team" dictated by a line diagram or having a debate between whether a Platoon Weapons Det should have a 60mm mortar or a second GPMG. It allows the commander to decide.

DGD&D in the UK commissioned a DERA report to support the "Rule of 4" in doctrine and found there is no Rule of 4. It's an opinion based on opinion. It simply does not exist, and there is no evidence it works.

I guess I stuck that one in on the end to plug my view - but I think it works as a general principle. I found that when, for whatever reason, a platoon or company was denuded of that 4th maneuver element that it made things alot harder.

Ideal Platoon? You've got some huge margins in there, for something "ideal."
I'd say 24-30, with 6-8 Officers/NCOs and a very basic weapons set.
I think the "ideal" will remain elusive, and alter given context.

I've found it harder to sustain operations with less than 30 guys as you can't rotate troops off of task to rest. Keep in mind that I also account for our vehicles, which chew up 12 guys in change for a phenomenal capability set.

I guess the thrust of my post was that the ideal isn't something we can pin down to exact numbers. Your ideal platoon has just as wide of arcs as mine (which I am assuming is your purpose). What I was really getting at is I don't think a Platoon with 36 guys is going to be more or less effective than one with 44 guys (same with a Sect of 8 vs a Sect of 12). A well trained and equipped Sect of 8 will kill a Sect of 12 guys lacking in those departments. So I guess if we wanted to discuss the "ideal" Sect, Platoon and Coy we should look at capabilities and how to most effectively set a unit up to manage those capabilities.

Cheers,
Infanteer

[William F. Owen]

The "Golf Bag" approach is, in my opinion, a sound one. My "HQ Section" has - at any time - 3 to 5 soldiers. In the carrier we keep a mortar, a GPMG (with more in the other cars), a recoilless rifle and - now - a DM rifle.

It is sound, if you don't end up taking a knife to a gun fight. We used to keep an 84mm and a GPMG in the 432s, but we could always de-buss carrying all weapons. When weapons are getting left behind, there is the top of a slippery slope.

I've found it harder to sustain operations with less than 30 guys as you can't rotate troops off of task to rest. Keep in mind that I also account for our vehicles, which chew up 12 guys in change for a phenomenal capability set.

Yep. Good point. Other ways to skin that cat, but can't argue with your logic.

I guess the thrust of my post was that the ideal isn't something we can pin down to exact numbers. Your ideal platoon has just as wide of arcs as mine (which I am assuming is your purpose).

Concur. We have to compare like with like.

[Ken White]

...and have found that it really doesn't make a huge tactical difference.

Only when you take 30 to 50% casualties does it become significant. That makes the USMC Squad of 13 with three ARs / SAWs a good one due to that depth (weapons become casualties also). Other than that, size and employment are highly situation dependent and there's no 'best.'

I guess I stuck that one in on the end to plug my view - but I think it works as a general principle. I found that when, for whatever reason, a platoon or company was denuded of that 4th maneuver element that it made things alot harder.

The triangular design was developed to prevent inexperienced or poorly trained Armies from being too predictable by forcing an unbalanced approach. With smaller, professional forces (pending the next major war), that need not be a concern. Organizing in fours facilitates rotations, lessen overhead and gives more flexibility and depth. It also offers a 25% increase in junior leader training slots.

...which chew up 12 guys in change for a phenomenal capability set.

Can also impact your training level if you aren't careful to rotate those vehicle minders on a regular basis. Everyone needs some dismount time...

...So I guess if we wanted to discuss the "ideal" Sect, Platoon and Coy we should look at capabilities and how to most effectively set a unit up to manage those capabilities.

All TOE are, as you mentioned, an administrative device. Organization for combat is a totally different creature and is or should be totally METT-TC dependent. There is no one size fits all, no 'ideal' as every war, every operation will present peculiar demands and the error will lie with he who's a slave to the prescribed organization -- or doctrine.

The advantage to large platoons and companies is combat depth; you can sustain losses and still function. The disadvantage is bulk and clumsiness leading to lack of stealth and diluted training -- the more people you have, the more that will not be present for some reason. The key is to take what you're given, do the best you can with it and never stop studying and thinking.

[Infanteer]

I just finished reading through that 19 page monster which, on a lot of points, mirrors this one. I think it comes down to this:

My thinking for platoons focusses on generating patrol multiples. That is relevant, regardless of the conflict, terrain, or threat. Supporting and sustaining dismounted operation, regardless of numbers or weapons types, is something that has to focus thinking on the platoon level.

The fixation on squad size has proven worthless. We need to move beyond it.

I guess a TO&E sets, as discussed above, the admin foundation for a Platoon to launch. The Aussie 2012 Rifle Platoon seems to have the right idea because it appeared (at least to me) to be the most general in concept. A platoon is composed of 10 groups of 4 guys. There is a "weapons locker" - quite simple in its loadout - in weapons that they can access. The 4 man teams can be stacked to any degree and each one supplied with an addional weapon from the locker based upon the mission. The Platoon is not vehicle specific - managed readiness helps decide what platform a Platoon should focus developing skillsets on ahead of time.

Need 3 groups of 12 each with a GPMG? Go with it. How about an assault group of 16, a support element of 16 (with 2 mortars an 84mm and a GPMG) and a security element of 8 (with 2 GPMGs)? Why not? How about busting your guys up into groups of 10 to mount in IFVs (involves splitting a group of 4 - oh well) or 20 to ride in helos? Sure. Smart, adaptable NCOs will make it work.

The key for a Platoon isn't to figure out if 3 or 4 Sections of 8 or 12 men will do better in a "2 Up, 1 Back" or "1 Up, 2 Back" formation. It is about figuring out a "Playbook" - something like an American football team which has multiple plays for offensive and defensive lines (and if it keeps setting up on the line with the same play it gets hammered). I've been trying to do this with my Platoon - devise 4-6 "configurations" to dominate a certain sized area through aggresive patrolling while still maintaining a footprint (mostly around our vehicles) and allowing a certain level of rest in order to sustain operations. It is important to have a variety of configurations so the bad guy - who in this war seems to always have better SA - does not really get a grasp on what you're doing.

Anyhow, just some random thoughts.
Cheers,
Infanteer

[William F. Owen]

The Aussie 2012 Rifle Platoon seems to have the right idea because it appeared (at least to me) to be the most general in concept. A platoon is composed of 10 groups of 4 guys. There is a "weapons locker" - quite simple in its loadout - in weapons that they can access. The 4 man teams can be stacked to any degree and each one supplied with an addional weapon from the locker based upon the mission. The Platoon is not vehicle specific - managed readiness helps decide what platform a Platoon should focus developing skillsets on ahead of time.

Concur. It does tick most of the important boxes, and the ADF is close to being on the money with this one. I know the two guys who came up with it, and they briefed me a couple of years ago.
Strangely this was thanks to an intro by one lowly Lt Col, called Dave Kilcullen!.

[Infanteer]

Strangely this was thanks to an intro by one lowly Lt Col, called Dave Kilcullen!.

Never heard of him - should I know who that is?

[Rifleman]

The Aussie 2012 Rifle Platoon seems to have the right idea because it appeared (at least to me) to be the most general in concept. A platoon is composed of 10 groups of 4 guys.

We know organizing the platoon into fire teams instead of fixed squads will work - the Rhodesian Light Infantry did it that way. It's not a matter of if it will work, it's a matter of if it's he best way.

I don't know the answer but it's an interesting concept.

But if it's done that way do the fire teams need to be more robust? For example: we usually hear that four men is the ideal fire team but in order to have a good chance of having four present for duty should we ask for six?

We know that six men can operate under one leader and an assistant without any internal team subdivision. Recon teams commonly did just that in Vietnam and that was in heavy cover.

Is this worth considering? Or if you're going that route is it just as well to stick with traditional squads/sections?

[William F. Owen]

We know organizing the platoon into fire teams instead of fixed squads will work - the Rhodesian Light Infantry did it that way. It's not a matter of if it will work, it's a matter of if it's he best way.

I don't know the answer but it's an interesting concept.

Got any source material on the RLI Platoon Organisation? I think the C-47 was limited to dropping 16-men so 4 x 4-man teams?

We know that six men can operate under one leader and an assistant without any internal team subdivision. Recon teams commonly did just that in Vietnam and that was in heavy cover.

True, but you have to have pretty well trained NCOs to make it work well. I've always come down on the 3-5 man fireteams.

Is this worth considering? Or if you're going that route is it just as well to stick with traditional squads/sections?

Yes it is. Removing the Squad/Section level speeds everything up and makes everything a lot easier. This is the trick the Aussie 2012 structure misses. Fireteam groups can really only be about 24-30 men strong, but 4 x 30 man platoons is the same total as 3 x 40 man platoons. The 30 man platoons also need far fewer NCOs!

3 x 40 man 2012 platoons = 30 4-man fireteams
4 x 30 man FTGs = 24 5-man fireteams